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ABSTRACT
"HE

HAD NO RIGHT":

SEX, LAW,

AND THE COURTS IN VERMONT,

1777-1920

SEPTEMBER 2000

HAROLD A. GOLDMAN,
J.D.,

MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE

BOSTON COLLEGE LAW SCHOOL

M.A.,
PH.D.,

A.B.,

UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Kathy L. Peiss

This

is

a social and legal history of the role played by Vermont's courts in

regulating sexual activity during the nineteenth and early twentieth century.

It relies

on a

quantitative and qualitative review of civil and criminal cases brought and disposed of in

four of Vermont's county courts, as well as the decisions of Vermont's Supreme Court.

Unlike urban areas that developed alternative administrative centers of regulatory power,

Vermont's

county courts were

rural

its

most important

site

of sexual discourse

in the late

nineteenth and early twentieth century.

Civil suits

were brought by and on behalf of women and

girls for

sexual

defamation, sexual assault, breach of promise to marry, and bastardy, along with suits

brought by fathers resulting from their daughters' seduction. Such

rates

suits

had high success

harm
and awarded large monetary damages. Judges and juries focused more on the

caused by uncontrolled male sexuality than on female moral transgressions.

on notice

that they

would be punished

for violating sexual norms, including

sexual advances.

vi

Men were
unwanted

This study also examines

how

prosecutors, judges, and juries dealt with criminal

sexual offenses such as adultery and forcible and statutory rape. Supreme Court
decisions liberalizing the evidentiary requirements for a conviction coupled with concerns

about a surging divorce rate and flagging morality led to a dramatic increase

in adultery

prosecutions after the Civil War. The state imprisoned himdreds of men and

women

this offense.

In forcible rape cases, courts allowed evidence of prior sexual acts on the

part of the alleged victim to be used to impeach her credibility

made

consent, but they also

perspective.

for

clear that the question

on the question of

of consent depended on the woman's

A man's perception that the sexual advance was welcome carried little

weight. The state also raised the age of consent from eleven to fourteen (1886) and then

sbrteen (1 898), leading to a surge in statutory rape prosecutions.

cases, guilty verdicts

were obtained

judges and juries punished

men

in a large majority

of cases.

As with

And

as with

for failing to control their sexual impulses.

vii

forcible rape

civil cases,
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INTRODUCTION

I first

became

interested in the history

working as an attorney

Supreme Court

in

of sex, the law, and the courts while

Vermont. Flipping through the pages of a digest of Vermont

decisions one day,

I

stumbled upon a heading entitled "Seduction."

immediately struck by the seeming incongruity of a word
dry legal resource work. In

my mind,

novels of Samuel Richardson.

fascinated to learn that

As

I

the

like

was

"seduction" appearing in a

word conjured up images not of the

law, but the

read the summaries of the Court's decisions,

Vermont law had allowed

I

fathers to sue

men for

I

was

impregnating their

daughters out of wedlock and that some fathers had availed themselves of this legal

remedy. While researching the subject for a seminar paper

on

sex, law,

and the courts

in

I

realized that a broader

Vermont could be an important

work

contribution both to our

understanding of the history of law and sexuality and the history of Vermont.
Scholars have created a growing body of work documenting changes in sexual

attitudes, practices,

and regulation during the nineteenth century. In seeking

to explain

these changes they have noted such influences as urbanization, the development of a

middle

class, foreign immigration, rural influx, the

growing importance of industrial wage

changing role of women, and the

They have

labor.

developments had wide-ranging and sometimes disparate
regulation of sexuality.

The nineteenth and

also

documented

effects

on the

early twentieth century

saw

how these

definition

and

the deployment of

campaigns,
a repressive Victorian sexual morality, the development of social purity

restrictions

on

abortion, and the creation of interventionist state agencies. At the

same

exploration of alternative sexual
time, urbanization created space and opportunity for the

1

meanings and practices and allowed various

and transform one another's sexual

classes and races to mingle and to influence

values. This scholarship has contributed greatly to our

understanding of the history of sexuality during

However, gaps
sexuality has focused

this time.

our knowledge remain. For one thing, most of the work on

in

on the urban environment. Because the

city

dominant sexual values were challenged the most by phenomena
obscenity, and homosexuality,

most clamorous. But as

it

late as

was

was the

site

like prostitution,

the city where reactions to these challenges were

1920, half of all Americans continued to

live in rural

communities of less than 2500 people.' These people also struggled with the

and regulation of sexuality, but they continued
had always posed to
rape.

But

rural society

was

to focus

itself undergoing

were topics of great concern
changing sexual values

in

in the countryside.

America

exploration of these communities

illegitimacy, adultery,

of divorce,

illegitimacy,

and

and venereal

activity

is

of

and early twentieth century, an

necessary as well.

how society comprehended

have relied on a variety of sources and methodologies.

New

and regulated sexual

Many

scholars, influenced

studied the attitudes
Social History and feminist and Marxist approaches have

and contributions of those outside the

In 1920

If we are to understand the story

in the nineteenth

Historians seeking to understand

in

the challenges heterosexual sex

and the challenges these developments posed to family structure and gender roles

disease,

•

definition

change. Declining agricultural fortunes,

rural depopulation, social instability, increasing rates

by the

on

These challenges included

their society.

where

49 percent of Americans

communities of 10,000 or

Government Printing

less.

traditional centers

of power

in

American

life:

live,
communities ofless than 2500 people. Fifty-nine percent
(Washmgton,
Abstract of the 14'' Census of the United States, 1920

lived in

Office, 1923), Table 14.

2

immigrants, the poor, women, and sexual and ethnic minorities. Historians have
relied on
diaries, letters, oral histories,

and the

artifacts

of working

class cultural production to

understand the sexual values of ordinary people and the effects of sexual regulation on
them.^

By

contrast, other scholars, influenced by French thinkers like Michel Foucault,

have focused on the development and deployment of sexual discourse by

institutions like

the medical and scientific community and government bureaucracies.^

As
where

a result, scholars have shifted their gaze from traditional centers of authority

sexuality

was

defined and regulated, such as the legal system. Yet in America, and

especially in rural America, the courts and law continued to play a vital role in defining

and regulating

sexuality.

For example, Vermonters were aware of the

created by urbanization, immigration, and industrialization. Elite

also

knew of the growing promise of administrative remedies to

issues

and debates

members of the

society

the challenges these

developments presented. But the processes driving the definition and regulation of
sexuality in

more urban

areas

came much

later to

a largely rural state

like

Vermont.

Instead, during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Vermonters focused

^

Examples

include: Christine Stansell, City

of Women: Sex and Class

in

New

York.

on the

1789-1860 (New

York: Knopf, 1986); Robert C. Allen, Horrible Prettiness: Burlesque and American Culture (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Kathy Peiss, Cheap Amusements: Working Women and Leisure
in Turn-of-t he-Century New York (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986); George Chauncey, Gay

and the Making of the Gay Male World (New York: Basic Books,
Sex,
1994); Timothy J. Gilfoyle, City of Eros: New York City, Prostitution, and the Commercialization of
1790-1920 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992); Walter Kendrick, The Secret Museum: Pornography in

New

York: Gender,

Urban

Culture,

Modern Culture (New York: Viking,
^

1987).

Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality: Volume One:

Pantheon, 1978);

An

Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley

Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from

the Greeks to

(New York:

Freud (Cambridge:

(Berkeley:
Harvard University Press, 1990); Eve Kosofeky Sedgwick, The Epistemology of the Closet
Persuasion: Knowledge,
University of California Press, 1990); Elizabeth Lunbeck, The Psychiatric

Gender, and Power in Modern America {Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

3

problems created by a changing agricultural society and
their

law and courts as sources

for the regulation

in

doing so, continued to look to

of sexuality.

Furthermore, the legal model Foucault and other French thinkers had in mind

when

they downplayed the importance of juridical institutions in the creation and enforcement of
sexual values

was

significantly different than that

jurisprudence

was

centrally controlled, national in effect,

magistrates vmder a

which existed

Roman legal model. The Anglo-American legal system was

government was largely a

distant presence,

World War

I.

creating space for a diversity

juries determined the fate

factual questions.

making them an

Juridical

little

Law (1873),

power was exercised

in

of the accused and often had the power

A common law system meant that judges'

power and

at the state level, thus

of statutes and precedent. Unlike

alternative source

the federal

involved with the legal regulation of

of law-making

European

courts, local

to decide both legal

decisions

and

became law, thus

authority. Thus, particularly in rural

America, the courts were an important part of the story both

institutional

America. European

and carried out by examining

considerably different. With the exception of the Comstock

sexuality before

in

in

terms of their on-going

the extent to which large numbers of people participated in their

operations.

Recently, historians and legal scholars have begun to examine the legal system and

its

role in constructing

and regulating

sexuality.

Much of the work that

has examined law

reviewed the law
and sex has taken a national approach. For example, some scholars have
reported decisions
of rape or seduction as a national phenomenon, relying heavily on the

of the

states' highest courts

of appeal. In our Anglo-American

continental model, law-making

power

is

legal system, unlike the

shared between the legislature and the appeals

4

courts.

The

decisions of a state's highest court (usually

known as the supreme

court or

the court of appeals) have the force of law. For this reason, the written decisions of these

courts have been collected, organized, published and widely distributed.

As

a result,

it

is

quite practical to review the decisions of all the states from any well-equipped law library

in the country.

These national surveys of the law's treatment of sexual matters

are helpful in

exploring the broad contours of a sexual tort like seduction or a criminal matter like rape.

However, they
in the

are to a great extent ahistorical for the simple reason that no person living

way

nineteenth and early twentieth century ever experienced the law in the

works present
During

these

it.

this time,

law was an intensely local phenomenon.

Jurists in

Vermont and

elsewhere did have some access to the decisions of other state supreme courts through the

work of commentators and

their treatises.

legal obligation to follow the decisions

ignore them.

The

attitude

toward other

But then as now,

of other

had no

liking for citations

states' courts

of cases from other

states,

free to distinguish or

summed up by RusseU Tail,

who

legal historian,

supreme courts had no

and feh

precedents was

states'

one of Vermont's leading judges and an early

state

told lawyers that "he

but would rather they were

committed to the flames, for they are no authority here ... and are often found,
troops, fighting

on both

Swiss

sides."^

If the situation at the

Supreme Court

national precedents, things at the

courts, including Vermont's,

'

like

trial

level

was independent-minded,

court level were even

more

had a hard enough time getting

trial

Association,
"Memorial to Russell Taft," Proceedings of the Vermont Bar

5

insular.

vis-a-vis

In fact, supreme

judges to foUow their

vol.

6 (1902), 54.

own decisions,
powerful role

which were binding

authority.

Anglo-American system

in the

lawyer knows, there

is

Furthermore, local juries exercise a

in

both

and criminal cases. As any

civil

an enormous gap between the law

Nineteenth and early twentieth century

trial

practice

was a rough and tumble

opposing counsel doing whatever they could get away with

The extent

prevail.

to

certainly affected the

books and the law

in

trial

in action.^

affair

with

in order to see their clients

which judges allowed or disallowed these courtroom tactics

outcomes of cases-as did judges' own

Finally, a national

instructions to the jury.^

approach provides no useful information on

how many of a

given type of case was brought, what the success rate was or what kind of damages were

awarded or punishment

how
is,

law

really

inflicted.

Given

all this,

we

can see that

worked on real people, we must study

as an almost entirely local and state

local trial courts

where people

first

it

in the

'

it

may

explain

Roscoe Pound, "The

brought their claims and where

why such local

Law in Books and

the

studies,

Law

in

For an eye-opening account of tum-of-the-century
Cross-Examinaiion (New York: Macmillan, 1904).

*

way

it

acted

to understand

on them,

that

phenomenon. This means studying the records of

defendants were judged by their peers. Such an approach

inherent in

we want

if

is

no matter

and criminal

not easy and the

how vital,

Action," American

trial practice,

civil

have been so

Law Review 44

see Francis L.

difficulties

rare.^

(1910): 12-36.

Wellman, The Art of

Examples of local studies include Karen Dubinsky, Improper Advances: Rape and Heterosexual Conflict
Kathleen Ruth Parker, "Law,
in Ontario, 1880-1929 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993);
County Court, 1850-1950" (Ph.D.
Culture, and Sexual Censure: Sex Prosecutions in a Midwest Circuit
'

Policing
Michigan State University, 1993); Mary Odem, Delinquent Daughters: Protecting and
Hill: University of North Carolina
Adolescent Female Sexuality in the United States, 1885-1920 (Chapel
Canadian Rape Law, 1800-1892," in David
Press, 1995); Constance B. Backhouse, "Nineteenth-Century
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
H. Flaherty, ed., Essays in the History of Canadian Law, vol. 2
and Carnally Know: Rape in Eighteenth-Century
1983), 200-247; Barbara S. Lindemann, "To Ravish
diss.,

Massachusetts," Signs 10 (1984): 63-82.

6

Vermont's Legal System

Vermont's

courts, like those

bottom of the court system were the
justices

of other

local justice courts, presided over

of the peace. These courts heard minor

debt cases,

civil

of multiple

states, consisted

civil

levels.

by

At the

locally elected

and criminal matters such as smaU

and criminal assault and battery cases, and other petty matters. They also

had authority to bind over criminal defendants

in

Appeals from these courts could be taken to the
justice courts have survived sporadically

more
local

and not

serious cases pending

trial.

county court. The records of the

in sufficient

numbers to permit a

systematic survey of these courts' operations.^

The second

level

of justice

in

Vermont were

the county courts. These were courts

of general jurisdiction and with various exceptions over time, heard
cases. Until 1825, they

were presided over by judges elected by the

all

criminal and civil

state legislature

and

aided by locally elected assistant judges. After 1825 the Supreme Court judges, also
elected by the legislature, presided over the county courts

on

half of the judges elected by the legislature were chosen from

The

highest court in

Vermont was

the

circuit as well.

among

Supreme Court.

its

own members.

Until 1825, the

Court had overlapping jurisdiction with the county courts. Theoretically
plaintiff in

more

a

in the

civil

case had the right to

two jury

trials in

trials

when

sitting

en banc

Supreme

at least,

the county court and then

Supreme Court. After 1825, the court became a

longer oversaw jury

More than

a

two

true appeals court and

in its capacity as

no

a court of review.^

The Vermont Justice: Being a Treatise on the
For the operation of the justice courts, see Milo L. Bennett,
Peace (Burlington, 1 864) and Henry A. Harman, The
Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction of Justices of the
«

Vermont Justice and Public Officer (Rutland: Tuttle, 1905).
from the founding period to 1920, see Samuel B^
For the structure and operation of the court system
1825," Vermont History 46 (Fall 1978): 205-220; P.
Hand, "Lay Judges and the Vermont Judiciary to

'

This study examines both

civil

and criminal cases.

Civil suits involved legal

disputes between private parties-seduction or breach of marriage promise for example. In

order to

initiate

a

civil suit,

the plaintiff would cause a declaration

(i.e.

a complaint) along

with a summons to be served on the defendant. The declaration contained various
allegations against the defendant and typically listed the

plaintiff (knovm as the

ad damnum). Oftentimes

required by rule of court to

file

defendant's costs and expenses

a

the plaintiff or his lawyer

bond of thirty or

in

case the

fifty dollars

plaintiff"

lawyer would respond to the allegations contained

known

as a demurrer). Discovery

payment of the

The defendant or

in the declaration

if true

would be

to guarantee

did not prevail.

denying them, asserting a defense or arguing that even
or form (this was

amount of damages sought by the

by admitting them,

they were insufficient in law

would then commence, including

taking of various depositions of the parties and witnesses. If the parties did not

case would be scheduled for

as a bench

trial in fi-ont

respond to the complaint or participate

amoimt sought

of a jury or with the judge alone

(this

depending on the desire of the defendant. If the defendant

trial)

in the declaration

plaintiff failed to

show up or

file

in the proceedings,

would be awarded

his

to the

the

settle, the

was known

failed to

a default judgment in the

plaintiff".

Similarly, if the

a required bond, he would be "non-suited" and the

Occasional Paper
and Samuel B. Hand, "Litigious Vermonters: Court Records to 1825,"
Judicial History of
No 2 (Burlington: Center for Research on Vermont, 1979); Russell S. Taft, "The
Constitutional, Judicial, Professional
Vermont " in William T. Davis, ed.. The New England States, Their
"The Vermont Bench and Bar," m
and Industrial History, vol. 3 (Boston, 1897), 1409-31; Frank L. Fish,
Walter Hill Crockett (New York: Century History, 1923):
vol. 5 of Vermont the Green Mountain State, ed.
Jeffrey Potash

6-28.
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defendant awarded his costs. Non-suits were often entered

in cases

where the parties had

settled the case.'°

Criminal procedure was somewhat different since the state
the charges.

attorney

The man responsible

who was

for prosecuting criminal defendants

was the

state's

elected annually in each of Vermont's fourteen counties. State's

men at

attorneys were often young

and judges complained about
state's attorney

was the party bringing

the beginning of their legal careers and

their lack

of experience. In difficuh criminal cases, the

might be assisted by a local lawyer brought

the state. Criminal defendants in serious cases

one appointed by the

The lawyer's

court.

some lawyers

who

in for the

purpose and paid by

could not afford a lawyer would have

fees and other expenses of the defense

were

paid from the state treasury."

Originally a criminal prosecution for serious crimes could only be brought

indictment handed

down by

upon an

a local grand jury. After 1839 however, state's attorneys

could bring prosecutions by information (a sworn statement alleging the crime) for
crimes where the

maximum prison sentence was

cases, the prosecution

had to be

still

initiated

prosecute by information was extended to

was twenty years or

less.

all

seven years or

less.

In

more

life in

serious

by indictment. In 1898 authority to
cases in which the

maximum prison

In 1904, the Legislature permitted prosecutions for

not punishable by death or

all

all

sentence

crimes

prison to be brought by information and created the

Nineteenth-century legal practice was notoriously complicated and relied heavily on pleading causes in
much later than
proper form. Vermont did not give up this old feshioned form pleading until 1915,
procedure, see James Gould,
almost any other state. 1915 Vt. Acts 90. For a review of civil pleading and
Vermont
A Treatise on the Principles of Pleading in Civil Actions (Burlington, 1849) and Bennett, The
Justice.

" Proceedings

of the Vermont Bar Association,

vol. 7, no.

1900 (Burlington, 1894).

9

1

(1904), 74-79; Vermont Statutes. 1894, §

position of Attorney General. His office

criminal legal business.

1

The

ability to bring

898 greatly expanded the power of the

people

who had

was tasked with overseeing

the state's civil and

most criminal charges by information

state's

after

attomeys while reducing that of local

controUed prosecutions for most serious crimes through the requirement

of indictment by grand jury proceedings.*^

The records produced by
First, there are

civil

and criminal cases take several

different forms.

the pleadings themselves, the actual complaints, answers, motions,

indictments, informations, and other papers filed by the parties. During the period under

study these documents were collected

at the termination

of a case by the clerk of court,

folded into small bundles, tied tightly with a string, placed in

wooden

crates with the other

pleadings from that term or year and then nailed shut. Over time, these pleadings have

been scattered to the winds. Many have been destroyed, some have ended up
hands, or in public and private archives.

Some

in private

others were sent to the state's public

records office where they were poorly microfilmed and then thrown, completely out of

order back into boxes. In a few cases, the pleadings remain on

courthouses.

The inconsistency of preservation and

site at

the county

the practical difficulties of unboxing,

untying, unwrapping, surveying and then re-packaging tens of thousands of the pleadings

made them an

impractical source for a comprehensive survey of the courts' activities. In a

few cases where

suits

and could be located,

of interest had been found by other means and the pleadings

I

exist

have used them to supplement our knowledge of a particular case.

1
Vt. Acts 64. Some
Revised Statutes. 1839 (Burlington, 1 840) Chapter 1 02 § 1 ; 1 898 Vt. Acts 46; 904
of Charles Hogan," Proceedings of
lawyers called for the abolition of the grand jury altogether. "Address

the Vermont

Bar Association,

vol. 5, no.

1

(1898), 85-99.
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1

riic

1

second type

record produced by Ihe courts were Uie clerk

ol"

conlain briel entries niade by the elerk ol

liese

(lie

action taken

on

a case at

Typically each county court kept a separate docket lx>ok lor each

court.

U>oks.

s tlockel

each

lerni ol

of the two terms

ofcourt held per year. While the docket Ixmks ol the Supreme and County Courts are
mostly

intact,

they

iirc

inconsistent from county io county in identifying the civil or

criminal cause ol action

in

each case.

The thoroughness and consistency ol entries varies

widely Irom county to county. In sonic counties the causes are identified with great
consistency over a period ol

time.

filly

or seventy years,

Docket entries are especially useful

matters, since they

list

in uiulei

in others, for

much

shorter periods of

standing the courts' handling of criminal

every criminal case brought, including those

in

which the

prosecutor ehose not to go forward allcr an information or indictment had been

know,

This allows us to

prosecuted.

This

is

for

example,

how many

filed.

rape cases were brought but never

valuable information allxMt incomplete.

I

have processed

all

of the

docket entries and where appropriate make reference to them.

Hie
lH>oks.

I

final

hcse are large leather-l>ound volumes of from 600 to 1200 pages each.

Handwritten

in

each case,

verdict,

source of information about the courts' activities are the clerks^ record

until the late

tlie

nineteenth century, they contain et)pies of the original complaint

dcfendaiU

s

answer or defense, the mode of trial

one was

held, the

and punishment or damages handed down. Ueciiuse they arc records of hnal

actions taken in cases, they do omit

cases, they

Ix'fore

if

some important

information.

Particularly in criminal

do not record those cases which were dismissed by prosecutors or the courts

going to

trial

criminal or
or plea. I'urthermore, they do not always identify the

:s of action with enough specificity to classify
causes

1

it.

Although they are not

entirely

civil

complete, these volumes are the single best resource for analyzing the
courts and this study relies heavily on them.'^ (See Figure

activities

of the

1 .)

Unfortunately, unlike the opinions of the state supreme courts,

trial

records are not

organized by subject matter. Instead, the entries appear chronologically beginning

in the

eighteenth century with volume one and proceeding, volume by volume to the end of the

study period for each county.

As a

resuU, the only

way to

locate cases

begin at page one, volume one, and read through every single

brought

in

civil

of interest

to

is

and criminal case

each county over the entire time period of the study.

The Four Counties
I

chose to look

at the

records of four of Vermont's fourteen counties: Addison,

Orange, Rutland, and Windsor.
accessible records and

would provide

I

sought a combination of those which had intact and

which represented a cross-section of the Vermont experience and

sufficient data for analysis.

Together they make up the middle

third

The four counties chosen

of the

state

and wealthy regions and some of its most intensely

are contiguous.

and represent both

its

most populous

rural areas. (See Figure 2.)

Windsor was the most populous of Vermont's counties during the

first

half of the

nineteenth century. Vermont's early industrial development (particularly mills, machine

tools and railroad yards)

was concentrated

in the

towns of Windsor,

Springfield,

and

Orange and Windsor Counties from the late
books become reliable in 1827 and Rutland
eighteenth century to 1920. The Addison County record
at the courthouse, are reliable from 838
County's records, supplemented with judgment files located
•3

The record books

identify every cause of action in

1

onward.
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White River Junction. The county

seat at

Woodstock was

a center for law, for banking,

and for medical education. The county's population began

1

to decline after

870 Windsor had been surpassd by Chittenden and Rutland counties

1850 and by

in the

west-mostly

as a result of the growth of the cities of Burlington and Rutland respectively.

By 1920

there were fewer people living in Windsor County than there had been one hundred years

(See Table

before.'''

1.)

Rutland County experienced rapid growth
century. But ahnost

all

that

its

villages

and small

The

tovsTis also lost

Addison and Orange Counties had
rural, they

had seen a

city

boom and

city

became a center

However, outside the

transportation, and marble extraction.

and

nineteenth and early twentieth

growth was centered around the

half the population of the county lived.

rural

in the late

of Rutland, where about
for banking,

city,

the county

was mostly

population during the course of this study.

their best

days behind them by

then bust in sheep raising. Those

1

850. Intensely

who had

gotten to the

counties early and established themselves could expect a reasonably comfortable

An

early but copious history of the county

and

its

principle towns

is

life

on

Lewis Cass Aldrich and Frank R.

More recent treatments of the
Becomes a Necessity of Life:
county's early history are contained in William J. Gihnour, Reading
University of Tennessee Press,
Material and Cultural Life in Rural New England 1 780-1835 (Knoxville:
Reform, and the Social Order in the
1989); Randolph Roth, ne Democratic Dilemma: Religion,
Hohnes,

eds..

History of Windsor County Vermont (Syracuse, 1891).

University Press, 1987); and T.
Connecticut River Valley of Vermont, 1791-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge
1840-1880 (Montpelier, Vermont Histoncal
D. Seymour Bassett, The Growing Edge: Vemont's Villages,
Society, 1992), 49-85.

A general

history of the county,

its

principal towns,

History of Rutland County (Syracuse, 1 886).
comparing the population figures for Rutland

and industries

is

H. P. Smith and

W.

S.

Rann,

eds..

The urban nature of the population growth can be seen by

m

1900
the county as a whole. For example,
people or 27 percent lived in the town of
Rutland County's population was 44,209 of which 12,149
and
which 21,155 people or 45 percent lived
Rutland hi 1920, the county's population was 46,213 of
growth which occurred in and around the city,
around the City of Rutland. If one removes the population
population during this period.
the county, like the others studied, actually lost

Town and

m
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Table

1

Population of Addison, Orange, Rutland, and Windsor Counties, 1791-1920

COUNTY

1791

1800

1810

1820

1830

1840

1850

Addison

6,420

13,417

19,993

20,469

24,940

23,583

26,549

Orange

7,663

18,238

25,247

24,681

27,285

27,873

27,296

Rutland

15,590

23,813

29,486

29,975

31,294

30,699

33,059

Windsor

15,740

26,944

34,877

38,233

40,625

40,356

38,320

TOTAL

45,413

106,225

109,603

113,358

124,144

122,511

125,244

COUNTY

1860

1870

1880

1890

1900

1910

1920

Addison

24,010

23,484

24,173

22,277

21,912

20,010

18,666

Orange

25,455

23,090

23,525

19,575

19,313

18,703

17,279

Rutland

35,946

40,651

41,829

45,397

44,209

48,139

46,213

Windsor

37,193

36,063

35,196

31,706

32,225

33,681

36,984

TOTAL

122,604

122,288

124,723

118,955

117,659

120,533

119,142

Source: William Doyle, The Vermont Political Tradition

and Those Who Helped Make

It

(Montpelier: William Doyle, 1994).

the farm or in the small

towns and villages

that

dominated the landscape. Large numbers

land or opportunities and
of young people however could not find access to

west.

all

Addison and Orange Counties,

like

left for

the

Windsor, and the area outside of Rutland

Town

second half of the nineteenth
experienced major declines in population during the

throughout
century. This pattern was one repeated

all

of Vermont during

this period,

16

Child, Gazetteer of Orange County, VT..
comprehensive history of Orange County is Hamilton
Smith,
^'^'^Z^^^'^;"
for Addison County see H P.
^
I7T2-I888, Part 1 (Syracuse, 1888) and
the towns of Chelsea (Orange County)
on
historians
modem
by
Counn' Vermont (Syracuse, 1 886). Work
provide valuable msightmto developments in
STSdXbv^, Shoreham and Cornwall, (Addison County)
Stayed Behind: Rural Soaety in mneteenth-Century
copies Tmselves. hLi S. Barron, Those Who

An

early

'

.

S^e

~W(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
District

1984); P.

1761-1850
^.f^y]^^^^^^^
Religious Activity.
Patterns of Community Development and

16

'^1

(Brooklyn. Carlson

Sources and Methodology

Taken

all

several hundred

together,

I

more volumes of clerk's docket books

mostly handwritten records.

volumes.

I

processed some 160 volumes of clerks' record books and

I

exammed

totaling

some 200,000 pages of

every civil and criminal case appearing in these

recorded any case involving violent crime (including assaults, attempted rape,

rape, statutory rape, attempted murder, and murder), any case for the violation of sexual

prohibitions (incest, bigamy, adultery, lewdness), any civil case involving defamation,
violence, or sexual infractions (seduction, bastardy, breach of marriage promise,
alienation of affections, civil ravishment), and every divorce (including the causes alleged

and the grounds for granting them). Information about these cases was entered

into a

database.

I

supplement the data contained

in the record

information contained in several dozen complete

enough
were

to discover in various courthouse vaults

still

trial transcripts

which

I

was

fortunate

and basements. Some of these

transcripts

sealed in their original packages and had never been opened. These sources are

particularly important in

statute

books and pleadings with

showing

how the power of judge,

lawyer, jury, precedent, and

tugged and pulled on one another as Vermonters sought to use

define codes of sexual conduct, enforce those codes, and punish

their courts to

men and women who

transgressed them.'^

Publishing, 1991). Roth's Democratic
as well as

Dilemma

also explores nineteenth-century society in

Orange County

Windsor.

transcripts of criminal trials we have were
Because of the prohibition against double jeopardy, the only
State v. Damon, 2 Tyl. 387 ( 1 803).
created by defendants appealing their convictions.
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Though
fit

the

trial

courts exercised a

good

deal of independence, they nevertheless

into a legal system shaped and defined at the state level.

were, to some extent, constrained by the
the

Vermont Supreme Court and by

common law as

statutes passed

of their operation would not be complete without

The

actions of the

interpreted and

by the

legislature.

trial

courts

handed down by

An understanding

also understanding the broader legal

universe in which they existed. Furthermore, an examination of these state-wide legal

sources serves as a check to make sure the four county data are not anomalous, but
instead reflect a reality experienced across the state.

The

decisions of the

provided guidance on many

Supreme Court were binding on the
issues.

As we

trial

court judges and

shall see, the court's thinking

on many of these

matters evolved as the century progressed. This evolution in turn affected the operations

of the

trial

courts. In

actions of the

trial

Vermont

courts.

the appeals court had a particularly direct hand in the

Vermont had no intermediate

fi-om the county court. Furthermore,

Supreme Court judges presided over

its

courts as well during most of the period of this study.

county court during

its

appellate court to hear appeals

Each judge would

the

trial

preside at the

term, and then return to the county v^th his brother judges to hear

appeals fi-om cases at the sitting of the Supreme Court on circuit. Judges did not however

hear appeals fi-om cases on which they had served as the

understand sex and law

at the trial level,

we need

trial

judge. Thus, in seeking to

to understand the precedential context in

after 1905.
The county courts had their own cadre of judges prior to 1825, between 1850 and 1857, and
Acts 19; 1849 Vt. Acts 40, repealed 1856
Taft, "The Judicial History of Vermont," 1409-1431; 1824 Vt.
Supreme Court judges were prohibited from
Vt. Acts 7; 1906 Vt. Acts 63. Subject to rare exception.

sitting

on appeals from their own

trials after

1

850.
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which

it

took place.

I

therefore

discussion of activities at the

weave the decisions of the Supreme Court

my

trial level.

The courts were bound by
legislature

into

civil

and criminal

statutes passed

had authority to control the operation of the courts

administration. Because of this,

my research also

in

by the

legislature.

The

terms of jurisdiction and

included a systematic review of all laws

passed by Vermont's legislature from 1779 through

its

1921 biannual term. All statutes

touching on the operation of the courts, the rights of women, marriage and divorce, and
sexual matters were also entered into the database. These sources too must be considered

in trying to

it

imderstand the universe of sex and law as Vermonters would have experienced

during the period under study.
In addition to the decisions of the state Supreme Court and the statutes passed by

the legislature, other sources supplement the four county data. Incarceration rates for

adultery and rape and rates of illegitimacy and divorce demonstrate the state- wide nature

of many of the trends discovered

at the

county

level.

I

have also surveyed the

law produced by local lawyers and judges as well as those most commonly

Vermont's jurists

in their pleadings

Bar Association, founded
informal commentaries

understanding

how the

in

and opinions.

thought about their role

in

relied

proceedings of the Vermont

practice and are an important resource for

system operated and

it.

19

how the

on

on by

1878, and published annually, contain valuable formal and

on Vermont law and
legal

Finally, the

treatises

state's judges

and lawyers

Historical Context

The events examined

Vermont progressed from an
and beyond. While

in this

study took place in a broader historical context, as

unsettled wilderness to independent republic, to statehood

this is intended to

be a close study of the courts and sexuality,

it is

necessary to set that study into the broader context of Vermont history.

Vermont was

settled last

French and British and
not begin

of all the

New England

their respective Indian allies

in earnest until after

states.

meant

that

state.

Initially part

universal

manhood

always

in reality) the

suffrage and the

union as the fourteenth

European settlement could

of the Province of New York,

Verraonters declared their independence from the crovm and

spirit (if not

between the

1759. After that, settlers from western Connecticut and

Massachusetts poured into the

democratic in

Conflict

first

new

New York in

republic

to abolish slavery.

was

the

first

to grant

By 1791 Vermont joined

the

state.''

Early settlement took place rapidly and by 1800 the population had

150,000. While

1777. Deeply

initial settlers

grown to over

did well, most of the decent land and best opportunities had

been taken by the early nineteenth century. The opening of the Champlain and Erie Canals
in the

1820s

facilitated the

particularly in

New York.

back toward the

east,

movement of Vermont goods
But

it

to ports

and urban markets,

also allowed far cheaper agricultural produce to flood

making Vermont's small

hill

farms

less

and

less competitive.

ed., A More Perfect
of the founding period are discussed in detail in Michael Sherman,
Vermont Historical Society, 1991); H.
Union- Vermont Becomes a State, 1777-1816 (Montpelier:
Nature: Readings in Vermont History
Nicholas Muller III and Samuel B. Hand, eds.. In A State of
Doyle, The Vermont Political Tradition and
(Montpelier, Vermont Historical Society, 1985); William
Robert E. Shalhope, Bennington and the
Those Who Helped Make It (Montpelier, William Doyle, 1992);
in Vermont, 1760-1850 (Baltmiore, Johns
Green Mountain Boys: The Emergence of Liberal Democracy

The

politics

Hopkins University

Press, 1996).
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The

agricultural difficulties

posed by Vermont's

increasing competition offered by the

instinct for reform.

were

Though many

and constant and

West manifested themselves

related trends which characterized the

early twentieth century. These

terrain

in three

Vermont experience throughout the nineteenth and

rural depopulation, a sense

of decline, and a strong

areas of the country experienced similar challenges,

they were feh especially keenly in Vermont. There are several reasons for

thing,

Vermont was

Northeast,

it

was

so overwhelmingly rural and agricultural.

the only

broad and

The most

this.

For one

rural state in the

New England state with no port on the Atlantic and no

corresponding urban center or urban

elite.

Though

it

did have a small industrial and

mining base, these operations were small compared to the agricultural sector. This meant
that the shifting agricultural tides affected almost

lived in the state

and

all

Vermonters no matter where they

at all institutional levels.^"

Vermonters did not take the challenges posed to

down. After
less

and

less

was more

disease,

bad weather, and mid- western competition made grain production

economically viable, Vermont farmers switched to sheep farming. The land

suited to the production

of grazing animals, and

provided a growing demand for wool.

sheep

their agricultural livelihoods lying

boom between 1 820 and

1

840.

or almost six sheep for every man,

As

mills in southern

New England

a result the state experienced an incredible

By 1 840

woman, and

there

child.

were 1,681 ,000 sheep

Though many people

since
heep trade actuaUy increased the trend of out-migration

it

was

in

Vermont,

prospered, the

far less labor

factory or

and women aged sixteen or over were
For example, in 1850, only three percent of men
s industrial
Valley which was the main site of Vermont
railroad workers in the Comiecticut River
As late as 1920, 70 percent
development. Roth, Democratic Dilemma, 270.
^'J^^^^^
population
37 percent of the
Hampshire, only f^^^";^^
Lmmiities ofless than 2500 people. In neighboring New
14" Census of the United States, 1920, Table 15.
did. Abstract of the
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intensive than crop agriculture. Prices

western competition and

began to decline

after

1840-the result of increased

Except for a brief spike during the

tariff uncertainties.

sheep farming declined dramatically by the end of the century when

it

Civil

War,

was replaced by

dairy farming.^'

The

intensity

of these trends

in

Vermont was

also

due to the sheer rapidity with

which they were experienced. When Vermont was created
England

state already

new.

entirely

Its

had 150 years of history behind

founders were not exaggerating

of independence from both New York and
or government, and

may be

society

boomed and then seemed

Vermont,

when they

Britain, that they

truly said to be in a state

Vermonters were creating something

it.

in 1777,

entirely

to decline

in contrast

New

was

asserted in their declaration

were "at present without law

of nature." The sense that

from scratch and the

weighed

every other

rapidity with

particularly heavily

which

that

and spurred them

to seek answers in reform.

Initially

revitalization

the response to Vermont's problems took the form of spiritual

and moral and

the antebellum period,

existing reform

political reform.

Although these responses were widespread

Vermont was exceptional

movements. The

in the intensity

state experienced the

enormous enthusiasm. Historian Randolph Roth claims

with which

it

in

adopted

Second Great Awakening with
that in the first half of the

in the
nineteenth century, Vermonters had the highest rates of church attendance

Protestant world, with

^'

some

Vermont's agricultural history

eighty percent of the population regularly attending services.

is

detailed in

Edwin C. Rozwenc, Agricultural

Policies in Vermont,

Harold Fisher Wilson, The Hill Country of
1860-1945 (Montpelier, Vermont Historical Society, 1981) and
Twentieth Centuries (Montpeher,
New England: Its Social and Economic History in the Nineteenth and

Vermont

Historical Society, 1947).

22

They belonged

to a myriad

of denominations. The

antislavery with gusto. Statewide prohibition

state also

was passed

in

embraced temperance and
1852 and the

state

remained

dry until 1904 after Vermonters approved a local option law.^^

Beyond

Vermont

their support for these

well-known

also notable for the extent to

which

and spavmed numerous others. William

Miller,

1

is

it

religious

and moral movements,

supported preexisting fringe movements

who

predicted the end of the world in

843 and then went on to found the Adventist Church, was raised

Smith and Brigham Young were both

bom in the

state.

up

his first

community

in Putney.

radical procreative arrsingements as a

Vermonters also looked to

was

It is

interesting that both

bom in Brattleboro

and

Smith and Noyes promoted

key component of their alternative communities.^^

politics as

an engine of reform from early on. Vermont

the only state to vote for anti-Masonic presidential candidate William Wirt in 1832

and elected an anti-Masonic governor to
state

law

Joseph

John Humphrey Noyes, the

founder and leader of the experimental Oneida Community, was

set

in Putney.

went dry

in 1902.

Michigan

in

in

1

852 and remained so

between 1831 and 1835. The

for fifty-two years, before adopting a local option

The Republican Party was founded

nearly simultaneously in

Vermont and

1854. Vermonters remained so loyal to the party that between 1854 and

1962, no Democrat

was ever

elected to state- wide office. Support for the cause of union

and anti-slavery was so strong

^ 1902

office four times

Vt. Acts 90.

in the state that

more than

ten percent of the state's total

Robert Ludlum's Social Ferment in Vermont, 1791-1850

(New York:

AMS Press,

More recent works include Potash,
1939, 1966) remains an influential introduction to the topic.
Shalhope, Bennington and the Green
Vermont 's Burned Over District; Roth, Democratic Dilemma; and
his opening remarks at the
Mountain Boys. Roth's figures for church attendance were provided in
Montpelier, Vermont, September 1999.
biennial symposium of the Vermont Historical Society,

^ Ludlum, 238-275.
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population served in the Civil War. Vermont was second only to Michigan in
per capita

numbers killed-an astonishing

The period

of the

1870 was a difficuh one

after

historian Harold Fisher

1.6 percent

state's total

1860

population.^''

for Vermonters. Pioneering social

Wilson famously proclaimed the years 1870

"winter" of the Vermont experience.

More

to

1900 as the

recent analysis has challenged that paradigm,

arguing that some parts of the state were more correctly characterized by a period of
stabilization rather than decline. Regardless of the reality,

perception of decline was very
their buildings fell into ruin

real.

Population

fell,

most

whole

hill

historians agree that the

tovms were abandoned,

and were consumed by encroaching

forest.

Wool

prices

declined and Vermonters were forced, again, to remake their economy, turning to dairy

farming and the production of bulk milk, butter, and cheese-products better able to

compete with midwestem production.^^

The sense of decline experienced by Vermonters focused not only on

the

economic, but also on the very Yankee society they had created. There was a sense

that

the rural, close-knit communities that had not yet actually disappeared were descending

into corruption

and immorality. Declines

venereal disease,

tramping, and the

men wandering from place to

place looking for

movement of French Canadians

farms led Vermonters to

Doyle, 128-202;

in the birthrate, sky-rocketing divorce rates,

Howard

fret

into the

work

or simply

towns and onto marginal

hill

about social and cultural degeneration.^^

Coffin, Full Duty: Vermonters in the Civil

War (Woodstock,

Vt.:

Countryman

Press, 1993), 356.

" Wilson, 97-210;

Barron, 26-30; Rozwenc, 1-4.

Project in the Green Mountain State
Gallagher, Breeding Better Vermonters: The Eugenics
Gallagher's work includes a comprehensive
(Hanover- University Press of New England, 1999).
nineteenth and early twentieth century Vermont s
discussion of most of these themes. During the late

" Nancy L
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The

society also

felt

under pressure because of perceived changes

women. Young Vermont women had been

New England

since the

century as farms

1

for the factories

of southern

manufacturing increased, and as demand for female

One commentator

young woman would want

to remain

writing

on

this trend in

1

859 asked why any

on the farm when they remembered

"their

worn out

mothers."^^ Vermonters' extraordinarily high rate of male participation in the Civil

meant

that

women had

to take

on

responsibilities previously reserved for

Of the 34,000 men who

in agriculture.

of

820s. But the trend accelerated throughout the nineteenth

failed, as local

industrial labor grew.^''

home

leaving

in the role

left

men,

War

particularly

the state to fight in the war, half never

permanently returned to the state-a loss of five percent of the

state's entire population.^'

Responding

women

rights to

to a changing social

own property

in their

and economic order, married

own name

and control

their

gained increased

own wages. Vermonters

worried about the implications of all of these changes.

Vermont's lawmakers (both

its

legislators

creating these changes and responding to them.

and

The

the legal status of women fi-om the very beginning.

its

judges) were deeply involved

legislature

had concerned

in

itself with

My own survey of every statute

and the House of Correction were filled with hundreds of people who had been arrested for tramping.
years later the figure
In 1883-1884 there were fifty people in the House of Corrections for tramping. Ten
was 120. By 1906 it was 210. See the "Reports of the Officers of the State Prison" and "Reports of the
Vermont
Officers of the House of Correction" in Vermont Legislative Documents and Official Reports and

jails

State Officers Reports published biannually by the Secretary of State's office.
'

" See Deborah

Vermonters: Perspectives on the Past, ed.
219-224;
Michael Sherman and Jennie G. Versteeg (Montpelier: Vermont Historical Society, 1992),
P. Clifibrd,

"Vermont

We

'Mill Girls,'" in

Wilson, 139-152.

J.

G. Holland,

Farm

Life in

New England (Boston,

1

858), quoted in Wilson, 72 and n. 70.

" Wilson, 72-74.
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passed between 1779 and 1921 reveals that Vermont's
public and private statutes dealing with

law of marriage and divorce during

legislature enacted at least

women, women's

this period.

rights,

But the pace

women's

issues,

175

and the

greatly accelerated during

mid-century, with 136 (78 percent) of those statutes passed between 1850 and 1921 and
101 (58 percent) passed between 1870 and 1921/°

At the same

Vermont's divorce

time,

rate

doubled between 1860 and 1900 and by 1920

it

began to skyrocket. The

was

five times the rate

it

rate

more than

had been

sixty

years before.^' In addition, the rate of illegitimate births reported to the State Board of

Health quadrupled between 1860 and 1920

at

a time

when the

population was both

stagnating and aging^^ (see figures 3 and 4).

By

1

869, formal agitation for female political rights began. In

declining rural populations, the General Assembly gave

ofiSce in local elections.

1

880, responding to

women the right

to vote and hold

But these changes-employment of women outside the home,

early as 1779, the legislature passed a statute prohibiting the sale of an heiress's lands without her
consent whether the property was acquired before marriage or while under coverture. The earliest statute

^°

As

granting expanded legal rights to married

feme

sole status to

Allen Soule,

ed..

women came

women whose husbands were

Laws of Vermont,

vol. 12

in

1

846,

when

the General Assembly granted

imprisoned. 1846 Vt. Acts 31. For the 1779 act see

o{ State Papers of Vermont (Montpelier: Secretary of State,

1964), 146.

1870 (50); 1880 (39); 1890 (46); 1900 (68); 1910 (104);
222-225.
1920 (153). Twenty-Third Report of the State Board of Health (Montpelier, Tuttle, 1921),

"

The

figures per 100,000 are as follows: 1860 (30);

dramatically from 1.45:1 in the 1870s to 1.21:1 in the 1880s and 1.26:1
decades of the twentieth century (to 1.3:1
in the 1890s and then recovered slightly in the first and second
1857-1921," in Registration Report of the State Board of
in both decades). "State Registration Tables:
inhabitants were fifty years of age
Health (Montpelier, 1922), 222-225. By 1900 21 percent of Vermont's
whole. Wilson, 141-142. This trend continued to
or older as compared to 13 percent for the nation as a
on Government in Vermont,"
1920. Paul Dunham, "Population Trends and their Implications
^2

The

ratio

of births to deaths

fell

Center, University of Vermont, 1963), 6.
(unpublished manuscript prepared for the Government Research
Vermont. Thousand of young men and
Copy at Special Collections, University of Vermont, Burlington,
people bom in the state,
women migrated out of the state from 1840 onward. In 1861 out of 480,00
Vermont in the Civil War, A History, vol. 2
168,781 resided outside its borders. G. G. Benedict,
(Burlington, 1888), 791.
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Married Women's Property Acts, and local voting and

by a desire to increase female autonomy, but by other

office

social

holding-were motivated not

and economic imperatives.

And

in fact, efforts to increase

own

sake were met with tremendous resistance and ridicule-even from

women's economic,

legal,

and

political

Out-of-state suffiagists noted the particularly hostile environment in

questions of political rights for

The challenges posed

for their

official quarters.

Vermont on

women for example."

to

Vermont

various responses at the local and state

of an

autonomy

effiisive rhetoric celebrating

society by

level.

all

these developments were met with

One was the development and deployment

Yankee values

that continues to this day.

of Vermonters was complete without a summation of aU

that

No

made Vermont

gatherii^

a bastion of

small-town republican values-whether a meeting of the state's physicians, lawyers, or

most famously, the old home week celebrations which began

in the

1890s

in

response to

the declining fortunes of Vermont's villages and towns. In deploying this rhetoric,

" In 1869

proposed an amendment to the Vermont constitution which would permit women to
elections. The amendment was rejected at a constitutional convention by a vote of 23 1 to 1,

suffragists

vote in state

women to serve in
but not before the state's Council of Censors had considered an amendment to allow
of ridicule upon the
the state militia, a move that it admitted was "for the purpose of trying the effect
Council of
claim of woman suffrage." Paul S. Gillies and D. Gregory Sanford, eds., Records of the
to win
Censors of the State of Vermont (Montpelier: Secretary of State, 1991), 680. Later attempts
For
often met with behind the scenes political chicanery and parliamentary derision.
suffrage

were

1900 a petition was presented by the Woman Suffrage Association to the Senate to exempt
women from taxation (on the basis that they were being taxed without representation). The presiding
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B.
officer of the Senate referred it to the Committee on the Insane.
(Rochester, 1886), 383-389. Three
Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage, History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 3
on women's rights. The first
acts were passed by the General Assembly in 1880 impacting
example,

in

contiguous

two gave women the right to vote

women

conducting businesses

businesses.

in local elections

in their

own names

and

to hold local offices.

to sue

1880 Vt. Acts 103, 104, 105.
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and be sued

The

third allowed married

in all matters connected with those

Vermonters were building on a long

tradition

of self-congratulation and sense of

exceptionalism extending back to the founding

There was also a new response,
institutions created

by the

legislature.

era.^"*

new

reflecting

The move

by

realities-direct intervention

to dairy farming for

encouraged by a coherent scheme of statutory experimentation by the

state

example had been
legislature

and the

support of a nascent agricultural bureaucracy operating from Montpelier and the state

university in Burlington. State intervention to shore

up

faltering local institutions,

especially schools and road maintenance, also began in the late nineteenth century.^^

When
however, the

it

came

state

to matters

was slower

of wayward

sexuality, family

breakdown, and

to respond with administrative remedies.

effects

its

A growing state

bureaucracy, armed with detailed data compelled from the courts and towns by legislative

mandate

in the

increasing rates

850s, documented the effects of extra-marital sexuality including

1

of illegitimacy and divorce (and

adultery claims).

man

causes, including large numbers of

The Board of Health and Vermont's medical community were

aware of the existence of gonorrhea and
and the

its

responsible for compiling

syphilis.

its

well

Henry Holton, secretary of the Board,

biennial reports

was chairman of the AMA's

Committee on Prophylaxis of Venereal Disease. William Warren Townsend, another
doctor,

was

a

member of the American

Society of Sanitary and Moral Prophylaxis.

Townsend, who performed entrance physicals on inmates

" For

a treatment of the old

England: Regional Tourism

home week phenomenon
in the

local

in

at the state's

House of

Vermont see Dona Brown, Inventing New

Nineteenth Century (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press,

1995), 135-167.

« See Rozwenc generally

for the

change

to dairy farming.

On

early efforts to centralize control of

"'Little
Samuel B. Hand, Jeflfrey D. Marshall, and D. Gregory Sanford,
1854-1920," 53 Vermont History (Summer 1985):
Republics': The Structure of State Politics in Vermont,

traditionally local functions, see

141-166.
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CDrrcclions

history

in

Rutland, rcporlcd that 83 percent ol the adult males admitted a prior

of venereal

society," he

disease.

While these

warned Vermouths doctors

men

hailed

to take

Irom "the so-called lower

no comfort

in that tact since

strata ol

"venereal

micro-organisms, gentlemen, are no respecters of persons, and they attack the high and
lowly ofsocicty alike."

lownsend

told t>ran

thousand people traced to two young
Burlingtt)!!.

others

Townsend claimed

in the village.

io

women who

In other cases,

that syphilis

had

oftwo

small village

in a

slept with soldiers

they had met in

have traced the spread of the disease to several do/.en

whole schools had

outbreaks and whole families were riven by

were cautioning

epidemic ofsyphilis

syphilis.

to

By 1895 Vermont's medical

had become so widespread

blamed on licentiousness. In 1007,

a

Vermont doctor

claimed that eighteen to thirty percent of pregnant

be closed due to gonorrhea

that

it

could not always be

cited a medical authority

women

journals

had gonorrhea.

who

lie did not

challenge the claim.^''

1

hough

the state

was

active in gathering information

on these phenomena,

direct

interventions at the intimate family level by state agencies and their agents did not begin in

earnest until just before

World War

eugenical thinking then

came

to

dominate

these areas during the 102()s.

It

was only

I.

Historian

all

Nancy

(lallagher has

shown how

of Vermont's administrative reform

at this

efVorts in

stage that the state began to experiment

with increasingly powerful public institutions of control including the creation of a state

school for feebleminded children

(

1912), juvenile courts (1912), the

Vermont C'onlerence

ions of the VcnnonI Slate
Williani Warrcii lowiisciui, "Venereal Disease in Vermont," Transact

Medical Socictv for the Year

/W9 (lUirlington,

I

ree IVess, 1910), 66-75; yennont Medical Monthly, vol.

9 (Mareli 1903), 70; (Jallaglier, 58; Vermont Medical Monthly, vol.

Medical Monthly,

vol.

9 (DecenilKr 1907), 295.
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1

(January 1X95). 24; Vermont

of Charities and Corrections (1915) the Department of Public Welfare (1917), and the
Probation Board (1917).

A sterilization law was also proposed in

1913, but did not pass

untU1931."
Thus, there was a fifty-year gap between

initial

bureaucratic data gathering and

documentation of these problems and the formation of agencies exerting
surveillance and control of intimate family and sexual

life.

As a result,

responsibility for policing sexual activity and punishing those

sexual behavior and family

the past-the

life fell

communal and

violated

norms of
it

in

the legislature, and the local county courts. In

dealing with these issues, the legal institutions did not focus

in

official

to the state institutions which had always handled

Vermont Supreme Court,

or homosexuality, as happened

who

direct

more urban

areas.

on

prostitution, pornography,

Rather, in the face of threats to a

agricultural society, they sought to protect

women and

girls fi^om

aggressive male sexuality, shore up marriage and the family, encourage respect for the
authority of parents (and especially fathers), and contain the threat that sexuality posed to

these institutions.

Goals of This Study
In presenting this work,

sexuality in

Vermont

However, the

rapidity

and handled by the

1

865 led

me

tracing

its

it

is

my intent

to provide a comprehensive legal history of

development from the founding period to the 1920s.

of change

in the

way

in

which many of these

legislature, prosecutors, the courts,

and the

issues

were perceived

parties after approximately

weighted
inexorably to emphasize that period in the work. If the study seems

Gallagher, passim.
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toward the second half of the period

was weighted

because the pace of historical change

in the

law

there too.

In Chapter

woman's

it is

1, 1

discuss the civil remedies that were available for attacks

sexual reputation or for physical or sexual assaults

on her body

on a

as well as the

redress available to her for breach of marriage promise or out of wedlock pregnancy.

Chapter 2 examines the development and application of the

tort

of seduction

in the state,

demonstrating the Supreme Court's changing attitudes toward the nature of the injiuy to
fathers

and daughters. In Chapter

how the

3,

1

examine criminal prosecutions for adultery showing

Court's liberalization of the elements of proof and a surging divorce rate led to

dramatic increases in the prosecution and imprisonment of men and

women who had

sex

with persons other than their spouses. Chapter 4 explores the application of rape law

in

the state, paying particular attention to the question of character evidence and consent. In

Chapter

5, 1

document the

state's decision to raise the

to fourteen (1 886) and then to sixteen (1 898);

amount of sexual

activity

increased age of consent

with very young

girls.

show how

now within the purview of the
was mostly used

Lastly, in

Chapter

were probably the most important

how legal proceedings

I

age of consent for

to prosecute

6, 1

This

is

move

older

conclude by showing

site for explicit

greatly

criminal law and

much

from eleven

expanded the

how the

men from having

sex

how Vermont's courts

discussions of sexuality in the state and

forced thousands of ordinary Vermonters to participate in or

witness the creation of narratives of errant sexuality and

implications for

this

girls

Vermont

come

to terms with their

society.

a foundational study of the courts and their operation in matters regarding

sexual behavior and

its

consequences. This

work
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is

not an exploration of the sex

lives

of

Vermonters. Nor, for the most
Instead,

it

part, is

remains tightly focused on

it

about their attitudes toward sex and sexuaUty.

how

one institution-the courts-handled sexual

My main goal is to begin the process of exploring a legal

matters.

actually experienced

this subject,

by the people who

lived

Since

it.

we have

system as

it

was

almost no information on

my work is concerned with answering some basic, but crucial questions.

What kinds of civil and

many of those

criminal cases involving sex did Vermont's courts hear?

cases did they hear and what were the outcomes?

framed by the law and

how were those

How

How were the issues

issues explicated at the trial

and appellate level?

How did the operations of the court change over time with regard to these kinds of cases?
Why did the courts'
information

is

operations change and what might those changes

necessary to understand precisely

how the

mean? This

courts defined, chaimeled, and

regulated sexuality. Generating the data necessary to answer these questions comprises

the

main contribution of this work.
have sought to keep

I

two reasons.

First,

this

the narrow confines described above for

work within

a broader analysis which seeks to explain the inter-relationship of

until
court and society, while important, cannot be attempted

we have

at least a basic

of actual cases and
understanding of the judicial and legal process, and the identification

parties.

Second,

the legal process

I

believe

tell

we must

be very cautious in assuming that materials created by

of ordinary
us about the actual sexual experience or sexual attitudes

Vermonters.

The reason

it

for this has to

do with the complexity of the law and the way

values.
must simultaneously serve so many masters and

truth is a

major value assigned to criminal and

34

It is

civil process.

in

which

true that the search for

But

it is

only one of several

often conflicting values inherent in our system. Tradition, the adversarial process, and
constitutional and

truth.

common

law imperatives often conspire to

For example, during the

knew what happened
testifying.

As

in

a

civil

first

discovery of that

half of the period of this study, the parties

who

best

case-the plaintiff and defendant-were prohibited from

was considered

interested parties, their urge to perjure themselves

that the courts refused to expose

them

to such temptation.'*

not be witnesses for or against one another

sanctity

limit the

in civil

Husbands and wives could

or criminal proceedings,

and privacy of the marital union be breached.

Until

so great

876

1

this

was

lest

the

true even

when

they sought to end that union by divorce on grounds of intolerable severity or wilful

desertion.^'

The general

by divorce or

prohibition continued even after the couple's marriage had ended

death."" Constitutional prohibitions against self-incrimination

meant

that a

criminal defendant could reftise to answer questions under oath. But statutes would not

permit her to testify on her

meant

own

that a key technique used

behalf even

if

she wanted until

by humans to understand

their

one person and then reported by another-were off limits."^

This

common

law rule was reversed by statute

1852.

in

1

866."'

Hearsay rules

world-statements made by

In addition, almost

1852 Vt. Acts

all

the

13.

divorce cases in
1876 the legislature permitted husbands and wives to testify against each other in
extended to all divorce
which intolerable severity or willful desertion had been alleged. This privilege was

"

In

cases in 1882.

1876 Vt. Acts 77; 1882 Vt. Acts 67.

for being found
Ware, 65 Vt. 338 (1892); State v. Phelps, 2 Tyler 374 (1803) (in prosecution
wife not permitted to testify that she saw husband in bed
in bed with a woman other than his wife, former
the marital privilege exists to this day.
with another woman during their marriage). Subject to exception,
an exception to the marital secrets rule
Vt R Evid 504 By the 1 860s, lawyers understood that there was
Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence
340-34

^ French

in

v

prosecutions for wife beating. Bennett,

1

;

(Boston, 1860), 489-490.

Vermont

«

Constitution, Chap.

1,

Art. 10 (1793); 1866 Vt. Acts 40.

Vt. R. Evid. 803-804.
Subject to exceptions, this remains the law today.
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parties participating in the proceedings did so under compulsion or the threat

compulsion. Lawyers constructed their cases not to root out the

truth, but to

of
win and

in

so doing, they were constrained by the various conflicting values imposed by the legal

system.

For these reasons, we must be extremely

carefiil

from the discourse created and reported by these

about the conclusions to be drawn

sources.

They tell us how lawyers and

witnesses presented this information to judge and jury, they even allow us a glimpse of the
values those people thought judges and juries held and, in the case of lawmakers like

judges and

legislators, the values they

thought the law should promote. Furthermore, the

creation of sexual meanings and the regulation of sexual activity in the legal system

undoubtedly played a role

in defining the actual sexual experiences

meanings they ascribed to them.
through

in

narratives

And the

some of the sources examined
tell

actuality

of ordinary people and

of sexual experience does come

But the extent to which these sexual

here.

us what really went on in the minds, hearts, and bedrooms of Vermonters

must be tempered by the highly mediated context
should be careful in studying this material that

in

which they were produced.

we understand

its

We

shortcomings in

respect-not only for accuracy's sake, but out of fairness to the actors, long dead,

no longer speak for themselves.
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this

who can

CHAPTER

1

WOMEN, THE COURTS, AND CIVIL REMEDIES
FOR PHYSICAL AND SEXUAL VIOLATIONS

Introduction

Josiah

Brown died

in

the spring of

1

829 leaving

his wife

and children

destitute.

Seeking to support herself and her family, Ursula Brown sought out housekeeping jobs.

She claimed

to have

WilHam Brown

found one paying good wages, but

started telling people that Ursula

lost the

job when her in-law

was "an old whore," who had had more

than one bastard child and that she had become impregnated on July

of her husband
his slander.

Josiah. Ursula sued William claiming $1

The

00

parties agreed to have the dispute heard

of Ursula and awarded her

in lost

4'*',

after the

death

wages on account of

by referees who found

in

favor

damages-the equivalent of several months

fifteen dollars in

wages.'

That Ursula

Brown would have

to her sexual reputation in 1830

people fi-om the

make

start

things right.

and by

Even

1

is

turned to the courts for vindication of her right

not so surprising. Vermonters had been a litigious

830 already had a long

in the

1

760s and

1

tradition

of looking to the courts to

770s when Vermont was an unsettled

York, participation rates
wilderness nominaUy under the control of the Province of New

in

court processes were extremely high.

the area

now

constituting northeast

As

the only source of institutional authority in

Vermont

for example.

New

York's Gloucester

188-190. Vermont s unpublished
Brown, Orange County Court, June 1830 Term, vol. 12, p.
the
courthouses, the Public Records Center m Middlesex,
court materials are divided between the county
see the
Collections at the University of Vermont. Please
State Library in Montpelier, and Special
'

Brown

v.

citations are to Vermont court decisions unless
bibliography for flirther details. All subsequent

otherwise indicated.
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County Court served both a judicial and executive
date, county courts

were places where both

fiinction.^

And, from the

women and men could

interferences with their right to physical safety,

good sexual

earliest

seek vindication for

reputation, and the

consequences of sexual misbehavior.
Since Gloucester County

entire family groups, there

during the 1770s.^ Thus,

was dominated by men preceding

were few

women in the

women appeared rarely

pre- Vermont period. For example, the

their families or

by

county with independent legal status

in the earliest court

names of only

three

records from the

women appear in the records

of the Gloucester Coimty Court between 1770 and 1774 and only two of them appeared
as parties.

instructive.

However, the circumstances under which the two women do appear

Both found themselves

in

are

court over matters of wayward sexuality and

its

consequences. The Overseer of the Poor for the town of Mooretown brought an action

on behalf of Rebecca Martin
But her baby had been
result, the court

for

2

earliest

an action for bastardy against Hezekiah Silloway

bom ten months after the date

in 1773,

of the claimed impregnation. As a

not only found for the defendant, but a grand jury then indicted Martin

whoredom and

The

in

issued a warrant for her arrest.

Vermonters turned to

their courts in great

A year later, Elizabeth Thurston and

numbers. For example,

in Gloucester

County

entire northeastern quarter of Vermont),
(the least settled area of the state comprising what is today the
male population appear in the court's
the names of approximately 80 percent of the county's aduh
percent of the adult male population
records during its four-year existence from 1770 to 1774. Forty
or witnesses. Eighteen percent
participated as plaintiflfe, court oflBcers, persons seeking licenses,
Gloucester County Court, 1770-1774:
participated as plaintiffe in civil cases. Hal Goldman, "The
Historical Society and the
at a symposium sponsored by the Vermont

A

Hard Look," paper presented
Copy in the possession of the
Vermont Judicial Historical Society, Montpelier, Vermont, June 1995.
are located at the Orange County Superior
author The original records of the Gloucester County Court
Collections, University of Vermont, Burlmgton,
Court Chelsea, Vermont. A copy is located at Special
"Gloucester County Court Records,"
Vermont The records are also reproduced (with minor errors) in
(Bellows Falls, Vt.: Tuttle, 1926), 141-189.
Proceedings of the Vermont Historical Society, 7925-/925
'

Jay

Mack Holbrook, Vermont 1771 Census

Table
(Oxford, Mass.: Holbrook Research Institute, 1982),

12.
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Nathan Noyes were

indicted for

Their partners, though named

illicit

cohabitation with persons other than their spouses.

in the records,

were not

indicted.''

Vermonters placed a high value on communal peace and the
Historian Randolph Roth has

shown

that

Vermont and New Hampshire have

had very low rates of violent crime compared to the

Vermonters were no angels,

this early tradition

laws, for

meant

all injuries

or wrongs which he

that fi-om the earliest period

Vermont's courts provided a
of a woman's

right to

physical and sexual abuse.

assault

and

good

may receive

in

civil

While

nation.^

self-help,

and a constitutional

remedy "by having recourse
in

and

to the

person, property, or character"

their courts

civil

both as centers

redress for injuries.^

and criminal remedy for every possible

sexual reputation and to be

civil side,

a

a

woman could

fi-ee

unwanted

fi-om

initiate

prosecutions for

and rape. These approaches

woman could

bastardy, breach of marriage promise, alienation

"

historically

to local courts for civil

which they could seek

On the criminal side,

On the

and

to find a

battery, gross lewdness, attempted rape,

discussed in later chapters.

of the

Vermonters understood

of governmental power and as places

violation

was

rest

of looking

social order, the cultural intolerance for lawlessness

giiarantee that every person in the state

of law.

rule

will

sue for sexual defamation,

of affections,

assault

and

battery, civil

"Gloucester County Court Records," 159-160, 190.

Randolph Roth, '"Blood Calls for Vengeance!' The History of Capital Punishment
Vermont History 65 (Winter/Spring 1997): 10-25.

5

Vermont Constitution, Chapter 1, Article 4 (1786). The language was repeated
constitution which continues to govern the state today.
'
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be

in

Vermont,

in the

1793

ravishment, and,

191

£ifter

1,

for seduction

when part of a marriage promise case/ Thus,

with the exception of marited rape^, these criminal and

causes of action provided

women who were

multiple and sometimes overlapping remedies for

physically or

who were harmed by the consequences of out-of-wedlock

sexually assaulted or

activity or

civil

smears on

their sexual reputation.

Women (and sometimes their husbands,

parents, or guardians) brought suits and prosecutions for

all

of these

violations.

—success

and juries were extremely responsive to these causes of action

damage awards were very

sexual

rates

Judges

and

high.

Sexual Defamation

Vermonters

living in the eighteenth, nineteenth,

were deeply concerned about

their neighbors' character

great deal. At no point during this period

was

and early twentieth centuries

and talked about

there any particular societal taboo

public discussion of morals in general and sexual character in particular.

the state's founding

legal

code with

its

was accompanied by

prohibitions

on

all

that character

a

on the

The period of

the adoption of Connecticut's strict Puritan

manner of sexual deviancy and the provision of

reform that
severe punishment for their violation. The waves of religious revival and

^

Because married

women

could not sue in their

affections suits until after the
lifted.

Nieberg

v.

common law

own names,

disabilities

on their

Cohen, 83 Vt. 28 1(19 14). Thus, the

first

affections did not appear in the four counties until 1899.

September 1899 Term,

^

vol. 55, p.

The concept of marital

they were unable to bring alienation of
ability to sue in their

case of a

Knapp

v.

woman

own names were

suing for alienation of

Wing, Rutland County Court,

585-588.

rape, while undoubtedly very real to

women who experienced

it,

did not exist

Sex Right': A Legal History of the
law before the twentieth century. Rebecca M. Ryan, "'The
94 1 - 1 00 1 However, as this study makes
1
Marital Rape Exception," Law and Social Inquiry 20 ( 995):
remedy for brutal treatment received at the hands of their
clear women did have a criminal and civil
in the

.

granted
form of assault and battery prosecutions and divorces
pursued both remedies.
including sexual brutality. Women successfiilly

husbands

in the
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for mtolerable severity

swept Vermont during the

first

half of the nineteenth century had personal morality

(including sexual morality) at the center of their message.

Newspapers

detailed the

problems of loose morals, fornication, and profanity. Some denominations sought to
have the names of men

soliciting prostitution printed in local papers.

people gossiped about sexual matters and intimate personal

details

In their daily lives

were often known by

the entire community.' Three examples from the beginning, middle, and end of this study

demonstrate the public nature of this phenomenon as well as
In

1

describing

life in

It is

Swanton under
Brown. She
than

it

was

ubiquity.

827 Swanton native Alice Fisk wrote her brother Zoroaster two
the small upstate

gone to earn her teaching
Vermont.

its

clear

New York farming town of Oxford, where she had

certificate.

from her

Her brother was

letters that Alice,

the whiff of scandal as a result

told her brother that despite

in

letters

Swanton where she had

all

the Collector of Customs back in

a spirited young

of a

her

woman, had

conflict with a

difficulties, life in

left

man named Stephen
Oxford was better

to suffer under "a continual ding of slander." In

her description of life in Oxford, Alice lamented her straightened circumstances and the

snobbery of the people around her--a snobbery she

felt

was undeserved given

their

sexual behavior.

You must
ever
this

be rich

or you can be nothing,

.

.

.

that

is if I

I

don't believe there

& whoremasters in
have been rightly informed, & presume have.

place where there were so

was a

world

in this place

many whores

I

I

(Baptist
M. Potash, Vermont's Burned Over District (Brooklyn: Carlson Publishing, 1991), 164
in the newspaper); David M. Ludlum,
Association's efforts to print names of men soliciting prostitution
University Press, 1939), 19-21 (problems
Social Ferment in Vermont, 1791-1850 (New York: Columbia
^

Jeffrey

newspapers and by reformers); Randolph Roth,
of loose morals, fornication, and profanity discussed in
Order in the Connecticut River Valley of
The Democratic Dilemma: Religion. Reform, and the Social
Robert E. Shalhope, Bennington
Vermont, 1791-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987);
in Vermont. 1760-1850
and the Green Mountain Boys: The Emergence of Liberal Democracy
(Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
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young ladies I have been told, make use of a certain thing called
dilldoes one of them was found in the street, and advertised it belonged
to a family of the name of Short the very first young ladies in the place,
the

first

and notwithstanding
them,

if

Susan's

in reputation

girls

of any

Alice then turned to the

that there

all

is

no body good enough to speak to

have nothing else to boast of they stand the

girls

know.

I

men of the town

"a shiftless set the whole of them." She

described a lawyer, an old bachelor, who, though good

women
him.

fairest

business "never thinks of the

in

and never goes anywhere." She then related an anecdote she had heard about

He had

traveled to

"having never reveled

in

New York

with two friends. Knowing nothing of women

the pleasures of Venus," his friends take

houses^ The bachelor agreed

to

pay them

get "a chance to see a certain thing.''

desired sight, so after looking

it

all

five dollars

He went

on

him

to

"one of those

the condition that he

would

much

with them and "procured them the

over and examining

it

closely," the bachelor

proclaimed that the sight was "well worth the money, well worth
In her next letter to Zoroaster, Alice elaborated

on the

five dollars."

"villainy"

of Stephen

her certainty that as soon as she returned to Swanton she would hear the

Brown and

"ding, ding" of slander against her. She also noted Zoroaster's objection to her

remaining

in

Oxford because of "the morals of the place." But Alice assured him

morals did not bother her since

The circumstances of the
upon

her.

don't go any where or see any body except at school."

family she

She then launched

relationship

"I

into

was

staying with were such that no one

came

that

to call

an elaborate account of an alleged adulterous sexual

(between her tormentor, Stephen Brown, and a Mrs. Hoffman) back

Swanton. Alice explained

that the

because she

knew of the

affair the parties

"If 1
malicious gossip about her. Alice told Zoroaster not to worry.
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live,

in

had spread
she [Hoffrnan]

shall

so

have an opportunity of clearing herself or being proved

much from the
Other,

guilty ... for

I

will not

bitch."'^

more

public examples

of such

abound. In 1878, the Bennington

talk

nev^spapers breathlessly reported on the adulterous

of Ellen Hall and local lawyer

affair

John Beebe. Ellen's husband John was the son of Vermont Govemor Hiland

Beebe was married and had two

children.

The marriage ended

in

Hall.

divorce with Ellen

branded an adulterer and stripped of her children. Beebe was disbarred and the two
the state.

reprinted

The demand
it

bear

one week

for the account

later.*'

had been so high,

fled

that the papers obligingly

A year later, the Addison County Journal ran a piece about

a local probate judge and his adulterous affair vnth a local farm wife,'^

In 1904 the

between two

on a

Brandon Ledger ran a

local residents. In

series

of letters alleging an adulterous

affair

1913 the Fair Haven Era printed the following attack

local businessman:

There

is

a furniture dealer in this city

who ought

feathered and then ridden out of town

four

little

home

children but for

in spite

all

floor

interfere while

of the

at

rail.

He

has a fine wife and

persists in keeping an "affinity" at his

of the protests of his wife

scandalous manner. While

had to

of this

on a

to be tarred and

whom he

Lake Bomoseen a

he was beating his wife

abuses

in a brutal

and

short time ago outsiders

whom he had thrown to

the

cottage.*^

827 and 1 9 August 1 827 Fisk Collection, Box 1 Folder 2, Vermont
would like to thank Christie Carter at
State Archives, Montpelier, Vermont (emphasis in the original).
"

Alice Fisk to Zoroaster Fisk, 20 July

,

1

1

the State Archives for calling this correspondence to

my attention.

Scandal," Bennington
"The Bennington Scandal," Vermont Gazette, 12 July 878 and "The Bennington
Banner, 5 December 1 878.
"

1

''Addison County Journal, 31 October 1879.

"

Fair Haven Era, 4 September 1913.
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These examples provide important evidence about

attitudes

toward sexual

reputation as well as the extent to which such reputation was the subject of widespread
discussion. For example, Alice Fisk's letters

tell

us

much about

sexual discourse in early nineteenth century rural society. Fisk

the role of informal

was an educated

middling-class stranger to Oxford occupying a position on the edges of its social

life.

Yet she quickly learned of various intimate sexual matters involving the townspeople.
She was also well aware of untoward

relationships

back home

in

Swanton.

Many of

these things she learned from others.

The Fisk

letters also

communities. Alice

felt

show how important

reputation

in these small rural

she had been exiled from Swanton on account of unspecified

gossip which seems to have been sexual in nature. She

was bemused

was

that the leading ladies

immorality, while her friend Susan's

felt

she could not return. She

of Oxford had such high
girls,

who

stood "the

status despite their sexual

fairest in reputation,"

had so

little.

Nonetheless, the respectable and the famous were not

such sexual gossip

either.

Governor Hall made sure that

immune

to the fallout of

his son's divorce hearing

was

heard in "secret" but he could not protect the family or his son from the coverage of both
local newspapers.'"

editors

The

local probate judge could not escape the public eye.

The

of the Fair Haven Era were so outraged by the adultery and violence of the

furniture dealer-who, with his

maid and summer cottage was part of the respectable

June Barrows, "An American Chronicle, Part
North Bennington, Vermont, n.d.), 925-934.

1,"

(unpublished manuscript, Park-McCuilough House,
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middle

class, that they

of the community

advocated vigilante justice-a rare action for responsible leaders

to take.

The examples make two
Vermonters. Second,

things clear. First, sexual reputation

their sexual behavior

and censure, including

legal censure.

was subject both

When,

in

1

was important

to surveillance,

to

comment,

877, Orren Taft claimed that Priscilla

Hartshorn was a whore, that he had had sex vnih her before, and could any time he

wanted, Priscilla and her husband claimed that as a result of Taft's statements she had
not only "been and

is

exposed to disgrace," but was

now "liable

to

be exposed to a

criminal prosecution for the crime of adultery.""

Because of the serious nature of these allegations and the

potential for social and

even criminal sanctions that accompanied them, such charges were a dangerous game
for Alice Fisk

and the

rest.

If Vermonters

were prepared

to question the sexual

character of their neighbors, their targets were prepared to

make them pay

Throughout the period under study, Vermonters regularly sued those who
character-sexual or otherwise-into question.

Most of these case were

for

it.

called their

successftil

and

jury verdicts could be very large.

"Defamation"

which

is

the legal cause of action brought against one

call into question the

honor or reputation of another. The

words
encompasses both spoken words (slander) and written

tort''

(libel),

moral turpitude
had to allege the commission of a crime involving

" Hartshorn

A

tort is

v.

Taft,

Windsor County Superior Court, December

1

877 Terni,

Commentaries
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uses words

of defamation

hi general slander

to be actionable, but

vol. 32, p. 594.

person or property^ At cornrnon
a civil wrong-an injury done to one's

others.
assaults, and defamation among
actions as trespasses, nuisances,
/.
1
on the Laws of England, vol. 3 (London, 1768), 1

who

W.lham

Blackstone,
^^J^^^^^

a

libel

was

plaint iir to

actionable even

if

it

have a cause of act ion the words had to be "published"

third party).

The

truth

of the statement could be a defense

defamation was complex and
other

in speciiic cases,

insultingly

I

simply exposed one to public ridicule. In order for the

rile

(that

is,

to the action.

I'hc

meant

that

it

was

risky to speak or write

of one's neighbors.'^
suits for

defamation brought between 1790 and 1920

four counties. Seventy-one involved suits by

men

could be identified as alleging sexual misconduct.

their honesty in business

in

the

over non-sexual allegations or

allegations which could not be identified. Thirty-four were brought by or

on

law of

with exceptions which could favor one party or the

fhis unpredictability

have uncovered 105

women or

shared with a

and court proceedings.

Men tended

on behalf of
to sue for slurs

Common male causes were

allegations of perjury, counterfeiting, fraud, and theft.

This

is

not surprising.

i'or

The

business practices of the day relied heavily on the issuance of notes and law suits

concerning those notes were the most

The

credit worthiness

A

bad reputation for honesty was devastating

their sexual character.

V.

on the

a man's

sued for non-.sexual delamation and some men did sue

Women

less involved in business

Colby

for

relied

necessary credit."*

Some women

were

cause of action heard by local courts.

of those notes and successful collection on them both

reputation oi the maker.

ability to obtain

common

were

tar

and credit

C'hrislophcr Clark, The Roots

for

likely to

on

sue over sexual matters. They

one thing thus reducing opportunities

for

Field, 10 Vt. 353 (1838); Vnderhill v. Welton, 32 Vt.
American Law, vol. 2 (New York, 1827), 12-22.

Reynolds, 6 Vt. 489 (1834); Torrey

40 (1859); James Kent, Commentaries on

more

for slurs

v.

HHO-im)
of Rural Capitalism: Western Massachusetts,

Cornell University Press, 1990), 214-220.
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(Ithaca:

this

type of defamation. Sexual reputation was important to both

Vermont. But given a female's already subordinate
society, an attack

legal

men and women

and economic position

on her sexual reputation was potentiaUy a

far

more

in

in

devastating

injury-devastating enough to engage in the public trauma of a defamation case. If the
large

awards

women won

in these

cases are any indication, judges and juries

defamation worked a greater harm to

plaintiffs

when

it

felt

that

touched on sexual reputation

in

general and the sexual reputation of women in particular.

Since married

them

until

1

women could not

many

884,

sue

civilly in their

own names

cases were brought by husbands in their

for injuries

own name

to

or by married

couples for defamation of the wife's sexual character.'^ Others were brought by

defamation of their daughters.

done

men for

A review of a few of these cases gives us a sense of the

kind of injuries heard by local courts.

The

earliest

was a case by Ezra

1798. His young daughter had been ejected from the

in the plaintiffs

house

his wife called a

whore. The arbitrator

plaintiff and

in

Sylvester against Alexander Plumley over a tussle

who

room and

heard the case determined that both the

defendant had been equally to blame for the physical confrontation, but the

defendant's use of the term "whore" could not be excused and so awarded Sylvester ten

" The rules of coverture prevented married women from suing in their own names, they had to be joined
right to sue did not remain in
by their husbands in order to bring suit. However, upon their death, the
Women won the right to the
the husband, but passed to her estate. Earl v. Tupper, 45 Vt. 275 (1 873).
coverture in 1867. They
and separate use of personal causes of action inherited by them during
occurring during marriage in 1 884. 1 867
gained the right to sue and be sued in their own name for torts
women suing in tort did not join their husbands in
Vt. Acts 21; 1884 Vt. Acts 140. Thereafter married
sole

the action. Story

v.

Downey, 62

Vt. 243 (1890).
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dollars.^^ In

1

allegations he

man, had

831 Isaac and Minerva Rawley sued Alanson Wright over various

had made about Minerva, He

killed the

said that she

baby to prevent others from seeing

husband, and that she had given birth to puppies

found Wright

liable for

that

it

did not look like her

committed

bestiality).

The jury

defamation as to the adultery and illegitimacy charges and

awarded the couple $200. In 1 877 Horace and
claiming that Priscilla

(i.e.,

had gotten pregnant by another

was a whore and

Priscilla

that he could

wanted. As a result of which, she "has been and

is

Hartshorn sued Orren Taft for

have sex with her anytime he

exposed to disgrace, and

is

rendered

liable to

be exposed to a criminal prosecution for the crime of aduhery." That case was

settled.

In

1

884 William and Jane Chase sued Cyrus Lovell

for calling Jane "a black

whore,'' challenging her chastity, and accusing her of being a prostitute.

for the plaintiffs, but

awarded only one cent

in

The jury found

damages.

In addition to husbands bringing suits on behalf of their wives, fathers also sued
to protect their daughters' reputations. In 1806, Ebenezer Jewett told people he had

seen young Thankful Salter having sex with a dog. Her father sued him and

$500-one of the
In

1

largest tort verdicts in

Orange County

won

in the first half of the century.

844 Arvilla English's father Josiah sued Benjamin Chase on her behalf after he

claimed to have begotten her with a bastard child. The case was

settled.^^

census
Windsor County Court, September 1798 Term, vol. 15, p. 219-222. The
younger, the other between ten and sixteen. We
of 1 800 shows that Ezra had two daughters, one ten or
the Second Census of the United States
do not know which one was involved. Heads of Families At
Historical Society, 1938).
Taken in the Year 1800, Vermont (Montpelier, Vermont

^°

Plumley

v.

Sylvester,

Windsor County Court, December 1872 Term,
288-291.
Windsor County Court, May 1884 Term, vol. 34, p.

2'

Hartshorn

v.

Tafi,

Orange County Court, December 1806 Term,
613.
Orange County Court, December 1844 Term, vol. 15, p.
Salter

v.

Jewett,

48

vol. 32, p. 594;

Chase

v.

Lovell,

vol. 7, p. 347-349; English

v.

Chase,

Some women brought

suits in their

own names to

vindicate their sexual

reputation. These suits were concentrated at the end of the period under study.

already described Ursula Brown's successful

1

jury found for

Hannah and Welton

have

her in-law William in 1830. In

suit against

859 Hannah Underbill sued George Welton

I

for telling people she

was a whore. The

appealed. Slander, in order to be actionable, required

an allegation that imputed both moral turpitude and criminal behavior. Since prostitution

was not

iUegal,

Welton argued

of chastity. The Court agreed
slander

(i.e.,

that there could be

no lawsuit for merely imputing a lack

woman a whore was not

that calling a

slander per se), but if Hannah could

show

rendered her

less

that that anxiety

shown

suit.

that the statement

had caused her

capable of attending to her daily business, she had

damages and could maintain her

and of itself

that the statement caused her

special pecuniary damages, she could prevail. Since she had

had caused her "grief and anxiety" and

in

lost

shown

time and

special

The Court afiOrmed the jury's award of $183."

In 1892, Lizzie Carpenter sued Ezra Willey in the Orange County Court for

calling her a

whore and

for saying she had

committed adultery with a

was boarding with her and her husband. The jury found

local minister

for Carpenter and

who

awarded her

$679. The same year, however, Melissa Leighton sued her brother-in-law Erastus

Thayer for

calling her

a

"common

strumpet," "a whore," and an "adulterous

streetwalker," and alleging that she ran a whorehouse.

At

trial

Thayer introduced

evidence that Leighton actually did run a whorehouse. The jury found for Leighton, but

" Underhill

v.

Welton, 32 Vt. 40 (1859); Underhill

v.

Welton, Orange County Court, June 1858 Term,

Docket No. 38, Public Records Center, Middlesex, Vermont.
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awarded her only one

dollar in

damages-an

indication perhaps of its opinion as to the

value of her reputation.^'*

Cora Porter was the servant
their claim that

won

same

Haven Era

John Steams W£is a wife beater and adulterer and ought to be

feathered, and driven out of town

and

referred to by the editors of the Fair

$500. Steams prevailed

on a

rail.

She sued the editors

in his suit as well,

in

in

tarred,

1913 for defamation

winning a $500 jury verdict the

A year later, Mary Pullinen sued Liisa Lookso for telling people that the

year.

reason she could not get pregnant was because "she uses

lots

A jury awarded

of men."

Pullinen thirty-seven dollars.^'

Overall, cases alleging any kind of defamation had high success rates.

cases brought in the four counties, 68 percent resulted in a verdict for the

Another 14 percent were

settled or discontinued

cases resulted in a defense verdict. The average

$163. Though

or

girl's

all

such suits had high success

sexual reputation or suits brought by

by the

105

plaintiff.

Eighteen percent of the

plaintiff.

damage award

Of the

for

all

such cases was

rates, cases involving attacks

women in their own names

on a woman

for non-sexual

defamation had the highest success rates and the highest damage awards. Suits brought

by men over non-sexual allegations had the lowest success
damages. Suits brought by

men

for vindication

rates

and the lowest average

of their own sexual reputations were

higher,
about as successful as non-sexual cases brought by men, but the damages were

though

still

not as high as those attained

in the

female cases (see Table

Orange County Supreme Court, May 1892 Term,
232-238.
Thayer, Rutland County Court, March 1892 Term, vol. 50, p.
Carpenter

v.

Willey,

vol. 20, p.

2).

It is

a

453; Leighton

v.

1914 Term, vol. 61, p. 232-236; Stearns v.
Porter v Metcalfet ai, Rutland County Court, September
vol. 61, p. 80-92; Pullinen v. Lookso, Rutland
Turner et al, Rutland County Court, March 1914 Term,

25

County Court, March 1916 Term,

vol. 61, p.

663-666
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Table 2

Success Rates for Various Defemation Suits

Subject

Male

Total

7P

PlaintiflF

in the

Four Counties

Guilty

Settled/Discontinued'

Not Guilty

Avr. Damages

48 (68%)

8(11%)

15 (21%)

$139^

(Non-Sexual)

Male

Plaintiff

8 (67%)'

12

1

(9%)

3

(25%)'

$163'

(Sexual)

Female

14

(79%)

2 (14%)

1

(7%)

$221'

4 (50%)

4 (50%)

0 (0%)

$273*

(68%)

15(14%)

19(18%)

$163*^

1 1

(Sexual)

Female

8

(Non-Sexual)

105

Total

71

This includes cases that were settled by the parties, discontinued, or where a non-suit was entered
the plaintiff Non-suits could indicate a settlement, but it is impossible to tell from the records.
'

^

There were a

^

N=43.

total

of 73 such

suits,

If we include the 5 cases

for

but in 2 the outcomes could not be determined,

where one cent

in

damages was awarded, the average decreases

to

$122.

by

stipulation.

Includes

1

guilty verdict

'

Includes

1

directed verdict later affirmed by the

*

N=6.

^

N=10.

If we include

1

If we include

Supreme Court.

case where one cent in damages was awarded, the average decreases to $140.

1

case v^ere one cent damages were awarded, the average decreases to $201.

'*N=4.
^

N=63.

If we include the 7 cases

where one cent damages were awarded the average decreases
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to $147.

measure of the success
even though such

rate

women

of suits involving

In

all suits.

Vermont sexual reputation was important enough

sexual impropriety were so damaging that plaintiffs

even physical harm as a

result

favorably upon these suits and

that

of a man, woman, or

felt

it

child,

Allegations of

£ind

as

and

judges were willing to

their success rates, the courts

would appear

was viewed

to fight for.

free to argue mental injury

of these statements and juries

acknowledge and compensate them.^^ Given

sexual reputation that

of all such cases brought, they

suits represented only 21 percent

represented six of the top ten damage awards for

women's

or

looked

that injury to sexual reputation-whether

more damaging, and thus deserving of

higher awards than injuries to a man's non-sexual reputation. But sexual defamation was

only the

first

level

of civil

redress in the courts.

and

girls, especially

injury for

which Vermonters (including women) could seek

As with defamation, juries and judges viewed

injuries to

those harmed by sexual violation, in a particularly punitive

women
light.

Civil Assault

In the four counties studied,

women

and

girls

I

uncovered fifty-seven

between 1794 and 1920 out of a

total

civil suits for assaults

of 246

civil assault

on

cases brought

always
during this time (23 percent). Defendants in these female cases were almost

male.

cases

^

Women were

sole defendants in only three

women were named

After being called a whore,

of the

fifty-seven cases. In four

more

as defendants along with their husbands.

Hannah Underbill declared

that she

was

"greatly injured and enfeebled in

and dejection of spirits, insomuch that she
greatly grieved, and was also prevented and
was deprived of much sound sleep and repose, and was
duties and labors with the strength and health that
disabled from pursuing and following her accustomed
Vt. 40 (1859) (emphasis omitted).
otherwise would have enjoyed." Vnderhill v. Welton, 32

both body and mind, and was caused

much

anxiety, trouble

she
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women in their own names.

Twenty-four lawsuits were brought by
twenty- four involved

the wife.

suits

Another

brought by husbands or husbands and wives for assaults on

Nine were brought by parents (usually but not always by

fathers) for assaults

on minor daughters.

Though

single

women brought

suits in their ovsoi

names as

early as

1

836, most of

these actions were concentrated toward the end of the period under study v^th twenty-

two being brought from 1865 onward and twelve being brought
similar to the pattern

women

in their

women's

suits brought,

suits

ovm names coming after

acquisition

success rate for

of defamation

of the

women

This

1

876. This roughly coincides with married

bringing suits in their

in sixteen or

Three cases were non-suited, two of which

done to them

in

1

884.^^

67 percent. One case was dismissed

was

settled

by a

lose at

trial.

no costs
If we count

the settled cases as successftil outcomes, the success rate climbs to 83 percent.

cases.

suing in their

own names were

The average award

for

women

far higher than the overall

suing for assault in their

after

stipulation.

likely resulted in settlement since

were awarded to the defendant. In only three cases did women

women

The

own names was high. Of the twenty-four

the defendant paid a settlement of $175. Another case

for

was

with eleven of the fifteen cases brought by

right to sue in tort for injuries

women prevailed

after 1900.^^

Awards

average for

o\m names was

all civil

$218^^

(see Table 3).

"

Suits for civil assault

were brought by women

in their

own names

in 1836, 1849,

1865

(3),

1873, 1875,

1912, 1913, 1914(2), 1915(2), 1920,
1878, 1886, 1888 (2), 1893, 1902 (2), 1904, 1906, 1911,
2»

1884 Vt. Acts 140. This permitted married

This figure omits one award to a

woman

women

of one cent

$204.
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to sue

in

and be sued

damages. If that

in their

own names.

result is included the average is

8

Table 3

Civil Assault

Subject

Total

Cases

in the

Guilty

Four Counties

Not Guilty

Settled

Non-Suit

Avr.

Award

Female

Plaintiff

24

1

Husband/Couple

24

17

6 (67%)

{7l%f

3%)

2 (8%)

3

(

0 (0%)

3

(13%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

1

3

(

1

3%)

$2

1

4 (17%)

$186'

2 (22%)

$3

(Assault on Wife)

Parent

7 (78%)

4'
1

(Assault on Daughter)

Male

PlaintifF

188'

147 (78%)'

245

187 (76%)

(1%)

29 (15%)

1 1

(6%)

$ 99'

4 (2%)

34 (14%)

20 (8%)

$127*

I

(Assault on Male)

Totals

'

N=16. This

average
^

*

Includes

average

1

award

1

cent in damages. If that result

case in which the defendant defaulted and judgment

In 3 cases the court
is

woman of one

to a

is

included the

$204.

is

N=l 5.

figure omits

awarded only one cent

in

was

entered.

damages. If those

results are included, the

$155.

'»N=7.

^

There were a

'Includes

I

total

of 89 such cases,
1

1

outcome was unknown.

default judgment.

found
^N=133. have omitted an anomalous award of$5000 to a male plaintiffin 1912. Ajury
granted in a
Simeon Flibotte liable for biting Isaac Mayo's ear off. This award exceeded any other
Court, September 1912 Term,
assault case by more than $3800. Mayo v. Flihoite, Rutland County
were awarded and case in which 50 cent
60, p. 394-396. If 9 cases in which one cent damages
I

1

damages were awarded
*

N=171.

If we include

is

added, the average

is

$93.

awards of less than one dollar the average
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is

$1 17.

civil

vol.

Between 1816 and 1895 twenty-four cases were brought by husbands or married
couples for injuries done to wives/" Seventeen resulted
percent). In only three cases

the plaintiff was non-suited

by

in victories for the plaintiffs (71

were the defendants found not

two of which were

women in their own names,

guilty.

As with

likely settlements.

average for

brought

also smaller than in

woman in their own name-$l 86-though still higher than the

all civil

Nine

suits

very few involved female defendants (only five-two of

which accused other couples of assault). Awards on average were
cases brought by

In four other cases

overall

assault awards.^'

suits involved parents or guardians bringing suit for assaults

Seven (78 percent) resuhed

in guilty verdicts.

was non-suited-one of which

at least

two cases

In the remaining

was probably a

on minor

girls.

the plaintiff

Average damages were

settlement.

very high-SSM.^^

When compared to
1794 and 1920,
men. Of the
percent

—

1 1

1

civil assault

suits involving assaults

88

civil assault suits

cases involving male victims brought between

on women had success

percent higher success rate than that experienced by single female

rate as that

between

plaintiffs (71 percent)

plaintiffe

and the

of suits brought on behalf of minor daughters. The chief difference

suits involving

Suits for civil assault

male victims and female victims was the amount of damages.

were brought by married couples

in

1

8 1 6,

1

8 1 9 (2),

1

828,

1

843,

1

847, 1851,1853,

1884, 1885, and 1887
1854, 1858 (2), 1861, 1864, 1867, 1868, 1873, 1874, 1875, 1878 (2),

"

of the

involving male victims, plaintiffs prevailed in 78

(67 percent) and 7 percent higher than married female

same

rates close to those

In three cases the court

awarded only one cent

in

damages. If those

(2).

results are included, the average is

$155.
"

The

the
year of the suits brought on behalf of minor females and

(nonsuit), 1870 ($36),

damage awards: 1849

(nonsuit), 1867

1870 ($500), 1872 ($497), 1897 ($2), 1912 ($1050), and 1914 ($104).
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The average award

male victims of assault and battery was

in cases involving

$99-considerably lower than the payout for female victims

The

in

such

suits.'^

more generous treatment of cases involving women

courts'

demonstrated when

we compare the

figures in those cases to the overall totals for

assault cases. During the entire study period, the average award for

was

cases

$127.^''

is also

The average award

all

all civil assault

for cases involving female victims

was almost

twice that-$235. This trend existed throughout the study period with average awards

for

women

exceeding the overall average during every part of the study period.^^

Furthermore, though suits involving awards to female victims comprised only 20
percent of all awards, female victims

made up

five out

often of the highest damage

awards and eight out of the highest twenty awards for the
Civil assaults

on

women

and

serious beatings and sexual assaults.

used

civil suits to

girls

entire period.

ranged from scuffles and hair pulling to

Women and

girls

and husbands and guardians

seek redress for these sexual assaults throughout the nineteenth and

early twentieth century.

The most

were sometimes designated as

serious of these assaults involved actual rapes and

"civil

ravishment" actions, though legally they were

all

five reported decisions
considered actions for assault and battery. There were

"

and the average awards for the
for men, the overall average awards
In calculating the average awards
1912. A juiy found
award of $5000 to a male plamt.ff

period

si

900-1920,

Flibotte

1

1

m

have omitted an anomalous

able for biting Isaac

Their award exceeded any other panted m a cml
September 19 2 Term, yoL 60,
Flibotte, Rutland County Court,
cents. If those
only once cent damages and m another 50

Mayo's ear

off.

by more than $3800 Mayo v.
^ 394-396 hi nbe suits the plaintiff was awarded

LTauk

ca^e

suits are

"

included the average

If we include

is

$93.

awards of less than one dollar the average

is

$117.

^e ^-n
and the average for female victims
-Average overall awards for each period
1900-1920 ($284, $344).
$177); 1870-1899 ($99; $152);
1849 ($71; $269); 1850-1869 ($100;

^esp-t^
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1796-

sexual assault claims brought as

civil rather

1880, 1890, 1919 and 1921 and

at least five

than criminal cases in Vermont in 1872,
unpublished decisions

There were another eleven cases brought as

counties.

among

civil assaults

the four

which contained

allegations of a sexual nature, but did not rise to attempted rape or rape.

The Supreme Court's

decisions in the reported cases allow us to trace the

contours of suits brought by or on behalf of women and
decisions plus the outcomes in the unreported cases

women a place where
and sexual

girls for

make

sexual assault. These

clear that the courts provided

they could seek and receive redress for assaults

on their

physical

Furthermore, the courts did not seem to be institutionally hostile to

safety.

such claims.

Alexander
Alexander, aged

v.

Blodgett (1872) arose out of an alleged sexual assault on

fifteen,

by Royal Blodgett. Blodgett worked

for

Mary's

Mary

father, Charles

Alexander, and had been living with the family. Alexander was a fanner and up and

coming member of Guilford

society.

Elected to the legislature in 1876, his biography in

the Legislative Directory noted that he had served as

justice

of the peace,

in addition to holding "all the usual

Mary Alexander, aged

daughter,

Royal Blodgett

town

in her father's

fifteen,

constable, tax collector, and

town

offices."" Charles's

claimed that she had been sexually assaulted by

bam. Blodgett exposed himself to her then grabbed her

Mary

told

him to

"desist" and that if he did not she

shoulders and tried to

lift

would

A few days later, while her parents were out, Blodgett told her he

tell

her father.

The reported cases
155 (1890); Newell

in

v.

her dress.

Vermont are Alexander

v.

Blodgett, 44 Vt.

Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589 (1880);

mANiebyski

v.

476

362.
Legislative Directory, /S7<5-7577 (Montpelier, 1876),

57

1

872); Parker

v.

Coture, 63 Vt

Welcome, 93 Vt. 418 (1919) and

Vt. 504(1921).

" Vermont

(

9t

wanted to do the same

exposed himself and again

being

tried to

lift

He went

fired.

to

work

Charles Alexander brought

chased her around the kitchen, held her,

Mary

her clothes.

Blodgett continued to work and

father.

He

thing to her again.

the household for another year before

live in

for a business rival

suit against

mother who told her

told her

of Alexander's and

it

was then

that

Blodgett for the assault on his daughter.

Blodgett denied that the assaults had ever taken place.
After the evidence had been presented, the

the barn, Ross told the jurors that

towards

her,

supposing

there."

judge, Jonathan Ross, charged

the law of assault and assault and battery. In the case of the

on

the jury

trial

it

As

supposing

was

it

was

in

if

first

incident in

Blodgett had merely exposed himself and 'Vent

accordance with her wishes, and

laid

hands on her

not against her wishes and desire, that would not amount to any assault

second incident

for the

in

the kitchen

Ross instructed the jurors

that:

when he pursued her, (which would evidently indicate that she didn't
desire him to come near her and take hold of her,) if he did take hold of
her,

it

would amount evidently

occasion

if

he exposed himself, and she

went towards
license,

The

to an assault

her,

perhaps

it

and she did not

would be

flee

and battery.

knew what

On

his desire

the second

was, and he

from him, and evidently gave him

virtual consent,

jury then returned a verdict for the defendant

(emphasis

in the original)

and Alexander appealed.

ringing endorsement
Judge Hoyt H. Wheeler began the Supreme Court's opinion with a

of the

right

of persons to be

fi-ee

from

fear

of an

assault.

"The

plaintiff had a right to

person," he wrote, and "any invasion
absolute security against any attempt to violate her

of that

was

right

was

actionable."

unlawful, and

Though

the

if

proceeded with so

trial

far as to interfere with her

person

judge had correctly stated the law for assaults

to take into account the sexual nature of
generally, according to Wheeler, he had failed
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the case before him. Wheeler focused

on

of Judge Ross's instruction

that part

that so

long as the defendant thought Mary desired his attentions his exposing himself, coming

towards

her,

and putting

his

hands on her could not be an assault and battery.

woman or

rejected this, noting that for a 'Virtuous

girl" there

He

could be no more grievous

personal injury than what the defendant attempted to do to her and what mattered was
not what Royal Blodgett thought, but what
If the defendant
sight at

all, it

proceeded

exposed

was

in that

Mary Alexander perceived.

person and went toward the

his

unlawfiil. If he did so

manner

till

when he was

plaintiff in her

near enough or

he got near enough to her to indicate a

purpose to violate her person, and to justly put her in fear that he would
do so, he was guilty of an assault upon her. What he supposed about her
wishes or desires would make
directly

gave him the right

to

it

none the

suppose

so.

an assault unless she
He had no right to make any

less

attempt in that direction without her express and direct consent, and
that, too, first had and obtained. If he proceeded at all without such free

and full

No

consent,

it

was

at his

own

risk,

(emphasis added).

touching was required to prove the sexual assault according to the Court

because the mere "imposition of the fear and the influence

movements and

feelings

no obligation to

flee

consenting "and

if

would

from him

she did so

order to sustain her claim since she might stay without

should not be taken against her." The Court reversed the

defense verdict and returned the case to the

A related case,

1880. Sarah

trial court.^^

and one that shows the Court's soUcitude

process both to compensate

in

would have upon her

constitute an actionable injury to her." Further, she had

in

it

it

women for

NeweU, a young

blind

such

girl,

injuries

came

to

J.

and punish

for the use

of civil

their tormentors,

came

C. Whitcher's house once a week

emphasis on the issue of consent m Blodgett is
the transcript of th.s
a consent defense. We do not have
odd given the feet that defendant never raised
non est factum. Th.s
argued consent as an alternative defense to
case but it is possible that Blodgett

"

Alexander v Blodgett, 44 Vt. 476

may

explain

why the

issue

was

(1 872).

raised at

The

courts'

all.
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to teach his daughters music. After the lesson she

a

room of her own provided by Whitcher and

her room, sat

from

her.

his actions

On appeal,

One

his wife.

sat

up

and recovered a $225 jury

night.

verdict, including

$100

She sued
in punitive

sat

on her bed, leaned over her

There had been no touching, nor a threat of such touching.

sex.

may embarrass and

distress

do not necessarily

to an assault."

The Court,

in

an opinion written by Timothy P. Redfield, disagreed. The

approach by Witcher was an

of the

of the

Whitcher argued, among other things, that what he had done could

Whitcher' s lawyers argued that "acts that

amount

evening, Whitcher entered

for the rest

not constitute an assault on Sarah, since he had merely

and asked her for

for the night in

bed, leaned over her, and repeatedly solicited sexual favors

Sarah rebuffed him, dressed, and

Whitcher for
damages.

down on her

was provided lodging

victim.

assault, Redfield wrote,

The defendant

sat

on her bed

in the

because of its nature and the nature

middle of the night, leaned over her

"with the proffer of criminal sexual intercourse," an act which would "excite the fear and

apprehension offeree

words

Redfield' s

in the

execution of his felonious purpose." The whole act was in

'Hmlawfiil, sinister,

and wicked." His outrage

at

Whitcher showing,

virtuous
Redfield explained that the act of "stealing stealthUy into the bed-room of a

woman at
base

in

midnight to seek gratification of criminal

purpose and

directed at

who would

someone

in act"

dishonorable and

under any circumstances, to say nothing of such an assault

like Sarah,

"a poor, blind

violate every injunction

own hearthstone

lust, is sufficiently

girl

under the protecting care of very man

of hospitality, that he might dishonor and ruin

this unfortunate child,

who had

from such outrage."
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at his

the right to appeal to him to defend her

Having determined

that Whitcher's actions

were a

to the final matter of the appeal-the question of damages.

the

members of the jury

shocked Sarah as to

that if they

The

trial

Redfield turned

judge had instructed

found that Whitcher's actions had so fiightened and

injure her health, as she

compensatory damages

civil assault,

had claimed, then they could award

for that injury. Whitcher's lawyers argued that if his acts

would

not have injured a person of "ordinary nerve and courage" then there could be no
recovery. The Court, without citation to authority, held that the defendant's position

was

true only

manner

in

where

acts,

harmless and innocent in themselves, became wrongfiil by the

which they were done. Under such circumstances, the question of how an

ordinary person would construe them

was

the standard to be applied.

Court simply carved out an exception for cases

like this one.

breaks into the bed-room of a chaste and honest
sexual and criminal

is

commerce with

wrongful, and the act

damages
punitive

for

all

As with

"When a married man

woman at midnight,

is

if perpetrated is criminal;

actual injuries."

damages were

her, the act

However, the

and proposes to her

wholly wrongful; the aim and purpose

and the party offending must answer

The Court added,

in

also without citation to authority, that

available as well.^^

Blodgett, the Court

defendant's perspective. Rather,

showed

little

patience with a defense based on the

men were on notice

that soliciting

women for

sex was a

were absolutely certain
dangerous business and they had better not proceed unless they
their offers

were welcome. And, as we

which the

plaintiff seemed to

involving

women with less

Newell

V.

will see

below,

this

was

be a paragon of Victorian sexual

sterling reputations.

Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589 (1880).
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true not only in cases in

virtue, but also in cases

Such cases
assault,

what

raised another question for the Court. In a civil suit involving sexual

role, if any,

An opinion by the

could the plaintiffs sexual reputation play in the proceedings?

Supreme Court made

the female plaintiff was not a bar to a

reputation did not give

from

men

civil suit for

a free pass to assault

successfiil civil suits for violations

Parker
City Court.

v.

The

clear that the alleged

a fourteen year-old

Coture, came to her house

when her

plaintiff dumped dish

yard

in plain site

trial,

A bad sexual

women or provide them with immunity

civil

ravishment case in the Burlington

girl, testified

parents were out.

dress, grabbed her breasts, put his hands

to have sex with her. At

sexual assault.

of women's bodies.

Coture (1889) started out as a

plaintiff,

bad sexual reputation of

on her

that the Defendant,

He grabbed her,

genitals,

tore

exposed himself to her and

of his

family,

prior unchaste acts or that she

and that men and boys regularly addressed her
in turn participated in these

was unable

was of unchaste

to

show

that Parker

in

obscene

off color

had committed

character. His purpose in introducing

such evidence was not to prove his innocence, but to reduce the damages

trial

tried

water out her window while nude, regularly urinated in her back

conversations. However, the defendant

The

open her

the defendant sought to introduce evidence that the

language without apparent offense and that she

guilty.

Alex

if he

was found

court refused the admission of the character evidence and the jury

awarded her $100. The defendant appealed.

The Supreme Court agreed
civil

that evidence

of a lack of chastity was relevant

ravishment cases as to damages. Judge John

W. RoweU

in

likened civil ravishment

or seduction. In cases of slander for
cases to cases of slander for imputing adultery
reduction in
adultery, he noted, a defendant might seek a
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damages when

it

could be

shown

that "plaintiff was

to the speaking

commonly reputed

of the slanderous words.

and

wounded

modesty was relevant

wounded
actual

feelings."

to

damages because "shock

damages and one of the

principal grounds

The Court held

would

suffer as

much from an

to the sensibility

may

It is

how
is

it

may

plaintiff's

of modesty and

and an important element of

of awarding them"

cannot be said that a

"It

in

cases involvir^

of this kind as a

assault

when

she

woman without modesty

woman with modesty;

cannot be shown that the former has no modesty to shock, she
the latter, and

of the

that the plaintiff put her character in issue

"asks for damages on that score."

is

and

if

it

put on an equality with

recover for injury to that which she does not possess."^^

important to be clear about what the Court did and did not say in this case

said

it.

interesting.

sexual character

First,

the Court's choice of precedents to demonstrate the rule of the

The Court seemed

careful to choose

was impugned and another

did not say that bad sexual character

in

prior

Thus, the defendant

that the question

feelings consequent thereon, constitute a peculiar

sexual assaults.

case

man"

"the loose character and conduct of the daughter."

Given these precedents, the Court held

and

licentious

Similarly, in a seduction suit, "the parent

recovers not only for loss of service but for

show

to be an unchaste

in

was a bar

one example

in

which a man's

which a woman's was. Second, the Court
to such actions, only that

it

could be used

her
determining damages where the plaintiff sought compensation for the shock to

modesty occasioned by the sexual nature of the

assault.

Though one might argue

that

could prejudice the entire
despite such limitations, the introduction of such evidence

Parker
(1890),

v.

Coture, 63 Vt. 155, 156-157 (1890); Parker

Vermont

State Library, Montpelier, Vermont.
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v.

Coture, Vermont Reports Briefs, 63,

proceeding against the female

But as we

plaintiff.

shall see, these cases

were

characterized by a far more complex dynamic.

of these issues came together

All

period under study.

Thomas Welcome
two young
from

Anna Niebyski, a

a

decisions and

their effect

ravishment case brought

late in the

entered her house in late December 1917, grabbed her in front of her

was out
was

civil

Polish immigrant from Galicia, claimed that

children, C£irried her into another

Galicia,

cutting

wood

tried twice.

It

room, and raped

her.

Anna's husband, also

The case generated two Supreme Court

at the time.

raised questions about both reputation and consent and

on Vermont juries.

Welcome, aged
At the

in

first trial,

sbrty-four, denied that anything sexual occurred

between them.

he introduced evidence that Anna had an illegitimate child

living in

Galicia.

His intent was to reduce any potential damages she might claim for injury to her

modesty

resulting

and denied

it

from the

as well.

Anna denied

his claim

and her husband took the stand

also denied telling another Polish immigrant, one Tkorczyk,

child.

about the illegitimate

Anna's husband, the

He

rape.

When the

defense tried to put Tkorczyk on to impeach

plaintiff objected that his

testimony went to a collateral matter. The

court agreed and sustained the objection.

Welcome had

reputation problems of his

plaintiffs counsel asked

Welcome explained

Anna's lawyer then asked about the fiiends

trial.

contend with.

him about a rape he had been prosecuted

before in Greenfield, Massachusetts.

that

own to

The defense objected and

that

On the

stand, the

for several years

he had been acquitted.

who had testified on Welcome's behalf at

the judge sustained the objection. But Anna's

lawyer ploughed ahead anyway asking

if

Welcome had not bragged
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in front

of his wife

about the rape and

how

he had paid

ofif the

witnesses to testify on his behalf.

defendant again objected and the court again sustained

Niebyski $4700

enormous

in

damages, including $2700

verdict for the time."*'

The Supreme Court held

it.

in punitive

The

The jury awarded Anna

damages. This was an

The defendant appealed.
that the defendant

had a

right to

impeach the

plaintiff's

witnesses on relevant matters to the case and thus the judge's refusal to allow Thorczyk

to take the stand

was

error.

It

also held that the defendant had

been prejudiced by the

questions concerning Welcome's alleged witness tampering and that he deserved a

trial.

Welcome had

also argued that the punitive

damages were so excessive

violated the federal and state constitutions. His lawyers pointed out that the

fine for a criminal rape

Aima Niebyski

was only $2000 or $700

in punitive

less

new

that they

maximum

than what the jury had awarded

damages. The circumstances of the rape had not been nearly

heinous enough to warrant such a large award they argued.
occupied but a few
There was no prolonged struggle. The affair
moments. The woman was carried from one room to another and the act
consummated immediately. There was little, if any, bodily injury. She
.

.

.

up and about that night and prepare her husband's meal.
Later she complained of lameness or soreness of the back, but the
evidence also shows that she did not require medical attention, and that
she had previously suffered from a rheumatic trouble.

was

If this

is

the

able to be

same argument Welcome's lawyers made

way towards

explaining the large

damage award

in the first place.

it

may go

part

of the

In any case, the Court

my research
out of the thousands of civil suits documented in
awards larger than the one in Niebyski with the largest, $6800,

By way of perspective,
counties only five had

to the jury,

m the four
commg m a

case included not only permanent physical
malpractice case in which the plaintiff lost his foot. That
alone. Clearly the Niebyski jmy was outraged.
disability, but also $1500 in medical damages
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simply noted that the constitutionahty of punitive damages had been

and refused to

settled in the state

revisit the matter again in Niebyski.

On retrial, Anna Niebyski prevailed again,
Thorczyk's testimony and despite the plaintiffs

Welcome's witness tampering. Only

this

time

despite the introduction of

inability to bring

it

up the matter of

awarded her $2000 instead of

$4700-still a huge verdict, but one clearly reflecting less outrage than that of the

The defendant appealed

jury.

instruct the jury

first

again. This tune he claimed that the judge's refusal to

on consent was

error.

Welcome's lawyers had asked

the court to

explain that if the intercourse had been consensual, than the defendant could not be

liable for

damages. The judge refused and instead phrased the instruction negatively,

tellmg the jurors that if they found by a preponderance of the evidence that

had

laid his

hands on Niebyski without her consent, than they were to find for the

but if not, they were to find for the defendant.

plaintiff,

objected, the judge told

them

of consensual intercourse,

that if there

their objection

judge's charge

was

sufficient

The patterns

When the

had been any evidence

at all.

and affmned the judgment.

was taken

seriously

,

.

„,

,

1

that the

42

bad reputation was not a

by judges and juries-are confirmed by

within the four counties.
the unreported civil cases brought

appeared in an

to support the theory

The Supreme Court held

discernible in the reported decisions-that

bar to suit and sexual assault

defendant's lawyers

might be well founded, but Welcome had

denied that any sexual activity had taken place

,

Welcome

The

earliest sexual assault

Back against eight men who
828 lawsuit brought by Easty and Sally

01 vt 4 1 8

nQ

1

Briefs 93(4), no. 57
QV Niebvski v Welcome, Vermont Reports
Repor. Briefs 95,6), „o.
v. ^./c...

;,?;;^5^Sr:95 V,' S^ll^^^^
86 (1922)
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Ve™™

broke into the house and assaulted Sally "in bed alone being found and then and there
other enormities did to her."

been.

We have to imagine what those "enormities" might have

The use of such euphemisms was common

other cases were more

e5q)licit.

These

suits

in pleadings like this.

But pleadings

in

involved behaviors which ranged from the

defendant stalking the victim and using "vile language," to those in which he exposed
himself, to fondling, to attempted rape, and rape

suits that

were

explicitly sexual.

itself.

I

The cases were brought

have identified sbrteen

in

civil

1828, 1836, 1865, 1869,

1870, 1872, 1873, 1875, 1888, 1893, 1902, 1906, 1911, 1912, 1913, and 1920."' Again,

we

see a pattern in which

women's use of the courts

to vindicate these rights

concentrated after the Civil War. Eleven of these cases were brought by

own names,

three

is

women in their

were brought by married couples, and two were brought by parents or

guardians on behalf of minor

girls.

The average award was very high--$275 per

case.

claims arising out of sexual assaults in the four counties are: Back v.
Parker et ai, Addison County Court, June 1828 Term, vol. 1 1, p. 130-134 (assault on woman in her bed
vol. 17, p. 273by eight men); Quackenbush v. Preston, Addison County Court, December 1836 Term,
September
(stripped her naked, tarred and feathered her); Jones v. Baird, Rutland County Court,

Unreported cases involving

civil

276

Term,
1865 Term, vol. 40, p. 789 (rape); Cutter v. Waterman, Orange County Court, September 1869
Court, December 1870 Term, vol.
vol. 20, p. 572 (attempted rape); Smart v. Hitchcock, Windsor County
Patrick v. Vaughn, Windsor County Court,
30, p. 623 (Defendant exposed himself and fondled her);
D^ember 1872 Term, vol. 31, p. 240-241 (exposed her private parts, handled them, and pulled her
vol. 31, p.
lewd manner); Morse v. Burroughs, Windsor County Court, December 1873 Term,
about in a

on her"); Mines v. Pease,
376 (indecent exposure, pulled her clothes off, and "other indignities did
Hathaway v. Pottle, Rutland
Windsor County Supreme Court, vol 10, p. 299-306 (rape, pregnancy);
under her clothes and felt her
County Court, September 1888 Term, vol. 49, p. 448-449 (forced hands
Term, vol. 50, p. 612-613 (pushed her
private parts); Ely v. Cannon, Rutland County Court, May 1893
Chamberlain v. Putnam, Windsor County
around, made indecent proposals, put his hands on her);
and insuhing language and sohcitmg her to have
Court, June 1902 Term, vol. 38, p. 31-32 (using vulgar
June 1906 Term, vol. 35, p. 103-105 (rape);
intercourse); Hoole v. Tomlin, Addison County Court,
191 1 Term, vol. 60, p. 161-163; Hier v. Bodette,
Lillick V Hoag, Rutland County Court, September
(stalking and calling her vile names); Foley v
Addison County Court, June 1912 Term, vol. 35, p. 603
587-588 (threw his arms aroimd
Dockham, Windsor County Court, December 1913 Term, vol. 39, p.
June 1920
her); Lyon v. Severy, Windsor County Court,
her, kissed her on the face, intended to rape
Term, vol. 40, p. 507-508 (rape, pregnancy).

67

The average

rises

even higher

—

^to

$305 per case— if we throw out a one cent damage

award from the Back case mentioned

earlier.

The reputation of the woman was not
Quackenbush sued

after being stripped

probably a prostitute. At a criminal

staying

two years

witnesses

earlier, the

credible.

jury convicted.

At the

$400 damages

in 1836.'^

naked and tarred and feathered. She was

trial

for an assault

on the house where she was

defendants had sought to impeach the state's

—Quackenbush and

and therefore not

necessarily an impediment. Harriet

another

The court

civil trial,

—on grounds

woman

that they

were

prostitutes

refiised to allow the character evidence

and the

the jury found her attacker guilty and awarded her

In addition to those cases which explicitly alleged sexual assault, others had

sexual overtones to

verdicts.

One has

them and juries may well have taken this

to read between the lines in such cases. Thus, for example,

Chamberlain was ridden out on a
found the assault to be

enormous sum

in

wilftil

rail "full

of knots and

Mary

by three men. The court
in

damages

—an

1868. Other cases alleged assaults occurring during break-ins, or

and the large damages

The

physical nature of the assaults

in these cases indicate the possibility

of a sexual component."'

Allen Smith et ai, Addison County Supreme Court, January 1835
151-154. The civil case vvas Quackenbush v. Preston, Addison County Court,

The criminal case was
vol. "B.5," p.

nails"

and malicious and awarded $960

involved horsewhipping and being dragged about.

Term,

into account in their

December 1836 Term,

State

v.

vol. 17, p.

273-276.

vol. 26 p. 563-564 ($300); Chamberlain v.
Vernal v Adams, Addison County Court, June 1858 Term,
Term, vol. 30, p. 318-321 ($960, rode her out
Walbridge et ai, Windsor County Court, December 1868
Supreme Court, March 1878 Term, vol. 20, p. 222
of town on a rail); Priest v. Curtis, Orange County
June 1902 Term, vol.
v. Gilpin, Orange County Court,
($93 broke into house and assaulted her); Waters
Vt. 41 (1915) ($863,
willful and malicious); Rogers v. Bigelow, 90
23, p. 465 ($129, assault held to be
her about).
st^ck her with a horsewhip, laid hold of her and dragged
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The
cases.

confirms patterns aheady noticeable in the defamation

civil assault data

Women had access to civil causes of action to

their bodily

and sexual

outcomes from these

They used

integrity.

suits.

seek vindication for violations of

this access

Although the success

and could expect favorable

rate for

men was

women received much higher average damages in these cases.
have been sexual
in higher

That the assault

may

m nature did not impede recovery, but in fact seems to have resulted

damage awards. Furthermore,

the idea that

slightly higher,

the

Supreme Court

women of poor reputation should not have

actions of men

who

hurt

seemed

hostile to

access to the courts for

vindication of their right to physical and sexual autonomy.

woman could not excuse the

at least

The poor

women, but

it

reputation of a

could affect the

for injury to their sexual
value of their civil damages where they sought compensation

sensibilities or reputations.

The

courts did not allow

mipunity, even those with poor reputations.

Supreme Court made
It

assauh

women with

And perhaps most surprisingly, the

men approached women

seeking sex

at their

own risk.

to the

woman to

the man,
decide whether she had been sexually assaulted, not

women,

especially

women

was up

Lastly,

clear that

men to

suing in their

own name, seemed to have turned to

in greater
the court for vindication of their rights

numbers

after the Civil

War.

Rrparh of Marriag e Promise

Breach of mamage promise

men

who had engaged

them

to

in

provided an avenue for single

reneged or
moral or sexual promises and then

have sex. Several of these

resulted.

suits

suits

These cases were brought

in

women to
who had

sue

forced

pregnancy had
claimed that intercourse and

had to show
assumpsit (contract). The plaintiff

69

that

a promise of marriage had been made by the defendant and

The defendant's

failure to then enter into

that she

had accepted

it.

a marriage constituted the breach. While

some

cases might present witness testimony or written evidence of an offer of marriage,

many

did not. In these cases, jurors were asked to determine whether the plaintiff had

reason to believe that an offer had in fact been made and accepted. Plaintiffs thus

sought to introduce evidence of courtship.
In

its earliest case,

the

Supreme Court held

that

mere

attentions paid

by one

party to the other, even if long-standing and exclusive, were not sufficient in and of

themselves to establish a contract to marry. Instead, in the absence of an express

promise of marriage,
effect, this

meant

it

that

was the meaning of that

it

was

entirely

up

attention that

to juries to determine

would decide the

case. In

whether a promise had

been made or not based on the circumstances of the case. Juries were thus confronted
with a variety of evidence, from discussions about fixing up the defendant's house in
preparation for marriage, to detailed discussions of the defendant's financial statements,
to a neighbor's testimony that the parlor lights

went on whenever the defendant was

the plaintiffs house-the regular use of this special

plaintiff, that courtship

important to a woman.

status afforded to married

It

was

indicating, according to the

was under way."^

In a traditional society like

vitally

room

at

also the single best

It

in the nineteenth century, marriage

meant the opportunity

women,

way

Vermont

to start a family,

for a

woman to

was

for her to acquire the elevated

perhaps to have a home of her own.

attain a

measure of financial

security.

(standard of proof and

- Munson v Hastings 12 Vt 346 (1839); Whitcomb v. Wolcott, 21 Vt. 368 (1849)
Lalor, 94 Vt. 103 (1920) (discussion
ev^^LTof re~de^^^^^^ Luse):Z>... v.
Clark

V.

Hodges, 65 Vt. 273 (1893) (parlor

lights).
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of fmances);

Indeed, the extent to which women's self-definition and even base survival were tied to

marriage compared to those of men
suits

may

and why those who did were so

especially to

women,

expectations dashed.

explain

why few men felt the need to

unsuccessful.'''

Given the importance of marriage,

breach of marriage promise cases had

all

When Annie

bring such

at their heart the

notion of

Pollock found out that James Sullivan was not going

to marry her despite his promises (due partly to the fact that he

was

already married), she

sued him, declaring that as a result of his actions, she "has suffered great wrong and
injury

and damage to her

money

value,

feelings

and disappointment of her reasonable expectations,

and worldly advantages of marriage, permanent home, and advantage of

domestic happiness." Annie and her lawyers put a price on

this

damage:

$3000.'** In

an

opinion upholding the largest judgment ever awarded in such a case in the four counties.

Judge Fred M. Butler described the breach

this

way: "The contract

is

broken; fond hope,

so long and ardently cherished, has been forever dissipated, and the advantages she

might reasonably have anticipated are forever

lost to her.""'

Breach of promise cases presented a variety of factual scenarios. Thomas

Ketcham was supposed

to marry

Anna Thatcher when he

Instead, he married Jane Horton. In 1855, a jury

Elizabeth Pattison

after ten years,

1

892.

He

Suits by

came

work

as a housekeeper for

Hugh

Williams in

paid her $100 to settle that claim. She sued him again in

men were

so rare by the twentieth century that one

Sullivan, 53 Vt.

v.

Dolan, 88 Vt. 369 (1914).

507 (1881).

Pollock

V.

Dyer

Lalor, 94 Vt. 103 (1920).

v.

awarded Thatcher $1000
1

in

damages.

882.

When,

he refused to marry her, she sued him for breach of marriage promise in

possible "in theory." Stacey

^'

to

finished medical school.
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1

896 arguing

that he

Supreme Court justice described them

as

had promised her a house when she
settled

A referee ruled that the

retired.

1

892 payment had

disputes between them.^°

all

In another case the plaintiff argued that the parties had agreed to marry
after a
trial

run of keeping house together. William Forbes and Lucy Wells agreed that she

would keep house

for

him and

his children

with an eye towards marriage

if things

worked out between thenx When Lucy married another man, Frank Morse, Forbes sued
her in

1

892.

He

pursued Wells and Forbes for several years,

finally losing his

case against

her for breach of marriage promise and against Morse for enticing Lucy away from
him.''

This

last

and many involved pre-marital intercourse or

in big verdicts,

plaintiff had

had sex with another man. These

recovery. In

He

case notwithstanding, most suits were brought by

1

839,

last facts

Lama Ann Munson sued AppoUos

women, most

eillegations that the

resulted

female

were no impediment to

Hastings for breach of promise.

defended himself by arguing that she had had sex with another man. She denied

The jury

believed her and awarded $ 1 385. Hastings appealed and

it.

won a new trial, this

time bolstering the evidence of Laura Ann's promiscuity with additional witness

testimony. She

won again,

this time

recovering $1425." In 1866 Susan Lamphaere sued

Carlos Pitkin for seducing her, impregnating her, and then refusing to marry her,

Thatcher

v.

Ketcham, Rutland County Court, March 1854 Term,

Rutland County Court, September 1896 Term,
"

vol. 53, p.

"

Mumon

v.

Hastings, 12 Vt. 346 (1839);

Munson

v.

v.

Williams,

919-923.

Forbes v. Morse, Rutland County Court, March 895 Term,
County Court, March 1896 Term, vol. 53, p. 57-60.
1

vol. 34, p. 66.; Pattison

vol. 52, p.

232-239; Forbes v. Morse, Rutland

Hastings, Rutland County Court, April 1839

The two witnesses were later prosecuted for perjury and convicted.
Davidson, Rutland County Supreme Court, February 1840 Term, vol. 110, p. 21-22.

Terra, Docket No. 53.
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State

v.

'Svhereby she has suffered great damage in her good name, fame and reputation and been

otherwise injured." Pitkin defaulted and the court awarded Lamphaere $750 in damages.
In

1

889 Lizzie Currier sued Joseph Richardson claiming

intercourse with her, and then married another.

judgment
pregnant.

for

$750 entered

against him.

Kimball took her to a

man he

The defendant agreed

she sued and

won $2000

Reed sued John Kimball

said

was a justice of the

had two children with him before learning

suits

peace, but

that the marriage

He

in

damages

" Susan Lamphaere
J.

who was

v.

in fact

not

more than two years and

was

brought between 1805 and 1919

(fifteen),

1919."

fraudulent and that

in

(all

latter in

1901

but two of which

a positive result for the

plaintiff.

court (two), referee (one), by default (one) and

Carlos Pitkin, Windsor County Court,

May

1866 Term,

vol. 29, p.

452-453; Lizzie

275-282;
Joseph N. Richardson, Windsor County Court, December 1889 Term, vol. 35, p.
vol. 62, p. 892-894.
Tripp v. Henry E. Cheney, Rutland County Court, September 1919 Term,

Currier

Mary E.

by jury

in

got

defaulted and the court awarded her $2000.

appeared after 1847) twenty (87 percent) ended
Plaintiffs prevailed

had

to have a

Kimball was also charged with bigamy and adultery and convicted of the

Of twenty-three

her,

in tort for fraudulent marriage.

authorized to perform marriages. She lived with Kimball for

Kimball was married to another woman.

had seduced

Mary Tripp had sex with Henry Cheney and

When he refused to marry her,

In a similar type of case, Elnora

that he

v.

^ Elnora Reed v. John

F. Kimball,

Orange County Court, December 1900 Term,

vol. 23, p.

396-397;

Orange
Orange County Court, June 1901 Term, Docket No. 1 111; State v. Kimball,
makes clear that the merger doctrme
County Court, June 1902 Term, Docket No. 1 170. Kimball also
civil and criminal vindication for sexual wrongs
did not apply in Vermont. Women could seek both
Hoadiey v. Watson, 45 Vt. 289
committed against them. See also State v. Damon, 2 Tyl. 387 (1803);
Thus, the Vermont evidence
Hoadiey involved a non-sexual assault by a man on a woman.
1

State V Kimball,

(

873)

from seeking redress
Lea VanderVelde's assertion that merger prevented women
Law Review 4i (1996):
sexual wrongs. "The Legal Ways of Seduction," Stanford

calls into question

the courts for

m

m-

850.
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settlement (one).

a non-suit by

Onjy one case resulted

plaintiff

Two

in a not guilty verdict.

cases resulted in

—which may or may not have reflected a settlement.

could be enormous. In sixteen of the seventeen cases
ascertainable, the average

award was $971 This
.

enormous) judgment of $20,000 awarded

in

Damages

which damages were

figure excludes

an anomalous (because

to a female plaintiff in

1

91 9. If that figure

is

included, the average rises to $2090. Only four of the twenty-three suits were brought

Two

by men.

of those

suits resulted in defeults

by the

plaintiff,

one resulted

in the

only

not guilty verdict, and one received an award of $25-the smallest damage award during

the period. In fact,

rates

when

the male plaintiffs are stripped out of the data, the success

and average damage awards for female

$1034

plaintiffs

were even higher (100 percent and

respectively).

How can we explain both the success rates of these cases and the size of the
awards?

It is

clear that the cost

of caring

for illegitimate offspring

was not a

part of

these damages. For one thing, even in cases where the intercourse did not lead to

pregnancy, the female plaintiff recovered a large sum. Secondly, the cost of raising the

child

was not an element of damages

for such

in

a breach of marriage case. The appropriate

an injury was a bastardy proceeding.

wedlock could bring both a

suit for

Women who

became pregnant out of

breach of marriage promise and for bastardy. This

what Mary Tripp did for example. In addition to the $2000 she
for breach

of marriage promise, she recovered $300

"Suits were brought

in

suit

won

for the costs she

fi-om

is

Henry Cheney

had incurred

in

1862, 1864, 1866,
1805, 1839, 1848, 1849, 1851, 1852, 1853, 1854, 1855, 1856,

1867, 1871, 1889, 1893, 1895, 1896(2), 1911, 1919(2).
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taking care of the child to the date of judgment plus $6.50 per

week

in child

support until

the child's sixteenth birthday. Cheney's fickleness cost him dearly.^^

Instead of compensating

seems

clear that juries

were

in fact

marriage promise but also for
not technically permit

part

of the damages

Stokes

V.

Mason

women for the

costs of raising a baby out-of-wedlock,

compensating

women not

their seduction as well.

women to

sue for their

in these suits.

(191 1) a case

in

In

1

91

1

,

own

the

only for the breach of

Unlike

many

states,

plaintiff

Vermont

did

was an obvious

seduction, but this

Supreme Court made

which the female

it

this explicit in

sought damages for

seduction as part of her breach of marriage promise case. The idea of allowing such

suits created

it

was

a moral quandary for male lawmakers and feminists

unfair to allow a

woman 'Ho

engaged

in premarital sex.

On the

one hand

recover indirectly what the law has emphatically and

consistently forbidden her to recover." She

Court, because in seduction, the

alike.

was forbidden

man and woman were

to recover, according to the

equally at fault both having

At the same time, unless she were allowed

damages on account of the seduction, she would be prevented
circumstances contributing to the "distress of mind which

is

fi-om

to plead her

showing

all

the

an acknowledged element of

her damage."

The Court resolved
which took place

the matter by distinguishing between consensual intercourse

absence of the promise of marriage

in the

which took place within

it.

It

admitted that this

was not a

(i.e.

seduction) and that

strong distinction, for even

the
the intercourse took place in the context of a marriage promise,

if

woman was

Nonetheless, this
"nevertheless a responsible and consenting party to an immoral act."

Tripp

V.

Cheney, Rutland County Court, September 1919 Term,
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vol. 60, p.

892-894.

.

distinction

was

right to claim

the best the Court could do. In the case of seduction, the

damages

for her wrongful behavior-only her father did.

woman had no

But

in this case,

she had been impregnated based on a fraudulent promise and had a right to a complete

remedy

for the

damages sustained on account of the breach of that promise. The Court

recognized that the question "[might] not be entirely free from technical
that there

was "an element of justice

Court ruled that a

woman suing

a

in this solution

man

for breach

difficulties,"

but

of it that cannot be gainsaid." The

of marriage promise could add her

seduction as an aggravation of her damages. That

is,

her agreement to engage in

intercourse and/or ensuing pregnancy, occurring as a result of a marital promise,

was an

aspect of her damages and so should be allowed as part of the suit."

The

late date

of the Stokes decision notwithstanding,

it

is

unpublished cases that the seduction aspect of breach of marriage

accepted aspect of damages

in

such

suits.

As

early as

1

from the

clear

ceises

866 complaints

had long been an
in

breach of

marriage promise cases had referenced the "great damage in her good name, fame and
reputation" suffered by

women who had

been impregnated and then jilted. That

complaint had even used the word "seduced." Other cases detailed the

breach had deprived

plaintiffs

"aid, comfort, assistance

of the "care, custody, control,

and society" of their

fiances.

language of a seduction complaint.^* Thus, Stokes

Supreme Court confirmed the

'

stokes

V.

Mason, 85

practice

is

aid,

As we

way

in

which the

comfort and society" or

will see, this is also the

yet another example in which the

and values being applied

at the

county court

level.

Vt. 164 (1911).

Lamphaere v. Pitkin, Windsor County Court, May 1866 Term,
Windsor County Court, December 1867 Term, vol. 30, p. 128-13 1
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vol. 29, p.

452-453; Ashley

v.

Tupper,

Nonetheless, breach of marriage promise cases posed cultural and theoretical
challenges to Vermont's legal system.

Of all the causes of action examined

work,

in this

they featured the oddest and least compatible combinations of persons, venues, and
ideologies appearing in the courtroom. First, breach of promise cases were almost

always brought by that oxymoronic creature, the feme
legally capable person.

sole, a

woman who was also

a

A female in the courtroom acting in her own capacity was

antithetical to the legal regime

of Vermont and the nation, both

in a technically legal

sense as well as in the more general sense of the masculine culture of the courtroom.^'

Second, these

suits

asked the courts to apply legal/contractual principles, normally part

of the public (male) world of business, to the

private, intimate

world of domestic

courtship. Third, in cases where premarital sex had taken place, judges and juries were

confronted with the paradox of awarding money to

women who

had had intercourse

outside of marriage. In order to assimilate these oppositional values, someone's

ideology had to give way.
Stokes

summed up

between compensating

the tensions in these kinds

women for wrongs done to

of suits. The courts had

them-that

is

treating

choose

to

women as they

law to shore up
did any other injured party turning to the court for reUef or using the
gender and sexual expectations. The Stokes opinion was
the choices judges and juries had to

the other cases

5'

we

explicit

about the

make when confronted with these

of

difficulty

choices.

But

like

an
have examined, breach of marriage promise cases demonstrate

Michael Grossman, "Institutionalizing Masculinity: The

Law as

a Masculine Profession," in

Victorian America, Mark Games and Clyde
Meanings for Manhood: Constructions of Masculinity in
Chicago Press, 1990).
Griflfen, eds. (Chicago: University of
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inclination

on the

As a result,

is

part of judges and juries to hold their noses

was men who ended up being punished

and choose compensation.

for the violation

of their sexual,

gender, and (sometimes) contractual obligations rather than women.

Bastardy

Bastardy too provided

women with a remedy for the harm caused by

—

assault or out-of-wedlock sexual activity

so in a

^the

expense involved in raising a

way which was completely non-judgmental about

conception.

It

child.

It

did

the circumstances of the

did not matter whether the conception resulted from a rape or from

volxmtary, non-marital sex.

resulted

sexual

It is

impossible to

from forced sex and how many as a

know how many of these

result

pregnancies

of consensual sex, though

anecdotally that both situations resulted in bastardy

suits.

I

we know

have documented 142

bastardy cases in the four counties brought between 1784 and 1920 although there were

almost certainly more that were settled and not entered into the clerk's record books.

The

suits are fairly evenly dispersed

going to

trial

throughout the period with approximately ten cases

or verdict per decade.^ These cases had very high success rates. Ninety-

one cases resulted

in

a finding of guilt either by a judge, jury, or stipulation. Another

eleven were settled and discontinued and in eight others the court entered a default

judgment for the
Only

The
1860s

plaintiff.

Taken

all

together this amounts to a 77 percent success rate.

fifteen cases resulted in a not guilty verdict (1

1

percent). In the remaining cases the

1850s (10),
dispersion of cases was: 1800s (5), 1810s (2), 1820s (13), 1830s (13), 1840s (1 1),
1890s (12), 1900s (15), 1910s (23). The very high figure for the
1880s
1870s
(9),

(16),

(9),

which appeared in the docket books as
period 1910 to 1920 can be attributed to Addison County cases
may well have been settled and not
being settled and discontinued thus indicating that more suits
entered into the clerk's record books.
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plaintiff was non-suited, the case discontinued or dismissed-all

indicate a settlement.

I

could ascertain the award paid to the plaintiff by verdict or

settlement in ninety-one cases.

a young

of which could also

women employed

The average award was $208 or

several year's salary for

as a servant or mill hand. Payments averaged between $100

and $200 through the 1860s. From the 1870s onward, the payments increased to

between $200 and $400 up to 1920 with some

variation.

Normally these payments were

divided into weekly, monthly or quarterly payments extending out over the customary

four years required by

its first

four years

common law. Payment

was a

real

it

was

of raising the

child during

and tangible form of partial compensation which the law

provided on a no-feult basis to

And

for the expense

women who

truly a no-fault system.

had been impregnated out of wedlock.^'

Vermont's

trial

courts and the Supreme

Court repeatedly rebuffed attempts by male defendants to smear the female
complainant's sexual character. Since the only question to be answered in bastardy

proceedings was paternity, the courts did not allow even the limited character attacks

had begun to allow

As

in rape cases

early as 1832,

where consent was an

Vermont

A house servant earned as

issue after 1855."

Vermont's Supreme Court rejected an attempt by a defendant

to smear the female complainant's character. Parmelia

In 1837 a female

it

Morse had

testified that she

had

hand could earn as much as $3.15 per week less $1.25 for her board.
in
as one dollar per week. Deborah P. Clifford, "Vermont 'Mill Girls,'"

mill

little

the Past (Montpelier,
Micheal Sherman and Jennie Versteeg, eds., tVe Vermonters: Perspectives on
hands and $3 to $4
Vermont Historical Society, 1992), 219-224. By the 1880s the salary was $5 for mill
in Chapter 2. The highest payment in a bastardy
for a housekeeper. See discussion of wages for women
Rutland County Court in 1913 to Lydia
case not adjusted for inflation was $678 awarded by the
brought a separate suit for seduction and received $1200. Lydia
Fitzgerald,

whose

father

Thomas had

September 1913 Term, vol. 60, p. 708-710.
Fitzgerald v Patrick Connors, Rutland County Court,
Tapping Reeve, 2"' ed. (Burlington, 1 846), 277Lucius E. Chittenden, The Law of Baron and Femme by
278.

"

The

case, State

v.

Johnson, 28 Vt. 512 (1856),

is

discussed in Chapter 4.
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been impregnated by John
had been "a

that she

J.

Pineo. Pineo's lawyer then sought to introduce evidence

common prostitute"

prior to her impregnation.

objected to the evidence and the court agreed.

On

It

The

plaintiff

was excluded and Pineo found

liable.

appeal, Pineo's lawyers sought to justify the admission of sexual character evidence

by analogizing the bastardy proceeding to a rape

They argued

trial.

the bad sexual character of the alleged victim might be

credibility.

The Vermont Supreme Court would not hold

admissible in a rape

trial

Massachusetts case for

If such evidence

this proposition.

"how much

when

such evidence was

used to impeach a witness's

its

admission

also cited the Massachusetts

was immaterial

this

clear that evidence that

in a bastardy proceeding, "the

own confession"

the plaintiff and upheld the verdict.

Morse was a

prostitute

identify the real reason

test

i.e.

The Court

had nothing to do with her

competence as a witness. Though Chief Justice Titus Hutchinson did not

by the

time for the

had had sex out of wedlock.

The Supreme Court agreed with

made

a private

about her sexual

Supreme Court,

witness's character for chastity being suflSciently impeached by her

that she

in

rape case,

of character for truth could be

credibility rather than specific questions

proposition that sexual character evidence

in a

on a

she testifies to her previous purity."

plaintiff argued that only general evidence

Her lawyers

impeach her

was appropriate

stronger the reason for

prosecution, and for her sole benefit, and

reputation.

that

in order to

for another twenty-three years, so the defendant had to rely

Pineo's lawyers went on,

The

shown

that in a rape case,

explicitly

he believed the evidence had been introduced, he seemed angered

tactic, lecturing the

defendant that

if

a

woman were

a prostitute that "can be no

of the particular grade of confidence, that should be placed

80

in

her testimony. There

is

a difference, in

among persons of this

this respect,

defendant wanted to challenge the credibility of a

welcome
telling,

to

do

so, but only

and not by resort to

character as well as others." If the

plaintiff in a bastardy case,

by means of general evidence of her character

he was

for truth

specific sexual reputation evidence.

Hutchinson was not done however.

He

also challenged the plaintiff's use

Massachusetts case which had prohibited the use of sexual character evidence
cases. In that decision, the

chastity

was immaterial

Supreme

since the

Judicial

of the

in bastardy

Court reasoned that evidence of lack of

woman's condition akeady confirmed her

loose morals.

Hutchinson rejected the logic of this argument too. Such a theory, he wrote:
supposes that none but

common prostitutes

are found in this situation.

This cannot be a correct supposition. Undoubtedly some are seduced and
ruined, with

no connection with any but

that such a reputation

to ascertain,

how

is

no

their seducer.

certain, correct test

far the reputation

The

true reason

of truth. There

of a prostitute

is

is,

no way

affects her truth, but

by

proving her character for truth.
In 1843, the Court heard an almost identical case. Spears

v.

Forrest. In Spears,

the defendant had sought to introduce evidence that the plaintiff lived in a brothel and

was "a notorious

had been found Uable. In

his

lawyer noted the decision

in

to overturn

it.

female, for

trial

court had rejected the evidence and the defendant

arguments before the Supreme Court, the defendant's

Morse eleven years before and sought

to convince the Court

His argument before the Court dripped with sarcasm.

any unfairness to

more probing

The

prostitute."

his client but to other witnesses

inquiries

money,

on the

stand.

whom, he

Morse v. Pineo, 4 Vt. 281

(1 832).

focused not on

claimed were subject to

"The notorious and professional

effectually prevents any discussion

He

prostitution

of the truth and veracity of such a

The Massachusetts case was Commonwealth v. Moore,

194(1825).
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of the

3 Pick. (Mass.)

The virtuous

person.

know

others only

reason

why

the jury."

part of society,

fit

to be impeaching witnesses, shun her; and the

her in her all-absorbing professional reputation. Yet, by this rule, the

her truth and veracity are not called into question must be kept a secret fi-om

He

urged the Court to adopt the Massachusetts rule that gave lawyers the

prove "notorious professional prostitution."

right to

The Court
Bennett,

rejected these arguments and upheld Morse. In his brief opinion, Milo

who would prove

to be a consistent critic

evidence in most judicial proceedings,

flatly

of the use of specific sexual character

declared that evidence of prostitution

was

not admissible to impeach the character of Esther Spears. After two direct decisions on

the point in the

Vermont

courts, "the question cannot be considered, with us, as an

one, whatever the decisions

In general, the

rest

may have been

Supreme Court's

in

some of our

ruling in

cases would be

somewhat loosened

after

sister states."^

Morse governed bastardy

of the century and beyond. Although the standard

open

suits for the

for character evidence in rape

1855 the courts remained

resistant to

opening

the door for such evidence in bastardy proceedings. Thus, in 1848, the Court refiised to

allow

in

evidence that the plaintiff had sought out an abortion upon learning that she was

pregnant.

The

trial

judge had excluded the evidence. In another opinion, Milo Bennett

explained:

quite obvious, that to have allowed the inquiry
improper. Let the question have been answered as
It is

would have been
it

might have been, the

answer could have had no tendency either to have proved or disproved
child or not, - which
the fact, whether the defendant was the father of the
was the point at issue. If there were no other reason, why the question

« Spears

v.

Forrest, 15 Vt. 435 (1843).
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should not have been asked, this was sufficient. Certainly it could not
be
claimed as proper matter by way of impeaching the witness.^^
It

was Milo Bennett who would be

the lone dissenter seven years later

when

the Court

decided to permit the introduction of specific sexual character evidence as a means of

impeaching the

credibility

Twenty years

of alleged rape victims.
Court again reasserted the impermissibility of smearing the

later the

sexual reputations of bastardy

plaintiflfs.

Ella Luce,

aged

sixteen,

had been taken

Sylvester Sterling and his wife ten years before and had taken their

She

testified that Sylvester

name

as her

in

by

own.

had been having sex with her since she was eleven and that

was he who had impregnated

her.

In Sterling

v.

Sterling

unleashed the whole gamut of defense tactics against

(1

Ella.

868), the defendant

Evidence that Ella had sought

an abortion, had been sexually promiscuous, and had a bad reputation for truth were
admitted by

we

trial

judge James Barrett and the defendant had been found not

will see, Barrett

was

it

particularly unwilling to respect clear precedent

guilty.

when

with his conservative moral beliefs and was seemingly hostile toward female

it

all

As

clashed

plaintiffs in

sex cases.

In reversing Barrett, the

smear

tactics in bastardy cases.

the only issue to be decided

prostitute, or a

Sterling, Barrett

that

reiterated

The simple

of the matter was

had allowed

killer

in

fact

was

irrelevant

V.

that in bastardy cases

and could not mitigate damages. In

evidence of intercourse and familiarity with other

were out of time and thus could not possibly have

Sweet

its

paternity. That the plaintiff was promiscuous, a

was

would-be baby

position against the use of

Supreme Court

Sherman, 21 Vt. 23 (1848).
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led to Ella's pregnancy.

men

The

defendant's presumption-that

if

she had had intercourse with these

men before,

she

could very well have had intercourse with them later-was rejected by the Supreme Court
as resting

on

far

too speculative a

had long ago decided

that

As

basis.

for the issue of abortion, the Court noted

such inquiries were irrelevant

Sweet case discussed above.

It

it

in bastardy cases, citing the

reaffirmed earlier holdings that only general evidence of

character for truth telling were permissible in bastardy cases. The Court would continue
to resist eflforts to smear bastardy plaintiffs' reputations in the fliture.^^

In assessing the Court's holdings in bastardy cases,

that juries, judges,

was on

was

the

hook

in general

for the support

to prevent the

woman refiised

and society

woman and

of the

child

made

After

child.

all,

the impetus behind bastardy laws

from becoming a charge on the town. If a poor

to bring a bastardy suit, and

it

easier for plaintiffs or

defendants a strategy that might
character of the female

was

it

likely that the child

all

it

would become a

on her behalf^' The Court's

towns to win bastardy cases by denying

move some judges and juries-smearing the

sexual

plaintiff.

But practical considerations did not

Not

important to remember

had an incentive to make sure that some man

charge on the town, the overseer of the poor could bring

holdings

it is

states foreclosed

entirely

govern Vermont's bastardy law.

such strategies or foreclosed them so

forcefully. Recall

Judge Hutchinson going out of his way to distinguish Vermont practice from

Sterling

v.

Sterling, 41 Vt. 80 (1868).

In that case the
father ten

Court held that

it

Thus see

had been

example, Wilkins

for

v.

that

he should not hire the

for

example Revised Laws of Vermont, 1880

§

2409 (Rutland, 1881).
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of

he had told his

plaintiff as a servant because

of her character. The Court held that such evidence was too remote from any
and that it was "calculated to prejudice the complainant's case."

See

that

Metcalf, 71 Vt. 103 (1898).

error to allow the defendant to testify that

months before the alleged conception

Chief

feet in issue in the case

Massachusetts
bastardy

suit.

in the

woman bringing

women were

not credible or trustworthy. The Court's choices in

matter reflected a broader theme running through

much of its

civil

and criminal

jurisprudence. In evaluating the claims of parties, Vermont law tended to see

individuals

a

Other states did allow the introduction of such evidence on the theory that

immoral or unchaste
this

meaning to be given to the character of any

first

women as

and gendered beings second. Generalized assumptions about gender did

figure prominently in determining the nature

proper punishment for men. But

in

of the

injury to

women or

girls

and the

both theory and practice, judges and juries refused to

apply assumptions about gender to explain the specific actions of females except

in

rape

cases dealing specifically with the issue of consent.^*

Vermont's law

differed in another important way. Unlike

including Connecticut,

New Hampshire, Maine,

woman had

the putative father during her "travail"

not

named

prevent her fi"om bringing her

suit

some

in addition to Massachusetts,

State, 4 Del.

568 (1845); State

v.

states did permit

and Massachusetts, the

(i.e.

other states,

fact that a

during labor) did not

at the trial.^^

or testifying

Allowing evidence of immorality or lack of chastity

many

in bastardy cases

it.

State

v.

was the

exception. Nonetheless,

Seevers, 108 Iowa 738 (1899); Short

Coatney, 8 Yerg. (Tenn.) 210 (1835); Sword

v.

Nestor, 3

Dana

v.

(Ky.)

453 (1835).

On

the requirement of travail statements, see Beals

10 Cush. (Mass.) 284 (1852);

490 (1796). The theory was

Rodiman

v.

v.

Furbish, 39 Me. 469 (1855); Bailey

Hardy, 18 N.H. 431 (1846); Warner

that in order to

v.

v.

Chesley,

Willey, 2 Root (Conn.)

overcome the common law's prohibition against the

admission of interested party testimony there had to be some additional guarantee for the veracity of the
unlikely that a woman
allegation. The trauma of childbirth was deemed sufficient since it was thought

would lie "in the time of her utmost peril, with the fear of death and judgment before her eyes."
Maxwell v. Hardy, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 560 (1829). Vermont's earliest bastardy statutes (adopted from
constitution, the
Connecticut law) contained the travail requirement. But after adoption of the 1793
the woman until at least
requirement was dropped and in feet Vermont law prohibited examination of

one month
191-196.

after the delivery.

The

travail rule

1

Laws of Vermont (Rutland, 798),
modem people, but interestingly, the law still makes

779 Vt. Acts 82;

may seem odd to

1

787

Vt. Acts 2

1 ;

1

including the excited utterance and
exceptions for otherwise inadmissible statements made in extremis,
Vt. R. Evid. 803(2) and 804(2).
dying declaration exceptions and exclusions to the hearsay rule.
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Furthermore, though a town could bring a bastardy
refused to do so herself, bastardy

Vermont
stead

the

—

it

town

belonged to the

law, if she died before bringing suit, the

was personal
later

to her.

in cases

Where

a

it

woman and

a woman's

in

name

if she

not the town. Under

town could not bring

woman had

recovered money from the father

required the town to pay

Even

still

suit in

the action in her

paid for the support of the child and

a bastardy proceeding, Vermont law

over to her as reimbursement for sums already expended.

where a town had taken over the prosecution

for bastardy

she did not become "a mere nominal party without interest,"

from the

And no town could

woman
settle

the suit without her "consent and approbation." In other words, Vermont's bastardy law

was driven by something more than a purely

utilitarian effort at getting local

communities off the hook for the cost of raising iUegitimate
Bastardy provided

paternity, to

win

women the

child support,

children.

ability to turn to the state for

determination of

and to have the support order enforced. Judges could

and did require men to post bonds for the payment of support or hold them
failing to

comply with

their orders.

Vermont law discarded

in jail for

Success rates and support awards were very high.

the harsher and

more judgmental aspects of an

earlier

bastardy

law, even while other nearby states did not. Furthermore, while the law might not

compensate a

woman completely

for the

damage of say,

sexual assault or injury to her

sexual reputation caused by out-of-wedlock pregnancy, neither
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was

it

an exclusive

remedy. Seduction and bastardy

suits

could be brought in tandem as could suits for

breach of marriage promise and bastardy.

And

they were.'"

Conclusion
Nineteenth-century Vermont law provided

civil

remedies to

women and

girls

who

had been sexually dishonored, physically assaulted, impregnated or abandoned. Judges
and juries demonstrated a

clear

sympathy

rewarded them with favorable verdicts and large damage awards. In
applying the law of this area, Vermonters had to choose

was more

and they

for plaintiffs bringing these suits

crafting

among competing

and

values.

What

important, a female's right to be safe from sexual assault or a man's right to

assume a woman's sexual

availability?

What

could a female's reputation for

role, if any,

chastity play in a suit seeking compensation for sexual injury?

Could a

woman who had

consented to pre-marital sex seek compensation when that sexual bargain went awry?

These questions arose

growing

^°

Haynes

legal,

v.

in the context

economic, and

of broader

political

societal

autonomy, a

changes including women's

legal

system

less

and

less willing to

Sinclair, 23 Vt. 108 (1850) (introduction of evidence of breach of marriage promise

cost of supporting illegitimate child in seduction suit

was

and

error since those causes of action belonged to

could result in defendant being punished twice for the same wrong); Rollins v. Chalmers, 49
Vt. 515 (1877); Drake v. Town of Sharon, 40 Vt. 35 (1867); Sterling, 95. For examples of seduction and

woman and

Windsor County
White, Windsor County
Court, March 1821 Term, vol. 13, p. 221 and Town of Norwich v.
Court, March 1821 Term, vol. 13, p. 194; Fidelia Rollins v. Albert Chalmers, Orange County Court,
March 1877, Supreme Court vol. 20, p. 213 and Samuel Rollins v. Albert Chalmers, Orange County
Court, March 1877, Supreme Court vol. 20, p. 248; Ada J. Stearns v. Leonard B. Adams, Windsor
County Court, December 1892 Term, vol. 35, p. 517-518 and Edgar H. Stearns v. Leonard B. Adams,
bastardy cases arising out of the same transaction: Sarah Silver

v.

Solomon
Solomon

White,

Windsor County Court, December 1892 Term, vol. 35, p. 537; Anna L Giles v. George Brothers,
Windsor County Court, December 1897 Term, vol. 36, p. 553-554 and Lemuel A. Giles v. George
Breach of marriage promise
Brothers, Windsor County Court, December 1898 Term, vol. 37, p. 192.
Term, vol. 60,
and bastardy: Mary E. Tripp v. Harry E. Cheney, Rutland County Court, September 1919
Term, vol.
890-892 and Mary E. Tripp v. Harry E. Cheney, Rutland County Court, September 1919
p.

60, p. 892-894.
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bring extrinsic moral values to bear on contractual disputes, and a society facing a
in rural life including

crisis

growing rates of divorce, adultery, venereal disease, and

illegitimacy.

When it came to
from violence trumped

matters of physical safety, the right of an individual to be free

all

other competing societal values. This

is

true whether

one

looks at the outcomes of trials seeking vindication for individual rights or the opinions of
the

Supreme Court

defining the contours of those proceedings.

Both

trial

and appellate

courts were protective to the exclusion of other important societal values. Vermonters

were

intolerant

their

low

rates

of physical violence, regardless of the circumstances, a

fact reflected in

of violent crime. Even gross and insuhing words spoken about one's wife

could not excuse an ensuing assauh. For example,

in a series

of cases decided during the

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Court repeatedly rejected attempts to create

a defense to

suits for assault

and battery based on the argument

instigated the attack by his use

of harsh language. "The law abhors the use of force

either for attack or defense," the

its

use unnecessarily."

assault

and

battery."^'

No

that the plaintiff had

Court declared

words, no matter

in

how

an

1

883 opinion, "and never permits

gross or insulting could excuse an

Women benefitted from this absolutist

position in that they could

expect the courts both to compensate them for injuries from physical and sexual assault

and to punish male

assailants.

Day, 56 Vt. 318 (1883), cited in Goldsmith's Admr. v. Joy, 61 Vt. 488
In Willey the defendant had struck the plaintiff
(1889); see also Willey v. Carpenter, 64 Vt. 212 (1891).
"dirty little whore." He was awarded $50 by the
after the plaintiff had called the defendant's wife a
County Court, December 1890 Term, vol. 22, p.
court Nathan R. Carpenter v. Ezra Willey, Orange
the plaintiff for defamation and won a
595 In a separate action, however, the defendant's wife sued
Orange County Supreme Court, May 1892 Term,
jury verdict of $679. Lizzie Carpenter v. Ezra Willey,
^'

The quote

is

from Howland

v.

vol. 20, p. 453.
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Other cases posed a greater challenge to the legal system, particularly when they

combined the incompatible themes of legally independent women and consensual sex
such as a breach of marriage promise case. In her

Haag

highlights the incoherency

greatly expanded the

intellectual history

of these two concepts. Married women's property acts

numbers of women who were

contract law underwent a dramatic change.

legally free actors.

shifted

It

judges and juries had been free to consider the moral,

exchange

in

of consent, Pamela

from an
social,

earlier

At the same

paradigm

in

which

and cultural context of the

determining the rights of the parties, to one in which the intent of the parties

When the two

at the

time of the bargain became the sole determinant of their rights.

came

together, particularly in a breach of marriage promise case, the legal system

forced to

time,

make a choice between

permitting

women to

have the same freedom of

contract as men, and hence allow themselves to bargain their bodies and

compensation when

men

was

demand

did not uphold their end of the bargain, or sully the purity of

contract law by creating exceptions

when

it

came

to sexual matters involving women.'^

In both breach of marriage promise cases and in bastardy cases, the legal

system's answer was clear. If women could prove that a bargain was

man was

in fact the father

pay. That

is,

of the

child,

it

was

Vermont law made men pay

strong-whether

in the

Supreme Court's

the

man and

not the

for their actions.

woman's

or that the

woman who would

The evidence

high success rates and damage awards

refusal to allow the

made

in these

for this

is

cases or the

reputation or past immoral acts to be

used against her in pursuing these causes of action.

Liberalism (Ithaca:
Pamela Haag, Consent: Sexual Rights and the Transformation of American
on consent particularly with regard to
Cornell University Press, 1999), 25-60. Haag's emphasis is
of promise and contract.
criminal seduction, but she also addresses the issue of breach
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In examining the interactions of law,

way

focused on the

in

women, and

sex,

many

which the system treated women. But what

examination of the law

in the civil area

shows

is

scholars have

this initial

that the legal system

was concerned not

only with the behavior of women but also with the behavior of men. Rather than reading
these cases solely as regulating female behavior,

way the
its

historical actors did: suits against

men

we

might better understand them

for physical

in the

and sexual misbehavior and

consequences. Rather than shoring up female gender and sexual expectations by

denying

women access to

the courts or severely restricting the viability of their suits

because of their past bad acts or bad reputations, the courts decided to focus on

women for

compensating

expectations that

came

male misbehavior. As a

to the fore, and

them. These expectations for
especially towards

for transgressing

failure

passion, adherence to contract, and

of these norms.

Men could not avoid these

of others, especially women, to adhere to

gender and sexual expectations, except to the extent that
for that particular aspect

was male sexual and gender

included peaceful behavior towards everyone, but

for the violation

by pointing to the

it

was men who were punished

women, containment of sexual

payment of compensation
responsibilities

men

it

result,

women

of damages. Thus, when faced with

their

sought compensation

difficult

problems such as

whether a woman's voluntary pre-marital sexual experiences should prevent her from
receiving

full

sided with

to

its

compensation for the injury of a breach of marriage promise, the Court

full

compensation despite the

fact that in

doing so,

it

sent a

message contrary

obvious moral values about proper female sexual behavior.

The number of women seeking compensation
second half of the nineteenth century. This was

90

in their

likely

own names increased

in the

due to a combination of greater

female autonomy, changes
their

own names,

in the

law making

and high success

to the courts to take advantage

rates

it

possible for married

and damage awards. But

of the remedies they

actions except bastardy were small. Assuming that

offered.

women to

women hardly flocked

The numbers

women were

right.

The case had

suflBcient

in

order to

make

this

wealth to pay any judgment, the

$30 or $50 bond

all

these

paradox?

suing worthwhile, various conditions had to be

good chance of succeeding. The defendant had

to have a

attorney's fees, post a

for

in fact attacked,

defamed, and jilted more often than these numbers suggest, what explains

For one thing,

sue in

plaintiff had to

that

be prepared to pay the defendant's costs

was

the

to have

have enough money to pay her

norm

in

such cases, and she had to

These factors ruled out the

if he prevailed.

bringing of many cases.

Furthermore, the courts were not an empowering paradise for women.
Nineteenth-century culture did not value female autonomy and rarely sought to

encourage

Women faced

it.

women had to

rely

on

their

a legal system created and run by men. Until

husbands to bring

and judges no doubt saw the

their suits

suits as vindications

not so

and many male

responsibility

In

Newell

v.

or

seen,

the rhetoric of male

It

was thus a source of public

made much of the vulnerability of the plaintiff" "a poor, blind girl
man who would violate every injunction of hospitality, that he might

Whitcher, the judge

dishonor and ruin

at his

own

hearthstone this unfortunate child,

judge noted that there could be no
Blodgett, 44 Vt.

who had the

right to appeal to

him

to

Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589 (1880). In Alexander v. Blodgett, the
assault.
greater harm to "a virtuous woman or girl" than a sexual

defend her from such outrage." Newell

v.

As we have

young women,

inferiority or helplessness.'^

under the protecting care of very

Alexander

plaintiffs, jurors,

emanating from the courts was often a paternalistic or Victorian one,

which presupposed female

"

884, married

much of their wives'

daughters' rights, but of those of their husbands or parents.

particularly in the sexual assault cases involving

1

v.

476 (1872).
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discourse issuing from an important social institution, broadcast not only to male jurors

and spectators, but to powerful forces responsible

and judge. Thus,

it

could be hobbling to

political rights. Nonetheless, regardless

women

for

making law: lawyers,

legislators,

seeking greater sexual, social, and

of the motivation of those deciding these

questions, these suits help us define the realm of possibility for

courts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They

women in Vermont's

made

women had

clear that

a right to physical and sexual safety and that they could seek vindication when they were
abused.

Though

sexual reputation

was important and adherence

norms expected, a woman's bad reputation would be used
herself raised the matter by seeking

damages

the gratuitous use of reputation evidence.

for injury to

They

also

against her only

it.

made

to gender and sexual

when

she

The courts did not permit

clear that

men would

be held

responsible for transgression of society's sexual and gendered expectations of them and

that the

woman's

failure to

adhere to hers would not excuse

increase female autonomy, Vermont's courts displayed a

the right to compensation for

its

violation,

and an

Rather than a desire to

commitment

intent to punish

gender and sexual expectations society had for them.
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his.

to the rule of law,

men who

violated the

CHAPTER 2

FATHERS, DAUGHTERS, AND
VERMONT'S CHANGING SEDUCTION LAW, 1827-1914

Introduction

On March 20,

1914, in open court,

Thomas

Fitzgerald

of his daughter's out-of-wedlock pregnancy made him
I

cannot

tell

my farm;

it.

I

cannot express

there again in the

express

Under

world—why,

I

"Why," he

in

when he met

news

said:

made me crazy for a while. 1 sold
and was getting along nice until this
far, I

never wanted to

couldn't,--! can't express

it.

live
I

around

can't

my feelings.

further questioning, Fitzgerald admitted his humiliation

pregnancy

the

it, it

had bought a farm there
happened and I wanted to get away so
I

feel.

was asked how

191

1,

a humiliation he had

felt

on hearing of the

"ever since." Asked to describe

how he

felt

people, Fitzgerald told the court that he did not even want to meet them

at

alL'

Thomas

was suing

Fitzgerald

Patrick Connors for the seduction of his daughter

Lydia. His lawyer, Joseph Jones, understood the importance of conveying to the twelve

men on the jury

a father's sense of shame and dishonor upon learning the news that his

unmarried daughter had had intercourse with a

Such evidence of a
in

Vermont seduction

father's

trials.

Until

man and become

pregnant.

shame and humiliation had not always been welcome

1

879 the Vermont Supreme Court had not allowed

bring
such an inquiry. Vermont law had long given a father the right to

man who impregnated

'

his

daughter out of wedlock. But at

Fitzgerald V. Connors, Rutland County Supreme Court,
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suit against

common law the

November 1914

a

cause of

Terra, vol. 127, p.

action had been based

on a

father's loss

by her pregnancy, rather than

common law.

Traditionally,

of the value of his daughter's labor occasioned

for his shame.

when a master

The

origins of the tort lay in the English

lost the services

of his servant on account of

the actions of another, he had the right to sue for damages. This action per

servitium amisit

was adapted

in

quod

1653 to apply to cases where daughters had become

pregnant out of wedlock. This development was probably the result of clever lawyering.

Common law barred the testimony of an interested witness-and plaintiffs were the most
interested

of witnesses. But without the woman's testimony seduction could not be

proved. Giving the cause of action to the father instead of the daughter allowed her to
take the stand and

testify.^

In the nineteenth century, seduction law underwent dramatic change in form and,

some have argued,

in

meaning. State legislatures became increasingly active

regulating seduction by statute during the

these changes abolished the

permitted the father to sue

woman herself to

sue, or

statutory

and

late nineteenth century.

common law requirement

in the

that

its

loss be

shown,

absence of a master-servant relationship, allowed the

in states like

Vermont which

common law modification reflected

cause of action fi-om

economic

Some of

imposed criminal penalties against the seducer. The common

law also underwent modification

Both

mid and

in

technical origins as an

a

economic

did not pass legislation.

shift in the

tort to

one

language of the

that explicitly

and the Myth of the Ideal Woman," Journal of Law and Inequality 5
They Call My Good Nature 'Deceit": A
(1987)- 35-41- Jane E. Larson, '"Women Understand So Little,
382-383. Lucius E. Chittenden,
Feminist Rethinking of Seduction," Columbia Law Review 33 (1993):
'

M.B.W.

Sinclair, "Seduction

n. 1.
by Tapping Reeve, 2nd ed. (Burlington, Vt., 1846), 292-293,
of action to the parent or master, thereby
one of the necessary fictions of the law that gives this right
wrong-doer may not escape for want of
making the infent a competent witness. This is done that the
the nature, is susceptible of proof only through the
proof; the transaction being such an one, as, from

The Law of Baron and

"It is

Femme

parties to it."
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referenced the shame and dishonor suffered by a father and daughter as a result of her
intercourse and pregnancy.

Courts

in

Vermont and elsewhere had always been sympathetic

to plaintiffe in

seduction cases and damage awards often reflected far more than the actual value of the
daughter's labor. In other words, the outcome of seduction suits had long recognized

harm to

that the

this

fathers

many years

out

Vermont, beginning
articulate this

was more than merely economic. Commentators had pointed

before courts and legislators began explicitly to acknowledge

in the

1

As

In

870s and 80s, the Supreme Court became more willing to

harm rather than hide behind

earlier decisions.

it.

the economic fictions which had governed

a result, the Court, through

its

opinions,

became an

its

active

participant in public conversations about the effects of deviant sexual behavior.

What was

the Court's purpose in undertaking this greater role in fi-aming sexual

discourse? Scholars have put forth various theories as to

and

legislators altered seduction

law

at this time.

why lawmakers

Legal historian M. B.

such as judges

W.

Sinclair

argues that seduction reform reflected a repressive Victorian morality; a belief in an ideal

woman who was powerless to

prevent her

at specific legislation: Ontario's

his daughter's

changes

in

own seduction.

Constance Backhouse looks

1837 seduction statute which permitted a father to sue

master when she had been seduced by him. Backhouse argues that

Canadian seduction law reinforced feudal notions of property

in

humans.

Before these changes only the woman's master could sue in seduction and a father had

no protection when
house

in

his daughter

was seduced by another master-say the owner of a

which she worked as a maid. The new law was meant to shore up a

authority over his daughter at a time

when

industrialization

95

was undermining

father's

traditional

patriarchal control and

women were

challenges Backhouse's

critical

leaving

view of the

of the law as a form of protective

home

in larger numbers.^

legislation since

legislation, deterring

highly vulnerable servant girls/ This

was not an

it

Martha Bailey

ignores the salutary effect

masters from sexually exploiting

issue under

Vermont law

since a father

could always sue a master for impregnating his daughter.^

Between 1827 and 1914, Vermont's Supreme Court heard
seduction.

Vermont
it

in

As

in other states, the

way the

six appeals involving

courts talked about the tort changed in

as the nineteenth century progressed. This chapter explores that evolution, sets

a wider historical context, and grapples with the questions

it

raises

about our

understanding of sexuality' s relation to the law. But before proceeding with our inquiry,

we

should &st understand exactly what the elements of seduction were.^

Constance B. Backhouse, "The Tort of Seduction: Fathers and Daughters
Canada," Dalhousie Law Journal 10 (1986): 45-79.

^

in Nineteenth

Century

Martha J. Bailey, "Servant Girls and Masters: The Tort of Seduction and the Support of Bastards,"
Canadian Journal of Family Law 10 (1991): 137-162. Other scholars have used seduction as an
example of how the legal system inculcates attitudes about women and sex deep within the foundation of
their
the law. This, they argue, prevents women from obtainmg redress for criminal or civil violations of
civil
sexual autonomy. At the same time, others have explored the idea of reviving seduction and other

'

Ways of
causes of action as a tool in the struggle for sexual autonomy. Lea VanderVelde, "The Legal
;"
Seduction," Stanford Law Review 4S (1996): 817-901; Larson, "'Women Understand So Little
.

.

.

presented at the Five
Leslie Bender, "The Use of Common Law to Further a Feminist Agenda," paper
College Women's Studies Lecture Series, South Hadley, Massachusetts, December 1996.

'

Chittenden, 292. This

was Tapping Reeve's

position in 1816.

He

noted that 'Vhen a daughter

is

that loss of service

is

bound out as an apprentice, living with her master, a rigid adherence to the idea
But if we consider this action as really
the ground of this action, would prevent the fether's recovery.
would be no objection to
foundation in another principle, to wit, the disgrace to the femily, it
having

its

live as an apprentice to a master."
the maintenance of this action, although the daughter should

with the other so-called "heart balm"
Seduction was eliminated by the legislature in 1973 along
to marry, and criminal conversation. 1973 (Adj.) Vt.
actions: alienation of affections, breach of contract
'

Acts 198.
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In Vermont, a plaintifiFhad to prove two elements to win a seduction case. First,

he had to show that the defendant "debauched and carnally knew"
he had to prove that he was thereby deprived of his daughter's

his daughter.

services.^ This

element invariably resulted from the daughter's ensuing pregnancy. At

pregnancy was not a required element of the
without

it.

relations

tort,

In the absence of a pregnancy, the

had interfered with

but damages were

pleiintifif could

Second,

second

common law

difficult to

show

not prove that the sexual

his right to his daughter's services.*

We should not confiise our informal or literary notion of seduction with its
technical

common law meaning.

"Seduction" was simply the name given to a cause of

action which allowed a father to sue for the monetary loss caused by his daughter's out-

of-wedlock pregnancy.

'

A shov^g of force or artifice was not required.

Seduction was pled as a trespass "on the case."

A Vermont

litigant

had an

Neither did the

alternative available to

him

armis fVith force and arms") in which he alleged that the defendant had
''assaulted, debauched, and carnally knew" his daughter (emphasis added). "Force and arms" was
required language in a trespass action, but was often a fiction. Because the courts disagreed on which
in the

form of trespass

vi et

form was the proper one, lawyers often pleaded both trespass vi et armis and trespass on the case in their
complaints. These forms of action are distinct from our more limited contemporary understanding of
John Henry Wigmore,
trespass: an unauthorized breach of the boundaries of another's real property.
The Law of
Select Cases on the Law of Torts, vol. 2 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1912), 23; Chittenden,
Baron and Femme, 293, n. 1. For examples of Vermont pleadings, see Haynes v. Sinclair, Chittenden
Special
County Court, December 1850 Term, Writ No. 65, Chittenden County Court Records,
Chalmers, Orange County Supreme
Collections, University of Vermont, Burlington, Vermont; Rollins v.
Declaration, Vermont Reports
Court, March 1879 Term, vol 20, p. 248-249; Davidson v. Abbott,
Vermont; Fitzgerald v. Connors, Rutland
Briefe, 1, no. 41 (1880), Vermont State Library, Montpelier,
that the complaints for trespass
County Supreme Court, November 1914 Term, vol. 61, p. 59-60. Note
occasions over long periods of
on the case normally alleged that intercourse took place on numerous
relationship.
time indicating the probable consensual nature of the sexual

'

M

B

W

Sinclair, 37;

Thomas Thomer and G.N. Reddekopp, "A Question of Seduction: The Case of

In addition, practically speakmg,
MacMillan v. Brownlee," Alberta Law Review 20 (1982): 450-452.
been harder to detect by the parent or the
without a pregnancy the feet of the seduction would have

community.
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daughter's consent

vitiate the

cause of action. Her actions were technically irrelevant.

Legally, seduction as a cause of action belonged to fathers, not daughters.^

Early Approaches

Vermont's

Hubbell

V.

first

his daughter, getting her with child,

The jury awarded the

reflected only the value

It

was

the 1827 case of

Wheeler. Benjamin Hubbell accused the improbably named Philander

Wheeler of debauching
services.

published decision involving seduction

plaintiff the large

of services

lost

and thereby denying him her

sum of eighty

This

dollars.

sum

by the father fi-om the date of conception to

birth.

did not reflect the cost of raising the child which could have been pursued under a

separate action for bastardy. In addition, the

woman would

during most of her pregnancy. At this time, the average

less than

one dollar per week.'" As we

cases were often very large.

shall see,

however,

The

at the time.

had committed a trespass on the family home and

As a

trespass

on

for a female servant

civil

awards

in

was

seduction

highly technical aspect of law. Wheeler had been

boarding with the Hubbell family

the daughter.

wage

Philander Wheeler appealed.

The appeal hinged on a

knew

not have been incapacitated

plaintiff had alleged that the defendant

in so

result, the plaintiff pleaded

doing had debauched and carnally

seduction as an aggravation of the

the house, rather than as a separate action standing on

its

own. At

trial,

the

defendant had proved that he was boarding in the house, and thus he had permission (a

'

Backhouse, "The Tort of Seduction," 60; M. B.

This was the rate

in

1

W.

838. Deborah P. Clifford,

Sinclair, 48-49.

"Vermont

'Mill Girls,'" in

We

Vermonters:

(MontpeUer: Vermont Historical
Perspectives on the Past, eds. Michael Sherman and Jennie Versteeg
Society, 1992), 219-224.
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"licence") to enter

case had to

fail,

it.

Since he did not actually commit trespass, the plaintiffs entire

since he could not recover for aggravation of a trespass

taken place. The defendant argued that the

plaintiff had

which had not

an obligation under the rules of

pleading to specify exactly the cause of action so that he could defend himself against

And

this

was a

correct statement of law. Instead,

on dubious

placed the burden on the defendant of notifying the

with the licence defense so that the

plaintiff could

legal reasoning, the

plaintiff of his intention to

amend

it.

Court

proceed

his pleading. This ruling

was a

gross departure from the standards of the day which required highly technical formal
pleading on the part of the

comply with those
'

authorities.

'

plaintiff.

formalities.

Courts typically dismissed

which

failed to

Furthermore, the decision was contrary to other

Nevertheless, the

Vermont Supreme Court upheld

reasoning as well as the eighty dollar award.

It

was a typical example of the

the

trial

court's

further found Wheeler's actions to be

malicious and therefore prohibited him from escaping

oath. This

suits

liability

by taking the poor debtor's

courts' bias in favor of upholding plaintiff'

verdicts in seduction cases.

The Supreme Court's opinion
which

it

also distinctive for the matter-of-fact

discusses the seduction. Unlike later decisions, there

morality,

betrayal

is

no

editorializing

is

way

in

no discussion of

about the nature of the cause of action, no comments on the

of trust by the boarder welcomed

into the

home of the

father-no discourse on

The Court did not seek to
honor, no emphasis on injury to the daughter's reputation.
justify a ruling in the plaintiffs favor

instead, justified

"Chittenden, 293,

it

because of the moral wrong done to him, but

on highly technical

(if legaUy

n. 1.
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spurious) grounds, upholding a large

verdict which bore

little

result for the defendant

relation to the actual

was

same as

the

it

economic

would be

such language. The Court was sympathetic to the

But the

injury to the father.

in later

plaintiff

cases which did

make use of

and Philander Wheeler was

punished for his transgression.'^

On
Twenty-three years

later, in

the

1

Cusp of Change

850, the seduction case of Haynes

v.

Sinclair gave

the Court an opportunity to recognize explicitly the importance of sexual morality to the

tort.

The

plaintiffs lawyer, Lucius E. Chittenden, sought to introduce sophisticated

He was

theories into the case.

uniquely positioned to do so, having completed his

commentaries to Tapping Reeve's important
Reeve's work, which
legal fiction that

showed

relied

treatise

on family law four years

on eighteenth century precedent, revealed

injury to the father

was not

family of which he

was

really

the head.

Economic

injury

ground

was

damages,

family" and given

of the "daughter's character

the issue

connexion with another man

Hubbdl

V.

is

century.

The

a legal fiction Reeve wrote,

The

this,

19'*'

about loss of physical service, but to the honor of a

scarcely an item in the account.

"

It

which the notion of shame and dishonor, rather than economic

harm, had come to dominate commentators' thinking by the early

it

the nature of the

had come to characterize seduction by the early nineteenth century.

the extent to

although

before.

real

for

allowed to be proved; and,

is

the disgrace of the

for unchastity, her

if satisfactorily

does not lessen the damages for actual loss of service; for

Wheeler, 2 Aik. 358 (1827).
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"it is

proved,

that will be the

same, whether the daughter was, before that time, chaste or unchaste, yet
the

damages merely

To

nominal."'^

Chittenden, Reeve's

work and

invitation to litigate seduction in a

way

the cases decided subsequent to

that explicitly referenced the issues

morality and family disgrace, and most important,

As

fathers.

was lucky
plaintiffs

how

these harms

were an

of sexual

injury to

a result, Chittenden framed the Haynes case around these issues. Chittenden

in

having Milo Bennett as his

and victims

fight

it

worked an

in

sex cases.

trial

He had

judge. Bennett

was sympathetic

to female

already successfully resisted attempts to use

sexual character evidence against female plaintiffs in bastardy cases in the

would

will render

it

1

840s and

a long, and ultimately unsuccessful battle to prevent the use of such specific

sexual evidence in rape cases after ISSS.*'*

At
seduced

Chittenden argued that the defendant's alleged promise to marry the

trial,

woman

should be admissible. The defendant objected strenuously, arguing that

such evidence was only admissible

woman
in his

in

a breach of promise to marry case brought by the

To argue such evidence would unduly

herself.

prejudice the defendant and result

being punished twice for the same wrong. Chittenden argued that the evidence

was admissible

for the limited

gone about seducing

purpose of showing the way

his victim.

Bennett admitted

this

in

which the defendant had

evidence with limiting instructions

Chittenden, 291.
v. Sherman, 21
The bastardy cases were Spears v. ForresU 15 Vt. 435 (1843) and Sweei
are discussed in detail
The rape case was State v. Johnson, 28 Vt. 5 2 ( 856). Both cases
1

1

chapters.
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Vt. 23 (1848).
in other

to the jury as to the purpose for

which

it

could be used.'^ Chittenden also sought to

enter evidence of the daughter's chaste reputation and the

good reputation of her

The defense objected

damage

been part of the

to this evidence as well, arguing that

plaintifiPs complaint,

unless the defendant

&st attempted

and

in the alternative that

it

family.

to reputation had not

could not be admitted

to impeach her reputation-which he had not done.

Nevertheless, Bennett, admitted the evidence, instructing the jury that "they were

authorized to give damages for the mortification and

occasioned by the seduction, which

it

wounded

feelings

of the

plaintiff,

might well be supposed would be greater, than

the daughter were of bad character."

Finally, again,

over objection, the judge also

allowed the introduction of evidence of the expense of maintaining the bastard child

of the seduction. The jury reached a verdict

if

for the plaintiff in the

bom

amount of

$300-again, a very large sum. This outcome was reversed on appeal.
Chittenden had attempted to introduce a legal discourse which had
trappings of what

some

scholars have

come

to see as Victorian seduction.

all

the

He

sought to

admit evidence of chastity, family reputation, false promises; and, by focusing attention

on the bastard
defendant.

child, the extent to

Two

commentators to
feelings."

literary

which the daughter's

had been ruined by the

life

influences are discernible in this approach.

articulate the true legal

The second

influence

seduction (where

is

that

women were

harm to

—

fathers

The

first is

the effort by

"mortification and

wounded

of the seduction narrative—an attempt to give
beguiled into having sexual relations against their

'^Bennett explained to the jurors that such a promise

had a tendency "to prove an intimacy between

th

daughter by such means,
and an influence which the defendant might have acquired over the
under other circumstances." Haynes
and thereby render a seduction more probable than it might be
Sinclair, 23 Wt. 108, 110(1850).
parties,

i
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better judgment and natural inclinations) legal effect.'^

The

trial

both influences: injury to a father's feelings and the defendant's
favors with false promises of marriage.

court

considerations were from the formal requirements of seduction.

how

his

father.''

The question was whether

allow them to be spoken of at

The answer
that the admission

The Court's opinion

cases.

is

was

no.

It

fascinating in

its

First, the

work on evidence

The Court undertook

the

1

846

edition,

in

everyone knew

Vermont Supreme Court would

On appeal the Vermont Supreme

reversed the

trial

refusal to depart

Court ruled

chastity,

court and ordered a

and of

new trial.

from the form of the older

Court rejected the findings

its

own analysis of the

in

Simon Greenleaf s

cases cited by Greenleaf and held

Greenleaf s conclusions. Next, the Court held that even

evidence had been properly admitted, the

trial

judge erred

in instructing the jury

On the widespread influence of the seduction novel in early Republican America see:
Hill:
Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America (Chapel

"

North Carolina Press, 1980), 241-243.
"

legal

as to the admissibility of a promise of marriage in seduction

that those cases did not support

if such

still

error.

seduction cause of action.

influential

in his

of evidence of a promise to marry, of the daughter's

the expenses of child care

whose

trial.

1850 was

in

of these

But as Tapping Reeve had pointed out

1816 work and as Chittenden had reconfirmed

these issues mattered.

far all

Common law seduction

did not care about consent, or reputation-these were irrelevant in a tort

concern was economic injury to the

to

efforts to obtain sexual

important to remember

It is

was amenable

Backhouse, "The Tort of Seduction," 60; M. B.

W.

Sinclair, 48-49.
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Linda Kerber,
University of

that

such evidence tended to prove the seduction because

it

was simply 'too remote, to

justify its reception for such purpose."**

Next, the Court turned to the admission of character evidence supporting the
general reputation of the plaintiff and his family. The Court noted the

for introducing such evidence. "It

is

involved

in the issue

is said,

and therefore

it

that the character

may be

Court refused to allow such evidence. Only

first

plaintiflPs rationale

of the daughter

for chastity

supported by general evidence." But the

in cases

where the daughter's character was

impeached by the defense would evidence of the daughter and her family's

reputation be admissible. In other words, such evidence

defendant

upon

first

was only

challenged the daughter's character. "Until this

that general

good

character,

is

available

when

the

done, she must rely

which the law presumes every one to possess

until

it

is

impeached."^^

This comported with American law. As a

rule, U.S. courts

a promise of marriage into evidence in seduction suits. First,

a

wrong (breach of marriage promise)

for

which only the

of the seducer were irrelevant to seduction, since

it

was

were unequivocal
it

in their refusal to

permit

prejudiced the defendant by introducing

woman

could bring

suit.

Second, the promises

the loss of services to the fether that was

technically at issue, not the daughter's consent to the sexual act. Despite the ubiquity of the seduction
and, by prohibiting its
narrative as cautionary tale, the Vermont Court refused to give it legal meaning

—

admission as evidence, prevented juries from doing so either until 1911 when it allowed such claims, not
promise case. See the discussion
in seduction suits, but as part of the damages in a breach of marriage
between marriage promise
of Stokes V. Mason, 85 Vt. 164 (191 1), in Chapter 1. On the relationship
Sexual Rights and the
cases and seduction, see M. B. W. Sinclair, 40, 46-4; Pamela Haag, Consent:
52-54.
Transformation of American Liberalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 30-31, 35,

Court conceived that non-chastity (or bad reputation) could be used as a
defendant impeached her sexual
defense to seduction. There are several possibilities. It could be the
the use of sexual evidence for this
character to challenge her honesty, but Vermont did not recognize
It is

unclear here

how the

could be used to show that someone else
purpose and never would. If the Court meant that non-chastity
would comport with the older notion
had intercourse with the daughter and fathered the child, then this
Milo Bennett thought it should be used.
of the tort. Finally it could go to damages and that is how
where the daughter's
Some state courts permitted a reduction in damages for loss of reputation
might be used, the Haynes decision's intimation
reputation for chastity was poor. Regardless of how it
the exception in America before the second half of the
that reputation evidence could be used at all was
century.

M.

B.

W.

Sinclair,

45 and

n. 88.
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Court ruled

Finally, the

that the trial court's admission

of evidence showing the

probable expense of caring for the baby was also error. The Court reasoned that the
defendant would be unable to

insist that

such funds be applied to the support of the child,

nor would the award exonerate the defendant from

his obligations to support the child

under Vermont's bastardy law. The Court granted the defendant a new

second

trial

also resulted in a plaintiffs verdict, the

$200-although

still

a large

reflected the removal

sum.'^'

It is difficult

to

trial.^°

damages were reduced

know whether

While the

one-third, to

that lesser

sum

of child care damages, evidence of a promise to marry, the

issue

of

reputation, or a combination of the three.

In

Haynes

v.

Sinclair Lucius Chittenden had steeped himself in the

new language

of seduction law. This language eschewed the older theory of economic harm and
instead focused

narrative.

on

injury to the father's feelings

and a

literary rather

Chittenden provided the Supreme Court with sufficient legal authority to

acknowledge the way commentators believed seduction
quality

than legal seduction

of that harm ("the mortification and wounded

truly

feelings

harmed
of the

fathers.

plaintiff,

Since the

occasioned

by the seduction") depended on the daughter's reputation (and the reputation of her
family), Chittenden

was eager

that the daughter herself appear

and

implored Jacob Haynes to make sure his daughter was present to

why

she

Haynes

was

v.

hesitant to

do

this is

testify,

why he
and (probably)

so.^^

Sinclair, 23 Vt. 108 (1850).

Docket Book of the

Law Firm

of Phelps

& Chittenden,

1847-1854. Lucius E. Chittenden Papers,

Vermont.
Special Collections, University of Vermont, Burlington,

May 1849, 17 January 1850. Lucius E.
Jacob Haynes to Lucius Chittenden, 15 March 1849, 21
of Vermont, Burlington, Vermont.
Chittenden Papers, Carton 1. Special Collections, University
"
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But the Vermont Supreme Court refused to
the past.

It

was one

HubbelL

It

was

cram a

set

of facts

into the old tort as the

reftising to

do

so, the

Court signaled

its

tort to

be used as an overt means of engaging

and

value to a parent's reputation and peace of mind.^^

its

had

in

Court had done

in

it

quite something else to legitimate the introduction of new language into

By

the courtroom.

thing to

treat the tort differently than

The Court's

in a

unwillingness to allow the

discourse about female sexual purity

reticence did not reflect any kind of broad societal taboo

on the

public discussion of sexual morals in general and the evils of seduction in particular.

note

in

Chapter

Nor

century.

numerous

did

civil

unavoidable.

1

such discussions were

it

reflect

an absence of sex

and criminal cases

As

I

common

in

in

Vermont during

As

I

the nineteenth

talk in the courts themselves, as juries heard

which discussion of sexual matters was simply

have shown, sexual reputation was important and lawsuits to vindicate

sexual defamation could result in huge jury awards. In addition, Vermonters shared with

other Americans a penchant for reading novels, the most popular of which warned

women

of the consequences of seduction. But the Supreme Court's decision meant

that

seduction suits in the county courts would not provide an opportunity for such discourse

in 1850.^'

" The 1889 edition of the law report containing the Haynes case published by West Publishing Company
of St. Paul contains a lengthy note concerning the admissibility of character evidence of a woman's
chastity in both criminal

and

civil

seduction cases.

previously engaged in intercourse with another

The note explains how long

man must

a

woman who

has

wait before such evidence can no longer be

by 1889 there was no longer
any question in Vermont about whether such graphic discourse was appropriate. In 1850, however, the
Supreme Court felt otherwise. Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of the
used against her

in a civil or

criminal seduction

trial.

But, as

State of Vermont, 2"' ed., vol. 8 (St. Paul, 1889), 34-35, n.

we

will see,

1.

Gilmour, Reading Becomes a Necessity of Life: Material and Cultural Life in Rural New
(on prevalence of
England, 1780-1835 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1989), 208, 214, 408
(on widespread influence
novel in rural family libraries); Kerber, Women of the Republic, 241-243

William

J.

the
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In Haynes,

Vermont seduction jurisprudence was on the cusp of change. The
and the

plaintiffs attorney

trial

make

court were prepared to

at least

a rhetorical leap and

leave behind the older economic language that had characterized seduction in the past.

The Supreme Court was
acknowledging

go so

But

far.

did open the door slightly by

it

that reputation evidence might have a role to play in the defense

But how

actions.

unwilling to

it

of such

could be used remained unclear. This lack of clarity on the role of

reputation in seduction suits reflected a broader ambivalence about the proper uses of

such evidence

in civil

and criminal matters.

In 1856 the Court decided State

justifying the use

v.

Johnson, an appeal from a rape conviction. In

of specific sexual character evidence to impeach the

credibility

of a

rape victim on the question of consent, the Court analogized to seduction law. Judge
Pierpoint Isham relied

on an English seduction

case, Verry

v.

Watkins (1836), for the

proposition that on cross-examination of the daughter, defense counsel could ask her

about specific past acts of intercourse with other men. If she denied them then those

men

could be called to

testify in

order to

impregnated her. Judge Milo Bennett,

limit the

show

who

use of sexual character evidence

in

that

it

was another man who had

dissented from Johnson and

who

sought to

rape and bastardy cases, argued that Isham

had misinterpreted Verry. In seduction, a defendant could show

that "the daughter has

been previously criminal with other persons," but only on the question of damages, not
to discredit her claim that she had been seduced by the defendant. Bennett's argument

of the seduction novel

in early

Republican America); E.

J.

"The Age of Words," in Orations and
G. McCuUough (New York: Harper &

Phelps,

Essays of Edward John Phelps: Diplomat and Statesman, ed.

J.

lawyer in the state. In this
Brothers, 1901), 462. Phelps, a national figure, was the most prominent
the unintended efiect of spreading
essay he warned against the dangers of such novels since they had
to look to men other than their
immorality, creating false expectations in women, and causing wives

husbands

for perfection.
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was a

reiteration

of the position he had taken as

had been rejected by the

M

Court

trial

judge

in

Haynes-Si position which

Both men's position

in that case.

also departed

from

the general rule in other states. Other courts prohibited sexual character evidence as a

defense but did allow

it

in mitigation

evidence of specific sexual

level

activity.

with the issue of reputation

of damages, but only general reputation, and not

Nonetheless, both

men

indicated a growing comfort

in seduction suits while continuing to disagree

on how

that evidence could be used.'^'

The Tort

By

1

Shifts

879, however, the Supreme Court clarified

its

position on the role of

reputation evidence. In that year, the Court heard an appeal resulting from Samuel

Rollins's claim against Albert

The case was
of Chalmers's
found him

three issues

issue

Fidelia.

rather tragic, as Fidelia had died as a result of compUcations from the birth

illegitimate child.

The defendant requested a bench

liable for the seduction.

Rollins $841,

At

Chalmers for the seduction of Rollins's daughter

At a trial

for

trial

and the judge

damages, the jury awarded Samuel

of which $241 was specified as punitive damages. The defendant raised

on

trial,

appeal, only one

of which

is

significant for

our purposes.

the defendant argued that the judge could not instruct the jury

of the injury caused

on

the

to the father's feelings, nor the disgrace that might be brought

" State V. Johnson, 28 Vt. 512 (1856); M. B. W.
Carr. and Payne 308; 173 Eng. Rep. 137 (1836).

Sinclair,

45 and

n. 88.

The Verry case

is

reported at 7

Chalmers, 51 Vt. 592 (1879). The other two issues involved the court's refusal to allow the
the trial and its allowance of
defendant to argue his innocence of the seduction in the damages phase of
timely to object to such
evidence of the plaintiffs financial condition where the defendant had foiled
Rollins

evidence.

V.

The Supreme Court upheld

the

trial

court on both issues.
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upon him and

his family

on account of the

seduction.

The judge

refiised the defendant's

request and charged that "in estimating the value of the daughter's service, the jury

might consider the shock to the plaintiffs feelings and

sensibilities

by the dishonor so

brought upon him, and that that much enhanced the value of that service~the relation
that

was broken and

dishonored."^'

To

this charge, the

defendant objected. Following

the plaintiffs verdict, the defendant appealed the issue.

Interestingly, the defendant did not argue that such

in

and of themselves, but instead asserted

special

damages

other words, he

in his

that the plaintiff had failed to plead

them

as

complaint and was therefore prohibited from seeking them.^* In

made a technical

rather than an attack

damages were inappropriate

legal

argument against the introduction of the evidence

on the nature of the evidence

itself

Nonetheless, the Supreme

Court held that such damages did not have to be specially pleaded because, according to
the Court, such

damages "are a

natural resuh

declared for, and have for a long time,

if not

of the seduction, and need not be

always, been recoverable." For this

proposition, the Court quoted from Greenleaf s Evidence, the

casually disregarded in the

The damages
also for

all

Therefore,

in this action are given,

^

V.

same

treatise that

it

had so

before.

not only for the loss of service, but

from the nature of the

injury.

of the seduced, the jury may
of the comfort as well as the service of his daughter,

if the plaintiff is

consider his loss

"Rollins

Haynes case twenty-nine years

that the plaintiff can feel

specially

the parent

in

Chalmers, 593.

Special or consequential

damages are damages

that arise as a

consequence of the

injury, but

depend on

was arguing that the loss of
reputation was special or consequential
service to the father comprised the actual damages. The loss of
were dependent on the reputation
damages which could not simply be assumed by the impregnation, but
proved.
of the daughter or father and had to be specially pleaded and
fects in addition to the fects

of the injury

itself

In Rollins, the defendant
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whose

virtue

he can

other children,

It is

No

feel

no consolation, and

his anxiety as the parent

of

whose morals may be corrupted by her example?^

clear that the Court had

now decided to embrace

a different rhetoric of seduction.

longer preoccupied solely by the economic harm caused by a daughter's pregnancy,

the Court

now foregrounded the

father's feelings.

honor that had been impugned by the defendant's

And it was more
actions.

than just a father's

By his behavior,

the

defendant had tainted the relationship between father and daughter and between him and
his other children as well. Traditionally, the service that daughters

fathers

was purely economic. But now,

were to take

into account "the

"in estimating the value"

had provided

of that

shock to the plaintiffs feelings and

daughter's "service" to her father.

had

left

It

lay at the heart

of a relationship

by the

now become the

that the seducer

"broken and dishonored."

Supreme Court Judge Jonathan Ross,
this

service, juries

sensibilities

dishonor so brought upon him." Maintaining a virtuous reputation had

their

new

service.

"consolation."

The daughter's

in

upholding

this

language, elaborated on

virtue provided the father with "comfort"

The seduction had

potentially

"anxiety" for their future as well. This

is

harmed

and

his other children too, causing

him

a critique of disturbed family relations almost

psychological in nature. In this case, sexual relations had led to Fidelia's death-the
ultimate severing of the father-daughter relationship. (Ross also authored the companion

decision which declared that Fidelia's bastardy suit against Chalmers

Simon Greenleat; A Treatise on the Law of Evidence (Boston, 1860) quoted
596-597.
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was personal to her

in Rollins

v.

Chalmers,

and thus did not survive her

became

death).^° This articulation

of seduction's "true" harm

increasingly widespread injudicial writing throughout the 1880s.

Take
jury in an

damages

for

example the charge made by Tennessee judge Howell E. Jackson to a

887 seduction case. The charge was considered such a good statement of the

1

in

a seduction

trial

that a

copy of it was

Rollins decision in the West Company's

1

affixed as a note to the report

of the

891 edition of Vermont Reports. In his charge,

Judge Jackson noted how:

A

father,

of course,

feels a consolation in the virtue

right-thinking parents must understand that feeling.
plaintiff damages in

your discretion, up to the

limit

of his daughter. All

You may
claimed

declaration, for the loss of that comfort and consolation
right to feel in the purity

and virtue of his

child.

give the

in his

which he had a

You may

take into

consideration his loss of hope in the future of his daughter, and

compensate him for the same. You may award him damages, not only for
his

mental anguish

what

is

to

his feeling

in the

become of her
of anxiety as

other child.

You may

disgrace of his daughter, but for his anxiety as to
in the future.

to the effect

You may

take into consideration

of that daughter's example upon

his

look to the loss to him and his family of social

standing and jjosition by reason of the daughter's disgrace.

You may

consider his mortification, humiliation, and sense of dishonor.^'

Judge Jackson's charge combines a Victorian emphasis on female sexual purity with a
patriarchal concern about

Fidelia Rollins

v.

how one

daughter's ruination harms not only herself, but her

Albert Chalmers, 49 Vt. 515 (1877).

Reports of Cases Argued and Determined
2"' ed., vol. 7 (St. Paul: West Publishing, 1891), 215-216,
in the Supreme Court of the State of Vermont,
Southern codes of sexual morality for white women were particularly rigid and male honor
n. 1
important. Mary Frances Berry, "Judging Morality: Sexual Behavior and Legal

^'

Barbour

v.

Stephenson, 32 F. 66 (Cir.Ct.KY, 1887), cited

in

.

particularly

837-838
the Late Nineteenth-Century South," Journal of American History 78 (1991):
Sexuality in America
and n. 7; John D'Emilio and Estelle B. Freedman, Intimate Matters: A History of
Row, 1988), 94-96; Mary E. Odem, Delinquent Daughters: Protecting and
(New York: Harper
Hill: University of North Carolina
Policing Female Sexuality in the United States. 1885-1920 (Chapel
cited in the note express similar
Press, 1995), 35-37. Nevertheless, cases from other jurisdictions
note reproduced in every state's
themes. The fact that a St. Paul publisher included the charge in a
universality of its sentiments.
edition of reports published by it speaks to the presumed

Consequences

in
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father and the rest of the children. In addition, there

is

something new here-the

destruction of the sentimental relationship between father and daughter. Judges were
publicly stating that seduction

was no longer simply about economic

a view was described by Judge Jackson as a
lost

innocence-and
This

shift in

it

side

least,

was about

is

between two

the plaintiff,

on

parties.

The

lines

between them are

the other, the defendant. Seduction

is

involves three parties, the father-plaintiff, the seducer-defendant, and

the pregnant daughter.

father, the role

it

language and emphasis posed theoretical diEBculties for lawmakers.

on one

complex because

of barbarism." Instead,

lost daughters.

Civil lawsuits usually involve a dispute

clearly drawn,

"relic

service; in fact such

So long

as seduction's focus

was on

of the daughter (her consent, her reputation,

the economic

harm to

the

etc.) could, technically at

be ignored. Once the tort's emphasis shifted to the emotional value of the

father/daughter relationship, the daughter's behavior could no longer be glossed over.

Judges were faced with the

difficulty

of compensating fathers for the

their daughters' virtue, without appearing to

There were two ways to handle

this

The other was

is,

of comfort

in

condone the daughters' sexual behavior.

problenL

that they really could be "seduced," that

loss

One was

to infantilize

women by

arguing

talked into sex against their better judgment.

to use judicial discourse to reemphasize the importance of women

maintaining their sexual virtue-awarding damages to the father for the defendant's sexual

misbehavior while

at the

same time sending a message
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that the daughter's behavior

was

also inappropriate. In

Vermont, the tension between the two approaches played out

both the courts and the

legislature.^^

For example, the other seduction case from

(1

in

this period,

Davidson

v.

Abbott

880), extended the values explained in Rollins to single mothers of adult working

daughters. In so doing, the case illuminated the conflict between compensating parents

while condemning their daughters' willing participation in sexual behavior.

demonstrated

how some judges understood the

tort in rigidly

working
sister

in local textile mills for five dollars

and did chores around the house. In

Helen had engaged
his dry

goods

on her case

from age fourteen by

878, over the course of a year and a

She became pregnant and delivered a

at trial, the

that since

Her

850s.

per week. She lived with her mother and

father's absence, Helen's

The defendant argued

1

repeated intercourse with thirty-four year-old Elbridge

store in Hartford.

of that year. In her
plaintiff put

in

1

also

gendered terms.

Harriet Davidson had been abandoned by her husband during the

thirty-year-old daughter Helen had helped support the family

It

defendant

J.

child in

half,

Abbott

at

November

mother sued for seduction. After the

moved

for a directed verdict in his favor.

Helen was of age, her mother had to prove

that a

contract for her services existed. Since no evidence of contract between Harriet and

Helen had been shown by the

must

plaintiff,

she had not met her burden of proof and the judge

direct the jury to find in the defendant's favor.

The judge

agreed,

33

issues in the context of
note in the chapter on statutory rape, Vermont's legislature debated these
settled on fourteen-explicitly balancing the
raising the age of consent from eleven to eighteen. They
for policing their own sexual
girls against the need to hold older girls responsible

"

As

I

desire to protect

young

behavior.

"

Davidson

v.

State Library,

Vermont Reports Briefe, 1, no. 41 (1880), Vermont
for Hartford listed Elbridge
Montpelier, Vermont. The 1880 Vermont manuscript census
Abbott, Plaintiffs Bill of Exceptions,

boarder
Abbott as a "retired dry goods merchant" living as a
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in

the

home

of a wool sorter and his wife.

In his opinion,

rested

trial

judge James Barrett emphasized that the

on economic grounds:

"that

is

what

this suit is

brought

tort

for, the loss

Since no evidence was produced that showed "that relation that entitles

maintained for the loss of services," the

plaintiff had not

of seduction
of services."

suit to

be

proven her case and the

must be dismissed. In other words. Judge Barrett was evaluating the

suit

suit

based on the

old language of economic injury rather than the newer notion of injury to honor and the

He

parent/child relationship.

directed the jury to find for the defendant and the plaintiff

appealed.^''

As noted above,
of master and servant

seduction law was originally based on an adaptation of the law

to the relationship

action presumed that girls

who had

between fathers and daughters. The cause of

not yet attained their majority were their fathers'

servants. Fathers suing for seduction did not need to prove their minor daughters'

service as an element of the tort. In cases of aduh daughters such as that presented by

Davidson

v.

Abbott, the father typically had to

show

that the daughter

performed some

labor for him. Traditionally, however, in keeping with the bias in favor of finding for

plaintiffs,

as well as the understanding that the tort

economic

service, only the slightest services

Tapping Reeve's work on domestic

" Davidson

v.

1

n.

about more than mere

sufficient."-^^

1.
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his notes to

846, Lucius Chittenden noted that

Abbott, Judge's Order, Vermont Reports Briefs,

" Chittenden, 292-293,

really

needed to be proved. In

relations in

such cases 'Ihe slightest acts of service are

was

1,

Reeve himself noted

no. 41 (1880).

in

this in

1816, based on eighteenth century authorities. This had been the law for

hundred

to understand

why Judge

Barrett decided the question as he did.

His position was not supported even by cases decided

it

one

years.^^

It is difficult

was

at least

in the eighteenth century.

Nor

who had testified that

supported by the testimony of both Harriet and Helen,

she

paid her earnings to her mother, did chores for her, lived in the house and had done so
for fifteen years-evidence

case,

more than any

basis of the tort.

acknowledged by Barrett

other, that

To a

on

its

facts actually

struggling family, Helen's

in his decision.

Ironically,

it

was

this

comported with the older economic

wages were

vitally important.

Her

incapacity posed a serious economic problem.

Then why

did the judge take the drastic step of directing a verdict after the

plaintiffs case? Barrett could be hostile to female claimants in sex cases and

afi-aid to

was not

ignore settled law in order to impose his moral views on the parties appearing

One contemporary commentator wrote

before him.

that "inthetrialofcasesinthe

county court, his rulings were made more with reference to what he thought the law

ought to be than what

it

it

actually had

been declared to be

clear that Barrett controlled his juries through his

charge and thus juries seldom came

in

Barrett

right."^''

Davidson

v.

was

summation of the

Another made

facts during the

with verdicts contrary to his opinion of the case.

"Judge Barrett would control juries, but only

and

in the reports."

clearly troubled

in fiirtherance

of what he deemed to be just

by what he saw as the consensual nature of the

Abbott, 52 Vt. 570 (1880).

Magazine for
"The Supreme Court of Vermont, Part 4," 77ie Green Bag: An Entertaining
on James Barrett," Proceedings of
Lawyers 6 (March 1894): 138; Hoyt H. Wheeler, "Memorial Paper
42-43. Barrett's other cases- Sterling v. Sterling, 41 Vt.
the Vermont Bar Association, 6 (1902), App.

"

Russell Taft,
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relationship. In his recitation

of the

facts

of the case the judge noted

that

& without his

in intercourse with the defendant at his store "whither she voluntarily

Given her

solicitation went."^^

of the two elements necessary
the

new

status as a factory worker, the absence

may have been unable

her age, he

to

to conceive

and

father,

of her as a dependent owing services-one

make out a case

for seduction

to be found.

Without him, the new

tort

became

Nonetheless the Supreme Court reversed him.
the subject

made

it

clear that

"proof of the most

the cows, or making tea for the

under the old

But

rule.

plaintifif,

It

less ideologically coherent.

noted that

trifling acts

wiU enable the

Isaac Redfield

made

action in form

is

a century

in

its

clear that the tort

to recover

England and

damage

Though

is

had

plaintiff to maintain this action

for loss

of service; but

essentially for

The opinion

on the

subject.

wounded

is slight

loss.

"The

and nominal

in

feeUngs, dishonor, and

was

also confirmed that in

willing to include

mothers

Vermont a daughter's

On remand,

consent to sexual relations remained legally irrelevant.

Judge

has become well settled for

it

of service

the tort emphasized fathers, the Court

confines as well.

commentaries on

was no longer even about economic

this country, that the loss

and the recovery

cases,

disgrace."

it

all

of service, such as milking

for debauching the daughter." After reviewing various precedents

within

of a

language of seduction depended on harm to fathers-and Helen's father was

nowhere

most

Helen engaged

the parties settled the

unknown amoimt.^'

case for an

80 (1868) and State v. Potter, 52 Vt. 33, 40 (1879)-are discussed
the Court from 1858 to 1880.

in other chapters.

" Davidson

v.

Abbott, Judge's Order, Vermont Reports Briefe,

no. 41 (1880).

Davidson

v.

Abbott, 572-574; Davidson

v.

Abbott,

1,

Barrett served on

Windsor County Court, December 1880 Term,

Docket No. 44.
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The

rule that only trifling service

have become "well

settled," but that

was

sufiBcient to sustain

a seduction action

may

could not take away from the fact that such a rule

completely undercut the Court's past precedents regarding the tort of seduction. In
Rollins and Davidson

explaining

which

it

service

why the

we

tort

are witnessing the evolution of the

common law.

no longer required a showing of the economic underpinnings on

had been based. Commentators had long pointed out the

was

irrelevant, but

suddenly, they

felt

judges had continued to pay

it

fact that

lip service.

Now,

sufBciently comfortable (or compelled) to explicitly cast

admit that the tort was really about "wounded

Supreme Court by noting

way to more

that "in the

rather

it

aside and

this

out in his brief to the

modem cases the old idea of loss of menial service

enlightened views. "^*^

rejecting the legal fiction that

economic

and disgrace" and had

feelings, dishonor,

been for a hundred years. Harriet Davidson's lawyer pointed

has given

Judges were

Not only were

courts and commentators

had governed seduction for so long, but

like

Judge

Jackson's reference to "barbarism," they saw the explicit rejection of the economic basis

of the

tort as a necessary step

towards a more "enlightened" view of the

real

harm

seduction caused to fethers and daughters (or in this case, mothers and daughters)."'

^ Davidson

v.

Abbott, Plaintiffs Brie^ Vermont Reports Briefs,

1,

no. 41 (1880) (emphasis in the

original).

The use of a

barbaric/civilized discourse in discussions of sex

early twentieth centuries

was common

in

and gender

Vermont and elsewhere.

in

the late nineteenth and

In a decision interpreting

Vermont's

married woman's property acts issued three years after Davidson, Judge Redfield Proctor likened the
condition of married women prior to the passage of the acts as an "unreasonable disability which
barbarism had entailed upon them." Hubbard v. Bugbee, 55 Vt. 506, 508-509 (1883) cited in Lucy T.

Brown, "Married
Property?

You

Women

Better

Be

and Property Ownership

in the

Nineteenth Century:

Single, Dead, or Male," paper presented at a

You Want

to

Own

symposium of the Vermont

Rockingham, Vermont, June 1998. Copy in the possession of the author.
One advocate for an increased age of consent for girls described the campaign as a "culmination of
Purity Crusade. Sexual
centuries of efforts in the rise from barbarism." Quoted in David J. Pivar,

Judicial Historical Society,

and Social Control. 1868-1900 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973). Historian
and racial
Bederman explores the implications of the barbaric/civilized discourse for gender

Morality,
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Gail

important to recognize

It is

language

in favor

of new

was

difiBcult for

power beyond

them to admit

disregarding the old language.

process

it is

that they

was forjudges

Judges were sensitive to the charge

the easy reach of democratic government.

were

To understand

in fact fashioning

a

in

new

sexual discourse in a newspaper

common law

law. That they

relationships

article,

is

would do so

most

on seduction was the extent

common law judges'
same time

It

was one

a sermon, or an advice

system, the words of a judge's holding become the law.

must have seemed to

Perhaps what

the

new law by

the psychological tension inherent in this

Vermont's was a famously conservative court, wary of making

common

to simply discard old

important to remember where this change was taking place.

thing to adopt a

book. But

it

in the nineteenth century.

that they exercised a political

It

how difiBcult

indicates

how compelling the need to

protect these

them.'*^

striking about this explicit

to

radical changes in the

which

it

change

in articulated

emphasis

ran against powerful trends coming to dominate

thinking about the economic value of relationships. At precisely

that judges

were

telling the public that

it

was not mere economic

loss but

morality that mattered most in seduction cases, they were working a revolution in the

law by eradicating morality as an issue of judicial concern

in cases arising

out of contract

and property disputes.
Early nineteenth-century courts had focused on the specific expectations of the

parties to a contract

and

felt

no qualms about

altering the contract

between them to

in Manliness and Civilization: A
construction in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century society
1880-191 7 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States:

Press, 1995).

Berry, 838.

118

.

guarantee

its fairness.

This reflected an earlier jurisprudence which situated

itself within

a local moral economy. Legal historians such as Morton Horwitz, William E. Nelson,

and Arnold M. Paul have documented how courts came to

from contract law as the

rise

of a national and impersonal

strip

moral considerations

industrial capitalism

demanded

the imposition of more neutral and predictable principles of interpretation. In addition,

common

law judges, under pressure from democratic elements, sought to clothe

their

actions with the mantle of scientific objectivity and avoid the appearance of acting like

un-elected legislators.

intention

of the

governed

—

such a

The

result

was

that contract

parties as expressed within the four

regardless of the unequal bargaining

legal analysis

before the year

law became formulaic and the

comers of the document

power of the

parties or the injustice

might work. Thus, a worker with an annual contract

was up might

receive nothing

would never have permitted. Judges

—a

result

which an

who

quit

earlier jurisprudence

also cast aside older remedies for violations

of

public and private rights such as the injunction, in favor of the payment of monetary

damages. As a

result, older

notions of property rights, such as the right of an upstream

user not to have his land flooded by a downstream

dam went

unpunished, and often,

uncompensated."^ So powerful was the demand for contractual predictability that older
equitable principles which had protected the property of married

women were

dispensed

with and state legislatures, including Vermont, passed laws recognizing the legal

On

these trends see

Morton

J.

Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge:

the Common Law: The
Harvard University Press, 1977); William E. Nelson, The Americanization of
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society. 1760-1830
Rule of Law: Attitudes of Bench and Bar, 18871975); Arnold M. Paul, Conservative Crisis and the
Backhouse writes that despite these trends in
1895 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960). Constance
refused to deprive fathers of their status rights
other areas of Anglo-American law Ontario's lawmakers
of Seduction," 5 1
in their daughters. Backhouse, "The Tort
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made by married women and

contracts

granting

But the development of a law stripped of its
inconsistencies

traditional

right to their

own wages,"^

moral voice created tensions and

when that new law touched women/^

In seduction law, judges in

legal theories

them the

Vermont and across

the country

of injury which ran against the grain of these changes

were

articulating

in contract

and

property law. Deciding damages based solely on economic harm to the father was seen
as barbaric since such

important to

damages focused on

service rather than

in

movement

to subvert the law's

^

injuries

were dependent on the character

each case, since a woman's chastity influenced the value of her

relationship to her father and thus the

apparent

truly

modem civilization-respect for proper domestic relations between fathers

and daughters and parents and children. Those

of the parties

on what was

damages her

in separate directions

on these

new emphases when

came

it

The

issues indicates that they

courts'

were

willing

to protecting traditional sexual and

For Vermont, see generally, Lucy Brown. Brown's work

responses involving the rights of married women.

father might receive.

My own

is

the best one to date on legislative

survey of every statute passed between 1779

and 1921 reveals that Vermont's legislature enacted at least 175 public and private statutes dealing with
women, women's rights, women's issues, and the law of marriage and divorce during this period. The
pace greatly accelerated during mid-century, with 136 (78 percent) of those statutes passed between
1850 and 1921 and 101 (58 percent)) passed between 1870 and 1921. As early as 1779, the legislature
passed a statute prohibiting the sale of an heiress's lands without her consent whether acquired before
marriage or w^ile under coverture. The earliest statute granting expanded legal rights to married
women came in 1 846, when the General Assembly granted feme sole status to women whose husbands

were imprisoned. 1846 Vt. Acts 31; For the 1779 act see Allen Soule, ed.. Laws of Vermont
Papers of Vermont, vol. 12 (Montpelier: Secretary of State, 1964), 146.

in State

Stanley juxtaposes the powerful symbolism of newly-freed slaves' right to contract v^rith the
two spurred feminists to seek
disabilities imposed by the marriage contract. The contradictions in the
Bonds and Wage Labor: Rights of Contract
legal reform of marriage law. Amy Dru Stanley, "Conjugal
Age of Emancipation," The Journal of American History 75 (1988): 471-500. These

Amy Dru

in the

Supreme Court. In 1905 the Court struck down
day as an interference with the
protective legislation which limited New York bakers to a ten hour
legislation aimed at female tavern workers in
to contract. But in 1908 it upheld similar protective
208 U.S. 412 (1908).
Oregon. Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Muller v. Oregon,
inconsistencies extended

all

the

way

to the U. S.
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right

And

family roles.

minded

they were willing to do so even

if

it

meant

limiting the

more reform-

state legislatures."*^

The question of the

legal status

of women occupied

legislators' attention at

almost every session of Vermont's General Assembly from 1790 to 1920.
the 1840s, the legislature began to reform the

married

women from maintaining

Beginning

in

common law rules which prevented

a legal and financial existence distinct from that of their

husbands, but the legislative reforms liberalizing the rights of women were often blunted

by judicial decisions

limiting their effect/^ Thus, the

seduction cases seem to comport with

reality

its

Vermont Court's holdings

conservatism

in

extending the

new economic

of the law to married women.
In seeking to understand these changes, most recent scholarship

fitted these legal

developments into a broader Victorian

ideology had recognized the sexual natures of men and

v^dth

in

context."^^

women and

An earlier

women were

sexual virtue.

Men were

Republican

been comfortable

them so long as they were confined within marriage/^ Victorian

stressed that

on seduction has

rhetoric

however

expected to be passionless and pure and as such, guardians of

seen as naturally sexually aggressive, though they were

expected to curb those instincts through

self-discipline.^^

Thus, most writers on

Pamela Haag discusses these issues in the context of criminal seduction and breach of marriage
promise cases. Haag, 25-60. Haag's work was published after this chapter was written.

Lucy Brown, 14-20.

^ M.B. W.

Sinclair's article charts these statutory

changing notions of the "ideal female."

and

common

In her article,

critique to the nineteenth century changes.

D'Emilio and Freedman, 42-48.

Larson, 389-390; D'Emilio and Freedman, 58-59.
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law changes and argues that they

reflect

Jane Larson applies a more thoroughly feminist

'

seduction see the changes in seduction law in the nineteenth century as a reflection of

new Victorian sexual ideology.

this

new

Beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century,

seduction laws recognized "the prevailing sexual morality and economic reality that

made

premarital sexual experience or single motherhood an obstacle to a

chance to work and to marry and therefore a devastating social

woman's

A woman's

injury."^'

reputation for chastity had been technically irrelevant under the old property-based

common law cause of action. So

too,

was the

issue

of her consent." However, once

sexual morality had been foregrounded as the gravamen" of the

reputation

became

fair

dynamic developed
her

game

suit,

for defense attomeys-as did the issue

in jurisdictions

which allowed a

woman to

the daughter's

of consent.

A similar

bring a seduction action in

own name.^'*
The Victorian paradigm provides a neat explanation

for the apparent changes in

seduction law during the nineteenth century. The shifting tort reflected the shifting of

" Larson, 386; M. B. W.

M.

Ireland,

Sinclair, 78.

On

the importance of virginity to a

woman's

"The Libertine Must Die: Sexual Dishonor and the Unwritten Law

prospects see Robert

in the

Nineteenth-

Century United States," Journal of Social History 23 (1989): 27-44.

" Backhouse,"The Tort of Seduction," 60; M. B. W.

*^The gravamen

is

the material part of the case.

It is

Sinclair, 48-49.

that aspect of the grievance lying at the heart of the

dispute.

'^Larson, 385-387; Karen Dubinsky, Improper Advances:

Rape and Heterosexual Conflict in Ontario,
77-78; see also M. B. W. Sinclair, 78. This

1880-1929 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993),
was particularly true for statutes which made civil and criminal seduction available only to women of
Century
"previously chaste character." Michael Sturma, "Seduction and Punishment in Late Nineteenth
New South Wales," Australian Journal of Law & Society 2 (1985): 76-82; Martha J. Bailey, "Servant
Journal of Family
Girls and Masters: The Tort of Seduction and the Support of Bastards," Canadian

Law 10 (1991): 146-147; Thomer and Reddekopp, 455. One commentator argued that truly chaste
women would never give up their chastity. Thus, the only women who could sue under a seduction
cause of action under the statute
statute would be those who chose not to be chaste-rendering the
Thomas B.
and pointing out just one of the theoretical challenges the shifting tort posed.
S.W.2d 483 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984),"
Waltrip, "The Claim of Seduction in Missouri: Parker v. Bruner, 686
illogical

Southern Illinois University

Law Journal

11 (1987):

457.
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societal concerns

from economic control of daughters qua property to an emphasis on

female sexuality. But the chief problem with

would

call the

ideology.

By

this explanation is that

it

ignores what

I

"objective" outcomes of seduction cases before the invention of Victorian
objective measures, seduction did not change between 1790 and 1920.

Judges were sympathetic,

plaintifis typically prevailed,

and judgments were

six reported cases, the plaintifis ultimately prevailed in four.

before judgment was rendered. In three cases for which

awards were very

large.

large.

In the

In the sixth, the father died

we have

figures, the

damage

In other words, between 1800 and 1920, the rhetoric of the tort

had changed, but not the predictable outcome of the

cases.

A review of unpublished trial court decisions reveals a similar result. We have
the records of twenty-two seduction cases brought in the

trial

courts between 1796 and

1914 (including the Hubbell, Rollins, and Davidson cases discussed above)." After the

1796

case, six cases

» Ashley

were brought

in the

1

820s. There then followed a long hiatus with

Windsor County Court, March 1796 Term, vol. 3, p. 416-418; Silver v. White,
Windsor County Court, March 1821 Term, vol. 13, p. 22\\Juddv. Preston, Orange County Court, June
1822 Terra, vol. 1 1, p. 299; Hubbell v Wheeler, Addison County Suprerae Court, January 1827 Term,
vol. 4, p. 230-231; Spencer v. Spencer aka Lyon, Windsor County Court, January 1828 Term, vol. 14, p.
258-259; Adams v. Starling, Addis(Mi County Court, June 1829 Term, vol. 12, p. 104-106; Harrington v.
Ladd, Windsor County Court, March 1825 Term, vol. 14, p. 1; Hurlbut v. Nichols, Windsor County
Court, December 1858 Term, vol. 27, p. 493; Abbott v. Davis, Orange County Court, January 1866
Term, vol. 20, p. 454; Greeno v. Dicero, Rutland County Court, March 1876 Term, vol. 45, p. 566-567;
v.

Willis,

Chalmers, Orange County Supreme Court, March 1879 Term, vol. 20, p. 248; Davidson v.
Abbott, Windsor County Court, May 1879 Term, Docket No. 153; Kinney v. Flint, Orange County
Court, June 1880 Term, Docket Book 1, p. 207; Jennings v. Pineo, Windsor County Court, December
Rollins

V.

Adams, Windsor County Court, December 1892 Term, vol.
Term, vol. 37, p. 91-92; Crandall
35, p. 537; Giles v. Brothers, Windsor County Court, December 1898
Billings v. Sinclair, Windsor
V. Rand, Windsor County Court, June 1899 Term, Docket No. 1046;
1882 Term,

vol. 34, p.

165-166; Steams

v.

County Court, December 1902 Term, vol. 38, p. 89; Dickinson v. Eaton, Orange County Court,
December 1903 Term, vol. 23, p. 513.; Stacker v. Lewis, Windsor County Court, June 1906 Term, vol.
Court, March 1914 Term, vol. 61, p. 58-61;
38, p. 437-438; Fitzgerald v. Connors, Rutland County
Wheeler v. Walker, Windsor County Court, June 1914 Term, Docket No. 4863.
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no

suits

found

in the four counties until 1858.^^ After

each decade thereafter up to 1914.
that date through

1

No

fiirther

plaintiff's verdict.

cases appear in the four counties after

920 and no reported decision from any county were ever published

Out of the twenty-two cases brought

again.

1858 a few cases were brought

The defendant

was awarded

of twenty-two did the defendant prevail by

of the period studied (1796),

in the

towards the very end (1903). One of those defense verdicts

was

twelve resulted in a

defaulted in another case and a judgment

to the plaintiff. In only three cases out

verdict: at the very beginning

at the trial court level,

directed by the Judge, reversed, and then settled for an

the Davidson case, four other cases settled.

The remaining

(the

middle (1879) and

1879 Davidson case)

unknown amount. Counting
three cases

were

discontinued." Thus, in seventeen out of twenty-two cases (77 percent),

plaintififs

ultimately obtained a verdict in their favor or an out-of-court settlement. This success

rate

and large damage awards were also experienced by seduction

this time.^*

verdict

is

The

fact that only three out

of twenty-two

particularly startling in the context

involving questions of sexual injury.

civil assaults

on women

As

I

plaintiffs in

Ontario at

suits resulted in a not guilty

of civil lawsuits

in general, but

not of cases

note in the preceeding chapter, seduction,

like

(including sexual assaults), bastardy proceedings, and breach of

Dates of suits and amounts awarded to

plaintiflfe:

1796, 1821 ($45), 1822 ($108), 1825 ($50), 1827

1876 ($300), 1879(2) ($841), 1880
($80), 1828 ($214), 1829 ($23) (servant), 1858, 1866 ($308),
1906 (settled), 1914 (2)
(settled), 1882 ($300), 1892 ($25), 1898, 1899 (settled), 1902, 1903,
($1200)($1500).

"

daughter lost her bastardy suit
This number includes one case discontinued by the plaintiff after his
losing proposition. Giles v. Brother
against the defendant at the same term making a seduction suit a
Brothers, Windsor County
Windsor County Court, December 1898 Term, vol. 37, p. 91-92; Giles v.
Court,

December 1897 Term,

vol. 36, p.

553-554.

Backhouse, "The Tort of Seduction," 76.
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marriage promise cases, had very high success rates—70 to 85 percent of cases
resulted
in

a recovery for the

plaintiff.

A clear social message was being sent by jurors in

seduction cases and, based on case outcomes,

during the century

in the seriousness

at least as far as juries

it

was one

that

would remain

consistent

were concemed. In a measure of judges'

belief

of the offense, they often found the actions of the defendant to be

and malicious." Such a finding prohibited the defendant fi-om relying on the poor

'Svillful

debtor's oath as a means of escaping the judgment/^

Damages
cases for which

in these suits

we have

that a servant girl's

for

figures

was almost $384, a very

wages were as low as one

between three and four

See

could be very high. The average award

dollars per

week

dollar per

large

in the thirteen

sum when we

consider

week and a housekeeper's

in the late nineteenth century.*^^

Furthermore,

example, Hubbell v Wheeler, Addison County Supreme Court, January 1827 Term,

Adams

vol. 4, p.

Addison County Court, June 1829 Term, vol. 12, p. 104-106; Rollins v.
Chalmers^ Orange County Supreme Court, June 1879 Term, vol. 20, p. 248; Greeno v. Dicero, Rutland

liO-TiV^

v.

Starlings

County Court, March 1876 Term,

We can

see

how

seduction

suits involving the costs

vol. 45, p.

damage awards

566-567.

reflected

more than economic harm by comparing them

to

of female labor which did not have a sexual or femilial component to them.

Thus in suits by women against the estates of deceased men for housekeeping services performed by
them we find that the courts awarded women between three and four dollars per week for housekeeping
services such as cooking and cleaning in the late nineteenth century. Laura A. Thompson v. Estate of
Joshua Patton, Rutland County Court, March 1898 Term, vol. 55, p. 93-95 (four dollars per week for
and 1896); Annie Donnelly v. Estate of Daniel Haher, Rutland County Court,
September 1897 Term, vol. 54, p. 655-657 (three dollars per week for housekeeping services between
1879 and 1895). Vermont law allowed minor sons to buy their time and obligation to pay over wages

services between 1866

Chase bought his rights from his father for sixteen dollars per year.
2 Vt. 290 (1829). In 1857, Michael Bray gave up his right to his son's time and
Chase V.
earnings in exchange for some sheep. The boy was earning seven dollars per month. Bray v. Wheeler,
29 Vt. 5 14 (1857). Another way of looking at it is to compare an actual per quod case for loss of
from their

fathers.

In 1825, Joseph

could find only three. In only one case was there a verdict for the
claimed $100
plaintiff. In that case a father sued when his son was severely injured by a firework. He
Bailey v. Andrews,
in medical expenses and two months lost work. The jury awarded him $148.
Two other suits were brought
Windsor County Supreme Court, February 1 878 Term, vol. 1 1 , p.
services of a son or worker.

I

M.

vol.
under the /?^r^t/Oi/ cause of action. In Gagnev. Batease, Windsor County Court, June 1920 Term,
defendant. That suit settled after it had
40, p. 487-488, a fether sued for injuries to his son caused by the
Term, vol. 5,
gone to the jury. In Conan v. Raymond, Windsor County Supreme Court, February 1827
p.

25, an employer sued for injury to his indentured servant.
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The defendant

prevailed.

pregnancy certainly did not incapacitate a

woman entirely—if at

all.

Yet, a typical

complaint claimed that as a result of the seduction, the father had been denied the
services of his daughter from the date of conception to the date of birth—a claim
which

flew in the face of nineteenth-century lived experience and which further reveals the
fiction

began

of the seduction
at the

action.

According to standard seduction pleading, the injury

—

moment of unauthorized conception

father involved something

more than

loss

clear indication that the

of services.

harm to

the

When a seduction case did not

involve a fether-daughter relationship the damages were

much lower. Thus,

in

an

1

828

case brought by a plaintiff for the impregnation of his female servant, the jury awarded

only twenty-eight dollars. After requesting a
again. This time the jury

new trial,

awarded twenty-three

dollars.

the defendant

Just six

was found

months before,

liable

in

neighboring Windsor County, a jury had awarded a plaintiff $214 in another seduction

case.

in that instance, the plaintiff was

But

As

early as the eighteenth century,

a father, not an employer.^'

commentators were aware

requirement of showing economic injury was a

Tapping Reeve, vmting of seduction
cases),

in

fiction.

that the

And, as has already been shown.

1816 (based on an analysis of eighteenth century

concluded that loss of service was not the true rule of damages. Instead the real

ground for damages was the disgrace of the

femily.^^

Thus, long before the enunciation

of a Victorian ideology, judges and juries knew that seduction was

"really" about

disgrace and decided cases accordingly. Seduction litigation both before and after the

"

Addison County Court, June 1829 Term, vol. 12, p. 104-106; Spencer
aka Lyon, Windsor County Court, January 1828 Term, vol. 14, p. 258-259.

Adams

v.

Starling,

"Chittenden, 291.
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v.

Spencer

Victorian

shift

implicated questions of honor and a father's right to have control over
his

daughter's sexuality. These issues greatly predate notions of Victorian sexual morality

and lay

at the heart

It is

of any

easy to see

dynamic could also

social order based

how

in the small

on a

patriarchal family structure.^^

communities

that

exist long before Victorian ideology

Evidence from Vermont

reflects a

made up Vermont, such

washed over the

broad social desire to punish those

rural landscape.

who

with family relationships, reputation and sexual norms. Society regulated

a

interfered

many

sexual

behaviors ranging from seemingly consensual acts (seduction, adultery, and bastardy) to
entirely coercive

not only

in the

ones (sexual assault and rape). Thus, seduction needs to be understood

context of a Victorian transition from the economic to the moral, but also

as an act of invasion by a stranger into the family which denied fathers their authority and

thereby injured the family's reputation. If one views seduction as part of a

patriarchal system

century changes

response to

relations

new

in

which requires control over female

much

older

sexuality, then the nineteenth-

seduction law appear to be merely a reinforcement of older ideals

challenges to male authority rather than a

new development

in

in sexual

between men and women.^ Such a theory has great explanatory power given

^ For an ancient example, see Edward M. Harris, "Did the Athenians Regard Seduction as a Worse
Crime than Rape?" Classical Quarterly 40 (1990): 370-377. Conventional wisdom has it that the
Athenians regarded seduction as a worse offense than rape. Rape was a short-term physical assault on
woman. On the other hand, a seducer "could win a long-lasting mastery over her soul." To men who
were masters of their households and concerned with maintaining control over their daughters,
Harris
seduction posed a grave threat to their authority as masters and hence to their honor. Though
notion
argues that the Athenians did not regard seduction as worse than rape, he does not discredit the
offense.
that to some in a patriarchal society, seduction could seem a worse

Backhouse, "The Tort of Seduction," 77-78.
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a

that the actual

outcome of seduction cases changed

awarded or plaintiff success

rate before

The Victorian paradigm and

and

little

in

terms of the size of damages

after the spread

of Victorian values."

the patriarchal model provide powerfiil tools for

understanding seduction law during the nineteenth century. The Victorian model sees

changes

in the

patriarchal

law and explains them as reflecting new sexual values. In contrast, the

model sees new law and explains

it

as reinforcing older notions in the face of

a changing social and economic order. This paradox can be explained
that the important

of the cases, but

change

in the

in

seduction in the nineteenth century

discourse judges, lawyers and legislators

if

was not

now

we

recognize

in the

outcome

permitted in

prosecuting them. Juries awarded large verdicts in the eighteenth century and continued

to

do so

in the early twentieth.

Judges were pro-plaintiff in seduction cases before the

eighteenth century and they remained so in the twentieth. The stability of these objective

measures of attitudes about seduction over time suggest that they did not change, but the

way judges and
acknowledge
those values

lawyers talked about seduction did. They were

explicitly the importance

in the texts

economic

of sexual honor and purity and to foreground

of their decisions and

shifted fi-om technical analyses

now willing to

statutes.

The language of decisions

which stressed the old formal requirements (such as

injury) to explications

on shame, dishonor, sexual

between parents and daughters. Furthermore,

in

Vermont

purity,

and the relationship

that discourse focused

on

the

way that

the male defendant's impregnation of the daughter threatened the parent-child

" M.B.W.

but
Sinclair notes the punitive nature of seduction cases as early as the eighteenth century,
an explanation for it. M. B. W. Sinclair, 35-41. On changes in seduction law as a

does not provide
reflection

of older patriarchal attitudes clashing with new

Seduction," 45-80.
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realities, see

Backhouse, "The Tort of

relationship and the daughter's fiiture.

Even though the

results for the litigants

remained

the same, the changes in seduction law altered the courtroom discourse—articulating
injuries to fathers

and daughters that

in the past

had been understood, but went largely

unspoken.
have already noted

I

how perceived threats to

breakdovm of rural communities,

rising divorce

traditional family life-including the

and illegitimacy

rates,

and increasing

opportunities for female autonomy-were on the minds of many of Vermont's

intelligentsia.

explicitly

These problems may have spurred Vermont's judges to

was Vermont's

their

more

about seduction's real harm to parents and families while continuing to

encourage the success of plaintiffs

it

talk

own names

in their suits

courts, rather than

for seduction in 191

its

1

stemming from these transactions. Thus

legislature that

when the

gave

women the

right to sue in

claim was part of a breach of marriage

promise suit.^
Fitzgerald

Vermont,

v.

Connors (1914), the

sixth

reflects this dynamic.^^ Fitzgerald

and

last

seduction case ever reported in

sought $10,000 for the seduction of his

daughter, alleging only $300 in expenses on account of her pregnancy in addition to

unspecified damages for the loss of her services.

**

Stokes

" The

V.

Mason, 85 Vt. 164 (191

1).

The case

is

The jury returned a verdict of $1200.

discussed in greater detail in Chapter

1.

was Davis v. Carpenter (1900). In that case the father had brought a
mother
seduction suit against Carpenter, but had died before trial. Despite the feet that the daughter's
was now seekmg to continue the suit as administrator of the fether's estate, the Court characterized
of the father and dismissed
seduction as a personal action like slander which could not survive the death
upheld the trial court's
the suit. In a brief decision with no citation to authority, the Supreme Court
other seduction case

mainly concerned with injury to
death of the plaintiff. The
honor and reputation rather than economic injury which always survived the
tort had been completely eradicated in the
case shows the extent to which the old economic nature of the
Davis v. Carpenter, Brief of the Defendant,
eyes of the courts. Davis v. Carpenter, 72 Vt. 259 (1900);
Vermont Reports Briefe, 72(2), no. 67 (1900).
decision.

The Court's analogy

to slander

was

telling since that tort is
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At

trial,

under direct examination, the plaintiffs lawyer, Joseph Jones, asked the

plaintiff how his daughter's seduction

line

of questioning as being

had made him

feel.

The defendant objected to

irrelevant to the seduction action.

The judge allowed

questioning and Fitzgerald responded that he could not explain
that he had to flee the

knew

about

Fitzgerald

it.

was

town where he had

The defendant sought a

lived,

burden of proving she was

directed verdict

at the time the child

his servant.

the

how it made him feel,

and did not want to meet anyone who

in fact her father's servant since she

argued that she was eighteen

this

on the

issue

of whether Lydia

worked outside the home and he

was bom, thus

also

increasing the plaintiffs

The defendant's motion was denied by

the

judge.^«

Finally, the defendant

sought various charges to the jury which the judge also

denied. Instead, the judge told the jury that

daughter worked outside the

home

damages were

special

showed

To

if the

that the father

he did not in fact choose to exercise this

came

to the question

recover for the shock to his feelings and

dishonor brought upon him."

had

if

also charged the jury that if they

plaintiff was entitled to

could find for the plaintiff even

as long as the evidence

the right to control her wages, even

The judge

it

this the

had

right.

of damages, "the
sensibilities,

by the

defendant also objected arguing that such

damages and needed

to be pleaded specially, which the plaintiff

failed to do.^'

vol. 127, p. 185-186;
Fitzgerald V. Connors, Rutland County Supreme Court, November 1914 Term,
Briefe, 88(3), no. 48 (1914).
Fitzgerald V. Connors, Defendant's Bill of Exceptions, Vermont Reports

Fitzgerald

V.

Connors, Defendant's

Bill

of Exceptions, Vermont Reports Briefe.
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After the verdict, the defendant

new

trial

moved

and get a

based on the issues described above. The Supreme Court methodicaUy

disposed of the defendant's appellate issues.

had few options

Connors was
economic
fact that

to set aside the jury's verdict

in

left

injury.

It

was now

clear that seduction defendants

defending these cases. Like other defendants before him, Patrick

arguing old legal theories about master-servant relationships and

And

like

other defendants before him,

it

was a

ftitile

task. Despite the

Lydia Fitzgerald had been living seven miles away from home, kept

wages, and was eighteen

refiised to

deem

at the time

child, the

her emancipated and instead held that she

and that the seduction worked an
traditional

of the delivery of her

injury

was

still

all

her

own

Supreme Court
her father's servant

upon him. This was a gross departure from

the

law of seduction, but the Court was no longer paying much attention to the

legal issues that

had once defined the

tort, issues

which the Fitzgerald court now

believed continued to exist for reasons which were "historical rather than logical."'"

One of the most
In a case based

significant aspects

on moral

of the case

injury to the father,

it

is

Thomas

Fitzgerald's testimony.

was very important

for

him

to

communicate precisely to the jury how the seduction of his daughter made him
Fitzgerald had great difficulty articulating

development for the

plaintiff in this case,

defendant's actions had taken

Whether one views

it

away

this

it.

And perhaps

because

it

let

this

the jury

Vermont farmer's

feel.

But

was not a bad

know that

ability to

the

speak and name.

from the point of view of patriarchy or republican

citizenship, the

Connors, Brief of Defendant, Vermont Reports Briefs; Fitzgerald v. Connors, 88 Vt. 365
age and no longer living with her father, no
(1914). Tapping Reeve wrote that once a daughter was of
work, Lucius Chittenden did not contradict
action for seduction could lie. In his 1846 update of Reeve's
Fitzgerald

this position.

V.

Reeve, 292.
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seduction of Thomas Fitzgerald's daughter had stripped him of a central part
of his
definition

and power; mute testimony

of domestic and

social order.

to the threat seduction

Vermont's

posed to masculine notions

system made sure that Patrick Connors

legal

paid the price for his transgression.''

Conclusion
Writing in 1940, Lord Thankerton noted that "the action for seduction as
to English law has itself had an unsatisfactory development.

criticized

it

as

"among

the least respectable products of the

had "never been distinguished by

were
tort

rightly puzzled

.

Another commentator

common law," one which

logic or clarity."^ Twentieth-century

by the development of seduction. For want of a

which most recognized

(at

some

level) as

having

shame had been grafted onto a cause of action
start the true

."
.

for

for

better solution, a

injury.

Almost

it

and

fi"om the

rhetorical battle with the formal

economic

injury.

Such a

between what everyone says and what everyone knows does not make
or clarity." But

commentators

basis in patriarchal rights

economic

dynamic underlying the action had done

and mostly unrelated requirements of a case

its

known

does provide an opportunity for gaining

disparity

for either "logic

insight into the

way

in

which

the courts understood, law, sex, and family relationships.

If the question

is

whether the predictable outcomes of seduction cases changed

between 1790 and 1920 the answer would have to be

in the negative. Instead,

" Kathy Peiss provided the inspiration for this analysis.

"

Lord Thankerton 's comments came in Brownlee v. MacMillan, A.C. 802, 809 (1940); the second
comment was made in E. Joliffe, Canadian Bar Review 13 (1935): 331. Both are quoted in Thomer and
Reddekopp, 469.
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nineteenth-century changes in seduction law reflected an increased willingness to

recognize explicitly the real harm seduction did to fathers. In so doing, courts disposed

of the formal

legal technicalities that might interfere with punishing a defendant for his

actions and eradicated the legal fictions that had

The change
the Civil

War

demonstrated

Vermont's seduction law took place amidst the upheaval following

in

as the issue of female

came

sexual spheres

by a boarder. In

1

when we compare

in the social,

in the

the state's

economic,

political,

and

Vermont female experience

first,

middle and

last

are

reported

819, Benjamin Hubbell's daughter had been debauched in her

1

878, Helen Davidson had been seduced

labor at a local factory. In

and

autonomy

These changes

to the fore.

spatially

seduction cases. In

bound judicial discourse.

living miles fi-om

1

91

1

fi-om

wage

Lydia Fitzgerald had been impregnated while working

,

home—for

on her way home

home

all

intents

an independent woman. Vermont lawmakers

paid attention to these changes, but the particular modifications in the state's law were

more
little

rhetorical than substantive, the objective

measures of seduction having changed

during this period. Those rhetorical changes reflected the perceived threat

increasing female

autonomy posed

a desire to pimish

men

society's concern that

to close parent-daughter relationships

acting outside the

bounds of sexual propriety.

Vermont's Supreme Court, heretofore

reticent

combined with

It is

on

a measure of

the issue,

reversed itself and became a rhetorical instrument for aflBrming the importance of

compensating parents for the loss of their daughters' virtue-the maintenance of which

became the most valuable

service

The Fitzgerald case was
before 1920 and the

last

autonomous daughters now provided to

their parents.

the last suit for seduction brought in the four counties

published decision involving seduction ever handed
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down by

the

Supreme Court. Like

its sister suit,

breach of marriage promise, seduction disappeared

from the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
statute in 1973.'^

It is

sixty years before

issues

Or

left.

it

is

sexuality,

direct state intervention in the sexual affairs

coupled with the

states to abolish the so-called "heart

men and

require a review of court records after

similarities

seduction and the other
cases were high as were

women who

civil

in

these cases meant that they

When

protect a

escaped

it

came

woman's

this

suits increasingly

saw increased pressure

An answer to

the question in

causes examined in Chapter

in other

Vermont would

1

.

Success rates

in all these

despite the feet that the suits often involved

consensual pre-marital sex. The consensual sexual aspect of

came with a

to the civil causes

right to obtain

quandary by

a more

and differences between the courts' treatment of

woman's behavior on the one hand and
other.

were

920.

1

damage awards

had engaged

that there

bahn" causes of action-a move supported by both

feminist women.^'*

There are both

trial

move toward

of families, rendered such

ideologically untenable. In fact, the 1920s and 1930s

conservative

Supreme Court

Vermont's

possible that changes in society in the 1920s including a

of attitudes about female

liberalisation

was formally prohibited by

possible that such suits continued to be brought in

courts, but that the legal issues had been so settled by the

no appellate

it

built-in tension

between condemning the

permitting her to recover compensation on the

examined

in

compensation for

restricting the cause

the courts chose to

Chapter

1,

injuries.

With seduction, the courts

of action to

fathers

and continuing to hold

v. Lalor,
reported decision involving breach of marriage promise was handed down in Dyer
along with the other so-called
94 Vt. 103 (1920). Seduction was eliminated by the legislature in 1973
and criminal conversation.
"heart bahn" actions: alienation of affections, breach of contract to marry,

" The

last

1973 (Adj.) Vt. Acts 198.

M.

B.

W.

Sinclair, 82-93.
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the question of female consent irrelevant to the cause of action. Seduction allowed the

courts the luxury they lacked in cases where the
courts could lecture young

while

still

women

was

the

man who

The

the plaintiff.

about the importance of maintaining their chastity

allowing the father to recover

consistent loser

woman was also

when

they did not. In

violated sexual

norms or

all

these cases, the

interfered with family

relationships.

Relative to other causes of action, seduction

was

1796 and 19141 could uncover only twenty-two cases
rarity

becomes more

uncovered during

significant

this

when we

same period was a

rare in

in the four counties studied. Its

realize that every

women

in

one of the 142 bastardy cases

By

potential seduction suit as well.

Constance Backhouse found that seduction was the most
involving

Vermont. Between

common cause

contrast,

of action

Ontario during the same period. However, seduction as a popular

cause of action seems to have been the exception rather than the rule even

in

other parts

of Canada.'^
Several factors

may

explain the dearth of seduction suits.

No

lawsuit

is

a

pleasant experience, but the subject matter of seduction actions must have been

particularly diflScult for both father

explicitly

and daughter. After

all,

the suit increasingly

grounded on the idea of mortification. The aspect of seduction

that

became

made

it

" There were more seduction cases- 152-brought in Ontario between 1820 and 1900 than were brought
custody litigation. Backhouse
for prostitution, rape, infanticide, abortion, alimony proceedings, or child
almost no seduction cases outside of Ontario and speculates that Ontario's seduction statute which
finds

daughter lived elsewhere, and/or was under the authority of a
been responsible for its frequency.
different master, and dispensed with a showing of services may have
shown, the deficiencies corrected by the statute did not provide any kind of hurdle to
permitted fathers to sue even

Though, as

I

if the

have

Vermont litigants. However, given the much larger population of Ontario during the nineteenth
capita than Ontario. In 1890 Ontario
century, Vermont may have actually had more seduction suits per
Tort of Seducrion," 49-50, 73,
had 2.l'million people, the four counties had 130,000. Backhouse, "The
notes 81-82 and Chart No. 2.
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such an injury to
well explain

We

why few

damage

the

("allicrs

fathers

were

lo their reputations

willing to

have glimmers ofthis dynamic

in

compound

the testimony of

and that of their lamilies may

the injury by bringing a lawsuit.

Thomas

Fitzgerald

who

(according to his testimony

at least)

Haynes whose

lawyer Lucius C'hittcnden repeatedly expressed his anxiety

letters to his

about the case and explained

been incredibly humiliating

how

for

wanted

his

to hide from his neighbors

daughter feared

testifying.^''

seduction actions were entirely voluntary -and expensive,

sixty-six dollars to get a jury verdict against Alfred

in

1

825.

A

year

later,

Benjamin

1

women

in their

Ladd

it

by the towns,

cost Larkin Harrington

for the seduction

lubbcll .spent seventy dollars to

against Philander Wheeler. Jonas Spencer and 1

win jury verdicts

The suits must have

both father and daughter.

Unlike bastardy suits which could be forced upon poor

daughter

and from Jacob

homas Adams

spent over

of his

win a verdict

$100 each

to

seduction suits.^ These amounts do not include most of the

costs of hiring attorneys, either, which dramatically increased expenses.'* Samuel Rollins

spent $166

in his suit against

defending himself in

.lacob liayncs lo

that case

Harhtif^lon

v.

were over

$100).^''

in

Under the nineteenth century system.

Lucius Chitlcndcn, \5 March 1849, 21

C^hitlcndcn I'apcrs, Carton

^

Albert (Chalmers (Chalmers's attorney's fees and costs

May

1849, 17 January I8.S0.

Luciu.s E.

1.

UdJ, Windsor County

Court,

March

182.*)

Term, vol. 14,

p. I;

Huhhcll

v.

Wheeler,

v. Lyon, Windsor
Addison County Supreme Court, January 827 Term, vol. 4, p. 230-2.3 Spencer
Addison C;ounty Court, June
County Court, January 1828 Term, vol. 14, p. 2.58-259; Adams v. StarlinK,
1

1

1829 Term,

;

vol. 12, p. 104-106.

These included witness fees,
on parties. Jury fees, and judgment fees. The
filing fees for the writ, the co.sts of service of pleadings
Connors, " Taxation of Costs," Rutland County
loser bore the costs. See for example, l Uzgerald v.
Supreme Court, Novemtier 1914 l erm.

™ The

parties

had

to

pay numerous

Rollins V Chalmers,

fees

and costs

March 1879 Term, vol. 20, p. 248; Ledger of
18-119, 270-271, I-edgcT of Farnham and Chambcrlam,

Orange County Supreme

Farnham and Chamberlain, 1874-1892,

p.

1

to prosecute their suits.

C:ourt,
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successful plaintiffs could collect their costs from defendants, but

would they be out of pocket

for expenses

the defendant's costs as well.^^

dollar

bond

in

Some

and attorney's

fees, but

courts required plaintiffs to

order to guarantee payment of costs to defendants

if they lost,

not only

they also had to pay

file

a thirty or

fifty-

if they prevailed.

requirement would also have served as a financial hurdle.^' This probably explains

most

plaintiffs in these suits

were members of the middling

daughter in the household, or sued defendants

class,

This

why

had more than one

who had money. Not

only did they have

the financial resources to bring the suit and fece the consequences of a loss, but they

well have

felt

the injury to their reputation and that of their families

members of the lower

classes or families with

these middling classes or families with

from such

suits.

And

this

may

more keenly than

no other daughters. At the same time,

more than one daughter

combination of factors

may

explain

also

had the most to lose

why they were

so rare

despite their high success rate.^^

1878-1887,

p. 72, 100,

Roswell Famhara Papers, Special Collections, University of

Vermont.
Attorneys fees were allowable partly by statute and partly at the discretion of the judge, but awards
(Cambridge,
rarely covered the entire amount expended. See for example General Statutes of Vermont
1862), § 35, 36; Earl

v.

Tupper, 45 Vt. 275 (1873).

1878-1881
^'"Proposed Rules of Practice as Adopted," Proceedings of the Vermont Bar Association:
Frost v.
(Montpelier, 1882), 76. For examples of cases dismissed for feilure to file a bond see Louisa
N.
George Capron, Sr., Rutland County Court, March 1865 Term, vol. 40, p. 645 (bastardy); Harriet
Myers, Windsor County Court, May 1 870 Term, vol. 38, p. 572 (bastardy); Harris

M

Colby

V,

Winslow S

Hinchman

v.

Lyman A.

December 1899 Term, vol. 37, p. 263-264
MurcK Windsor County Court, June 1901 Term,

Ballou, Windsor County Court,

(alienation of affections);

Fred C. Pojfv. John

E.

vol.

37, p. 433 (alienation of affections).
that seduction tended to be a
a different pattern than in Ontario where Backhouse found
plaintifife, but still members of the
working-class cause of action with defendants slightly wealthier than

This

is

working

class.

Backhouse, "The Tort of Seduction," 74.
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In seduction suits judges and juries were called upon to evaluate
relations

between unmarried daughters and men worked an

family members. Seduction actions themselves were not

how sexual

injury to fathers

and other

common, but they were

part

of

an expanding category of sexual matters which came under the supervision of the
legislature

and the courts

at this

time including adultery and rape. These criminal matters

too provide us with opportunities to observe

Supreme Court responded
Vermont's

citizens

and

to the legal

how their

how the trial

courts, the legislature,

and the

and sexual issues raised by the sexual behavior of

decisions helped to define or alter that behavior.
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CHAPTER 3

VERMONT'S ADULTERY LAW,

1779-1920

Introduction: Early Statutory Development

The

Vermont were
legal

laws prohibiting adultery passed by the newly-created Republic of

first

unremittingly harsh. This reflected their origins in Connecticut's Puritan

code which was adopted almost wholesale by the men of Vermont shortly

declaring independence fi-om

prohibited a

man

New York.'

law, passed in February 1779,

another. In such cases both the

whipped on the naked body up
the forehead with the letter A).

caught without the

letter

of another man or v^th a

man and

the

woman were to

be

to thirty-nine times and then "stigmatized" (branded

They were

also required to

at all times while living within the state.

of their clothing

stripes for

first

fi-om "committing adultery" with the wife

woman betrothed to

more

The

after

on their

wear the

letter

on

A on the back

Convicted adulterers

who were

clothing were subject to another whipping of up to ten

each offense.^ The law against adultery was part of a comprehensive

scheme regulating

all

manner of sexual impropriety adopted by Vermonters

aftermath of independence.

Laws passed

in the next

in the

few days prohibited and punished

polygamy, lascivious carriage and behavior, incest and incestuous marriage, rape, and

Another section of the 1779 laws made

illegal marriage.^

bestiality subject to the

death

of whom had come from Connecticut, adopted the laws contained in the
vol. 12 oi State
Connecticut Statute Book ofl769. Allen Soule, ed.. Laws of Vermont, 1777-1780,
Papers of Vermont (Montpelier: Secretary of State, 1964), 35.
'

Vermonters,

many

2

"An Act

^

Soule, 12:39-41.

Against,

And

For the Punishment of Adultery," 18 February 1779;
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in Soule, 12: 38.

when committed by any man

penalty

penalty for

who was

or woman. The same section provided the death

men who committed sodomy

with exceptions for an underage partner or one

forced. Interestingly, the anti-sodomy statute applied only to

men and

not to

women.'*

Revisions to the law

brought more people within

law, the

new

the

time,

first

statute

783 made punishment

1

its

reach and contained greater complexity. Unlike the 1779

combined prohibitions on adultery and polygamy

added fornication as a criminal

that violations

for adultery slightly less harsh, but

in

offense.

The new

of the marriage covenant were "contrary

to the

in

statute's

one

text and, for

preamble noted

Command of God,

and

destructive of the Peace of Families."

The

1

779

with a married

statute

woman

not a crime, but a

civil

had reflected the

or sex with a

common

law understanding of adultery sex
:

woman betrothed. At common

offense brought by a

man

law, adultery

for the "adulteration"

of his children's

bloodlines caused by another's having had intercourse with his wife or fiance.^

clear that

Vermont's

first

adultery law of 1779, based

was

less specific.

It

It

seems

on Connecticut's, had simply been

an attempt to render as a new criminal violation what had been a
the 1783 language

was

civil infi-action.^

But

simply provided punishment for "any person"

^Soule, 12: 128.
*

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England,

vol. 3

Blackstone, adultery or criminal conversation was, as a public crime,

(London, 1768), 139. According to
left

punishable solely

at

the

At common law it was a civil wrong punishable as a trespass vi et armis
Such damages he continued
and damages were "usually very large and very exemplary [i.e. punitive]."
and fortune of the plaintiff and
"are properly increased or diminished by circumstances; as the rank
the wife, founded on
or connection between them; the seduction or otherwise of
discretion of the church courts.

defendant; the relations

settlement or otherwise to
her previous behaviour and character; and the husband's obligation by
provide for those children, which he cannot but suspect to be spurious."

<^

married
This seems likely given that statute's reference to sex with a

reflection of the fear

of adulterating the man's

issue.
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woman

or one betrothed-a

who

"shall

commit Adultery" and did not extend

to sex with a

woman who was

betrothed but not yet married. The law did not specify what adultery was or

be convicted for

it

—a

The punishment was

point which

would lead to much

litigation

on the

also different. Convicts continued to be lashed

on

who

could

subject later on.

their

naked

bodies up to thirty-nine times, but no longer faced branding.^ Instead they were forced
to stand

upon

the gallows for an hour with nooses around their necks.

statute, adulterers

up

were

also forced to

to fifteen stripes if found guilty

further provided that any

converse together as

adulterers.*

letter

man and woman obtaining

Man and

Polygamy was

in the

1779

A on their clothing and now feced

of not displaying the

letter at all times.

a divorce

who

The

act

then "cohabit or

Wife" would be subject to the same sanctions as

treated the

punishments for the offenders though
unmarried

wear the

As

same as adultery and provided the same

it

was not

clear

whether the partner who was

time would also face criminal sanction.'

at the

Also, for the

first

"blanket act." Such acts

time, Vermonters enacted

made

it

illegal for

what would come

a married

to be

man or woman to

known as

be found

in

a

bed

with another person of the opposite sex not his or her spouse. Sexual intercourse need
not be proved. Each offender was to be whipped,

upon

conviction, not exceeding thirty-

nine stripes. Reflecting the greater complexity of the 1783 legislation, the law contained

an exception for persons

who were

in the

bed against

their will.

The language

did not

9.
Hopkins, Orange County Supreme Court, February 1794 Term, vol. 1, p.
A jury found Hopkins guilty of adultery with Betsy Back. Taken out to the signpost at noon, he received
twenty lashes on his naked back and was fined twelve pounds.
'

«

See

for

example. State

John A. Williams,

Secretary of State,

1

ed..

v.

Laws of Vermont. 1781-1784,

965), 210-212.

'Williams, 13:211.
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vol. 13

of State Papers of Vermont (Montpelier:

specify the sex of the aggrieved person, but

women who

it

seems

likely that this

had been sexually assaulted from conviction under the

Fornication, that

is

was meant
act.'°

sex between two unmarried people, was treated more

Defendants charged with fornication could absolve themselves of criminal

by marrying each
four

pound

other.

fine or a

to protect

But even

if they

lightly.

liability

simply

did not choose this route, they faced at most a

whipping of up to twelve

stripes each.

The punishment was

to

left

the discretion of the judge."

The laws on
after

adultery, polygamy, fornication, and

Vermont adopted a new

sodomy were reenacted

constitution and remained almost unchanged.

in

1787

The one

exception was the law against fornication. Whipping was eliminated entirely and a three

month
more

statute

lightly

of limitations enacted on the crime.

This trend of treating fornication

than adultery or polygamy would continue.

Vermont joined the United
comprehensive scheme of statutes

aduhery was brief

States in

in

1

791 and adopted a

new

1797. The law of March 9, 1797 concerning

A man or woman committing adultery was subject to a fine of up to

$500 and whipping of not more than thirty-nine
continued to cohabit, those

stripes.

who committed polygamy,

Divorced couples
those

as adulterers. Prohibitions

and for the next hundred years the

state

on

fornication

who

who committed

those caught in bed with a married person not their spouse, were

same fashion

constitution and a

all

incest,

and

to be punished in the

were dropped from the new law

never again tried unmarried, unrelated adults for

Williams, 13:210.
" Williams, 13:212

'2

John A. Williams,

ed..

Laws of Vermont, 1785-1791,

Secretary of State, 1966), 165-167.
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vol. 14

of State Papers of Vermont (Montpelier:

.

—nor

having consensual sex

Nor would

it

again outlaw

century.''* Prostitution

for that matter those having sex with children over age ten.

sodomy

in its statutes for the remainder

too was never

illegal at state

though keeping a whorehouse was.'^ Lewdness

law

of the nineteenth

in the nineteenth century,

dropped out of the statute books,

also

not to be revived until 1839.'^ Instead, the focus was, as the statute

made

clear,

on

sexual acts destructive to the peace of families: polygamy, incest, and adultery.

" 1797 Vt. Acts

9.

In

1886 the

to sixteen twelve years later.

laws in Chapter

886 Vt. Acts 63;

age of consent
1

898 Vt. Acts

for girls
1 1

8.

from eleven to fourteen and then

See discussion of the age of consent

5.

The absence of a law

man

prosecute a

1

state raised the

for

prohibiting

sodomy

created problems for the state in 1898

having sex v«th another man. After conviction

for

sodomy

when

in the

it

attempted to

county court, the

defendant appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that no law prohibited his actions. The Court held
that since

the

sodomy was always prohibited by English common law and

common law

even

absence of a

in the

sodomy

or

of England not repugnant to
statute. State

v.

its

constitution or laws,

Laforrest, 71 Vt. 31

sodomy and buggery were imprisoned very

1

Vermont had adopted all of
sodomy was illegal in Vermont
since

(1899). Thereafter

men

accused of

intermittently (in 1896, 1900, 1912, 1916, 1920).

"Report of the OflBcers of the State Prison" and "Report of the Officers of the House of Correction,"
Vermont State Officers Reports for these years. It is possible that some were charged under the

in

'

lewdness statute instead, though

I

found no such cases

in

my survey of the

four counties involving

consensual sex. In 1905, Charles Rust was charged with lewdness for placing male minors on a stool
and then inserting "the projecting part of his private parts" between their thighs and then "act[ing] until
his

amorous passions were

intercrural.

Term,

Rust defaulted before

vol. 58, p.

in 1977.

satisfied."

69-71

.

trial.

It is

not clear whether the act involved penetration or was

State

v.

"Oral copulation" was

1937 Vt. Acts 21

1;

1

Charles

made

L. Rust,

illegal

by

Rutland County Court, March 1905
statute in 1937.

The law was

repealed

977 Vt. Acts 5 1

" Keeping a house of ill feme was made illegal in 1834. 1834 Vt. Acts 7. Prostitution was not illegal,
though some cities and towns with local ordinance authority did prohibit it towards the end of the
prostitutes
nineteenth century. Within the four counties studied, I have not found any prosecutions of
Vt. Acts
under the authority of common law. Prostitution was made illegal at state law in 1919. 1919
199.

man or woman,
Revised Statutes of Vermont, 1839 (Burlington, 1 840), Chapter 99, § 8. "If any
behavior, every such
married or unmarried, shall be guilty of open and gross lewdness and lascivious
more than two years, or by fine not
person shall be punished by imprisonment in the common jail, not
was used to prosecute prostitutes.
exceeding three hundred dollars." It does not appear that lewdness
(none earlier than 1846 the year the
the fifty-three prosecutions for lewdness I have documented
'6

Of

Supreme Court explained,

for the first time,

what lewdness was

in State

v.

Millard, 18 Vt. 574 (1846))

Vermont Supreme Court
than one-third, were brought against women. Although the
did not require the presence of a third
had held in 1846 that a conviction for open and gross lewdness
sexual natur^ither public exposure (usually
person most lewdness cases involved public displays of a
nature of a sexual assault (fondlmg women or
by men but occasionally by women) or actions in the
Supreme Court made clear that private acts of
solicitiiJg them to have sex). In a 1927 case, the
lewdness." State v. Franzoni, 100 Vt. 373 (1927).
prostitution could not constitute "open and gross
only

fifteen, or less
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Adultery law went through several more changes in the early part of the century.
In 1806 the General Assembly retained whipping and fines, but also offered the

of sentencing convicts to standing

alternative to judges

in the pillory for three hours, or

imprisonment for up to two years." Violations of the blanket act continued to be treated
the

same

away

as adultery.

Whipping was eliminated

in

1

816, reflecting the general trend

fi"om corporal punishment taking place throughout the nation as well as the

of alternative punishment made available by the opening of the

availability

Windsor

$1000

The law now provided

in 1809.'*

imprisonment

fine and/or

at

well.'^

of adultery faced a

hard labor in the state prison for up to three years.

also explicitly punished sexual intercourse

woman as

that those convicted

state prison at

It

between a married man and an unmarried

This would turn out to be an unsuccessful attempt to

exactly what adultery meant for purposes of criminal prosecution

—an

clarify just

issue

which would

vex the Supreme Court throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Other
than an increase in the prison term to a

maximum of five

years in 1839, the adultery law

1806 Vt. Acts 93.

The Vermont Supreme Court strongly condemned the use of torture and coerced confessions in an
1803 decision, declaring them totally illegal and fining the ofiBcers implicated in that case. State v.
Hobbs, 2 Tyl. 380 (1803). In 1816, Vermont prohibited its Justices of the peace from administering
whippings. 1816 Vt. Acts 128. These developments in Vermont mirrored the trend taking place
corporal
throughout the western world as governing theories of criminal punishment moved away from
punishment

in

which the

state publicly exacted

vengeance on the body of the criminal and toward
such reforms such as the Italian, Cesare Beccaria, were
its

confinement and rehabilitation. Advocates for
known to Vermont's judges. Hobbs, 381-382. John Reynolds, a former

Windsor, discussed

its

development and operation noting

of such inflictions as the

lash,

and the brand; and as the

official at the State Prison in

how "Humanity too,

effect

recoiled from the cruelty

of such severity was no argument

for its

by which criminals are confined to
reflecting on their conduct and at reforming their
labor, and should he allowed full opportunities of
Prison-Containing Sketches of its History and
lives." John Reynolds, Recollections of Windsor
Punish: The Birth of the
(Boston, 1834), 5-6. See also, Michel Foucault, Discipline and

continuance,

humane

legislators devised the Penitentiary system,

Discipline

Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan

" 1818

Vt. Acts

(New York: Pantheon,

1977).

1.
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would remain

largely

unchanged for the next 150

between adultery and
latter

now punished

law were

legislature

violations

of the blanket act

solely

by a

fine

years.

The 1818 law

for the

first

also differentiated

time. Violations

of the

of up to $1000. However, by 1839, the

had re-imposed the option of a prison sentence of up to three

years.

The

blanket act remained unchanged for the rest of the century.^"

We can make a few general observations about the statutory evolution of
What had been merely

adultery law.

become

criminalized in

America-a

a

civil

cause of action under English law had

reflection

of the merger of church and

colonies like Connecticut. Vermont's churches had courts of their

state in Puritan

own and the

state's

government, while avowedly Christian, was self-consciously anti-establishmentarian;
nevertheless

it

imported adultery into

its

criminal law with the adoption of the

Connecticut statutes. Unlike rape laws for example, laws against adultery, fornication,

sodomy, incestuous marriage, and polygamy underwent constant tinkering during the
first

sixty years

of the

state's existence-a reflection

both of the complexity of the

behavior they sought to regulate, and, seemingly, ambivalence about the proper role of
the state in regulating consensual sexual behavior.

By the 1840s

attained stability. Fornication (unless with a family

prostitution

the statutory law

member), sodomy, and acts of

were not deemed important enough to be addressed

in the

law books-even

focused entirely
they had been at an earlier time in the state's history. Instead, the law

on public

displays

of sexuality (lewdness) or consensual sex

family relations: adultery, polygamy, and incest.

Revised Statutes, Chapter 99, §§

1-3.
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that threatened marital and

if

Judicial Interpretation

This statutory evolution

is

only half the story. The application of the adultery

laws by real judges and real juries to real people formed the other
adultery prosecution required

one of the
place.

parties

two elements of proof

was married. Second,

it

half.

First, the state

A successful

had to prove that

had to prove that sexual intercourse had taken

But even where both elements had been shown,

it

was not always

crime had occurred because of confusion over the definition of adultery

Defendants challenged convictions on both grounds.

Initially,

itself

the Court's formalistic

instincts, hostility to defects in criminal proceedings, uncertainty

constituted aduhery, and confusion over what evidence

clear that a

over what exactly

was necessary

to prove

And

provided defendants with opportunities to have their convictions overturned.

indeed, the

Supreme Court reversed four of the

the Court had so liberalized

its

first five

appeals

evidentiary requirements that any

it

heard.^'

it

But by 1916,

man and woman

spending time alone with someone other than their spouse placed themselves

in legal

jeopardy.

The prosecution

risked an appeal fi-om conviction whenever

it

tried to

prove the

marriage of one of the parties by evidence consisting of something other than an
record of the marriage or testimony by one

earliest

2'

who was

present at the ceremony. The

published decision of any kind by the Supreme Court, State

The reversed

cases were: State

v.

Amice,

official

v.

Annice (1789),

N. Chip. 9 (1789) (reputation evidence inadmissible to
Chillis, Brayt. 131(1818) (failure to charge both man and
1

prove the marriage of the accused); State v.
(man and
woman with illicit intent rendered indictment defective); State v. Way, 6 Vt. 31 1 (1834)
adultery for which actual
woman seen in bed together sufficient to prove violation of blanket act, but not
(adultery is not a common law
proof of intercourse must be shown); State v. Cooper, 16 Vt. 551 (1844)
a marriage. In
The fifth case. State v. Rood, 12 Vt. 396 (1840) dealt with the issue of provmg
offense).

that case, the conviction

was upheld.
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had made clear

was

that reputation evidence

insufficient to

prove a marriage

aduhery prosecution. The Court threw out convictions even where the
evidence that the marriage had been registered but
certificates or

produced copies

If the Court

was

not been complied v^th,

that

were

failed to

was

an

state presented

produced the actual marriage

defective.^^

where technical

willing to reverse convictions

it

in

formalities

had

much of the burden on the

also willing to place as

defendant as the law would allow. Adultery indictments and informations charged the

defendant with having a husband or wife 'then living" for example. But the Court ruled

that

it

was not up

crime, but instead

Similarly, the

to the state to prove that the spouse

it

was up

to the defendant to

Court ruled that

complied with

all

it

was not

was

living as

an element of the

prove that the spouse was dead.

the state's job to prove that the marriage

the formalities of state law, instead the defense had to prove that

it

had

not.^^

In a similar vein, in 1913 the Court provided the state with an altemative method

by making the spouse competent to

to proving marriage

marriage. This violated the

spirit if not

testify to the existence

of a valid

the letter of the marital privilege law which

prevented spouses fi-om testifying against one another.

As we

will see

however,

it

was

very marital
not unusual for adultery prosecutions to transgress the boundaries of the

were intended

institutions they

State
Vt.

^

V.

Annice,

1

to protect.

N. Chip. 9 (1789); State

v.

Colby, 51 Vt. 291 (1878); State

659(1896).
834); Slate

State

V.

Way, 6 Vt. 3

State

V.

Nieburg, 86 Vt. 392 (1913).

1

1

(

1

v.

Rood,

1

2 Vt. 396
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(

1

840).

v.

Brink and Gibbs,

Another related

who

state's attorneys

issue facing the courts

spouse.

First,

provided

man had

in

it

meant

initiate

criminal proceedings.

who committed

cases of aduhery" (and, after

1

"a connection with an unmarried

woman had

and

Vermont law contained two

to punish people for having sex with

punished those

adultery in case said

sorting out sloppy pleading by the

failed to properly allege marital status in the indictments

informations they used to

different statutes

was

someone other than

"adultery." Second,

it

their

punished "as

is

880, "as aduhery") any act where a married

woman which would

constitute the crime

of

a husband living." This impenetrable language gave the

courts some trouble in cases where the prosecutor had failed to sufficiently allege the
marital status of the parties involved.

It

under the second clause were "adultery
In

1

W.

884, Chester

Searle

also raised the question of whether offenses

in the

was

Searle challenged the indictment before

man"

as well as the

indicted for having sex with a single

trial,

a married

woman was

involved and the

woman.

arguing that was impossible for a

commit aduhery with an unmarried woman. Adultery under

when

woman.

woman

in the

man

the statute only took place

Searle case

was

single.

punishment of married
the other hand, the second clause of the statute provided for

who had

sex with single

women,

but that

was not aduhery-and

for a married

Wheelock Veazey made

man to have

sex with another

clear that if it

woman,

On
men

Searle had been charged

with "adultery." The Court held that the indictment was defective.

was wrong

to

It

believed that

single or not.

it

And Judge

were up to the Court, such an offense would be

both "authority and reason." But the
included in the definition of aduhery on grounds of
language of the statute tied

25

State

V.

its

hands."

Searle, 56 Vt. 516 (1884).
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In 1903, the Court reversed another adultery conviction on the
same grounds.

Don Bisbee

had been indicted for adultery and convicted by a jury. The indictment had

failed to allege either that his partner

unmarried.

first

It

was

Emma Waterman was married, or that she was

therefore impossible to

clause or the second.

know whether he was being

The prosecutors argued

that

all

that

tried

under the

was necessary was that

they prove that Bisbee himself was married to get a conviction. The Court, citing Searle
as precedent, disagreed, setting the verdict aside and ordering that Bisbee be acquitted.^^
Finally, in

1915 the Court heard

case

its last

on the

been charged and convicted of adultery for having sex

question. Bert Bigelow had

vsdth

a married

woman. The

indictment identified him as a single man. Bigelow challenged his conviction on the

grounds that a single man could not commit adultery. Unlike the Searle and Bisbee
cases which had been constrained by statutory language, this case permitted the Court to

determine once and for

whether

it

Since the

woman,

of the term or an

was

followed, a single

violations

of the marriage

ecclesiastical one.

sexual interference with another man's

the Court reasoned that the marital status of the

man's sexual rights

V.

definition

common law definition hinged on the

model punished

State

what "adultery" meant. The Court's decision depended on

would adopt a common law

ecclesiastical definition

that

all

man

man was

irrelevant.

But

if the

could not commit adultery because

vow rather than interference

with another

in his wife.^^

Bisbee, 75 Vt. 293 (1903).

" Thus, under an

ecclesiastical model, the

adultery. State

Bigelow, 88 Vt. 464 (1915).

v.

unmarried partner was charged with fornication rather than
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The Court delermined

that

Vermonrs law had

its

origins in the

thus the definition of adultery should be established under

man was

thus concluded that the marital status of the

whether or not he was an
for over

adulterer.

one hundred years and the

It

noted that

issue

this

common

common

law and

law precedents.^*

irrelevant to a determination

had been the practice

in

It

of

Vermont

had never before reached the Court. This was

"a strong indication that the profession has not seriously doubted the view

we now

adopt." Bigelow's conviction was upheld.^^

remains for us to determine the meaning of this confusing jurisprudence.

It

Though

the Searle court's decision might leave one with the impression that the adultery

law contained gaps which permitted the guilty to avoid punishment,
legislature's

1818 attempt

at

it

was

actually the

thoroughness that created opportunities for defendants to

attack the language of indictments. Vermont's adultery law took a belt and suspenders

approach, punishing adultery
neither spouses

who had

in

both

its

common

law and

sex in violation of their marriage

ecclesiastical

vows nor

escape the criminal law's sanction. The two clause approach,

law and ecclesiastical definition respectively, was an
trap for a

struck

few sloppy prosecutors. While the courts

down

their partners

utilizing

inartful solution,

in Searle,

forms so that

both a

could

common

and had provided a

Bishee and Bi^elow had

defined the
the convictions of two of three defendants, in doing so they had

Deuteronomy and Leviticus. The Court held that
man be found lying with a
common law adultery had its origins in Deuteronomy and Leviticus. "If a
that lay with the woman and the
woman married to a husband, then they shall both of them die, the man
reflected the common law because
woman " Deut 22- Lev. 20. The Court held that the Mosaic model
he hath humbled
for violating his marriage vow, but "because

2«

Curiously,

the

it

did so by resort to religious sources:

common law

punished the

man

not

his neighbor's wife." Deut. 22: 24.

2"

State

V.

Bigelow, 88 Vt. 464 (1915).
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adultery law so broadly that

it

was

illegal for

any adult to have sex with another

if either

of them was married.
Marriage was always key of course.
adultery laws, one thing

was

certain,

of a marriage was the key triggering

No

matter

how

the Court interpreted the

a marital relationship was required. The existence

state action.

Without

it,

the state had no statutory

authority to regulate the consensual sexual behavior of unrelated Vermonters through

its

criminal laws.

However, so long as the prosecutors pleaded properly, once a marriage was
proved,

its

existence "contaminated" both parties, rendering

them vulnerable

to

prosecution. In fact, the law required that both partners be prosecuted.^*^ The unmarried
partner faced identical penalties despite the feet that he or she had not violated a

marriage vow. Obviously

this

was intended

to deter people

from engaging

in intercourse

with married people.

What happened when one of the
marital status

State

V.

parties claimed that he

of his partner? The Court faced

Audette.

was

ignorant of the

this vexatious question in a

1908 case,

The defendant, a twenty-four year-old Vermonter, had met

two year-old woman

at

a twenty-

a party. After a five-month courtship they married. The

woman

on the
represented herself as single and stated that she had never before been married
license application. In fact she had

Massachusetts.

'°

State

V.

When the

Searle, 56 Vt. 5 1 6

(

been married before and had a husband

information

1

living in

was discovered, the defendant was charged with

884).
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adultery.

was

He opted

bench

trial,^'

argued ignorance as a defense to the charge, but

convicted.

On
defense.

is all

for a

that

appeal, the Court noted the potential for abuse in allowing an ignorance

The

state

was necessary

to convict

defendant's mental culpability or

the facts of the case before

took place as a

result

whom he thought

we would today

argued for what

of an

was

fault.

the act

call a strict liability

itself,

The Court

standard

—

that

without any inquiry into the

dealt with the issue

by distinguishing

with other possible scenarios in which sexual intercourse

it

"illicit

to be single, or

connection." That

is, if

a

man had

sex with a

woman

above the age of consent, or not within the confines of

the consanguinity laws and he turned out to be mistaken, that could not prevent a

prosecution for adultery, statutory rape, or incest. The

having sex outside of marriage. "In such a case there
the defendant understands

will not relieve

him from the

be faulted was that he had

her.

it,

Other than

that,

man—courting the

and

his ignorance

legal penalty."

failed to

he had

woman,

of the

is

man deserved what

he got for

a measure of wrong in the act as

fact that

But the only

makes

tiling for

it

a greater

wrong

which Audette could

meet the young woman's parents before marrying

fulfilled

the expectations that society held for a

young

introducing her to his parents, marrying her, and only then

having sexual intercourse with her. Given

this,

it

would be

unjust not to allow

him a

defense of ignorance."

" That

is,

a

trial

without a jury with the judge serving as both finder of

feet

and law.

from an "illicit
400 (1908). The Court's distinction between sex resulting
Vermont law simply did not make sex
connection" and the case at bar was legally questionable.
of the term "illicit connection" reflected m.stead
between unmarried men and women illegal. The use
State V Audette 81 Vt.

the legal status
rather than an accurate characterization ol
the Court's moral objections to such behavior
of sexual acts between single adults.
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Proving Intercourse

The

issue

which most preoccupied the Court during

intercourse. Early on, the Court

made

clear that

was proof of

proof of actual intercourse was required

—

for a conviction

this period

setting a high bar for state's attorneys

by requiring pregnancy,

confession, or observation by a third party for a successfiil prosecution.

was much

easier to prosecute since

The blanket

one merely needed to show a married person

in

act

bed

with another not his or her spouse "under such circumstances as to afford presumption

of an

intention

illicit

between them." But, as with the adultery

sometimes charged one crime then

tried to

clauses, prosecutors

prove another, resulting

in reversals

by the

Supreme Court.
In

1

834, a prosecutor charged Ebenezer Way, a married man, with carnal

knowledge of Nancy Wilson under the analog to the adultery

At

trial,

the prosecutor

showed (by way of a third party witness)

had presented themselves as "man and wife," had
had been seen

in

bed together with

had instructed the jury

statute discussed above.

that they

their clothes

lived in the

on

that

Way and

Wilson

same house together, and

the floor by the bed.

had to be convinced beyond a

rational

The

trial

judge

doubt that

intercourse had in fact taken place between them, and that that "connexion" could be

inferred by circumstantial evidence.

The jury convicted. But the Supreme Court

overturned the conviction because the state had provided no evidence of actual

intercourse.

The prosecution was

really

one for violation of the blanket

act,

not the

had been charged as adultery and gone to the jury as adultery.

adultery statutes, yet

it

The Court explained

that the offense

must always be proved

in

a case. Circumstantial

person of the offense, but not tha
evidence could be relied upon to convict a particular
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the ofTense had taken plaee. In other words, the state liad not proven

taken place, only that circumstances were such
troubled by this Ibrm of prosecution since

solely because they had the opportunity to

The Court's

strictness

would be modified as
sexual regulation

its

could have.

he Court was greatly

I

men of crimes

allowed the state to convict

commit them."

the century progressed.

second half of the century

it

a erime had

on matters of proof as evidenced by Way and other cases

we have examined,

Court departed from

it

tliat

tliat

at the

earlier

As with

several

of the other areas of

adultery law too underwent a transformation in the

hands of the Supreme Court. Beginning

in

1876, the

adherence to legal formalism and instead took a

far

more

instrumentalist approach in the application of adultery law. This approach greatly

expanded the evidence
see,

available to the state in proving an adultery case, and, as

was accompanied by

set a high hurdle for

of sexual intercourse

testimony, none of which

was

either

prosecutors since

it

seemed

necessarily available in such cases. Instead, prosecutors

prior to or even after the alleged adulterous act

Just as defendants in rape cases sought to

tried to

V.

show

credibility into question

which formed the

man and woman

basis

of the charge.

prior or even subsequent lack of chastity

on the

issue

of consent, so too, prosecutors

acts of
prove adultery beyond a reasonable doubt by showing past or subsequent

familiarity

State

woman's

to require

by confession, pregnancy, or witness

sought to introduce evidence of an "improper familiarity" between the

to call the

shall

a surge of adultery prosecutions.

The Way precedent
actual evidence

we

between the man and woman.

^Fay,

6 Vt. 311 (1834).
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In State

married

Bridgman

v.

(1

876) a married

man had been tried

woman named Chastina Warren. The

husband repeatedly went to her shop looking

for having sex with a

state presented testimony that Chastina's

for her, only to find himself locked out for

reasons he could not understand. The state put two witnesses on the stand
testified at the divorce hearing

Chastina and the defendant

he had seen the two

brought by Chastina's husband that they had seen

in the act

of intercourse. Another man. Drew,

in flagrante delicto several

supplemented by what was

who had

months

in efifect character evidence:

later.

testified that

The witness testimony was

"a great

many

of familiarity,

acts

and several acts of adultery" between Chastina and Bridgman, some of them going back
six or

seven years before the act alleged by the prosecution. As was usual

in adultery

cases, the defendant had been convicted.^''

The case

raised a host

greatest attention to the issue

of issues on appeal, but the Supreme Court devoted

its

of past and subsequent acts of familiarity and adulterous

behavior between the defendant and the perhaps misnamed Chastina Warren. The Court

noted

at the outset

of its opinion that the general rule

in criminal

evidence had to be restricted to that which proved the alleged
cases the general prohibition gave

way and evidence of other

and

civil

illegal act.

cases

But

was

that

in specific

instances of illegal activity

indictment
could be admitted to help prove the likelihood that the crime alleged in the

had also been committed by the defendant.
subsequent acts which were not

illegal

It

went on to show

that

even prior and

were admissible to prove a criminal

offense.

were

defendants going to trial for adultery
Overall in the four counties studied, 63 percent of all
of the cases the jury hung. When we include guilty
convicted; 31 percent were acquitted; in 5 percent
being convicted
all defendants facing trial ended up
pleas in these figures, we find that 82 percent of
numbers will be discussed in greater detail below.
Ahnost all who were convicted went to prison. These
3"
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The Court's assumption, based on highly-regarded
that

of Simon

Greenleaf,

was

that married

men and women did not

aduhery. Instead, the immoral groundwork had

The

ofifense

charged

in this

first

on evidence such as

treatises

to be

easily

commit

laid.

case cannot, ordinarily be committed

till

the

of natural modesty and the safeguards of common deportment
and conventionality have been overcome by gradual approaches, and the
relations of the parties have been changed fi-om those usually existing
between the sexes, to the most intimate. On trial for it, the prosecutor
restraints

has to overcome the presumption that those restraints and safeguards
have not been broken over. To do this it is always proper to show what

spoken of [in Greenleaf s Evidence] as an adulterous disposition and as
a habit of adulterous intercourse.^^
is

The Court's explanation

for

how adultery happens

notion of seduction.

It

belief that familiarity

between the sexes

to the lure

that

presumes marital

of an adulterous

none of the

tryst.

fidelity as the

is

Given

sounds very similar to the Victorian

normal condition and displays a

necessary to wear

its similarities

a spouse's resistance

to seduction

authorities state the rule in gendered terms.

adulterous familiarity

down

what

is

interesting

is

The development of an

was required of both sexes before they could

fall into

iniquity

—and

legal jeopardy.

Where, as

in

Bridgman, there was evidence

in intercourse prior to the act that

was

that the parties

had actually engaged

the subject of the charge, this

was even more

probative of their adulterous disposition, and thus, even less open to debate as to

admissibility.

"[T]here could be nothing more potent, to

or manner was remaining between the parties, and to

show

show

that

no

barrier

its

of modesty

the real relation between

them, than the fact that they were in the habit of committing the act fi-om time to time."^^

"

State

V.

Bridgman, 49 Vt. 202 (1876).

Bridgman,2\\.
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The Court

did not

comment on

the similarity between

its

explanation of how

adultery unfolds and the language of Victorian seduction. But neither did
similarities

between the evidence

in adultery trials

sexual transgressions. In defending

its

position,

allowed evidence of intercourse between the

ignore the

that in other cases involving

noted that

in

a bastardy case,

plaintiff and defendant occurring

years prior to the birth of the baby as tending to

was

it

and

it

show

it

had

some

three

the likelihood that the defendant

in fact the putative father.^^

In rape cases too, past evidence of intercourse between the defendant and the
alleged victim were also admissible, the Court pointed out, but not those between the

woman and other men.
woman prior to
in fact

it is

in

Evidence of sexual relations between the defendant and the

the rape did not excuse

it,

but went instead to the issue of whether

been carnal knowledge accomplished by force and against her
any wise more lawful for a

had such

intercourse, but because

the intercourse

relationships

was

forcible."^^

between the

man to commit
from the

rape upon a

relations

parties in bastardy

had

"Not because

woman v^th whom he has

between them,

The Court concluded

will.

it

it is

less likely that

that because the past sexual

and rape cases were admissible,

it

made

perfect sense that such evidence also be applied in an aduhery proceeding. Trial judges

even permitted the admission of evidence of subsequent adulterous disposition-even

when the

acts

were outside the jurisdiction of the

state.

Again, this use of what amounts

Davis, 38 Vt. 163 (1865). "The previous familiarity or intimacy existing between the
alleged sexual intercourse that is the subject
parties, was a circumstance bearing on the probability of the
to each other at the time when, as is
of the prosecution. It tended to illustrate the relations of the parties
relation has always
by the prosecutrix, the child to which she gave birth was begotten; and this

" Thayer

v.

claimed

been considered proper evidence, as well

^ Bridgman,

for

one party as the other."

212.
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to character evidence

was not gender

sensitive, but applied to cases involving

both male

and female defendants.''

The Supreme Court had taken
which the

great care in delineating the circumstJinces under

state could use past or subsequent acts

of familiarity

in

an adultery

trial.

Nonetheless, that evidence was always a supplement to evidence of the actual act of

intercourse lying at the

intercourse

window

in

was

still

heeirt

of the criminal charge. That

required.

However,

that formulation

is,

evidence of the act of

went completely out the

an opinion by Judge James Barrett for the Supreme Court just three years

later in State

v.

Potter (\S79). In that case the Court greatly loosened the standard for

proving adultery. From then on, almost any evidence of even an opportunity for
intimacy would be sufficient to sustain a conviction.

Lyman
Potter.

Potter,

aged

fifty-eight,

and a farmer, was married to

For several years, Lyman had been sleeping

daughter. Laura slept

altogether.

in

a separate

room

The daughter was unmarried,

in the

in the

fifty-year-old

same room as

Laura

his step

house and eventually moved out

but had had three children. Potter arranged for

attended the births and
a doctor and nurses to attend the delivery each time, had himself
held one of the newborns

him

father.

in his

Other witnesses

hands afterwards, and encouraged the children to

testified that Potter

wife since the second child was

bom; and

had told them he had not

that he could

call

slept with his

have sex with the step daughter

Term, Transcript of Trial, p. 37. Eaionv^as
''Statev £a/o«, Windsor County Court, SpecialJune 1917
Brittell had already
for having sex with Mrs. Rena firittell.
a prosecution against an unmarried man
inquired about the living arrangements of the two m
been convicted in a separate trial. The prosecutor
had taken place in Vermont. The defense objected,
Ticonderoga, New York after the alleged adultery
happenmg between
jurisdiction of the court and that anything
arguing that Ticonderoga was out of the
purpose of
disagreed. "It isn't introduced here for the
the two there was inadmissible. The judge
It .s not relied on
adulterous disposition between these people.
conviction, but to show that there was an
.t all the same.
an ofTcnce in New York." But he admitted
for a conviction. We can't convict for
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even

if his

wife

two together

was just

six feet

in the grass five

away. Other witnesses

and seven years before

intercourse had taken place. Potter

was

in

testified that

they had seen the

a position that indicated

indicted for adultery.

He

could also have been

indicted for having sex with a partner within the confines of consanguinity, but

Potter's lawyers objected to the admission of aU this evidence.

was

not.''°

They argued

that

the state had to prove a particular act of intercourse and none of the evidence did so.

Witness testimony of alleged post-coital sightings were
so outside the three-year statute of limitations.

all

more than

None of the

three years old, and

other evidence satisfied the

requirement that the state prove that an actual crime had taken place. This principle,

known

as corpus delicti

raised the

was required

same problem State

prove adultery cases

if it

v.

Judge Barrett, writing

As

far as

Way had

forty-five years before:

In effect, the case

how could the

could not rely on circumstantial evidence alone? In

Court had simply declared that

aside.

in all criminal prosecutions.'"

it

could not. In Potter

for the Court,

brushed

it

all

changed

its

state

Way the

mind.

of the defendant's objections

proving the corpus delicti was concerned, he admitted that evidence of

daughter's three
the actual crime of adultery had to be proven, but held that the step

illegitimate children

were

sufficient for that

purpose. "The crime consists

the alleged intercourse by the respondent with the

girl.

in the fact

She was unmarried. Intercourse

respondent or some one
of a man with her must be proved, whether he be the

«

It

was

illegal for a

man

to

(Cambridge, 1862) Chapter

have sex with his wife's daughter. See
1

of

e.g.

else.

General Statutes of Vermont

17 § 9.

been committed before a person can be convicted
Criminal law requires proof that a crime has actually
the victim
for murder unless the state can show that
of it For example, a person cannot be convicted
has
arson unless the state can show that a building
was actually killed. A person cannot be tried for
52
corpus delicti or "body of the crmie." State v. Potter,
been burned. This principle is known as the

^'

Vt. 33 (1879).
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Unless that should be proved, the

fact

of crime could not be imputed. She had three

children. That demonstrated there existed corpus delicti

some

Once

man."^'^

corpus

dubious.

delicti

The

was thus

appropriate. Barrett's conclusion

step daughter's out-of-wedlock births

of the crime of adultery. Had they been the

on this

act, let

In this opinion, Barrett lived up to his reputation as a judge

the law get in the

way of his

alone of adultery.

speaking for sbc other members of the Court as well as himself.

for a reversal. Potter had

wife

first

abandoned

moved out of the

marital

It

delicti.

who was unprepared

personal sense of right and wrong."^

factual circumstances presented by the Potter case

Still,

he was

seems clear that the

were simply too horrifying

his wife for a sexual liaison

all

to allow

with her daughter. His

bedroom and then out of the house

supplanted by her daughter. The step daughter had assumed

point

of intercourse with an

Thus, the children were not, as Barrett had argued, evidence of the corpus

let

of

were not necessarily the

result

unmarried man, they would not be evidence of any criminal

to

part

the corpus delicti had been shown, circumstantial evidence proving

that Potter had been the father

was very

on her part and on the

completely,

of her mother's

domestic duties including her sexual and procreative functions. Potter's apparent public

flouting

trial

of legal,

meant

social,

and sexual convention, and the numerous witnesses presented

that the relationship

this case get

away even

if it

precedent would be set by

«

State

V.

Potter, 52 Vt. 33,

See Chapter

had been a local scandal The Court was not going to

had been dubiously prosecuted and even

it.

if a

dubious legal

Rather than remand the case to the county court, the

40 (1879).

1.
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at

let

Supreme Court

itself passed sentence.

never imposed by the

As time went

Potter got jSve years in prison, a

courts.''^

on, the Court continued to loosen the evidentiary requirements for

proving adultery, implicitly overruling State

v.

Way each time.

In

1

896 the Court

Ida Brink and George Gibbs, an appeal from an adultery conviction.

decided State

v.

There was no

direct evidence

at

maximum almost

of adulterous intercourse-only

that the

two had showed up

a boarding house representing themselves as husband and wife, had shared a room

with one bed

in

it

for

one

night, after

recognized the precedent of the

which George departed never to

Way case

with

its

return.

The Court

admonition against convicting for

adultery in cases where the corpus delicti had not been shown. But like in Potter the

Court could not allow adulterers to
noted (wrongly) that

if the

slip

through

its

fingers

on such a

requirement of showing the corpus delicti were adhered

the crime could not be proven independently of the persons

numerous

authorities

would prevent

technicality. It

on trial.

It

then cited

and decisions from other jurisdictions which argued

adulterers

from ever being brought

to justice.

to,

that

such a rule

The Court concluded

that

the admission of circumstantial evidence of adultery actually established the corpus of
the crime, rather than serving merely as corroboration of direct and positive testimony of

adulterous intercourse.

overruled

Way

It

held that Judge Barrett's decision in Potter had in effect

without explicitly saying so. The Court admitted that convictions based

on such evidence were only "probable" or

"uncertain," but

^

it

was

willing to risk

in adultery convictions
For example, out of 175 prison sentences handed down
five years.
between 1794 and 1920, only two were for the maximum of
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it,

for

in the four counties

without such a ruling, a conviction "can rarely be had on account of the secret nature of
the crime."^^

In 1902, the Court loosened the standard of proof for adultery even more. State

V.

Kimball was an appeal from an adultery conviction

in

Orange County. The

prosecution had shown that the defendant John F. Kimball had been married to Lillian

Stoddard, but was living with Alice Reed. Alice had married John not knowing about

first

his

marriage to Stoddaid. She had had two children with him; Kimball referred to Reed

as his wife and she referred to him as her husband; he called himself one of the children's

"papa" and said Reed was the "mama." But the prosecution had not been able to prove
intercourse between the

two on the date charged

occasion) or even that the two had slept

in the

in the indictment (or

same room together

on any other

in the

house where

they boarded. Following the close of the state's case, Kimball's attorney had sought a
directed verdict because the state had failed to prove that any crime had taken place,

much

less that

Kimball had committed

it.

The

trial

judge refused the motion and the jury

convicted.

The Supreme Court began

its

decision by stating the general rule that a person

cannot be convicted of a crime unless the state

committed—that
was hard

is

first

shows

it

one has been

the corpus delicti. But the Court then noted that in

to figure out what, exactly, constituted the

perjury case,

that

was not necessary

to

prove

first

that

some cases

body of the crime. Thus,

someone had

lied

in

it

a

under oath, but

proceeding the Court reasoned,
only that the defendant in question had. In a blanket act

it

was not necessary

''State

V.

to

show

that

two people had been found

Brink andGihbs, 68 Vt. 659 (1896).
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in

bed together, only that

the

two people

had been. The Court's reasoning was quite odd, because

in question

both examples, the prosecution would

committed the crime charged

actually

have to prove that the individuals

still

(i.e.,

that they lied

bed together, one of them being married to a
delicti

all,

under oath, or were found

into the criminal act.

Way had made

V.

to avoid prosecuting people simply because they

—and

grounds to prove adultery

in

in fact

clear that in aduhery prosecutions, opportunity

it

in

The purpose of

had the opportunity to commit a crime without any proof that they had
State

in question

third party). In such a case, the corpus

and the actions of the defendants merged

the corpus delicti rule was, after

in

in that case the

two defendants had

was

done

so.

insufiBcient

actually been found

bed together.
In Kimball there

was simply no evidence

that a crime

had taken place

—

^the

crime

in question being intercourse

between the married Kimball and Alice Reed. And the

Court admitted as much. As

in Potter

approach.

It

argued that

if

proof of actual intercourse were necessary for a conviction

no one would ever be found
It is

and Brink, the Court adopted a result-oriented

guilty, citing the ubiquitous

Greenleaf for

not necessary to prove the direct fact of adultery; that

there

is

if it

this proposition.

were,

not one case in a hundred in which that proof would be attainable.

very rarely, indeed, that the parties are surprised in the direct act of
adultery. In every case, almost, the fact is inferred from circumstances
It is

that lead to

it

by

fair inference;

and, unless this

were the case,-unless

were so held,-no protection whatever could be given
In other words, as in Brink, the Court overruled State

v.

this

to marital rights."^

Way, because the requirement

place was simply too
of proving that a crime—aduherous intercourse—had taken

way of protecting

"marital rights."

Not only

difficult

and got

^

Greenleaf,
Kimball, 74 Vt. 223, 227 (1902) quoting Simon

State

V.

in the
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did the Court do

On Evidence

(Boston, 1860), §

away with

the requirement that actual intercourse be proved, but even the obligation to

prove the particular time or date of the crime. All prosecutors now needed to show was
that the opportunity for intercourse

was

the statute of limitations for the crime.

present at

It

was up

evidence presented by the prosecutor such as

point within the three years of

to the jury to decide whether the

living in the

same house,

acknowledging the partner as a spouse to

illegitimate children,

sufficient to

some

the presence of

third parties, etc.,

was

prove adultery beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, what had been

questions of law for the judge to answer had

This represented a

shift in judicial

now become

questions of fact for the jury.

authority totally at odds with the trend of judicial

usurpation of the jury's authority which had taken place in Vermont and elsewhere

throughout the nineteenth century.'"
In justifying

its

decision, the Court argued that circumstantial evidence

was

always admissible as evidence of the crime.
not to be presumed guilty of the crime from the
mere fact of his opportunity to commit it, yet, where an adulterous
disposition is shown to exist between the parties at the time of the alleged

While the respondent

offense, then

showing

is

mere opportunity, with comparatively

guilt, will

slight

circumstances

be sufficient to justify the inference that criminal

intercourse has actually taken

The Court then quoted from a

string

place.''*

of out-of-state cases

After reciting the circumstantial evidence against Kimball
sufficient to bring the case within the rule without

in

it

support of its position.

held "these are facts

proof of the parties having occupied a

only decide questions of fact and not law. In
law in criminal cases over a strong dissent by
1849 it reasserted the right of juries to decide questions of
The Court did not bring its law mto
Judge Milo Bennett. State v. Croteau, 23 Vt. 14 (1849).
late, but still ten years before
with the rest of the country on this question until very

Vermont was quite

late in declaring that juries could

conformance

Kimball. State

v.

Burpee, 65 Vt.

1

(1892).

Kimball 229
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room together
that the act

any time; and

at

was committed

at

it

is

enough

if the

circumstances lead to the conclusion

sometime, not definitely shown, during the term of the

cohabitation, without pointing to any particular time and place."^^

amended Vermont's
parties

was

The

decision in

ejBFect

adultery statutes. Instead of outlawing intercourse where one of the

married, Kimball

now made Vermonters

susceptible to an adultery

prosecution even though only cohabitation had been shown and even though sharing a

room, much

less

a bed had not been proven

at all.

Despite the Court's radical reforming of adultery law in the
century, there were

adulterers. Allen

in

1907 and again

show

that she

intercourse

some

lines

it

would not allow the

state to cross in pursuing alleged

Sanderson was seen having intercourse with

in

late nineteenth

his hired girl

on a highway

1909. Against the defendant's objection, the state was allowed to

had given birth to a child

showed an adulterous

in 1908.

disposition,

The Supreme Court held

and the

fact

of their

that acts

living in the

of

same

house was evidence "of the existence of opportunities available to persons thus
criminally intimate and inclined."

really saying

why then held

it

The Court

ruled that the birth

admissible without

proper to show that upon the death of the child the

respondent obtained a burial permit, and buried the body
farm, and that no one else

was

was

in

a cemetery located on his

present.

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court reversed the decision because the state had
introduced evidence that the defendant had been arrested for bastardy on another

amounted to
occasion. Since the defendant had not put his character in issue, this

Kimball, 23

1

(emphasis

in the original).

165

character evidence intended to prove the disposition of the defendant to
commit crimes

of this nature. The Court reversed on these grounds

The Court
1913 when

it

further

alone.^°

expanded the amount of circumstantial evidence permitted

in

allowed the state to introduce evidence of the adulterous partner's

reputation for chastity in both

and criminal proceedings. In cases where there was

civil

"evidence of conduct tending to establish the charge," the Court held that "the bad
reputation for chastity of the person v^dth

whom the

offence

is

alleged to have been

committed may be shown, as tending to render the occurrence of the adulterous

The Court

probable."^'

reiterated

its

act

more

holding in another one of the four adultery cases

it

decided that term. While noting that the character of the defendant could not be inquired
into unless he or she first put their

good character

in evidence as a defense, the

held that the character of the other partner could be.

woman "if it

exists"

that the ofiFense

was singly a circumstance

like

It

Court

held that the bad character of the

any other bearing on the probability

was committed." Prosecutors were quick

to

add

this line

of inquiry to

their arsenal."

The

final

case of the era shows

how close

the Court

between character evidence and evidence of adulterous
(1928) was a case heavily
sheriflf of Windsor

^ State

fi-eighted

by

politics since

it

was

willing to skirt the line

disposition. State

v.

Fairbanks

involved accusations against the

County, Wallis N. Fairbanks. Fairbanks had taken young Irma

V.

Sanderson, 83 Vt. 351 (1910).

5'

State

V.

Nieburg, 86 Vt. 392 (1913).

*2

State

V.

Snyder, 86 Vt. 449 (1913).

" Such testimony figured prominently

in State

v.

Mathews and State
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v.

Fairbanks discussed below.

Stoodley under his wing

at the request

adulterous carryings on with a married

of her parents who were worried about her

man named Dan

Barney. Stoodley continued to

pine for Barney and the two met on several occasions and had sex while she was under
Fairbanks' s supervision. She later accused Fairbanks of having sex with her too.

The defendant and

the state were both represented by future governors (Stanley

C. Wilson and Deane C. Davis, respectively). At
that Fairbanks

First

trial,

had gone out driving with Stoodley and another

he and Stoodley had

tried to

clear that the evidence

was

girl,

Minnie Rushford.

have sex, but since she was "unwell"

had desisted and instead had sex with Rushford. In

made

the defense objected to evidence

his

at the time,

he

charge to the jury, the judge

material solely to the extent that

it

demonstrated an

adulterous disposition between Fairbanks and Stoodley. The defendant objected to this

charge, arguing that

it

showed

that disposition

Supreme Court disagreed, holding
front

of the adulterous partner,

that if one could have sex with another

that in itself showed

modesty and conventionality between the
place and

toward Rushford, and not Stoodley. The

a breakdown

woman,

in the "restraints

admitted.

The Court

ultimately

reversed the conviction of Fairbanks on other groimds and remanded the case for

how it

young woman of abandoned

felt

^

State

V.

re-trial,

about Stoodley and Rushford; describing Stoodley as "a

character, apparently oblivious to

decency." Rushford, the Court wrote, was "another young

depravity."^'' It

of

parties" necessary before adultery could take

was thus competent evidence and could be

but not before stating

in

all

claims of morality and

woman of almost

had nothing to say about Fairbanks's character however.

Fairbanks, 101 Vt. 30 (1928).
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equal

An Adultery Trial in Action
The discussion has so

far

focused on the law of adultery-the legal framework

within which Vermont tried, convicted, and punished adulterers. The Court's
liberalization

with a surge

of the evidentiary requirements necessary
in adultery prosecutions

to convict after

with 90 percent coming

after

1

1876 coincided

870. Prosecutors

could always bring adultery prosecutions by information rather than indictment since the

maximum sentence was

five years.

Some were

initiated

by complaints of aggrieved

spouses, others by local police or grand jurors."

The Court's

liberalization

of evidentiary requirements

in these cases

increasingly given juries almost total control over convictions. Regardless

sentiment to go after adulterers, however, prosecutors

beyond a reasonable doubt

that the facts

fimnework of adultery as defined by

of a

statute

still

had

of the

had to convince jurors

particular case

fit

within the legal

and the Supreme Court. The

defense thus constructed their cases to appeal to the values of the

all

state

and

important male

jurors.

Trial transcripts provide important detail in understanding

judges perceived these matters and
their side. In cases

credibility,

where

how lawyers and

how they constructed their cases to win juries over to

direct evidence

of the sexual act was unavailable or lacked

prosecutors relied on circumstantial evidence. The state and defendants

evidence (often
fought running battles with one another as each side sought to introduce

of questionable

admissibility) besmirching the parties

and witnesses so as to

discredit

« For examples, see State v. Eaton, Windsor County Court, Special June 1917 Term, Transcript of Trial
(local officers witness sexual activity
(husband makes complaint); State v. Comstock, 86 Vt. 42 (1912)
and obtain an

arrest warrant).
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their testimony. In so doing, they tried to get

the bench

would

allow.

Much of this

trials

were

as

much

as the other side and

evidence referenced appropriate gender and

domestic relations and focused on the ways
with them. Adultery

away with

which the

in

parties did, or did not,

also rife with frank sexual talk

comply

and evidence detailing the

intimate lives of the parties and witnesses.

In 1905, the state brought aduhery charges against George Jelley and Alice

Daniels.

rooms

The Deputy

at ten at night

Sheriff of Windsor

and found the two

they were escorted to

jail

County had knocked on the door of their rented

in varying states

where Alice spent

six

weeks

of undress. Allowed to dress,

until

she

was

bailed out by her

husband. The transcript provided only glimmers of the events that had led Alice to leave
her husband and go off with Jelley in the
her and Jelley to the train station and

aunt

when they were

arrested.

first

We know that her father took both

place.

we know that

Jelley

There are also hints that

it

was

staying with his uncle and

was

Alice's husband

who

initiated the prosecution.^^

Because of the nature of an aduhery proceeding, the evidence dwelt
the couple's intimate domestic relations.

living together as a sexually intimate

this end.

The deputy

from the

sitting

couple and introduced evidence toward

sheriff who arrested the couple testified that they

in Jelley's uncle's

room with

on

The prosecution was keen to show that they

had been

two rooms

at length

house for several days.

had been sharing

A bedroom had been separated

a shawl tacked up in the doorway. Deputy Frank Hayden

warrant for Jelley, but
they showed up at the house where the two were staying, deputies had a
pressure from her husband, Alice
not for Daniels. They arrested her anyway. Later, apparently under
pleaded guilty herself and
signed a request for the filing of an information against Jelley for adultery,
Court, June 1905 Term, Transcript of Trial, p. 3,
testified against him. State v. Jelley, Windsor County

When

30-31,43.
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testified that

in

it,

he found Alice Daniels

bed." Because the

sitting

room had a lounge

the prosecutor had to preemptively disprove the anticipated defense that
George

had been sleeping

in the other

two people had been

like

in the

He

room.

sleeping in

therefore elicited testimony that the bed looked

The prosecutor then asked about

it.

the lounge in

the other room.

This

Q:

How did

A:

There was a sort of quilt over

of some kind and a pillow, feather
pillow, the same as they use on a bed; that was placed on the top
of the head of the lounge.

Q:

In what conditions

A:

It

when the men came

to their

for

it."^^

though for omament-

The

inquiry continued.

What had George been wearing

did he get his clothes?

From both rooms.

The defense attempted

to rebut the implications

rooms locked or merely fastened? Only

Deputy Hayden was
in

as

him? Only a pair of pants and a

Was

with an old pewter spoon.

been

that pillow?

on the head of the lounge,

lay

was no marks on

Where

was

it

statement drew an immediate objection. Deputy Hayden then ofifered that

last

"there

appear?

it

it

sure. In

or did look

like

which room was

" Hayden does

not say

sure

fairly

it

it

was a

Jelley's hat

sight of a

the other deputy sheriff John Ballard

Did he get dressed? Yes.

of this testimony. Was the door

fastened, the latch had been replaced

a shawl that separated the two rooms or a curtain?

Did the bed look

shawl.

one person had been

how the

shirt.

rolling

around on

like

it?

two people had
The deputy was not

hanging? The deputy was not sure.

woman

in

bed

afifected

who testified: "There was

around and come back out into the kitchen where Mr. Hart
Jelley Transcript, p. 4.
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a

him, but

it

DidJelley

caused some mortification to

woman, abed

in there;

I

sat." Jelley Transaipt, p. 15.

whirled

.

have stockings on? The deputy did not think he

from the bedroom

closet his every

know. Was there a

fire in

bumed down and had
George's Aunt

day clothes or

testified that the

couple had taken their meals

the clothes JeUey retrieved

The deputy

his best outfit?

room? Yes,

the stove in the sitting

to be rekindled.

Were

did.

there

had been, but

How many pillows were on the bed?

bed had only been

at her table

and

later

cooked

their

it

had

Only one.^^

by one person and

slept in

did not

that the

own, but on her stove

in

the kitchen.

Jelley's case

guilty to the charges

was made

quite difficult by the fact that Alice

and served as the

state's star witness.

had intercourse repeatedly including on the night

that they

She

had already pleaded

testified that the

had been

two had

arrested.^^ This

was

important since the defense put pressure on the state to declare the specific act of
adultery for which

witnesses

who

it

was seeking

to convict Jelley,^'

testified that Alice

had denied ever sleeping with

witnesses had been in jail with Alice

brought out by the prosecution.

when they heard

We know that at

on adultery and lewdness charges when she met

George and Alice had occupied before

^ Jelley

her

least

their arrest

who

make

Jelley.

several

Several of these

these statements-a fact

one of these

Alice.^^

denied ever sleeping with Alice. Family members

Jelley Transcript, p. 4-1

The defense put on

women was

in jail

JeUey himself testified and

lived in the various houses

supported his testimony. But the

1

Transcript, p. 24.

Apparently the Supreme Court's decision in Kimball which seemed to dispense with this requirement

was not

relied

on by the

state.

The witness was Ethel Burroughs who was convicted of aduhery and sentenced to one and one half to
507-508;
three years imprisonment. Windsor County Court, June 1905 Term, State Cases, vol. 5, p.
Windsor County Court, December 1905 Terra, Docket No. 1076. The lewdness charge was dropped.
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defense never even tried to explain what the two of them were doing together.
This,

coupled with Alice's testimony, was
fifteen to sixteen

was

plea

later

Rena
had

left

fatal

and George was convicted.

month prison sentence."

He

received a

In exchange for her cooperation, Alice's guilty

dropped and the case against her entered as a nolle prosequi.^

Brittell

and Edward Eaton were

tried separately for adultery in 1917.

Rena

her husband William in Bristol where they had been living with their two young

children,

Hoyt and Hazel. By agreement, Rena took

half the ftimiture with her.

She

traveled to North Hartland where she ran a boarding house and took in laundry. After

her mother got sick, she went to stay with her in Ticonderoga,

to stay with her father,

who was now

living in

They had been
Brittell

arrested as a result

Hazel went

Rutland and Hoyt stayed with his mother.

During her perambulations, Edward Eaton showed up,
lived in: appearing first in Bristol, then

New York.

Zelig-like, at every

North Hartland,

of a complaint

filed

house Rena

then, finally, in Ticonderoga.

by William.

and Eaton were convicted largely on the strength of the testimony of

Rena's teenage daughter Hazel. She

testified that her

mother held herself out as "Mrs.

Eaton," that she and Eaton had shared a bed together, and that she had seen them

state

of undress

two

different states.

^

"will

"

State

call

it

coincidence, the defense, like in the Jelley case,

what BritteU and Eaton were doing together

" Windsor County

Instead,

it

in

was never

four different houses in

presented evidence through other v^tnesses that the two

Court, June 1905 Term, State Cases, vol.

5, p.

505-506.

no further prosecute." Windsor County Court State Cases, June 1905 Term,
Windsor County Court, June 1906 Term, Docket No. 2987.
V.

a

in the bed.

Other than to
able to explain

in

vol. 5, p.

Eaton, Windsor County Court, Special June 1917 Term, Transcript of Trial,
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p. 4.

505-506;

had not shared a room

Beyond

that, the

in

North Hartland and

had gone by her married name.

defense focused on Rena's outstanding qualities as a parent, William

Brittell's total failure in this regard,

The defense attempted
husband due to

that BritteU

his

and daughter Hazel's poor character.

Rena

to paint

as a

good mother who had had

to leave her

unreasonable jealousy, his drinking, and his refusal to support her and

the children-rather than an aduherous

woman who

left

home

defending Rena, he highlighted the washing she had taken

in,

to

the clothes she had

purchased for her children, and her struggle to put a roof over

example Eaton's uncle,

in

go with another man. In

all their

heads.

whose home they had stayed temporarily before

You

A:

Yes.

Q:

You

A:

I

Q:

And

while there they attended school?

A:

Yes

sir.

Q:

And

attended church?

A:

Yes.'*'^

understand she was supporting her boy and

know

particularly relevant to

they

was with

V.

judge put an end to

BritteU,

girl?

it

her.

successful in this effort.

an aduhery

boarders on the matter. "Q:

^ State

skills.

understand she was to earn money to support them?

The defense was only marginally

Finally, the

for

taking over

the boarding house, testified under cross-examination about Rena's parenting

Q:

Thus

trial

and was resisted

when Rena's

What was

The evidence was not
at

every turn by the prosecution.

attorney cross-examined one of her

her conduct toward the children-did she look

Windsor County Court, Special June 1917 Term, Transcript of Trial,
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p. 25.

after the children?

A: Yes

sir."

The

state objected

and the judge agreed, ruling that the

testimony was 'Hmimportant. She's not charged with neglect of her children."^^
Eflforts to

smear her husband were also contested by the

state

and rejected by the

court, though not before being repeatedly brought to the attention of the jury. These
efiforts

focused on William

Rena's lawyer sought to

support his family and his drinking.

Brittell's failure to

elicit

testimony from Rena herself.

How had you been-how did you happen to

Q-

First,

go over to

Ticonderoga?
A:

Mr.

Attorney:

Object.

The Court:

Let

Brittell refiised to

it

pay house rent or support

Be

stand. Exception.

us.

careful about these things. That

was

immaterial. Brother Taft.

Fm just doing

Taft:

it

to

show why

she

was

living there;

he refused to

support her.

The Court:

Never mind. Go

Rena then described how

on.

their fiimiture

came

reference to William's "refus[al] to support

Brittell' s

Q:

attorney tried one

time.

at the station?

Because he didn't provide for
Sfc

Q:

us,"*^^

Why didn't you stay down in Rutland when you went dovm there; When
he met you

A:

more

to be divided, sneaking in another

While you were down

]|C

3)c

there,

us.

Sfc

Brittell Transcript, p.

^

how did

Brittell Transcript, p. 71.

^

9|e

106-107.
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he act toward you?

Attorney:

Just a minute; Object.

Along the same

line

being an attempt here

to justify the charge the State's brought against this respondent,

by the conduct of her husband toward her or

hers,

which

is

entirely irrelevant.

The Court:

How's

that material?

Taft;

Why

is

it

from Mr,

to

show, Your honor,

Brittell; that

why Mrs.

Brittell

he was using intoxicating

was going away

liquors,

and

couldn't support her.

The Court:

You've shown that.

Taft:

And

The Court:

I

wouldn't stay-

think you've gone far enough in that

On cross-examination of William Brittell,

69

Rena's lav^er sought testimony about his

drinking.

A:

Her

ftimiture

was

sent in

my name

and

from Ticonderoga to Rutland-moved
Q:

Are you a man

Attomey:

Just a

The Court:

Excluded.

Q:

When you were

it

I

paid the freight on
into the

house

it

in Rutland.

that uses intoxicating liquors?

moment. Object to the question.

you meet her
A:

I

Q:

Were you

A:

I

Attomey:

Just a

at

Rutland there, and your wife came there, did

at the station?

did.

drinking that day?

had a glass of beer.

moment. Object to the question; have no

Brittell Transcript, p. 113.
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bearing.

The Court:

I

don't think

a drunkard

has bearing on the issue in this case, even if he was
didn't give this woman any license to go with

it

it

another man.

A:

Not

to go-well Til

Fmally, Rena's attomey tried one

v^thdraw the question, then/^

more time

to bring the fact

bear on the charges by springing the question

in the

of his

ill-treatment

of her to

middle of another inquiry concerning

the reputation of her daughter Hazel for honesty.

The

Q:

What kind of treatment

A:

Absolutely none-no

state objected to the line

The Court:

What

did

you receive from your husband?

sir,-

of questioning.

bearing has that-she had no right to commit a crime on

account of it,

if she did.

would probably show what she was avoiding-his kind of
treatment-she was getting away from his kind of treatment he was

Taft:

Still, it

dealing out to her as his wife.

The Court:

It

may be

Finally, the judge, in his

actions

excluded.^^

charge to the jury made clear that William

were not relevant to the aduhery charge. In a

jury to consider

all

it.

he was to blame for the separation or not,
crime" by the defendant, because "she was

However, the judge made

"it

clear that

whether

gave no Ucense for the commission of a

still

p. 16.

Brittell Transcript, p. 137.

^

confiising instruction, he told the

they had heard about William's ill-treatment of Rena, his

jealousy-whether he had any ground for

™ 5r/rre// Transcript,

Brittell's

Brittell Transcript, p. 146.
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duty bound to be a law-abiding

citizen."^^

The

truly

damning testimony

in the case

came from Rena's fourteen year-old

daughter, described in one court document as "very large for her years ... a

unusual

with

ability ...

many of the

and mentally

adolescent

.

girls

.

.

much more mature than most

who

appear

girl

of her

girls

in the transcripts as witnesses,

age."''^

As

Hazel's

testimony was delivered articulately and with great self-confidence. She was,
girl

of

like

many

witnesses, quite unflappable. Hazel provided the most direct testimonial evidence of

Rena and Edward's aduherous

disposition towards one another.

mother held herself out as "Mrs. Eaton,"

that her

She

testified that her

mother and Eaton shared a room

together both at the Briggs's and in the boarding house run by her mother in North
Hartland. Hazel testified that her mother would

returning to the

room

Rena's lawyer went

after

credibility.

He

had accused her of making faces

Hazel

that he

which point she had

called

at

Brittell,

way: by questioning her motives

him behind her back. She claimed

him a "son of a

faces.

bitch."

in the face

that he

He knocked

her

down again,

testified rather that

Answer

and,

he had spanked

to Respondent's Petition for a

Supreme Court, Windsor County, January 1918 Term.
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had been

He had knocked her down anyway

(Eaton

Affidavit of William S. Pingree, State's Attorney, in State's

New Trial, State v.

his children.

did so by showing her animosity toward Eaton. Eaton

according to Hazel, had kicked her

"

spoke of them as

in the typical

"grouchy for a long time," but denied making

at

in their

Under a questionable cross-examination. Hazel elaborated

and Hoyt called Eaton "papa" and

and attacking her

to tuck her in at night before

she shared vsdth Eaton. That she saw them in bed together

night clothes in the room.

that she

come up

her at the behest of her mother). Hazel admitted that she had been

smce.

mad

at

Eaton ever

74

Rena's lawyer thus sought to discount the adultery charges brought by William
Brittell as the

product of his jealousy and disregard for his wife's well-being coupled

with Hazel's animosity toward Eaton.

sought to

fiirther

prove

its

When cross-examining

theory by introducing a

letter

William, the defense

from him to Rena about

prosecuting Eaton for adultery and, through William's language, demonstrating
William's hatred for Eaton. The state objected, but the defense argued
William's animosity toward Eaton, his v^dllingness to

him, as well as his influence over Hazel

letter, ruling that

allegation

were

who

would be wdthin

tried

a "martyr" out of Rena to get

and that

if the facts

his rights to call

convicted and sentenced to two to three years

adulterers

at

there.

appealed to the Supreme Court for a

Soon

hard labor, the usual sentence for

at his trial.'^

after the conviction,

new trial,

of the adultery

Eaton names.'^ Rena was

of both sexes and the same sentence Edward received

But the case did not end

showed

hated Eaton too. The court excluded the

Eaton was not the one being

true, William

make

it

Rena's lawyer

citing newly-discovered evidence-Hazel

had recanted. In her petition to the Court Rena submitted several sworn

affidavits

including one from her daughter. Hazel stated that she had not seen any "improper

relations"

between her mother and Eaton while

living

with them, but that her father and

uncle had later convinced her that they had had an adulterous affair and pressured her to

Brittell Transcript, p. 36-37.

"

Brittell Transcript, p. 78-79.

Windsor County Court, June 1917 Term,

State Cases, vol. 7, p. 303-306.
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testify against her

mother and Eaton. She swore

testifying against her

that she

mother by her father and uncle

in

had been pressured

into

order to get Eaton thrown in

prison and that her uncle and the state's attorney had told her her mother would only get

probation and would not go to

jail.

Now she claimed that

she had slept with her mother

every night, had never seen the two of them in bed together, and that her mother had

Two

never referred to herself as Mrs. Eaton.
also

swore
In

Brittell

falsely.

in affidavits that she

its

awaiting

had told them she had

at the local hotel

lied at the trial.'^

answer, the state fired back, relying on affidavits of its own. WHliam

swore

He

of Hazel's co-woricers

that he

had never

tried to influence his daughter or pressured her to testify

also submitted a letter written

trial.

Brittell

claimed that the

landlady and turned over to him, so

by Hazel to her mother while Rena was

letter

had been found

unclear whether

it is

Hazel chastised her mother for pressuring her to

it

in

Hazel's

was ever

room by the

sent to Rena. In

testify falsely at the trial

it.

and blamed her

for getting into the situation in the first place.

of testifying against you, but 1 can't help it
now. You should never have told your lawyer about me and 1 never
would have been called. Mother I have always lied for him [Eaton], but I
Mother,

I

was asked

do not

to

tell

like the idea

the truth and did so.

sfc

sfc

3|t

I

sjc

never will

3^

lie

for

him

again.

)Jl

Now Mother you speak of me being to blame for all this trouble. You
would never of happened. Now let
say if had never come to Rutland
it

I

Eaton had stayed away

you and if
you had never have stayed out with him that night before you came down
here and if he had stayed away from you after you did get here this would

me

tell

you something.

If E. R.

fi-om

never have happened.^^

"

Affidavits of Hazel

Brittell,

™

M.

Brittell,

William W. Holmes, and Dora Holmes, Petition

New Trial,

State

Supreme Court, Windsor County, January 1918 Term.

Affidavit of William D. Brittell, State's

Brittell,

for

Answer

to Respondent's Petition for a

Supreme Court, Windsor County, January 1918 Term. Emphasis
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New Trial, State v.

in the original.

v.

The

answer also contained yet another

state's

aflBdavit

from Hazel,

this time recanting

her previous sworn testimony in her afiBdavit. Hazel claimed that the prior affidavit had

been made under the "persuasive influence and pleading" of her mother while she had

been

Woodstock. Hazel had seen her nearly every day and each time her mother

in jail in

had "begged of me to change

mother cried and so did
assist

father

her

if

I

could

.

and uncle and

.

,

I

and

,

."

my
I

story to help her out of jail. That during these talks

was much

stirred

Hazel went on to

my

and

state that she

that her original testimony

was

true.

sympathy was aroused to
had not been influenced by her

She had only

prevent her mother from going to prison.^' Affidavits from William

and the

state's attorney

new

trial.

It is

impossible to teU

were

by the

also submitted

who was

trial

The

last

rural

in

in

now assumed

went to

prison.

But the Supreme Court's
disposition

we

have a transcript took place

as well as the incredible surveillance

communities were subject

Union Village

Affidavit of Hazel

Brittell,

for relief and she

in

1924. This case too demonstrates the importance that "aduUerous

lived there for eight years.

™

Brittell, his brother,

on opportunity or adulterous

adultery case of this era for which

disposition" evidence had

on a farm

order to

judges and juries to convict and imprison on very shaky evidence.

Orange County

Vermont's

lied in

opposing the petition for a

telling the truth in this case.

willingness to uphold convictions based solely

allowed

state in

The Supreme Court denied Rena's request

my

M.

to.

William and

after a lifetime spent in

Their

grown son

Brittell, State's

Answer

to

members of

Emma Mathews had

New York and New Jersey.

settled

They had

resided in nearby White River Junction.

Respondent's Petition

Supreme Court, Windsor County, January 1918 Term.
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for a

New Trial,

William and

Emma had been married for thirty-three years.

William, aged

fifty-four,

seven year-old married

exchange

began spending a

woman also

for using William's

team

lot

The

trouble started

of time with Angie Wilmot, a

living in the village.

Angie worked

in

when

thirty-

Hanover. In

to get there every day, she carried William's milk to

the creamery.

Witness

after witaess for the state testified that

together, alone, and in the

company of others, around

Angie and William were seen

the village. William's daughter-

in-law Ruth testified that she had seen William and Angie enter the

that the

door had been locked.

the milk tickets and at the

testified that

when

On

bam separately and

another occasion she had seen William hand Angie

same time he had reached up and squeezed her hand. She

she had raised the issue with William he had denied

he did not want her coming around to his house anymore. Roy Stowell

it

and told her

testified that

while picking ginseng he saw William and Angie meet on the road (she with the team

and he in his
in the

car).

Peering

at

them from the woods, Roy

said

he saw the two

lie

down

bushes together. School teacher Minnie Randall saw Angie and William driving

in his car

with "some sort of traveling man" in the back

saw William pick Angie up
that she

in his car

and drive off with

had seen Angie come out of her house and

seat.

On another occasion she

her. In addition, she testified

talk with

William "many times."

bam

and William together in William's
Luther Roberts testified that he had seen Angie
and also one time

down

in the

covered bridge. They had been talking together.

Upon

in opposite directions. Etta Barstow, a
Luther's entering, they stopped and headed

up in his car and another time saw Angie
neighbor of Angle's saw William pick her
passenger seat.
driving the car with William in the
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The

local doctor, L. B. Jones,

saw

two

on the road, William

talking

were drawn up equal with each

in his

horse-drawn cart and Angie

other, both heading in the

same

in her

direction.

buggy. They

Angie moved

her buggy so the doctor could get by in his car. Finally, Angle's husband Melville
testified that

he had told William he did not want Angie

at his

house anymore and he did

not want William coming around to his house. Under examination by the state Melville
testified that

William ignored his entreaties, and,

house, picked Angie up

in his car,

it

who knew Angie was asked

was

bad.*'

Nor

a

later date,

came around

Every witness for the

their character attacked.

about her reputation for chastity. Everyone asked said

did William's character escape scrutiny.

own behalf. Under cross-examination by the

state,

it

He

decided to testify on his

was revealed

he had been

that

convicted of bigamy in IndianapoUs three or four years after his marriage to

though

it

was not

demanded a

clear

whether

Emma was his first

limiting instruction to the jury.

the bigamy conviction

was admitted

for

The court

obliged, informing the jury that

"solely for the purpose

of impeachment of the

you

will consider

no other purpose,"*^

The
sixty-four,

»°

Emma,

or second wife. The defense

witness, intending to affect his credibility as a witness, and gentlemen,

it

to his

and drove off v^th her alone.*"

Both Angie and William had
state

at

State

V.

truly explosive evidence

was

that provided

by WilUam's wife, Emma. At

Emma was ten years older than her husband.

She

testified that for four years,

Mathews, Orange County Court, June 1924 Term, Transcript of Trial,

p.

69-72, 77-78, 89-90,

95-96, 111, 115-116, 118.
"bad," "none too good,"
Four different state witnesses variously described Angie's reputation as
1 1 1.
"rather bad," and "bad." Mathews Transcript, p. 86, 100, 101,

^ Mathews

Transcript, p. 226.
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her husband had periodicaUy joined Angie in the

horses for the drive to Hanover.
only to find

it

hitch

up the

Emma would go down to the bam and pull on the door

on April

locked. Finally

bam when she came to

16, 1924,

Emma broke the

door open. She found

her husband William on top of a feed bin, with a horse blanket rolled up for a pillow

under

his

head and

Angie Wilmot was standing over him with

his trousers unbuttoned.

Emma,

her skirts up. Then, according to

covered her mouth with his hand.

it

He was

got ugly. She started to "holler" and William
so rough with her that her false teeth

of her mouth. All the while, Angie Wilmot stood there grinning
tried to force his wife out

manure

pile.

William

testified seeing

finally

managed

to carry his wife into the house.*^

close together one other time before April

how close they were

"So close you couldn't put a

knife blade

Emma's testimony had
one

standing together.

falling in the

Emma also
1

6.

The

Emma replied, tellingly,

between them."*^

to be taken with a grain

Angie and William would both

thing,

Then William

of the bam. The two tussled and both ended up

them standing

prosecutor asked her

at her.

out

fell

testify that

it

of salt

for several reasons.

For

never happened- William had

never had sex v^th Angie, never been intimate with her, never knocked his vdfe's teeth

out, never

ended up

in

a manure

afifections lawsuit against

to

lie.

Third, she

seemed

pile

with her. Second,

Angie seeking $3000
to be a

little

crazy.

had seen Angie and William go dovm to the

anywhere fi-om

five

Mathews Transcript,

^ Mathews

in

Emma had filed an alienation of

damages. She therefore had a motive

On cross-examination she testified that
bam together and

hundred to eight hundred times

p. 14-15.

Transcript, p. 18.
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she

had found the door locked

in four years.

She refused to admit

that this

was anything but a

guess.*^

Given

this

evidence

it

seems that without the

evidence of Angie's bad reputation, William's prior bigamy conviction, and the various
"adulterous disposition" testimony of hand holding, driving out together, and covered
bridge conversations,

it

would have been hard

to convict

on Emma's testimony

alone.

A final transcript comes not fi-ora an adultery case, but instead describes a trial
for attempted

murder motivated by an adulterous

Solomon James.

It

was the

liaison

Windsor County

was an

itinerant laborer

1

894, EfiBe and

weeks.

When he

it

in.

Wilbur, believing that

returned

home he found Solomon

The Spauldings moved

to Bentley Fisher's

made up

and Solomon had given up

mid-day, the

their relationship. EfiBe told

him

men ate

p.

cofifee

their dinner.

vomiting and diarrhea.

Mathews Transcript,

living in his

house where EfiBe had

in the

house and Solomon came with them.

woods.

On the

day of chopping

first

separate lunch pails for the men, Wilbur wanted their potatoes

combined so they could cook them on the
EfiBe

EfiBe

sick.

Wilbur asked him to help on a chopping job

EfiBe

Solomon and

he could find another bed. Wilbur retreated to his in-laws for several

been tending him because he was

wood,

Solomon

whom Wilbur had met when Solomon was plastering the

had become too intimate toward one another, protested
did not like

and

Solomon went on

for poisoning Wilbur Spaulding' s lunch with arsenic.

unfinished house he and EfiBe were living

if he

EfiBe Spaulding

ultimate nightmare of marital relations gone wrong, and a

lesson about where adultery could ultimately lead. In

trial in

between

He

fire at

the forest

site,

but EfiBe refused. Both

a few weeks before, but Wilbur

Wilbur became violently

continued to work but

55-56.
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ill

felt awfiil.

still

took

it.

and was stricken with

On the way home,

he

At

asked Solomon to cany his pail for him. He was bedridden for days and no one called
a
doctor until Wilbur himself went to see one several days

later.

He announced to the

doctor that he believed he had been poisoned. The doctor, not particularly helpfully,
told

him he

better be careful in that case of what he ate

m the future.

The doctor

refused to analyze the vomit Wilbur had brought with him, saying that he did not have
the expertise to do so and

Much

it

would

cost a great deal to have an expert

who seems to have

pressed against various closed doors.*^

its

spent a good deal of his time with ear

He testified that he

talking about poisoning Wilbur as well as

incident.

it.

of what happened in the house during the episode was witnessed by

owner, Bentley Fisher,

that they

do

Solomon telling

heard Effie and Solomon
EfFie

on another occasion

needed "to go slow."^^ This occurred before the date of the alleged poisoning

He

also testified that Effie had told

him

after

Wilbur got sick

that he

was not

going to live very long. The defense counsel for Solomon tried to impeach Fisher by
asking

why he had been

liberties

alone with Effie for so long and whether he had sought to take

with her; just one more example of the opportunistic use of sexual character

evidence by Vermont's

trial

lawyers.**

Fisher's testimony, like that found in the other trials

demonstrates

we have examined,

also

how little privacy rural Vermonters had and the extent to which they were

under constant surveillance.

It

also

shows how

living conditions for

working people

had begun
on cross-examination, James's attorney snidely asked when he
had let into your house." Fisher, apparently oblivious to
"to listen to the conversations of the family you
they moved in. State v. James andSpauldmg, Wmdsor
the sarcasm, admitted it had begun the day after
92.
County Court, May 1 894 Term, Transcript of Trial, p.
«^

In response to this snooping,

" Spaulding Transcript, p.
" Spaulding Transcript,

85.

p. 96.
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(living with family or boarding with strangers)

were quite

from the middle-class

different

Victorian ideal-a situation which provided opportunities for misadventure for young
girls

and wayward spouses-as well as the mechanisms

transgressions involving

We also

and punishing

for policing

them

see in this case the ultimate nightmare of those worried about

extramarital intimacy-a temptation which led not just to the breakup of the family, but to

murder. As with seduction, rape, and adultery

trials,

much of the

prosecution's evidence

served to symbolize the serious violations of social, sexual, and gender norms which led
to the criminal act, and, at the

elicited

by the state was

rife

same

time, explained

why

it

had happened. The testimony

with evidence of disturbed marital and gender relations

played out spatially in other people's houses. The Spauldings had been living
unfinished house in the village of Bethel. Wilbur

Solomon engaged

in

came

in

one day to

find Effie

an

and

conversation, alone, a situation the state's attorney described as

'talking and carrying on." Wilbur told Effie he did not think

involved so personally with Solomon. Effie's response

What answer

A:

She says

Q:

Had you been

A:

Yes,

Q:

Did you sleep with her afterwards?

A:

No

I

did she

was

make when you spoke

Q:

it

was

sleeping with her

up to

sir.

p. 4.

186

right for her to

blunt:

in that

could take another bed.

sir.*'

Spaulding Transcript,

in

that time?

way?

be

Wilbur departed thereafter for several weeks, staying

some

house, doing

part-time work, and returning only twice during that time and never staying

overnight.

When he

who had taken

sick,

finally

returned he found that he had been supplanted by Solomon,

become bedridden, and had been tended by

wdth them for several more weeks and
to

at Efifie's parents'

come

live

with them

had happened as Wilbur

Solomon

a

in

to continue to be a

Other witnesses

Solomon stayed

which time Wilbur invited him

new house and work with him on a chopping job.

testified, the

would shape Solomon and

fully recovered, at

EfiBe.

reader

is left

wondering why Wilbur would

member of his household. The answer to

Efifie's

If events

that question

defense as well as the judge's charge to the jury.

testified to the

ongoing intimacy between

and Solomon and

EfiBe

the extent to which Wilbur seemed to play the cuckold. Neighbors testified that

and Solomon were behind a curtained
Wilbur

sat in the kitchen.

telling

that

James would get the

Solomon

called

while

it

Efifie slept in

to her.

ice for her.

him a "damned

relations continued to

ofif

bedroom

in the unfinished

She also

At

refiised his ofifer

fool."^° After

moving

left

fi-om

telling

him
him

the room,

to another house, domestic

be disrupted. Solomon and Wilbur shared a bed

in

one room

another.

For the judge, one of the

difficulties in the

case

was making

how evidence of skewed

domestic relations could be used by them

innocence. After

was not a trial

all,

this

5/)o«Wmg Transcript,

p.

clear to the jury just

in assessing guilt or

for adultery or aUenation of afifections, but

instead for attempted murder. Judge Laforrest

'°

it

of ice, again

that point, Wilbur having

Efifie

house while Wilbur

ofifered to give Efifie her medicine, but she refiised

him James would give

invite

145-148.
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Thompson made

clear that the trial

was

not one for adultery and that the state need not prove adultery in order to
sustain

burden of proof. Rather,
friendship,

woman

evidence tended to demonstrate "an intimacy, a

between them such as would naturally turn the mind and the affections of this

from her husband towards

affairs, 'lhat is

this

James" and

if

James encouraged

this condition

of

evidences-such a disposition and feeling-is a circumstance proper for you

upon the question of motive and upon the question of probability of whether

to consider

there

if the

its

was anything

likely to

move

The judge then explored
to the jury that

it

was up

to

these parties to act against Mr. Spaulding."**'

the evidence presented in detail

them

to decide

whether

of her bed showed an adulterous disposition on her

had him stay

On the

at the

Wilbur out

part or merely reflected her

womanhood and

her fidelity to

other hand, instead of severing her relationship with Solomon, she

house and when she was

which the wife would

this point explaining

Effie's decision to kick

"righteous indignation" at Wilbur's "imputation on her

her husband."

on

naturally turn to the

ill

upon him

"called

husband

in

to perform those acts

case of sickness, to have

performed, and which the husband would naturally perform." The judge explained that

was up

to the jury to

to settle

make sense of it

"the court can give

you no

light

on

it,

you are

it."

In the alternative, what

the

all

two men continued

to have this

to

man remain

a

was

work,

to be

live,

member

is

made of Wilbur's

behavior? Did the fact that

and even sleep together,
his family,"

show

that

that there

Wilbur "was willing

was nothing

to the

claims that he had been suspicious of them before the alleged poisoning? If not, then

what did

it

say about Wilbur's behavior as a

" Spaulding Transcript,

man and husband?

p. 183.
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it

[I]t is

also proper for

is-just

what

you

you

his feelings,

to enquire just

and

his attitude

what kind of a man this husband
were towards his wife and it is

what a man of his kind of make up would
naturally do, or would be apt to do-or might naturally do if it were as
claimed by the state, or whether being as he was, the fact that he did not
assert his manhood and expel this invader, as the state claims, of his
for

to say whether he did

domestic peace, from the house, being the
assert his rights

as

man

and do what any husband, as

men go-would

be

likely to

he was, and

intelligent

likely to

high minded

men

do ....

This portion of the judge's charge to the jury amply demonstrates the gendered context

in

which the case had been presented and would probably be decided. The judge had

synthesized the varying gendered strands of evidence introduced by the state and the

defense into an explicit paradigm to be utilized by the jury. While the judge made clear

that

it

was completely up

provide them with an

to the jury to decide the

model

irresistible

inappropriate domestic behavior.

But there was a tension
evidence. If EfiBe and

And

in this

Solomon were

meaning of the evidence, he did

for assessing credibility based

this is

no

on appropriate and

surprise.

case between gender expectations and the

guilty,

than Wilbur had behaved

in a

manner

subversive to ftmdamental gender expectations. If Wilbur's testimony was to be

believed, he had tolerated an "invader

his

home.

find that

Thus,

in

.

.

.

of his domestic peace" to continue

to live in

order to find Solomon and Effie guilty, the jury would also have to

Wilbur acted outside the boundaries of behavior demanded of men and

husbands.

If the

evidence, he

judge was willing to leave

was not shy about

it

explaining

up to the jury to determine the meaning of the
what was

at stake in the case.

proven beyond a reasonable doubt, were the most serious offense

^

5/7awW/>Jg Transcript, p. 183-186.
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The

charges,

that could be

il^

committed

in the stale since

relationship that kept

it

they struck

a grave ofTence.

is

circumstances and conditions

to the

very core of Vermont^s society, the

ghied together- marriage.

This olTence charged

case that strikes

at the

in

which

it

It is

is

claimed to have arisen

very safety of society.

at the

law more sacred

an olTence that under the

I

here

in this

no relation known

is

of husband and wife bound together by
the laws of CJod and man as husband and wife cannot rely upon the
tluui that

protecting care and fidelity the one of the other
life

and safety

And

il

you

it

strikes at the very roots

in

matters alVecting their

of society as

believe that these respondents are guilty,

withhold your hand, but

it

is

it

exists to-day.

is

it

your duty to say "guilty."

your duty not

On

to

the other hand

you should give both of these respondents the benefit of every
presumption of law which have explained to you, and you should not
I

convict because they are charged with an atrocious and revolting crime;
they should only be convicted because their guilt

is

established

in

the

way

the kiw provides."^*

One hour and twenty

minutes

later,

the jury

and Solomon. Solomon was sentenced

When

came back with

guilty verdicts for both Ffiie

to ten years at hard labor

and

got eight.

they began their sentences, ten of their fellow convicts were serving time for

adultery.

A

decade

later,

there

were

thirty-seven,^'*

The Increase

in

Adultery Prosecutions

The development of this adultery jurisprudence took place
great surge in adultery prosecutions by the state aller 1870.

loosening of the standard of proof in such cases

(\>urt's decisions did

intimacy

in

imke

it

Vermont's towns,

Spauhiin}^ Transcript,

^

l-tlie

p.

far easier to

villages

is

in the

To what

context of a

extent the ('ourt's

related remains unclear,

convict people engaging

in

liut the

inappropriate

and farms. Fvidencc of the increase can be found

198-1 W.

of the House of C\)rrections" in
"Report of the Oflicers of the State Prison" and "Report of the Officers
Wilbur was granted a divorce on grounds
crs Reports (Montpelier: Secretary of Slate, 1906).

Sfnfc

OOu

'

of Etfie's confinement

at

the

May

1895 term of the Windsor County Court. Docket No. 372.
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almost anywhere one chooses to look. The Supreme Court issued

between 1789 and 1844, but issued twenty decisions on the same
and 1916. In 1870, no Vermont man or

woman sat

five adultery decisions

between 1876

subject

on account of an adultery

in prison

conviction. In 1916 there were fifty-nine. In that year there were

more men and women

serving sentences for adultery at the state prison than for any other serious crime except
burglary.'^

The move

to prosecute and imprison adulterers took place state-wide. State

records indicate prisoners hailing fi-om

were brought

fi-om

most of the

over the state and appeals in adultery cases

all

state's counties

between 1876 and 1916.^^

Trial court records fi-om the four counties studied fiirther highlight this increase.

Between 1 794 and 1 920,
or blanket act statutes.

at least

As noted

earlier, this

certainly higher. If we simply

docketing information

1890s to 1920, a period for which

counties,

we

we have

a floor and the actual

consistent docketing for

362 prosecutions were brought during

find that

is

not consistent

is

add up the number of prosecutions brought

fi-om the

^ The

charged under the adultery

of 463 prosecutions

firom county to county. Thus, the figure

number was

women were

463 men and

all

four

this brief period alone.

figures in 1916 for the State Prison were: Burglary (46); Adultery (39); Manslaughter (17);

Murder

in the

Second Degree

less than ten per category.

(16);

The

Rape

(16).

After rape, the numbers for other offenses dropped off to

figures are even

more astonishing when one

considers that the serious

crimes of manslaughter, rape, and murder led to long sentences, thus persons convicted of these crimes
tended to accumulate over time in prison. This w^s not true of adulterers whose sentences were typically

two
at

to three years.

both

facilities.

1869(0); 1870

The House of Correction opened

Number of men and women

(0);

1871

(0);

1874

in

1878 and closed

in 1919.

Convicts were housed

incarcerated for adultery or blanket act offenses: 1868 (0);

(2); 1876(5);

1878

(3);

1880

(2);

1884

(8);

1886

(4);

1888

(5);

1890

1892 (12); 1894 (10); 1896 (21); 1898 (24); 1900 (16); 1902 (27); 1904 (19); 1906 (45); 1908 (22);
See the "Reports of the Officers of
1 920 ( 1 5).
1 9 1 0 (22); 1 9 1 2 ( 1 3); 1 9 1 4 (59); 1 9 1 6 (59); 1 9 1 8 (47);
Legislative
the State Prison" and "Reports of the Officers of the House of Correction" in Vermont
(7);

and the Vermont State Officers Reports

Documents and

Official Reports

^ For example,

in 1914, the last year in

'

for these years.

which the prisoners' county of conviction

is

ascertainable fi-om

Franklm (5); Caledonia (3); Orange (3);
Rural Caledonia County led with
Rutland (2); Lamoille (2); Windham (2); Windsor (1); Addison (1).
had three. Franklin County had two,
four appeals, Chittenden, Windsor and Washington County each
and Orange, AddisOT, Rutland and Windham Counties had one apiece.

the records, the breakdown

was

as follows: Chittenden (17);
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Windsor County the number of prosecutions

In

for adultery increased

from four during

the 1850s to seventy-five in the 1910s. In rural Orange County between 1880 and 1920
the

number of prosecutions per decade

County during the same time
counties

saw

the

increased from nine to thirty-two. In Addison

number increased from one

to twenty-seven. All three

their populations decline during these periods. In Rutland, the only

which actually gained population during

this period, the

county

number increased from four

in

the 1890s to seventeen in the 1910s.

The absence of consistent docketing information from county
affect the statistics for convictions

and acquittals for adultery, since

to county does not

all

of these were

recorded in the clerks' record books. Thus, information concerning cases actually going
to trial or verdict

is

very

reliable.

high. Overall, 81 jjercent

Conviction rates for

of all cases going to

trial

all

cases going to

trial

were very

resulted in a finding of guilt either by

verdict (33 percent) or plea (49 percent).^^ Thirty-nine cases ended in an acquittal (16

percent). In seven cases, the jury hung.^*

Sentences were harsh. Out of 190 convictions,^

sentences.'^

all

The average sentence was between two and

at the state prison at

Windsor

" I assume that

where defendants pled

in cases

or,

once

it

opened

but fourteen received prison

three years at hard labor either

in 1878, at the

guilty the alternative

House of Correction

would have been

in

trial.

documented 463 adultery cases in the records of the four counties. Two hundred and forty-two of
nolle pressed or not carried
these went to trial or verdict. The remainder ended up as defeults or were
I

forward by the courts.

^ One hundred and
only

1

appeal,
ninety-seven defendants were found guilty, but because of reversals after

90 received sentences.

received a whipping-again, at the
Eight received large fines-most assessed early in the century. One
punishment of four convicts was
beginning of the study period. One received probation only and the
'0°

not recorded
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Rutland. Sentences were occasionally suspended and the convict placed on
probation,

but the

first

use of probation was not until 1901 and was quite rarely applied to

An

adulterers.

overall

breakdown by sex shows

that

62 percent of defendants were

male and 38 percent were female. However, towards the end of the study period, the
gender gap decreased and

for the last

decade of this study,

it

had been reduced to 55

percent males versus 45 percent females. In Orange and Addison Counties, the ratio of

male to female prosecutions was

essentially 1:1 throughout the entire period.

and Rutland were more biased towards men during the same
for example, the ratio

time.

In

Windsor

Windsor County

of male to female prosecutions was 3:2 during the

last

three

decades of the study.

Not

all

those accused of adultery were tried or convicted by plea.

brought during the period when

reliable

docket entries

exist,

of cases were not carried forward or were nolle pressed

Rutland Counties, and considerably higher

in

cases

between 28 and 44 percent

(that

not to proceed with the prosecution). The figure was lower

Of all

is,

in

the prosecutor decided

Addison, Orange, and

Windsor.'"^ There were

many reasons why

cases were not carried forward or nolle prossed including the death of the party, the

acquittal

of the other partner, or the conviction of the defendant on other grounds.

Although no

See

for

direct

proof exists of deal making,

example, State

v.

it is

highly likely that

Edward D. Kennedy, Windsor County

some defendants

Court, December 1901 Term, State

probation
Cases, vol. 5, p. 263-264. in only 20 cases did the courts suspend prison sentences and award
to convicted adulterers.

'"^

The

figures for cases not carried forward or nolle

prossed

reflect

only cases brought and not

am only
cases were dropped after defaults, successftil appeals, or after hung juries.
cases from the figures.
interested in cases which were never brought to trial .so I have omitted these
(June 1860
Addison County (June 1883 Term -December 1920 Term) (28 percent); Orange County

prosecuted.

Some

I

1919
Term-December 1920 l erm) (32 percent); Rutland County (September I89.S Term September
percent).
Term) (37 percent); Windsor County (May 1851 Term-June 1920 Term) (44
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had charges dropped

can also assume

in return for their

that prosecutors also

witnesses disappeared. Nonetheless,

dismissed prior to

trial,

cooperation

dropped cases when proof was

two-thirds were not. And, as

we have

or

difficult

of adultery prosecutions

if one-third

We

in convicting their partners.

overall

were

seen above, a person

charged with the crime faced a strong likelihood of trial and conviction or conviction by
plea.

Adulterous couples were increasingly prosecuted

with those found guilty

in pairs

receiving identical prison sentences to be served at Windsor and Rutland respectively.

Given
legal

this,

and the

fact that the system's bias ran against

men,

it is

system did not condone the sexual double-standard by which

their extramarital sexual

the practice of killing a

escapades while

man found

where the double-standard was

in

women were

not.

Nor

clear that

Vermont's

men were

forgiven

did

its

society

condone

bed with one's wife-a coordinate practice

in areas

in place.

remains for us to try and understand the dramatically increased role of the

It

courts in policing extramarital sexual activity. First of all, the adultery

similar to the other causes

We know that some

of action we have studied

Vermonters thought the

in

phenomenon

is

terms of chronology and legal

of such deals existed from one transcript

possibility

in

which the particeps and her daughter claimed the prosecutor had made such an offer in return for her
testimony. Nonetheless, she was tried, convicted, and sentenced to prison. Affidavits of Rena Brittell
and Hazel M. Brittell, Petition for New Trial State v. Brittell, Windsor County Supreme Court, January
1918 Term.

The double-standard and honor

killings existed both in large urban areas

John D'Emilio and Estelle Freedman, Intimate Matters:
Harper

& Row,

1988), 82; Robert

M.

Ireland,

A

and

in the

south and west.

History of Sexuality in America

(New York:

"The Libertine Must Die: Sexual Dishonor and the

Nineteenth-Century United States," Journal of Social History 23 (1989): 27-44.
Relatedly, Vermont law did not condone a violent response to abusive and insulting language, even to
one's wife, no matter how gross and did not permit such words to form the basis of a reduction in
Unwritten

Law

in the

compensatory damages. Again,
including die

64

Vt.

212

(1

New England

this

states.

was

in contradistinction to die practice in

Goldsmith's

89 1) (defendant had called

Admr

v.

plaintiflPs wife a
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Joy,6\
whore).

Vt.

most other

states,

488(1889); Willeyv. Carpenter,

dynamic. Beginning

in the

made changes

in the

law governing the cause of action-either expanding

(as in the case

of statutory rape) or making successful

easier (breach

of marriage promise, seduction, and

1

870s and

1

880s, the

Supreme Court and the Legislature

civil

its

or criminal prosecutions

adultery). It

is

possible that the

changes to adultery law made the prosecution easier and thus encouraged
attorneys to bring

more

the increased emphasis

suits.

But why would the Court make

on catching and punishing

application

it

easier?

state's

What

explains

adulterers?

Before offering some hypotheses specifically with regard to the increase

in

adultery prosecutions, the data in the four counties can help us rule certain explanations

out.

One

possibility to explain the adultery craze

adultery taking place and hence

was

that there

more adultery prosecutions.

was simply more

It is difficult

to quantify the

we do have

true incidence of a

phenomenon

indicate that this

a highly unlikely explanation for the increase in prosecutions.

is

most of the increases came
and aging. Second,

if the

like adultery.

in counties at

true incidence

Nonetheless, the evidence

a time

First,

when populations were both declining

of adultery was

increasing,

one might expect to

see an increase in the percentage of divorces granted for adultery. But the data does not

support such a hypothesis.

Beginning

in

Vermont

in 1866, the state

in its annual reports.

began including elaborate

statistical

data on divorces

This data included a break-down of the number of

divorces granted by county, the causes for which the divorces were granted, and the sex

ratios for that information.

What we

cause for granting divorces. In

fact,

find is that overall, adultery did not increase as a

it

declined precipitously as a cause for granting

Between 1862
divorces between 1862 and 1920 as a percentage of all divorces granted.
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and 1867 for example, 30 percent of all divorces
adultery. Fifteen years later, the percentage

around 15 percent

The data

for the remainder

in

Vermont were granted on grounds of

had declined to 18 percent.

of the study period. (See Figure

for the four counties

shows a

similar dynamic.

It

would hover

5.)

During the 1860s,

adultery as a percentage of divorces granted ranged from 20 percent in Orange County
to

36 percent

in

Rutland County with Windsor and Addison

falling in

between. In the

next decade the rate declined by almost half in Addison, Rutland, and Orange Counties,
but rose sUghtly (to 32 percent) in Windsor. The decline stabilized and by the end of the

study period,

all

four counties had rates of divorces granted for adultery hovering in the

mid-teens to 20 percent of all divorces granted (see Figure

6).

Observing the number or percentage of divorces granted for adultery does not

tell

the whole story as to the real incidence of adultery in

only

tells

us

how many

Vermont

society.

divorces were granted for adultery, and not

were brought which alleged it. This data

is

more

difficult to get at

The data

how many petitions
because each

county's divorce records presented the information differently. Only in Orange County

do the records

consistently indicate both the grounds alleged in the petition as well as the

grounds for which the divorce was granted for the whole period. That data indicates
that

many more

allegations

of adultery were brought

in divorce cases

than were

of 1264 divorce

petitions

recognized by the court.

Between 1794 and 1920,
in

Orange County. Overall, 3 1 5

for example, a total

petitions cited adultery as

were

filed

one of the grounds for the

other
divorce (25 percent). In the vast majority of cases, aduhery was listed along with
the higher
causes (most typically intolerable severity or desertion). However, despite
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in

Vermont,

1

860-
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number of petitions

alleging adultery (as

opposed to divorces granted for

that cause),

they also declined as a percentage of all divorce petitions brought. The percentage of
petitions alleging adultery in

Orange County declined by the middle of the century

to 16

percent in the 1850s, spiked to about 25 percent of all petitions during the decade of the
Civil

War, declined back to

its

pre-war rate in the 1870s and then climbed into the mid

twenties and stabilized there from 1881 to 1920*^^ (see Table 4). The use of divorce

data to measure the actual incidence of adultery

the extent

it

does have value,

out an increase

this

in the true adultery rate as

surrogate charge in place of prostitution.

illegal in

Vermont

is

To

a crude device.

an explanation for the surge

in

in the rate

As we

in prosecutions.

of adultery was

its

use as a

will recall, prostitution itself was not

Thus, one could argue that communities and

until 1919.

prosecutors were using aduhery

population

measure, and the declines in population, seem to rule

Another possible explanation for the increase

made

in the

order to go after prostitutes and their partners. There

are examples of aduhery prosecutions which arose out of encounters with prostitutes.'^

The use of court records such

as divorce petitions to determine the actual incidence of adultery

quite problematic. First, most divorces wctc uncontested, which

means

that while the petitioner

is

O^nown

as the libellant) had to prove his case, he did so in the absence of cross-examination or rebuttal
testimony. Thus even in divorce cases ^^4^ere adultery was '"proved," this '"proof was not reliable.

Furthermore, when multiple grounds for relief were alleged in the petition (which was the normal case)
courts often granted the divorce on a ground other than adultery. It was easier to prove desertion or
intolerable severity-both legally

and

socially.

Given

its difficult

fectual requirements (particularly

and
before 1876), overt sexual nature, and the potential for criminal penalties on the offending spouse
their clients on
partner, most lawyers avoided proving adultery when they could obtain a divorce for
other grounds. This

was

particularly the case

whoi

petitions alleging multiple grounds including

grounds of
adultery were contested. In such cases, the court almost never granted the divorce on
ground other than adultery in 79
adultery. In Orange County, the court chose to grant the divorce on a
than adultery when it was the
percent of such cases. Sometimes the court even found a ground other
petition does not mean that
only cause alleged. So again, merely because adultery is asserted in a
it was not cited as a cause did not
adultery actually took place. The opposite is also true, just because
procedure to be tainted
mean it did not take place. Furthermore, lawyers and judges understood divorce
this data as a measure of actual
by collusion and fraud-further calling into question the value of
in this chapter,
adultery. These issues are discussed in greater detail later

Neiburg

v.

Cohen, 83 Vt. 281 (1914).
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Table 4

Number of Divorce

Decade

Total

and Number Alleging Adultery As a Cause
County by Decade, 1794-1920

Petitions Filed

For Adultery'

Orange

Percentage of All Petitions

1794-1799

10

6

1800-1809

18

12

1810-1819

28

11

1820-1829

32

11

1830-1839

34

8

1840-1849

35

6

60%
67%
39%
34%
24%
17%

1850-1859

50

8

16%

1860-1869

85

21

25

1870-1879

191

31

16%

1880-1889

154

39

1890-1899

66

1900-1909

246
206

49

1910-1919

175

47

25%
27%
24%
27%

1264

315

25%

Total

in

%

Includes petitions alleging multiple causes including adultery.

But

this explanation

seems unlikely as

well. First,

it

would seem much

easier to simply

pass a state law prohibiting prostitution than to force prosecutors to meet the higher
elements of proof required in an adultery prosecution. Second,
prostitution by ordinance

unsuccessfiiUy.'^^ Third,

still

two

went

after

people for

cities

which prohibited

illegal cohabitation-albeit

to three year prison terms for prostitution

harsh-especially in light of the lesser sentences imposed

would have been

on those convicted of violating

Rutland City arrested people engaging in prostitution, lewdness, and keeping a house of ill fame
under an ordinance passed in 893. "Report of the Chief of Police," and "Ordinances of the City of
'^^

1

Report of the City of Rutlandfor the Year Ending December 31, 1906. Nonetheless , it
also arrested people for illegal cohabitation too in 1896, 1899, 1901, and 1903. The convictions for the
latter charge were all nolle prossed on appeal to the county court-probably because Rutland City had no
authority to prosecute people for such an offense. See Rutland County Court, Docket Nos. 3361, 3716,
Rutland"

in

3717, 3839, 3925, and 3930.
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local prostitution ordinances.

Fourth, there are very few instances of repeat

prosecutions of women or

for adultery

were being used
clients

in this

men

way.*^

which one would expect

Finally, the state

if the

adultery laws

could pursue prostitutes or prospective

by use of the existing law against lewdness

if their solicitations

included any

sexually demonstrative behavior.*'^

One

last

may be

explanation that

petitions alleging adultery as a

means

discounted

is

the use by prosecutors of divorce

to generate criminal adultery prosecutions. While

the percentage of divorces granted for adultery did not increase significantly as a

percentage of all divorces granted during the

the

enormous increase

in the rate

petitions alleging adultery. Thus,

late nineteenth

and early twentieth century,

of divorce meant a large increase

it

is

in the

possible that prosecutors simply

raw number of

combed divorce

petitions in order to generate adultery prosecutions or waited for a court to grant a

them with a maximum of sixty days in jail or a
$50 fine. Rutland, Ordinances Chapter 25 (1893). When prostitution was made illegal state-wide, the
statute imposed a $100 fine and up to one year in prison for a first offense and up to three years for a
Rutland punished prostitutes and those

second offense, but

it

who

solicited

provided for probation as well. 1919 Vt. Acts 199.

There are a few such cases. This data does not prove that these men and women actually engaged in
prostitution. State v. Caleb B. Williamson, Windsor County Court, Docket No. 96, May 1867 Term and
State Cases, vol. 2, p. 293-294, December 1871 Term (adultery); State v. Melissa Wyman, Windsor

County Court, State Cases, vol. 6, p. 29-30, 35-36, December 1906 (adultery with two different men);
State V. Mattie Ryder, Addison County Court, vol. 35, p. 167-169, December 1907 Term and State v.
Fred Whittimore, Addison County Court, vol. 35, p. 170, December 1907 Term (charged with adultery
with one man and particeps in prosecution of another); State v. Lucy Bland, Windsor County Court,
State Cases, vol. 5, p. 583-584, June 1905 Term (adultery with Frank Danforth); vol. 6, 303-304, June
Minnie Cox, Windsor County Court, State Cases, vol. 5, p. 235-236,
Dec. 1 90 1 Term (adultery with Ed Matot) and Windsor County Court, Docket No. 2 1 5 1 December 1 903
Term (nmning a house of ill feme). Minnie Cox shows up in the records one more time. Ironically, in
1919 she was the plaintiff in an alienation of affections suit against Anne Linehan in the Addison
1910 (with Henry Turner); State

v.

,

CountyCourt. Docket No. 2151, December 1919 Term. The

suit

was

discontinued.

Seymour Bush, Rutland County Court, vol. 42, p. 876-877, March 1870 Term (exposed
himself to a married woman and solicited sex fi-om her); State v. Charles Garvey, Addison County
State v. Mabel
Court, vol. 33, p. 344-345, June 1889 Term (exposed himself and solicited intercourse);
view of men, women
TwcA, Rutland County Court, vol. 61, p. 187-188, September 1914 (having sex in
State

V.

and children,

soliciting a

man

for sex

and grabbing his
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privates).

divorce on grounds of adultery and then brought criminal charges. If this were the
case,

one would expect

to find a high incidence

but the divorce data indicates that this

in

Orange County

brought against

it is

difficult to

County, which

is

of overlap between divorce and adultery cases,

not the case. In

for the entire period in

which divorce

fact, there are

only fifteen cases

petitions alleging adultery

men and women convicted of adultery. And even in those

determine whether the petition or the prosecution came
after

1

877 recorded only the grounds

were

fifteen cases,

first.

In Addison

for granting a divorce, rather than

the cause stated in the petition, only nine people were involved in divorces granted for

aduhery and prosecutions for adultery. Again,

it

is difficult

to

tell

which came

first,

the

prosecution or the divorce proceeding. In Rutland County five cases overlapped over a
sixty-year period. In

Windsor County, which saw the

greatest

number of adultery

prosecutions, there were only ten overlaps between divorces granted for adultery and the

240 prosecutions

for adultery

between 1850 and 1915. During the same period, there

were over 250 divorces granted

for aduhery.

The percentage of petitions

adultery which were also accompanied by criminal prosecutions

to both the overall

number of petitions

alleging adultery and the

is

alleging

minuscule compared

number of adultery

prosecutions both overall and by decade.'"

None of these hypotheses
The most obvious explanation

is

explains the increase in the

that prosecutors

number of adultery

cases.

and juries were responding to the

unprecedented wave of divorces which swept the county courts beginning

in the

1

860s.

decade by decade breakdown of divorce/prosecution overlaps for Orange, Addison, Rutland, and
Windsor Counties reveals the following: 1790s (1); 1800s (0); 1810s (2); 1820s (0); 1830s (1); 1840s
1860s (1); 1870s (2); 1880s (3); 1890s (10); 1900s (8); 1910s (10). During the last three
1850s

'"A

(1);

(2);

counties was: 1890s
decades of the period under study the number of adultery prosecutions in the four
(78); 1900s (128); 1910s (152).
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All four counties

showed dramatic

progressed-doubling and

tripling

increases in the rate

of divorce as the century

between 1862 and 1921

.

This increase in the rate of

divorce mirrored both state and national trends which saw the overall divorce rate almost

quadruple during

this

same

time.'^^

(See Figure 5)

The Problem of Divorce
InitiaUy, the

the

process for obtaining a divorce had followed the English model with

Governor and Council

substituting for parliament.

By 1779 jurisdiction over

divorces had been transferred to the Supreme Court, though the Council continued to

meddle, sometimes overruling the decisions of the Court.

York, Vermont's divorce law followed a

liberal

Unlike neighboring

New

model, providing a broad range of

causes for termination of marriage."'* Testimony was submitted by sworn affidavit rather

Paul H. Jacobson and Pauline F. Jacobson, American Marriage

and Divorce (New York: Rinehart

&

Co., 1959), 92-93.

Soule, 12:142. For a discussion of Vermont's early divorce law and experience therewith, see Betty

Bandel, "What the
233. In

its first

Good Laws of Man Hath

meeting, in

,"

46 Vermont History (Fall 1978): 2211786, the Council of Censors rebuked the Governor and Council for
Put Asunder

.

.

.

took "the extraordinary step of divorcing Laurania
M'Clane and Ruth Chamberlain, fi-om their respective husbands, and declaring their right of marrying
again." "Address of the Council of Censors," in Paul S. Gillies and D. Gregory Sanford, eds., Records
overruling the courts, specifically mentioning that

it

of the Council of Censors of the State of Vermont (Montpelier: Secretary of State, 1991), 60.
Adultery was one of the six causes for which divorce was available

in VeraiOTt.

The

others were

confinement for three years or more, willful desertion for three years, absence fi-om the state for seven
1880
years, intolerable severity, and husband's feilure to support. See e.g. Revised Laws of Vermont,
degrees
(Rutland, 1 88 ) § 2362. A marriage was void ab initio where the couple was related within the
1

prohibited by statute or

where one or both were already married. Revised Laws, §§ 23 14 and 2346.

Marriages wctc voidable for lack of age (eighteen for a woman, twenty-one for a man), idiocy or lunacy,
Revised Laws, §
physical incapacity, or where the marriage was accomplished through force or fraud.

2349
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than

in

person and, based on

my review of the records,

uncontested petitions (which

comprised the vast majority submitted) were granted as a matter of course.*'^
After

1

860, the state's annual reports began detailing the number of divorces by

county as well as the cause for which they were granted and breakdown of men and

women awarded
divorces

came

in

divorces. Evidence of legislative

1866 when

it

concem with the growing number of

added divorces to the

reported to the Secretary of State on an annual

list

basis.*^^

of statistics required to be
Thereafter, divorce

was

the

focus of continuous action on the part of the legislature which sought to stem the tide of

broken

femilies.*'^

In 1870, jurisdiction over divorces

Supreme Court

was

transferred to the county courts, with the

retaining only appellate jurisdiction/'^

The procedure changed

as well.

Instead of the Supreme Court hearing and deciding petitions once per year in writing, the

now hearing

county courts were

divorces at

two terms per

year,

and taking

live

testimony.

The switch

to county court jurisdiction had been motivated at least in part by the

desire to reduce the

petition process.

number of divorces by cracking down on

fi'aud

and collusion

in the

But the use of the uncontested divorce continued and now couples had

Vermont, along with Rhode

Island,

and

New Hampshire had the most

liberal divorce

laws in the

North during the early republican period. Norma Basch, Framing American Divorce: From the
Revolutionary Generation to the Victorians (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 47.

^'M866Vt. Acts

58.

This data can be found in the Registration Reports issued by the Secretary of State until 1896. After
sets of
this date the data was included in the annual reports of the State Board of Health. Complete
the
these important sources are located at the State Library in Montpelier and in Special Collections at

University of Vermont, Burlington, Vermont.

1870 Vt. Acts 27.

204

two terms per year

in

which to seek dissolution of their marriages rather than one. The

numbers of divorces had been
swinging

Avildly after the

number of divorces,
dramatically, but

it

increasing during the 1840s, 1850s, and 1860s, but began

change

in

1870. Reflecting legislative attempts to reduce the

the rate would rise and

never

fell

fall

below the 1865

during the next fifteen years, sometimes

level

and the trend was

clearly

upward. At

a time of stagnant population growth, the rate of divorce increased 25 percent
during the

decade of the 1870s."^
Attempting to discourage divorce, particularly by people fleeing
jurisdiction

which granted

final

divorces only for adultery,

prohibiting the granting of divorces to people

New York's

Vermont passed a law

who had resided

in the state for less

year. It also prevented the person at fault fi-om remarrying for three years.

the legislature passed

"An Act

to Diminish the

prevent collusive, uncontested divorces,

Frequency of Divorce."

required

it

all

in

1878

than a

In 1884,

An efifort to

divorces to be continued to the

next term as a matter of course and mandated the presence of both parties in court unless
the petitioner could

show

attendance of the spouse.

that he or she

It

had made a good

active measures,

filed in his

in the fiiture.'"^'

by designating the

if it felt that

Two

years

the attendance of the other

later,

local state's attorney

the legislature took

a party

county and authorizing him "when the public good

Vermont's population increased by
'2°

1878 Vt. Acts

'2'

1884 Vt. Acts 94.

procure the

also gave the court authority to try the case in the absence

of the other spouse or to continue the case
spouse might be obtained

faith efifort to

less

in

every divorce case

shall so require" to enter

than 2000 people during this decade,

16.
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more

evidence

in the

case on the part of the state. The act also authorized payment to the

state's attorneys

of five

dollars for every divorce case they participated

repealed the section of the

hearing.

In

1

1

in.

It

884 act requiring the presence of both spouses

890, the whole experiment ended

when

also

at the

divorce

the legislature passed a law

forbidding the participation of state's attorneys in divorces. '^^

The

Legislature intervened yet again in

1

894.

It

extended the residency

requirement for parties seeking a divorce for causes accruing
before bringing their petition. In

expanded the

from Figure

ability

1

896

it

dramatic decrease

increased the period to

of couples to separate without formally

5, legislative intervention in

in the

another state to one year

in

two years and

divorcing.'^''

number of divorces. But the drop was always short-term and

increase in divorces

was

the topic

segments of Vermont society during the

Most people
the

clear

it.

Pent up

invariably caused the rate to surge after each attempt at restriction.

The
all

is

1878, 1884, and 1894-1896 always resulted in a

illusory, since the legislation did not prevent divorce, but simply delayed

demand

As

also

in

Vermont understood

of debate not just

late nineteenth

that the divorce rate

phenomenon worrisome and worthy of condemnation,

knew who was

getting divorced and

why because

1886 Vt. Acts 69.

1890 Vt. Acts 76.
1894 Vt. Acts 50; 1896 Vt. Acts 50, 51.
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local

in the legislature, but in

and early twentieth centuries.

was

increasing and most found

if not action.

newspapers

Vermonters

dutifiiUy reported the

names of the broken

families

churned out by Vermont's courts

at

every term along with

the reasons for their destruction.'^^

Newspapers ran frequent

on the problem of divorce with

articles

national worthies weighing in on the causes of the

phenomenon and

The

editors noted that Jameson's opinions

argued that divorce was
Christianity

instincts,

the general

restrictions

liberalized the divorce

movement

distinguished for

divorce],

original type." Singling out

fixed population

on divorce

North American Review.

were coincident with

it

on

laws-a

is

it.

The

their

own. Jameson

colonists, reflecting their reformist

reflection, according to

freedom

for greater social

it [i.e.

article

common in pre-Christian societies and that the rise of

had led to severe

had

in the

and

offering solutions.

In 1883 the Burlington Daily Free Press ran a lengthy summary of an

by Chicago Judge John A. Jameson which had appeared

local

If

Jameson of "a step

in

New England has become

because she has reverted farthest toward the

Vermont, the judge noted that Vermont "an old

of nearly pure American descent" had a very high

rate

State, with a

of divorce which

he blamed on lax divorce laws.

As

for solutions,

restrictions

would

Jameson weighed the pros and cons of greater or

on the granting of divorces.

either

If the laws

were too

abscond or "defy law and religion and sink

the other hand, too lenient a divorce law

irreconcilable.

While Jameson believed

adultery (or "the scriptural cause" as

it

was often

then the discontented

into flagrant immorality."

would render every

that divorce

strict

lesser

On

marital difference

ought to be available for other than

referred to) in order to protect

women

"Chittenden County Court Divorces, September 1871 Term," Burlington Daily Free Press,
24 October 1871, p. 3 and "Addison County Court Divorces, December 1876 Term," Burlington Daily

See

e.g.

Free Press, 21 December 1876,

p. 3.
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and children from

brutal,

drunken, or deserting husbands, legislatures and courts had to

clamp down on the collusion and fraud which characterized, by

his estimate, four-fifths

of all divorces. '^^
Jameson's analysis formed the paradigm of almost

all fiirther

connnentary on the

matter in Vermont in the nineteenth century.

It

included an assessment that divorce rates

were increasing and

It

argued that most people getting divorces

were working

was

that this

class people rather than the middle class. Divorce

available for too

legislative

was a problem.

many causes, was

was too easy to

characterized by fraud and collusion, and

and judicial action should and could solve the problem. Vermont

commentators regularly
interesting is that almost

cited all

all

of these reasons for the increase. What

commentators, whether lay or

particularly

is

clerical, trained

as scientists or

lawyers, agreed that the most effective response to a climbing divorce rate

one.

Though commentators

often

made

unwilling to rely

on

religious institutions alone as the answer.

to an interventionist state as the engine

One example of this

is

the

of reform.

legal

Society.

Almost

all

it)

they were

of them looked

'^^

comments of Lucius

of the Vermont State Medical

was a

reference to the importance of religion and

moral training (or the "command of God" as the early adultery law had put

secretary

obtain,

It fell

Butler, an Essex physician and

to Butler to write the

"Judge Jameson on Divorce," Burlington Daily Free Press, 25 April 1883,

summary

p. 3.

"Divorce Reform: Opinions of Burlington Thinkers upon the Subject," Burlington Daily Free Press,
16 February 1884, p. 1; "Women's Views of Divorce," Burlington Daily Free Press, 4 January 1890, p.
"Easier Divorce,"
4; "A Report of Progress," Burlington Daily Free Press, 24 January 1890, p. 4;
Vermont's
Burlington Daily Free Press, 1 March 1895, p. 4. A few looked to cultural explanations.
habits. Their
most famous lawyer, Edward Phelps, blamed the problem of divorce on women's reading
began to cast their eyes
husbands failed to live up to the standards of their fictional heroes. They then
Edward John Phelps,
towards their fi-iends' husbands. "The Age of Words" in Orations and Essays of
ed.

J.

G. McCullough

(New York: Harper

& Bros.,

1901), 462.
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which accompanied

the annual state statistical report beginning in
1867.

about the rate of divorces

began to

statistics

reflect

in

At &st casual

Vermont, by the 1870s, Butler's reports on the divorce

a growing agitation as the rate increased-an increase
he, like

others tracked by comparing the ratio of divorces to marriages.
Butler attributed the
increase to a laxity of morals, the ease of obtaining a divorce,
and the
available.

To

Butler, petitions sought

were "put up jobs" and

on grounds of desertion or

"frivolous." If something

number of grounds

intolerable severity

was not done, Butler warned

that the

marriage ceremony would become "a mere farce and mockery." Eventually,
he began to

advocate each year that the number of causes available for divorce be reduced to
just

one-the scriptural ground of adultery. Since adultery as a cause was rare compared to
intolerable severity

and desertion, Butler advocated

this as

While he approved of the 1878 law which prohibited the
remarrying for three years (thus cutting

a means of reducing divorce.

guilty party in a divorce

down on collusive

suits),

from

he complained that

it

did nothing to reduce the number of causes available. According to Butler, Vermonters

viewed the marriage contract as merely a matter of convenience to be dissolved

"whenever

interest or caprice or lust shall dictate."'^^

With Butler's departure

in

1882, the simimaries of the divorce data were

presented without an accompanying

editorial.

By the

early

1

900s, however, Henry

Holton, a physician and secretary of the Board of Health, began writing the summaries

and the

editorializing

began anew. The see-saw pattern

characterized Butler's tenure had

Butler's

comments appear

in the

in the rate

become an unmistakable surge

summaries

in

of divorce which had
divorces accelerating

to the data contained in the state's Registration Reports

from 1867 to 1882.
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ever upward. Holton saw

this

development not only as a threat to the

marriage, but to the very stability of the state. Tying

home

to government,

argued that major disruptions to the former threatened the

stability

noted that the

20

1

ratio

of divorces to marriages had been

Holton believed

in 8.

that the causes

This resulted in children

families.

failing to

entering into ill-conceived marriages.

on

of the

crisis

in

1

in

1

of

institution

of the

Holton

He

latter.

886 but by 1907

were many including

it

was

lax discipline in

render obedience to parents and then

Hohon argued

needed to learn early

that children

to control their impulses better, that the legal causes for divorce needed to be

reduced, and the church be more actively involved

A year later, his report was no less urgent.
intervene,

it

was a decidedly

While

in teaching the sanctity

on

calling again

the church to

The church, according

secular intervention he advocated.

to Holton should teach that "the welfare and stability of the State depends

character of its homes."

He

if a large

"disrupted, torn and annihilated" the children of these

their characters

upon

the

claimed that the greatest menace to the republic was the

decadence of its homes. As "the fountain head of public morals,"

homes were

of marriage.

"dwarfed and ruined" and, as a

result, the state

number of

homes would have

"crumbles and anarchy

ensues."

Hohon's

new

idea.

survival

direct tie

between domestic order and the security of the

Republican motherhood and the role of the

of the nation was a

liberal family in

life

and increasingly more able to do

themselves reflected both a

was not a

ensuring the

common enough part of early republican rhetoric. But

Holton' s language was situated in the context of a state

private

state

so.

The

new commitment and
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far

more

statistics

willing to intervene in

Holton commented on

greater ability by the state to exercise

centralizing authority.

earlier era than

it is

And

Holton's language

is less

almost a caU for a fascistic conception of the role of family
and

In entering the marriage state, the

man and

wards of the

state.

consent of the

These

the

responsibilities cannot

hence the duty of the

state,

its

destruction,

guarantee given by persons

do them

part,"

who

is

be

laid aside

without the

state to iself [sic] before

allowing an action to take place which strikes
multiplied, will cause

at its

permanence, which

its

enter the marriage relation shall continue

and that the vows

citizenship

shall

be

faithfully fulfilled.

and for the

who

of

deserted their

A year later he expanded the zone of damage caused by divorce asserting that

families.

destroyed not only the

"to what

its

state to require the publication

marriage banns and to adopt a non-support law to go after people

it

if

not only to demand that the

Holton called on the high schools to teach students about the model home and
relation to the state and

state.

woman assume not only
state and to their children who are

obligations to each other, but to the

"until death

the persuasive moralizing of an

is

state, but the nation itself

essential in all governments,

Though most found
example of this

latter

obedience to constituted authority

all did.

home

y^'^^

A fascinating

opinion was expressed by the president of the Vermont Bar

sought to explain the increase

of more

called for a return in the

the trend in divorces worrisome, not

Association, Charles Heath, at

the object

He

its

annual meeting

1886. Heath, a Montpelier lawyer,

He began by asserting that no

in divorces.

attention and criticism since

divorce law, noting the attention given to

in

it

law had been

1850 than Vermont's marriage and

by the secular and religious press and the

formation of societies to draw the attention of the public, lawmakers, and the courts to
the issue. Heath confirmed what the records had shown-that divorces had increased

greatly in the past twenty-five years.

Holton's

comments appear

Board of Health

for the years

in

But he was unwilling to agree

that this

was

the summaries to the data contained in the annual reports of the State

1907-1910.
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unquestionably a bad development.

He

asserted that a laxity of morals

cause of the increase, nor a result of it. The

shift to

it

divorces.

now took
He

live

testimony,

irregularities

By 1 875 however,

this

of army

some of the

life"

increase in the

860s and

1

870s to

in

camp

in

various ways.

increase. Finally, he noted that

had

it

had declined, and that some had pointed the

Heath rejected

explanation too, noting that a larger

this

percentage of divorces took place

among

Heath claimed

of the family" was

that the "condition

1

had caused some men to go astray

that public morals

finger at recent immigrants.

frequently and,

many men from their homes and placed them

no longer explained the

been "obscurely hinted"

more

tended to be more sympathetic to those seeking

also (correctly) ascribed

the Civil War, which had taken so

"where the

it

neither the

county court jurisdiction had

increased the number of divorces granted because the court met

because

was

the

members of the old Yankee
than

far better

it

stock. In fact,

had been during

the earlier part of the century and that laxity of either public or private morals could not

explain the increase in divorces.

Instead,

Heath argued

greater autonomy.

He

that the increase in divorces

was a

noted that a majority of petitions were

explained the rapid advances

women had made

result

initiated

of women's
by

in obtaining equal rights to schooling,

possession and use of property, and personal rights. The higher divorce

according to Heath, "an

rights-a revolution

evil

rate,

per se'' but merely a symptom of a revolution

of which he approved. As a

as society adjusted to the

women and

new

realities

result, the tide

in

was

women's

of divorces was

inevitable

of this revolution-and nothing could stop
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not,

it.

Restrictive legislation

would not work and

neither

would

resistance

from judges who

refused to grant divorces, nor the exhortations of others.*^^

Few commentators

shared Heath's sanguine attitude toward female autonomy or

the impact of a rising divorce rate. The Legislature

number of divorces through
back the

tide.

legislation.

After

And

it

1

legislative intervention, but

reduce the

such solutions could not hold

896, the state gave up attempting to prevent divorces by restrictive

could do

and

intolerable severity

tried, repeatedly, to

little

about the most

But

desertion.*^'

to a significant proportion

common causes of divorce

could go after behavior which

it

of those divorces-adulterous

it

in the state:

believed led

activity.

Conclusion
Adultery law was meant to protect the security of the family by protecting the
marital relation that

was

at its core.

The family was defined by

boundaries-boundaries legally recognized and defined by the

defined family

was

Appropriate family

also supposed to be private and shielded

state.

drawn

But

its

that publicly

from public view.

depended on clear-cut roles for men and women.

life

parental authority and

tightly

It

presumed

antipode: children's obedience and loyalty. Heterosexual

"Address of President Heath Upon Marriage and Divorce," Proceedings of the Vermont Bar
Association vol. 2, no. 1 (1886), 74-82; Hiram Carleton, "Charles Henry Heath," in Geneological and

Family History of the State of Vermont (New York: Lewis Publishing, 1903), 280.

was illegal to beat one's spouse and the state tried, convicted, fined, and jailed men who did so. I
documented 1 1 1 crimmal assault cases in which the defendant and the victim(s) had the same last name.
It

Of those,

eighty-four involved

men charged

with assaulting

women

identified as their wives or charged

women wdth the same last name. assume that most of those cases involved wives,
though we know that assaults of daughters and mothers were also occasionally prosecuted. Domestic
with assaulting

assault cases extend all the

I

way back

to the first decade of the nineteenth century. Fines

common punishment throughout the period under study. However, imprisonment
became increasingly common toward the end of that period.
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were the most

as a punishment

physical and emotional intimacy too

Adultery transgressed

all

was

to be confined within the marital union.

these boundaries.

Men and women had

sex with partners other

than their legally sanctioned spouses. Unmarried couples waved
"marriage licenses"
around.

were

Women who

called "papa"

were not wives were called "Mrs."

by children

who

did not belong to them.

found themselves physically replaced by invaders:

were
or

entitled to

Men who

left

were not

fathers

In several cases, spouses

out and locked out of places they

occupy: beds, bams, and automobiles. The substitution of another

woman for the

spouse

lawfiilly entitled to

man

hold that position was understood as a

serious moral, cultural, social, and legal transgression and prosecutors did what
they

could to highlight this fact to the
criticized

Rena

Brittell for

men of the jury. The

prosecutor in the Eaton case

allowing her partner in adultery to spank her daughter Hazel.

This was a job for parents and not the sexual "stranger" Edward Eaton.

Q:

And

v^th that condition that she didn't

at that time, did

It is

like

him, you told him to whip her

you?

A:

When

Q:

Why didn't you whip your daughter yourself?

A:

Because she fought

Q:

So you sanctioned this man who was a stranger to your daughter so
speak, to whip your daughter on this occasion, did you?

A:

Yes

somewhat

she

was

so saucy to

him

me when I

certainly did.

touched

her.

to

sir.'^^

ironic that the

traditional family, the

more

the adulterous couple fulfilled the fianctions of a

more evidence of an adulterous

themselves.

Eaton Transcript,

I

p. 137.

214

disposition they compiled against

Yet, criminal prosecutions for adultery held within them the
seeds of a far
terrible irony.

The process of a

ideal in almost every

Vermont

marital

way.

criminal prosecution shattered the values of the family

pierced the veil of privacy and intimacy surrounding

Criminal prosecutions revealed the flaws in Vermonters'

life.

marriages, turned family

testiiy against

It

members

one another

against one another, forced husbands and wives to

of their vows and the

in violation

ordinarily prohibited such testimony. In short,

life

which further shattered the family

The

more

intervention

of the

from mothers and

fathers.

families," adultery

law

it

of a law which

spirit

was a traumatic

public airing

of private

ideal.

state prevented marital reconciliations

Though passed with

and took children

the intention of "preserving the peace

in action did just the opposite.

The

of

transgressing of boundaries

which characterized adultery was multiplied and magnified by the prosecutions
themselves. Imagine fourteen-year-old Hazel Eaton being questioned in her mother's

presence about the intimate details of her mother's sexual

life at

the lock up in White

River Junction, or, maybe even worse, on the stand in a crowded Vermont county

courtroom. Adultery

trials

reversed traditional lines of authority, placing the fate of

adults in the hands of children

who must have

felt

the tug and pull of femily loyalty very

intensely.

To

prosecutors and juries however, the sacrifices must have been worth

it

in

order to stamp out the behavior in the future. Adultery, like seduction and statutory

rape,

was a dagger pointed

at the heart

of the standing domestic order.

disruptions in that order, to divorce, to violence,

and perhaps

to murder.

were aware of both the sky-rocketing divorce rate as well as the
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It

tie

led to

Vermonters

between adultery and

divorce. Furthermore, the amount of adultery
to 1920. If we

combine divorce

''in

the air"

was enormous between 1870

and criminal prosecutions alleging adultery,

petitions

thousands and thousands of Vermonters faced the accusation, made publicly and under
oath, that they had engaged in adulterous sexual intercourse/^^ Local communities

could follow the sad trajectory of an adulterous
neighbors imprisoned, and,

in

some

cases, a

affair,

tawdry

a divorce, a femily ruined,

suit for alienation

of affections.

^^'^

We do not know for certain why Vermonters went after adultery in the late nineteenth
century, or even

if that effort

adultery law by the

was

part of a conscious plan.

Supreme Court

rights, the availability

of divorce

after

1875

statistics,

But the changing language of

explicitly designed to protect marital

the fevered talk of the threat of growing

divorce rates and of declining morality add up to an explanation.

For example. Orange County, one of the

least

populated counties in Vermont during this period, had

a combined total of 340 prosecutions for adultery and petitions for divorce alleging adultery between
1

870 and

1

number of counties m the state) we get a total of 4760
wide. The total was probably much higher than this. Rutland

920. Multiplied by fourteen (the total

adulterous allegations for this period state

County, which had very few adultery prosecutions during this period had 366 divorce petitions granted
for adultery

between 1870 and 1920. Obviously,

many more

petitions alleged

it

as a cause but were

granted for other grounds.

example, the newspaper coverage of the adulterous aflfeiir between Ellen Hall the wife of the
Bennington County Clerk John Hall and daughter-in-law of Hiland Hall, the governor of Vermont. Hall

See

had an

for

affair

with John Beebe, a local lawyer. After John Hall obtained a divorce, Ellen ended up

running off with Beebe, both abandoning their children in the process. 'The Bennington Scandal,"
Vermont Gazette, 12 July 1878 and "The Bennington Scandal," Bennington Banner, 5 December 1878.
Interest in the scandal was so high that the Gazette republished its story the follovmig week. See also
Shackett

v.

Shackett and Shackett

v.

Hammond, Addison County Court, June and December 1872

276-290. Susan Shackett sought a divorce on grounds of failure to support,
intolerable severity, and adultery. Her husband Marshall opposed the petition alleging that Susan had
committed adultery. The court agreed and dismissed Susan's petition. Marshall then sued George

Terms,

vol. 29, p.

of Susan's affections and won a $5000 jury verdict. At a retrial after a
Burr, Addison
successfiil appeal, the award was reduced to $500. See also Loretta Burr v. Edward
County Court, December 1905 Term, Docket No. 2967 (divorce granted for adultery) and Loretta 1

Hammond

Burr

V.

for alienation

Gertrude Kimball, Addison County Court, December 1905 Term, Docket No. 2947 (criminal

conversation).
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Historians have long argued that prosecutions for consensual sexual
offenses like

adultery dropped off in the nineteenth century and that other remedies-such as

vengeance killing-thereby increased. Indeed, beginning

in the late 1860s,

numerous

highly publicized instances of men killing their wives' paramours rocked the nation. '^^

Vermont, however, went a

different

way. Vermonters were never tolerant of such

violent self-help and remained deeply committed to the rule of law. Faced with a

perceived adultery problem, they used the courts to go after those committing the
Historians have also argued that the problem of divorce and responses to

it

were

act.

largely

a product of the Progressive Era.'^^ But, in Vermont, a recognition of the threat posed

by divorce, and

The impulse
nothing

legislative solutions to that threat

to harness the

new and was

work and prosecuting

power of the

reflected in both

were already developing by the

state to solve a social or

of these approaches. But

adulterers simply uncovered even

the idea of state intervention

now became

more

moral problem was

legislative fixes did not

adultery.

By the

modem state. As a result,

life

was a

880s,

re-directed toward a

vital

area of

the traditional impulse to harness

governmental mechanisms to solve the problem of divorce and adultery by

would be

1

The comments of Henry Holton

demonstrate an urgent acceptance of the idea that intimate family

judicial action

870s.

coupled with increasingly powerfiil

administrative techniques and an eagerness to use them.

concern for the health of the

1

modem and far more direct

legislative

and

state

Ireland, 29-31.

Elaine

May argues that the

first

systematic attempts to explain the skyrocketing divorce rate

came

in

profession of social science, citing an 1897 example which
the
placed the blame on the "emancipation of women." As we can see however, attempts to explain
develop solutions, and even to point to the emancipation of women as a cause arose two

the late nineteenth century from the

new

phenomenon,

Vermont. Elaine Tyler May, Great Expecations: Marriage and Divorce
Victorian America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 2.

decades before this

in
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in Post-

intervention into the intimate lives of many Vermonters.
late nineteenth

A judicial intervention of the

and early twentieth centuries became the precursor to eugenics,

institutionalization,

and

sterilization

of "degenerate Vermonters"
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in later years.

CHAPTER 4

RAPE

Introduction

Many

historians

They have argued

and scholars have been highly

that female complainants

by the court process.

critical

of American rape law.

were treated more

like criminals

than victims

Women who complained of sexual assault had their reputations

dragged through the mud, were accused of inviting the assault by
or were simply not believed. The law encouraged
special evidentiary requirements

violent crimes. This formulation

this

on rape prosecutions

their dress or behavior,

kind of treatment by imposing

that did not apply to other kinds

of

of rape law promoted highly gendered models of proper

and improper sexual behavior for men and women. The values both

reflected

reinforced a sexual double standard discouraging and even punishing

and

women who

transgressed the bounds of female modesty, while excusing or even promoting male

sexual promiscuity and aggression.

sexual safety seriously at

all.

Some have argued

that courts did not take

Judges and juries either did not view women's need for

protection as important or sought to use rape as a means to dominate

the use of sexual terror practiced with impunity.

protection to

women or

women from sexual assault

girls to

As a result,

or offered

it

women through

the law offered

little

selectively, protecting middle-class

the exclusion of members of the working class, ethnic minorities, or

women with immodest

reputations.

Though some of this work has
national surveys

women's

of appeUate decisions

relied

in

on

local studies,

rape cases.
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most has been based on

As with other

parts

of this study,

the experience in

law

Vermont allows us

in the larger legal context in

nuanced

inter-play

of law,

sex,

to examine the development and application

which

existed.

it

and gender than

That examination reveals a

earlier

work has

far

of rape

more

led us to understand.'

Statutory Development

Rape was

the

19* century. The

earliest

of 1 769, made rape a
bestiality.

most serious sexual

infraction regulated by

Vermont's courts

in the

rape laws, adopted in 1779 from the Connecticut Statute

Book

capital crime, as

it

This earliest law carried with

did other sexual violations such as

it

sodomy and

the hallmarks of the traditional rape

prosecution dynamic. In addition to penetration accomplished by force and without
consent, the complaining witness had to

make

her allegation immediately after the assault

(or "forthvsdth" in the language of the original statute) and she had to

show

that "in time

of distress" she did "make an out-cry on the occasion." Although the law provided the
death penalty for those convicted, apparently no

man was

ever executed for rape during

the twelve years the law permitted this ultimate punishment.^

The most frequently cited works are Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975); Catherine MacKinnon, "Feminism, Marxism, Method and
State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence," Signs 8 (Summer 1983): 635-658; MacKinnon, "Reflections on
Sex Equality Under Law," Yale Law Journal 100 (1991): 1281-1328; Susan Estrich, "Rape," Yale Law
Journal 95 (1986): 1087-1 184. Historical studies making such arguments include Lyle Koehler, A
Search for Power: The "Weaker Sex" in Seventeenth-Century New England (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1980); Terry L. Chapman, "Sex Crimes in the West, 1890-1920," Alberta History 35 (Fall
19"' Century Canada
1987): 6-18; Constance Backhouse, Petticoats and Prejudice: Women and Law in
'

(Toronto:

2

Women's

Allen Soule,

ed..

Press, 1991),

1 1

1,

331.

Laws of Vermont, 1777-1780,

vol.

12 of State Papers of Vermont (Montpelier:

Between 1777 and 1987
Secretary of State, 1964), 12: 40-41. Capital punishment was rare in Vermont.
were actually executed, hi any
fifty-five people were sentenced to death, but of those only twenty-seven

Vermont did not execute felons who did not kill. Randolph Roth, "'Blood Calls for
(Winter/Spring
Vengeance!' The History of Capital Punishment in Vermont," Vermont History 65

case, as a rule,

1997): 10, 13.
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,

In 1791 the legislature amended the law, removing the earlier requirements
of

out-cry and immediate prosecution.

took place

at the

same

time, the

As with the amendments

Vermont

to the bastardy

legislature cast off the

more

law which

antiquarian

aspects of these laws that had been the legacy of Connecticut's Puritan legal code.^ The

new law
it

also

was now

removed the death penalty and

left

to the

Supreme Court

to decide

and corporal punishment. Imprisonment
jails

for

were the only option

treated

and

fines.

more

the punishment indeterminate. Instead,

on the

appropriate fine, imprisonment,

Vermont was

in

rare at this time because local

available for holding convicted criminals.

most consensual sexual crimes

was

left

relied

on

fines

Thus the

penalties

and whippings." Rape, being coercive,

seriously, with provisions for imprisonment in addition to whippings

Despite the indeterminancy of the statute,

seems clear

it

that the legislature

contemplated severe punishment for rape. For one thing, the statute required
convicted of rape to sew a large cloth

letter

"R" on their outer garments

all

those

"fi-om the

expiration of twenty four hours after [their] imprisonment." Those caught without the

letter

were to be whipped up to ten

Furthermore,

limited the

in

cases where whipping

number

to

In

was

part

one hundred lashes-by

imposed by any criminal
^

stripes at the order

statute

and

easily

of the

far the

of any justice of the peace.

original sentence, the statute

most severe corporal punishment

enough to

kill

a man.^

Vermont, the amount of a woman's resistence and speed with which she reported the

assault

were

account when determining the credibility of her allegation rather
than dispositive facts foreclosing prosecutors' attempts to bring charges. State v. Wilkim, 66 Vt. 1

simply factors
(1892); State

for the jury to take into

v.

Niles,

47 Vt. 82 (1874).

example the laws of 1787 which imposed whippings, brandings, and fines for consensual
Laws of Vermont. 1 785-1 791
sexual violations such as adultery and fornication. John A. Williams, ed.,
165-167.
vol. 14 of State Papers of Vermont (Montpelier, Secretary of State, 1966),
"

See

for

Vermont (Montpelier,
John A. Williams, ed.. Laws of Vermont, 1 791-1 795, vol. 1 5 of State Papers of
Corporal Punishment (London:
Secretary of State, 1967), 20; George Ryley Scott, The History of

'

Torchstream Books, 1954), 59, 83.
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Despite the potentially rigorous penalties available,

any

man

being convicted,

earliest part

between

1

much

of this study.

794 and

1

could find no instance of

punished in the four counties for rape during the

less

Of the

I

four rape cases

807 aU resulted

in

I

could locate in the four counties

not guUty verdicts. In the two attempted rape

cases brought during the same period, one defendant defaulted and the other
was found
guilty

of the

lesser offense

of assault and merely

fined.

It is

not until 1809 that

we

begin

to see convictions and imprisonments for rape and attempted rape. This coincides with

the opening of the State Prison at Windsor. Thereafter, the number of convictions for
rape, attempted rape, and other kinds of sexual assaults increased dramatically. While no

men were
and

1

1

found guilty of rape or attempted rape among the known cases between 1794

807, the situation becomes reversed fi-om

809 and

1

820, of the ten

the time meant sex with a

men tried
girl

two received

may well be

that the

under eleven), seven were found guilty by juries. All seven

six years).

(three received ten years,

1

opening of Windsor State Prison

8 1 8, the law of rape

two received seven

Three others defaulted. None were acquitted.

remedy which judges and juries could now
In

809 onward. For example, between

for rape, attempted rape, or statutory rape (which at

were sentenced to lengthy prison terms
years, and

1

rely

in

1809 created an appropriate

on when deciding sexual

was again amended. The

the requirement that rapists wear the letter

"R" on

assault cases.^

discretionary sentencing and

their clothing after release

were both

discarded. In their place, the legislature imposed a ten-year prison sentence and a

fine (or either at the discretion

rape

*

at

of the judge) for

rapists.

It

set the penalty for

seven years' imprisonment and a $500 fine (or either also

Roth, "History of Corporal Punishment in Vermont," 13.
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It

$1000

attempted

at the discretion

of the

And

court).

finally,

it

common law's eleven year-old

wrote the

statute law, treating sex

between men over age

rape, regardless of whether

it

was "with her

The law remained unchanged by
for rape

fine

and

886 and sixteen

younger than eleven as a
'

facing

1

849 when the maximum penalty

up to twenty years

or both. Those convicted of attempted rape faced a

fine

girls

will or against her will."''

statute until

was doubled, with convicts now

and a $1000

1

fifteen

age of consent into the

maximum

in prison,

a $2000

sentence often years

or both. Other than an increase in the age of consent (to fourteen in

in

1

898), the statute remained unchanged for the rest of the study

period.*

During most of the period under study, a rape or attempted rape charge had
brought by an indictment handed
local people to decide

whether a

down by

a grand jury. This meant that

man would

it

was up

to be

to

face a prosecution for rape or attempt.

Prosecutors did not get the right to prosecute by information

in serious cases like

rape or

attempt until 1898.^

Under Vermont

woman by

law, a rape occurred

force and without her consent. '°

when a man had
The

simplicity

sexual intercourse with a

of the prohibition was

deceptive. For rape, while the most serious sexual ofifense, also posed the greatest

evidentiary difSculties for both the prosecution and the defense. For one thing, rape

rarely occurred in the presence

of a

third party. Thus, corroboration

'

1818 Vt. Acts

1.

»

1849 Vt. Acts

7;

'

See the discussion of the development of prosecutions by information

.

.

difficult.

Other

1886 Vt. Acts 63; 1898 Vt. Acts 188.

"If any person shall ravish and carnally

against her will

was

.

."

1849 Vt. Acts

know

in the Introduction.

a female of the age of eleven years or more, by force and

7.
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sexual offenses

left

were brought to

a more complete evidentiary record. Seduction and bastardy cases

light

woman in question.

Abortion cases typically had

pregnant woman, the

was

by pregnancy-obviously someone had had intercourse with the

man who

also available in the

impregnated her, and the abortionist. Physical evidence

form of a

Adultery typically came to

at least three potential witnesses: the

light

fetus,

bloody clothing, and medical examination.

on account of third party

witnesses, divorce

proceedings, or illegitimate pregnancy. But evidence was often lacking in an

unwitnessed rape and such physical evidence as there might be-tom clothing, bruises,

body fluids-while bearing a resemblance
carry with

it

to the physical proof mentioned above, did not

the same evidentiary weight because

it

elements of the crime. Unlike adultery for example,

that intercourse

had taken place

in order to

did not in and of itself prove the

it

was not enough merely

prove the criminal

act.

This

to

show

was because

the

question of whether or not the crime had taken place was contingent upon the mental

understanding of the alleged victim.

Had

it

Had

force been used to accomplish the intercourse?

been accomplished without her consent? Resolution of these

depended

entirely

upon

the perceptions of the

woman. As

issues typically

a result, rape cases,

more

than other sexual infractions were, for the most part, decided by the jury's weighing of
the testimony of the alleged victim (usually referred to as the "prosecutrix").
Typically, to prove an unwitnessed rape, the state had to put the

stand to testily."

A defendant having no alibi had two choices:

had sexual relations with the
" "Usually the prosecutrix

is

woman or that

the sex

was

woman on the

argue that he had not

consensual. Either way, the

the only witness upon the question of whether the act

was by

force

and against her

respondent that he discredit
and without her testimony no conviction can be expected. It is all important to the
If he cannot cross-examine the
her testimony, and usually his only means of doing this is by cross-examination.
aoss-examination."
with a view to disaediting her story, he is deprived of the substantial benefits of a
will,

prosecutrix
Slate

V.

Hollenbeck, 67 Vt. 34, 37 (1894).
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woman's

credibility often lay at the heart

credibility

depended on character. But

of the case and

in the nineteenth century,

how was character to

be assessed? What

role, if

any, could past sexual behavior play in that assessment?

Character and Consent

Those who would be witnesses
courts

&ced

Vermont's eighteenth and nineteenth-century

a raft of exclusions and challenges to their credibility based on beliefe and

assumptions that are

in the case.

in

Thus,

temptation to

lie

now alien to

plaintifife

us.

Some were excluded because they had an interest

and defendants

in civil cases

on their own behalf was deemed too

could not testify because the

great to trust their testimony.'^

Criminal defendants could not be compelled to testify against themselves of course, but

they could not voluntarily testify on their

own behalf either until

1866,'^ Others

were

excluded because of social policy considerations. The sanctity of the marital relationship

outweighed the search for

truth.

Therefore, husbands and wives could not testify for or

against each other in any civil or criminal proceeding.

God

could not

testify.

Those who did not

believe in

Nor could people who had been convicted of treason, any

or any crime involving dishonesty. These latter two disabilities were removed

but those

who had been convicted of crimes

involving perjury were

still

in

felony,

1851,

prohibited

from

This disability was removed by statute in 1852. 1852 Vt. Acts 13.

" Vermont Constitution, Chap.

I,

Art. 10 (1793);

1866 Vt. Acts 40.

spouses from testifying as to
Subject to exceptions Vermonters retain the right to prevent their
in civil cases in which the husband
confidential statements made between them in criminal cases or
wife are not adverse parties. Vt. R. Evid. 504.
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testifying

and those whose past crimes had involved moral turpitude could have

credibility

impeached as a

their

result.'^

In addition to these exclusions and grounds for challenging credibility,

courts also allowed lawyers to attack witnesses in

civil

Vermont

and criminal cases based on

their

reputation for honesty. In general, nineteenth-century law carefiilly limited the admission

of character evidence

in civil

and criminal

trials.

The

rules governing the introduction of

such evidence were complex both because they varied depending on the use lawyers
sought to make of this kind of evidence and because of the

conflict

between finding the

truth and protecting parties fi^om unfairly prejudicial testimony.

In criminal cases including rape, reputation evidence could be used to impeach a

witness (including the alleged victim or the defendant

if he

chose to

testify).

In general,

lawyers could impeach the testimony of a witness only through the use of evidence of
their general reputation for honesty.

lived in the witness's

truth-telling.

The lawyer would place someone on the stand who

community and ask him about the Mdtness's general reputation

Impeaching witnesses could not make reference to

impeached witness nor express

their

own opinion.

specific acts

All they could

what they believed the general reputation of the witness was

do was

for

by the

testify as to

for truth-telling in the

community.'^

Acts
The religious and criminal conviction disabilities were removed by statute in 1851. 1851 Vt.
where it
The Court did not define "moral turpitude" until 1963 in State v. Foumier, 123 Vt. 439,
'5

12.

being criminal. Other authorities
declared that such acts had to be "base or depraved" in addition to
sentiment or accepted moral standards of
define moral turpitude as behavior "that gravely violates moral
a community." Black 's

Law Dictionary,

6* ed.

A. Harman, The Vermont
Milo L. Bennett, The Vermont Justice (Burlington, 1864), 343; Henry
Justice

and Public

Officer (Rutland,

The

Tuttle

Company, 1905) 366-369.
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We have already seen how lawyers in some civil or criminal cases sought to
attack the sexual reputation of a witness or party in order to impeach credibility and
that

such efforts were generally prohibited by the Supreme Court. During the 1830s and
1

840s, the Court repeatedly held for example that a woman's history as a prostitute

could not be used to impeach her
Court, as

were

had done

it

credibility in civil or criminal cases.

in bastardy cases, expressly rejected

In so ruling, the

Massachusetts holdings which

to the contrary. In an 1835 prosecution for assault and battery, the

upheld the

trial

court's refusal to permit the defendant to impeach

witnesses by introducing his

two of the

state's

ovm witnesses who would testify that they were common

prostitutes.

The Court repeated

truth-telling

was

admissible.

Supreme Court

It

the rule that only evidence of a general reputation for

acknowledged

that the practice

of most vices tended to

"impair the moral sense, and weaken the force of the obligation to speak or act v^th due

regard to truth."

noted that

if

It

likened prostitution to intemperance or thieving in this respect, but

such behaviors did lead to dishonesty,

it

was easy enough to

limit the

testimony to the effect of such vice on the witness's general reputation for truth-telling

without having to delve into the cause of such reputation. The Court asserted that to do
othenvise would introduce a

step.

"We

justice,

new

rule

of evidence and

it

was unprepared

apprehend the inquiry proposed would be entirely new

in

our courts of

dangerous, and some cases slanderous, and no equivalent benefit would be

derived fi-om permitting such an inquiry.'"^

The Court adopted

cases arising out of bastardy suits {Morse

Pineo (1832) and Spears

v.

discussed in earlier chapters).

State

to take such a

V.

Smith, 7 Vt. 141 (1835).
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this position in

v.

two other

Forrest (1843)

Because the testimony of the alleged victim was so

crucial in

most rape cases,

defense lawyers were particularly keen to impeach the credibility of the woman.

To do

so they often sought to introduce evidence about the woman's sexual morality. But they

came up

against the law's general prohibition

credibility.

of such evidence as a means of gauging

As a result, Vermont's judges were

repeatedly called

nature of evidence the state and the defendant could enter about

upon to determine the

women who

charged

rape. In attempting to resolve these disputes, judges found themselves facing a dilemma.

On the one hand, the
the

limited evidence available in

woman's testimony was a

evidence.

On the

credibility

of her

other hand,

trials

and the importance of

strong temptation to permit the admission of character

it

seemed

allegations based

the alleged rape.

most rape

unfair to the aUeged victim to judge the

on behavior

Some judges were

prior to

and sometimes even following

well aware that such evidence could be used to

punish a victim, both by humiliating her and preventing conviction of her

most importantly

for

Vermont's conservative judges,

its

rapist.

Perhaps

introduction ran contrary to the

general rules governing the admissibility of character evidence.

Beginning

in the

middle of the 19* century Vermont's Supreme Court was asked

to sort out the question of character evidence with regard to the prosecutrix.

question that arose in rape cases was

this:

The

to what extent could her testimony be

impeached by questions concerning her moral character? Could one simply inquire of
her general moral reputation?

Or could one

delve farther either by putting her past

encounters
sexual behavior into question or even by inquiring about past specific sexual

with other men?
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The

leading case

was

State

for rape and incest committed

reported rape case

least three times

in

and

v.

on his

Vermont. The
that she

Johnson, an 1855 prosecution against Levi Johnson
sixteen year-old daughter Sarah. This

state alleged that

had gotten pregnant as a

was the &st

Johnson had had sex with Sarah
result.

at

On cross-examination,

Johnson's lawyers had asked Sarah whether she had had sex with other men, naming

them and

specifying the particular times and places. These occurrences were alleged to

have taken place both before and

before she became pregnant. The

In reversing the

trial court,

claimed her fether had raped her and

after the time she

trial

judge had refused to allow the cross-examination.

Supreme Court Judge Pierpont Isham, writing

for the

two-

judge majority, ruled that a defendant could not introduce evidence of the woman's past
sexual experiences with other men. However,

it

had to do

typically

in order to

if the state

put on the prosecutrix (which

prove the case) the defendant, on cross-examination,

could inquire about her sexual experiences. Judge Isham based the opinion on his

interpretation

decision

of several English cases which had considered the matter. He justified

on the relevance of such testimony

to the issue

purely mental act and that in determining whether

into

a woman's previous

result

of her mind," but

If she

habits.

if she

it

of consent, arguing

that

it

his

was a

took place or not one could inquire

was immoral, then consent would be

"the natural

was not immoral then such consent would be

and repugnant to all her moral feelings.
Such habits as are imputed to this witness by this inquiry, have a
tendency to show such consent, as the natural operation of her
inconsistent with her previous
.

.

life,

.

propensities, and rebut the inference or necessity

In other words, whether she

that she

was

had not consented and

sexually immoral

that she

had

went

resisted.

229

of actual

violence.

to the credibility of her claim

While Isham's opinion held that a

woman could be

asked these questions

made to answer them.
engaging

in

if she testified,

If an aflBrmative

he did not claim that she could be

answer would subject her to prosecution for

adulterous acts, for example, she had a right to claim the privilege against

self-incrimination.

Judge Isham's opinion drew a strong dissent fi-om fellow judge Milo Bennett.
Bennett absolutely rejected the proposition that past immoral acts should be used to
discredit the testimony

of a prosecutrix. While he agreed with the proposition that a

was admissible

general reputation for lack of chastity

specific past

bad acts could be used. In the

Simon Greenleaf s

influential treatise

first

in

place,

rape cases, he denied that

it

was contrary to

on evidence had made

authority.

clear that such specific

evidence of immorality could not be used. Instead, the defendant could only rely on
general reputation evidence of immorality. Second, Bennett

and morality of the leap from one

illicit

was troubled by

the logic

action to the next,

A general want of chastity may fiimish a basis for a presumption that the
illicit

connection was by consent, and thus

it

becomes

material to the

But no such presumption should be allowed to arise from a
particular instance of an illicit connection with another person.
Presumptions cannot rest upon mere suggestion or surmise. They must
have some ground to stand upon, some facts upon which they can arise.
issue.

Bennett's criticism was more than a critique of Isham's faulty logic,

human

nature influenced by his

The error

... in

known

my view

is,

in

it

reflected a

view of

evangelical view of redemption.

assuming that a presumption of consent

might arise from the fact of a previous illicit connection with some other
person, and when JUDGE COWEN undertook to dispose of the cases of

" State

Johnson, 28 Vt. 512, 514 (1856). Consent would not have been an issue on the incest count,
but incest was punished the same as adultery which allowed a maximum sentence of only five years (as
opposed to twenty years for rape). 1 797 Vt. Acts 9. On re-trial, Johnson was acquitted by a jury. He

was

V.

year for an assault on his wife, pled guilty, and was sentenced to four months in jail.
Johnson, Windsor County Court, December 1860 Term, State Cases, vol. 1, 538, 596.

later tried that

State

V.
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Rex V. Hodgson and Rex v. Clark [English cases cited by the majority],
being overruled by the laws of human nature, I think he undertook too
much. Though we may concede, so far as our moral convictions are
concerned, to use the language of JUDGE COWEN, that "one who has
akeady

started

on

the road to prostitution,

would be

as

less reluctant to

pursue her course, than one who still remained at her home of
innocence," yet courts of justice cannot act upon evidence addressed
simply to their moral convictions.

might, no doubt, have an effect upon

It

our moral convictions, to show on a

trial for theft, that

the defendant

was

given to stealing, yet courts of justice could not act upon such a fact, and
why should we presume that a female continues in a voluntary course of
lewdness, because she has had, at some previous time a sexual connection

with some other man. If the law will not allow such evidence to be the
basis of a presumption, it should not be received.'^

Bennett

But he waged a

lost this battle.

—

mid- 19''' century jurists

^he

wrote a

war on the decision

guerilla

in

a way typical of

Nineteenth-century jurists

treatise.

who opposed

the ideological direction of the state or federal courts wrote law treatises in an effort to

sway

legal opinion to their side.

These authors sought to exploit the

lawyers and judges had limited access to reported decisions or

By authoring a treatise and

legal research.

particularly at students or

into the next generation.

volume

treatise

on

directing

it

little

fact that

many

inclination to

at these individuals

do

and

young lawyers, they could hope to

inculcate their perspectives

The most famous example of this

Joseph Story's four

constitutional

law written

is

order to blunt the threat state's rights

in

jurisprudence posed to John Marshall's nationalist legacy.^" Bennett's Vermont Justice

(1864) became one of the most widely-used legal authorities

in the state during the

second half of the 19* century.^' Though marketed as a guide to Vermont's non-lawyer
" Johnson. 5 19.

On

Bennett's evangelical outlook, see "Remarks at the Funeral of Mile Bennett," The

Daily Free Press [Burlington], 10 July 1868.

^°

R. Kent

My thanks to Crocker Bennett for this citation.

Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph

Story: Statesman of the

Old Republic (Chapel

Hill:

University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 181-195.

^'

S.

Crocker Bennett

II,

Judge Milo Bennett: Puritan

symposium of the Vermont

Judicial Historical Society,
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an Industrial Age (paper presented at a
Burlington, Vermont, June 1997), 18. Copy

in

in

of the peace, both

justices

it

its title

page and Bennett's preface made expUcit

would be used by the junior members of the

strictly within the jurisdiction

to have a lasting influence

Thus

it

comes

of justices of the peace—in

on

hope

that

went beyond matters

short,

it

was Bennett's attempt

on the law.

as no surprise that Bennett

Court's ruling on evidence
before. In the section

bar. Its contents

his

in

rape cases set

would attempt

to

down on the Johnson

rape, Bennett ignored the

Johnson

undo the Supreme

decision nine years

ruling, arguing,

based on

citation to Greenleaf, that:

The respondent may give in evidence the general bad character of the
female, for want of chastity, as furnishing a basis for a presumption that
the illicit connection was by consent; but we apprehend the true rule is,
that

no such presumption can

illicit

reputation: "It

is

woman could be

no defence

committed upon her." That

of State

V.

particular instance

of prior

raped, regardless of her station in

that she

is,

was

common

a

strumpet,

the law did not immunize

had a bad reputation for

credibility in determining "if a rape

The

from a

connection with another person, other than the accused.^^

Furthermore, any

their victim

arise

chastity.

was

rape

men against

or her

was

actually

rape charges

when

Rather, that reputation went to her

actually

influence of Bennett's treatise

if a

life

was

committed upon

her."^^

reflected almost immediately in the case

Reed (1867). Amaretta Marcott claimed

that Albert

Reed had raped

her.

the possession of the author.

^ Milo Bennett, The Vermont Justice, 574-575.

^ This comported with

common

Blackstone. "The civil

[i.e.

Continental] law seems to suppose a prostitute or

harlot incapable of any injuries of this kind: not allowing

chastity of her,

who had

indeed no chastity

at all, or at least

any punishment

hath no regard to

it.

for violating the

But the law of England

common
does not judge so hardly of offenders, as to cut off all opportunity of retreat even from
it to be felony to force
strumpets, and to treat them as never capable of amendment. It therefore holds
course of life."
even a concubine or harlot; because the woman may have forsaken that unlawfixl
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England,
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vol.

4 (Oxford, 1769), 213.

Reed,

thirty-three

and a ferm laborer, was the Marcotts' neighbor.

examination Reed's lawyers asked Amaretta

conductor on the

railroad.

if she

knew one

On cross-

Eleazer Harwood, a

She had denied knowing him, but offered

that she might

have

seen him. Reed's lawyer then asked her whether she had had sex with Harwood the
previous spring

and the

trial

when he walked her home along

the railroad track.

The

state objected

judge, James Barrett, upheld the objection. The defendant then entered

general evidence that Marcott's character for chastity

was bad and

the state gave

evidence that she had a good reputation for chastity. Reed was convicted.

On appeal,

the state cited Bennett's treatise and argued that Johnson

According to the

state's brief,

Johnson was "rejected by a

was bad

large majority

law.

of the

profession of this state, as a wide departure from the ancient land marks of the law; in

fact a perversion

of the principles that have received approval of the best

legal

minds

in

the past and present."

The Court's defensiveness over
Benjamin H. Steele noted
questionable, but

made

felt

it

that

it

its

opinion in Johnson was obvious. Judge

had been the

result

of a divided court and was

legally

could not overrule so recent a decision. "Before the decision was

the question was, at least, debatable both

upon reason and

perhaps more important that the point should be

settled,

than

authority,

how it was

and

it

was

settled." Steele

only been
did not note something else which distinguished the Johnson decision-it had

decided by a three-judge court. Between 1850 and

permanent three-member Supreme Court and

trial

did not hear appeals. Thus, the Johnson decision

1

857, Vermont experimented with a

courts overseen by circuit judges

was

who

particularly vulnerable to criticism

short-lived) court, but a divided one at
as the product of not only an experimental (and
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that.

Steele justified the admission of past sexual experience evidence

such evidence was extremely valuable to the defendant

on the ground

in the case before

it

that

given general

testimony presented as to the prosecutrix's bad general reputation for chastity. "The
jury

would be

less

ready to conclude that a

woman who had once

afterwards properly resisted, than they would

The Court held

virtue."

settled in the state

that the matter

of Vermont. Tried

if she

had been a

improperly yielded

woman of unquestioned

of the admissibility of such evidence was now

again.

Reed was found

guilty

a second time.

appealed again and his case was continued for four years before the prosecutor

He

finally

entered a nolle prosequi}^

The Court's
potentially

more

sexual injury.

prostitution

decision

hostile to

on this

issue

was one of the few

women than that of other

in

which Vermont law was

states in matters concerning sex

and

We have seen that in bastardy cases and on the issue of the effect of

on a

witness's credibility,

Vermont tended

to be

more accommodating

toward female complainants and witnesses. But on the question of past reputation,

Vermont was

distinct

from neighboring

New England

states.

Both Massachusetts and

New Hampshire had declared that only evidence of general reputation for chastity could
be introduced to impeach the

credibility

cited Greenleaf for the proposition

soul searching of the

State

V.

"

State

V.

v.

and neither decision displayed any of the agonized

Vermont cases."

Reed, Windsor County Court, May 1 867 Term, Docket
Docket No. 1.
Reed, Windsor County Supreme Court, February 1871 Term,

Reed, 39 Vt. 4 1 7, 4 1 8-20

No. 233; State

of an alleged victim on matters of consent. Both

Forshner, 43

N.R

(

1

867); State

v.

89 (1861); Commonwealth

decision consisted of only one paragraph.
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v.

Harris, 131 Mass. 336 (1881).

The Harris

s

Despite the Court's decisions

appeal from an adultery prosecution

in

in

Johnson and Reed resistance continued.

1

In an

876, Judge Hoyt Wheeler stated that in a rape

case evidence of prior sexual intercourse with the defendant was admissible, but

"evidence of like acts of intercourse between her and other
the second edition of the annotated reports of the

1

not."^^ In his notes to

in

Johnson had been approved

in

in

Reed, but then went on to state the rule promoted by Greenleaf and Bennett that

V.

specific acts with others

the

is

Vermont Supreme Court, published

890, editor Charles L. Williams observed that the rule

State

men

were inadmissible and

community before the

alleged rape

Alabama, and Michigan cases
In

1

in

is all

that "her general reputation for chastity in

that

can be shown." Williams cited Nevada,

support."

to permit a rape defendant to introduce

894 Judge Russell Taft had refused

evidence that the alleged victim had had intercourse with another man. Mary Oilman, a
fourteen-year-old servant

claimed, she

finisher.

girl,

was

living in the

was raped by Hollenbeck' s brother Eddie. Eddie, aged

He and

his wife

she had had intercourse with a
the question. Hollenbeck

was

man named
convicted.

will,

V.

Upon

brass

On appeal.
Reed

objection. Judge Taft excluded

Judge Henry R. Start held

that the

for support. "Usually the prosecutrix

upon the question of whether the

act

was by

force and against her

It is all

important to the

Bridgman, 49 Vt. 202 (1876).

Johnson, 28 Vt. 512 (1856) in Charles L. Williams,
1 890).
Determined in the Supreme Court of Vermont (Minneapolis,

Note

was a

time she claimed to have been raped,

and without her testimony no conviction can be expected.

State

"

at the

Billett.

question had been proper, citing Johnson and

the only witness

26,

she

had been staying temporarily with George. Hollenbeck'

lawyer cross-examined Mary, asking whether

is

home of George Hollenbeck when,

to State

v.
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ed..

Reports of Cases Argued and

respondent that he discredit her testimony, and usually his only means of doing

by cross-examination.

If he

discrediting her story, he

Re-tried, Hollenbeck

is

this is

cannot cross-examine the prosecutrix with a view to

deprived of the substantial benefits of a cross-examination."

was again convicted and sentenced to

ten years.^*

Despite their differences about the nature of sexual reputation evidence that

could be admitted in rape cases,

all

the jurists involved in the debate treated rape cases

differently than others. All agreed that the alleged victim's sexual reputation

game

if she testified.

was

fair

This was a departure fi^om the general rules of evidence which

normally allowed only a witness's general reputation for honesty to be admitted. The
un-selfconsciousness with which they accepted this departure

In

worth thinking about.

is

no other criminal or quasi-criminal case was such evidence permitted.

that in bastardy

and assault cases, the Court repeatedly held

that

We have seen

such evidence was

inadmissible and that only general reputation for truth could be used to impeach

who had not been

witnesses

Just

two years

convicted of committing crimes involving moral turpitude.

after Hollenbeck, for

example, the same Supreme Court ruled that a

murder defendant could not impeach witnesses

for the state

by cross-examining them

about their operation of a brothel. The author of that opinion, Russell Taft, had served
as the

trial

judge

in the

Hollenbeck case.

It

had been his

sexual reputation evidence in that case that had led to

its

refusal to permit specific

reversal. In State

v.

Fournier

above and held that only a witness's
(1896) he cited the long line of cases discussed
general reputation for truth could be tested.

"

<:tnte

None of the

other

Supreme Court judges

1895-1896,"
the Superintendent of the State Prison for
V Hollenbeck 67 Vt 34 (1894); "Report of
Records of the State Pnson at
Reports fir 1895.1896 (Rutland, 1896) 31;

JveZnt^L^^^^^^
Windsor, vol. 4,

p.

of Vermont, Burlmgton. Vermont.
292, Special Collections, University
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dissented from Taft's opinion, including Judge Start

Hollenbeck allowing such evidence (and more)

Why then did jurists
evidence when

it

came

was an easy charge

in rape cases.^'

Some men mistrusted women, believing that rape

woman to make and

disprove.^" Sexually promiscuous

given the morality of the times,

As

written the opinion in

so easily accept the departure from the general rules of

to rape cases?

for a

who had

it

extremely hard for a defendant to

women were

would be

seen as particularly untrustworthy, and

surprising if they

a result, the Supreme Court permitted a

woman's

were not so perceived.
reputation for chastity as

well as past specific acts of sexual immorality to be used against her if she

testified.

This was an exception applied only to rape cases and was not permitted even in other
criminal and civil cases of a sexual nature where there were female witnesses or

victims. Technically,

its

use in rape cases was quite limited. The evidence was

admitted solely to impeach the alleged victim on the question of consent and only

testified.

The

rule

raping unchaste

admitted

she

Since the crime's existence rested on the woman's perceptions, and successfril

prosecution depended on her testimony, her credibility was

consent.

if

was not intended

women. The

may seem

to

all

important on the issue of

immunize men from the

limited purposes for

risk

of prosecution by

which such evidence was

like a distinction without a difference,

to

be

however. The admission of

conservative, all-male jury against
sexual reputation evidence might well prejudice a

the female victim since

2'

State

V.

Vermonters were intolerant of non-marital sexual

activity.

Fournier, 68 Vt. 262 (1896).

quoted m Blacks one, tiiat rape i a most
must b
and impartially to be punished with deatfi; bu "
detesmble crime, and therefore ought severely
defended by the
made, hard to be proved, but harder to be
remembered, that it is an accusation easy to be
See for example. State v. Bedard, 65 Vt.
p^tcusei, though imiocent." Blackstone, vol. 4, 214-215.

- Judges sometimes referenced Mathew Hale's comment,
30

278 (1892)

in this respect.
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later

If the

woman's

sexual reputation could be called into question, could the sexual

reputation of the male defendant be used against him as well? Technically, the answer

was
only

no.

It is

important to remember that the issue of the woman's reputation came up

if she testified,

and then only went to the question of consent. Until

defendants were not permitted to
not be forced to

subpoenaed by

testify

impeached based on

1

866, criminal

on their own behalf and thereafter, they could

who

testify against their will (unlike the alleged victim

either side). After

1

866, a rape defendant

his general character for

honesty just

could be

who took the
like

stand could be

any other witness.

Prosecutors often went after defendants seeking to show that they were of bad character.

They could not be impeached by

reference to sexual matters however. But

ask ourselves what the effect would be

if such inquiries

were permitted.

could be asked whether she had consented to sex with others

in the past,

prosecutor ask of the rape defendant? Presumably he would ask

with a

woman before

without her consent.

his refiisal to incriminate himself would

had the

right to decline to

might place them

in

testifying defendant

No

if he

we

If a

have to

woman

what would a

had ever had sex

defendant would admit to such an act and

be honored by the court-just as female witnesses

answer questions about

their past acts

where a positive answer

jeopardy of an adultery charge.^' However, evidence that a

had been previously convicted of a crime involving perjury or moral

turpitude could be introduced as a

means of impeaching him and,

this included past convictions for sexual assault.

And

lastly,

as

we

will see

below,

prosecutors sought to

evidence) every chance they
introduce character evidence (including sexual character

got-regardless of its legality.

3'

Throughout the nineteenth century the

statute

of limitations for both offenses was three years.

Vermont (Rutland, 1798), 594.
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Lam o

1 hus in State

v.

Gile (1918) a statutory rape prosecution, the state sought to

introduce evidence that the delendiint had had

The prosecutor
the

iirgued that the testimony

mind of the complainant.

I

was

iui illicit

relationship with another

woman.

to be used only to fix a particular date in

he court warned the prosecutor to focus solely on the

intimacies committed with the complainant herself, but the prosecutor's next question
specifically niuned the other wi)man.

t

he state also examined a witness about the

delendant's general reputation lor morality

The witness responded

for honesty).

raised the admission

commimity

was

I

it

bad.

the conviction.

Ciile

(rather thim his reputation

he defendant was convicted and

of this clwacter evidence on appeal.

comment and upheld

without

that

in the

I

he Supreme Court recited

was sentenced

it

to three to five years in

the state prison.^^

There

is

no question

that the

exception to the general rule regiu^ding character

evidence rellected gender conceptions. If a

past,

some judges

another

man

at least believed that

cases.

permitted.

hus, in statutory rape cases

in

" Staie

V.

where such evidence showed

GiU\ Vermont Reports Br icts, 93(2).

of the State FYison,

Lawyers
credibility.

extend

issue

was

(

1

9

1

8);

with

evidence

this

ixn issue,

the

Supreme

victims on issues of past sexual

person had committed the

that cmothcr

1

it

exception

this

State

v.

Gile. 93 Vt

.

1

rape aises sought to raise the issue of past sexual activity as a

he Court refused

where consent was

no. 2

girl

in the

42

(

1

9 9); Records
1

vol. 9, p. 59.

in statutory
I

of the

man

sex with one

she would consent to do

reiiised to

lui

in

where consent was not

C'ourt refused to permit cross-exiunination

activity except

likely that

cases where consent was

beyond rape

I

was

But even these judges

in the future.

Only

it

woman engaged

in issue.

to allow

State

v.

an expansion of the narrow rule

Simpson^ 78

Vl. 124 (1905).

Chiipter 5.
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I

it

test

had created

his issue

is

of general

in adiill

rape aiscs

discussed in detail in

What
is

difBcult to

efifect

did the Court's jurisprudence actually have

know how many women never came

their past sexual experiences aired in court.

on rape prosecutions?

It

forward because they feared having

We also do not know how many cases were

not prosecuted by the state because of this issue, or

how many men might have been

acquitted after the alleged victim had been impeached by the use of such testimony. But
I

do not

make

it

believe that jurists, in allowing such evidence, were motivated by any desire to

easier for

Vermont men to rape women and

girls.

We know that in some cases

admission of this evidence did not prevent convictions. For example,

in the

HoUenbeck

prosecution discussed above, after ruling that the defendant had a right to ask the alleged
victim

if she

had had sex with another

new trial. On retrial, Hollenbeck was
state prison.^"* Furthermore, at the

man the Supreme Court remanded the

again convicted and sentenced to ten years in the

same time

exception to the character evidence rule,

placed

men on notice

that

it

was

the

case for a

it

that the

Court was carving out

its

also developed a parallel line of cases

which

woman's perception of events that mattered

in

a

rape prosecution rather than the man's.

Rape Law and
I

the Female Perspective

have shown that Vermont society

particular

had

little

self-help." Instead

tolerance for anyone

it

in general

and

who engaged

valued the rule of law,

1

courts and juries in

in sexual deviance, violence, or

communal

"Report of the Superintendent of the State Prison for

its

peace, and the right to be

left

895-1 896," in Vermont State Officers Reports
'

for 1895-1896 (Rutland, 1896), 31.

"

"Self-help"

means taking an

action with legal consequences, whether legal or not-in

law into one's own hands. Black 's

Law Dictionary,
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ed.

efifect

taking the

alone.

At

the

same time

that the courts

evidence that applied only to

line

of cases

women

in

carefully defining the right

In so doing they

made

it

were carving out an exception to the

of

rules

rape cases, they were also developing a parallel

of a

woman to

clear that a determination

control male access to her body.

of whether a woman's

legal rights

had

been violated depended on her perceptions of events rather than those of the male
defendant.

Four years
for the rape

after the

Johnson case was decided

of Orilla Vincent,

of the Rockwell

Orilla,

aged twenty-one, had been a servant

John Hartigan, aged

family.

Sunday morning while the Rockwells were
flirting

wdth

He

Orilla.

thirty,

and raped

her.

Orilla then locked the door. Hartigan

left.

him

that if tried to

come

in,

if

she would

tell

would not take

his

home
One

Hartigan came in and started

she wanted to have a baby. She told

pushed her against a

flour

After thirty minutes, Hartigan got up

went around to a window, but she

Rockwell. Later, he begged her not to

what had happened, offering to pay her money and give her a
that she

in the

their newly-hired hand.

for $300. Hartigan grabbed her,

barrel, then forced her to the floor

and

was

at church,

propositioned her, asking

him she would not have one

1856, John Hartigan was tried

in

money and he threw

it

on the

silk scarf.

floor.

She

She

later

told

tell

testified

gave the

money-twenty-five cents-to Mrs, Rockwell.

Rockwell

testified that Orilla

was

silent at first

about the incident, but once she

asked her what was wrong, she told her what had happened and showed her marks and
bruises fi-om the assault. Orilla

strength,

of medium

apparent strength."

was described

size," Hartigan

Two

doctors

as being "a

was described

as being "of medium size, and

testified that as Orilla
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woman of good health and

had described the

assault "it

was

practically impossible that sexual connection or penetration could have taken place'"

presumably because she should have been able to physically
Harligan faced two counts

The

trial

in

the case, one for rape, the other for attempted rape.

for attempt.

lie told the jury that if they

Ilarligan's attempt for a lime, "but ultimately yielded,"

second count

Based on

for attempt,

this instruction,

likehliood

even

if

it

Ibund that she had

found that Vincent had resisted
could find him guilty of the

it

later

consented to the intercourse.

and perhaps on the testimony of the doctors concerning the

of actual penetration, the jury acquitted

llartigan

of the rape, but found him

of attempt.

On

appeal, Ihirtigan's lawyers argued that

if

Vincent had consented to the

intercourse, that consent "related back" to retroactively

Judge

Kellogg rejected

I.oyal (\

woman

that the

this

condone the

"It

woman

argument. Writing for the Court, he held

consented aHer the

fact,

and

we

with an intent to commit a rape as well as to the higher olTence."

If llartigan

had used force against Orilla Vincent with the

assiiult

committed a criminal

act.

He had no

did not matter

It

if

intent to rape her, he

right to assault her in the first place.

32 Vt. 607

(

I

had

she had later consented to the sexual

conviction and remanded the case for sentencing.^^

Hartif^an,

she later forgave

regard this principle as IxMUg applicable

of an

V.

if

that a

has never been regarded as a legal excuse Ibr the consummated olVence

to the case

intercourse.

later

initial assault.

could never retroactively consent to a sexual assault not even

her attacker.

Slate

Uartigmrs attempt.

judge, John Pierpoint, instructed the juiy on the law of rape, then turned to the

second count

guilty

Irustrate

K60).
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The Court upheld the

There are several ways to read Hartigan.

woman could be

On the

sexually attacked, resist, and then end

one hand, the notion

up consenting

that a

to intercourse

is

the bete noire of feminist rape critiques. This narrative of resistance then capitulation

women extremely vulnerable to

leaves

unwdlling to take "no" for an answer.

finely

honed technical sense of the

sexual attack and serves as an excuse for

On the

other hand, the Hartigan decision reflects a

right to bodily

autonomy.

Kellog's doubts that Orilla Vincent was assaulted at

on the

trial

women to

court.

issue

women at

all,

First, despite

Judge

he refused to impose

his opinion

Second, the legal schema imposed by the appellate court allowed

control access to their bodies

She could refuse and then consent

The

men

or, as

on a minute by minute, second by second

we

will see, she could consent

basis.

and then refuse.

of consent was dependent on the female's perspective and men attacked
their

own peril. Even assuming that

Orilla Vincent

had had consensual sex

with the hired hand, that had not immunized him for punishment for past bad acts

—even

those which led to the supposedly consensual sexual encounter.

Fourteen years

of Hartigan. In State
David Niles, aged

later,

v.

the Court

She

the rape of twelve-year-old Lillian Gray.^*

testified that

she had

left

were going

to have sex

" Hartigan himself did escape punishment in
sentencing, he was pardoned by the governor
1

On the way, Niles told

got to the sugar house. She testified

when they

the end.

Remanded back

instead.

State

V.

to the county court for

Hartigan, Addison County Court, June

860 Term, Docket No. 84.

At the time, the age of consent

in

Vermont was

eleven.
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1

Gray was

the house with Niles in late January

and walked two miles with him up to a nearby sugar house.
Lillian that they

facts

Niles (1 874) the Court heard an appeal of the conviction of

fifty-five, for

Niles' s step-daughter.

was confronted with the mirror image of the

8 1 8 Vt. Acts

that

he made no threats nor used any violence towards

her.

Lillian explained that

when

they got to the sugar house, Niles took off her under clothes, put her on some boards,

and climbed on top of her. She

made no

tried to get

tell

On the

way, Niles threatened her and told her

anyone about what had happened. Several months

Niles and took her with her to the

home of a

friend.

The

characterized as "unfriendly" toward Niles, asked Lillian

and

but he held her down. She

outcry. After fifteen minutes they walked to a nearby village where he bought

her a dress. They then returned home.

not to

away from him,

Lillian told her that she had.

Niles had threatened to

that Lillian

The

had had

trial

kill

She told Ladd

her and her mother

sex, probably

that she

if

friend, a

if

Mrs. Ladd,

left

who was

had not told anyone because

she did. Medical testimony showed

more than once.

the sexual act, but then withdrew her consent after

it,

mother

she had been abused by him

judge, Jonathan Ross, charged the jury that

thereafter forcibly continued

later, Lillian's

it

if Lillian

had consented to

had begun, and the defendant

knowing she objected,

it

was

still

rape.

The jury then

convicted Niles of rape.

On appeal, Niles argued, among other things,
could not then withdraw her permission

in the

that

once she had consented, she

middle of the

act.

"When

a

woman

exposes her person, invites sexual intercourse, rouses a man's passions and allows him,

in

pursuance of such

invitation, actually to penetrate her person, the

animal passions which have been roused by her

own

act, reftise to

mere

fact that the

submit to her

The state
commands-instantly to cease-has no resemblance to the high crime of rape."

on

the
the other hand argued that "rape implies violation of

occurs

at

any time during the carnal intercourse when the
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woman's person; and

woman withdraws

her

it

consent." The Supreme Court agreed with the

there

was no

rule

of universal application on the

into account the physical strength

and

all

Judge

state.

of the alleged

Homer

subject. Instead, the

that the trial judge's instruction

and Niles's continued action rendered him
grounds.^^

On retrial,

adultery instead.

Royce held

Court could take

was not

guilty

on the

facts

guilty,

error and that Lillian's resistance

of rape. The Court reversed on other

he was sentenced to four years

The Court spoke again on

this issue, this

in prison.'*"

time in a decision stemming from a

ravishment case which feU between Hartigan and Niles and was decided
defendant. Royal Blodgett,

worked

family. Charles's daughter,

for Charles Alexander

Mary Alexander, aged

fifteen,

sexually assaulted by Royal Blodgett in her father's

her then grabbed her shoulders and tried to

would

tell

her father.

lift

and had been

her dress.

Mary

A few days later,

Blodgett continued to

1872.

living

The

with the

bam. Blodgett exposed himself to

kitchen, held her, exposed himself and again tried to

father.

in

civil

claimed that she had been

lift

told

him

to "desist" and

while her parents were out,

Blodgett told her he wanted to do the same thing to her again.

mother who told her

of the case,

the prosecutor changed tactics and tried the married Niles for

Found

that if he did not she

that

victim, her relationship to the defendant,

the other circumstances disclosed by the evidence. Based

Royce wrote

E.

He

chased her around the

her clothes.

work and

Mary

live in the

told her

household for

Vermont law allowed a witness to testify that the alleged victim had
was not however permitted to give the
told her of the assault and named the perpetrator. The witness
and this
name of the perpetrator or the particulars of the crime. Mrs. Ladd had done just that in Niles
State

was

V.

Niles,

47

Vt. 82 (1874).

the ground for reversal.

For Niles's

1

875 conviction

for adultery see

"Report of the Superintendent of the State Prison

for

{K\i\.\B,nd, 1876), 15. Prosecutors
1876 "in Vermont Legislative Documents and Official Reports
adultery against defendants in the
sometimes hedged their bets and brought counts for both rape and
December 1896 Term, State Cases, vol. 4,
same prosecution. State v. Shedrick, Windsor County Court,
Docket
Sterlin, Windsor County Court, May 1866 Term,
p 286 (statutory rape and adultery); State v.
Bridgman, Windsor County Court, December 1857
Nos. 107-109 (rape, adultery, lewdness); State v.
Term, State Cases, vol. 1, p. 543-544 (rape and adultery).
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another year before being

it

was then

fired.

He went

work

to

for a business rival

of Alexander's and

that Charles Alexander brought suit against Blodgett for the assault

on

his

daughter. Blodgett denied that the assaults had ever taken place.

After the evidence had been presented, the

instructed the jury in the Niles case

assault

and assauU and

jurors that

was

in

battery.

two years

trial

later,

In the case of the

judge, the same Judge Ross

charged the jury on the law of

first

incident in the

bam, Ross

had merely exposed himself and "went towards

if Blodgett

accordance with her wishes, and

laid

hands on her supposing

her wishes and desire, that would not amount to any assault there."

incident in the kitchen

Ross

who

it

told the

her, supposing

was not

As

for the

it

against

second

instructed the jurors that:

when he pursued her, (which would evidently indicate that she didn't
desire him to come near her and take hold of her,) if he did take hold of
her,

it

would amount evidently

to an assault and battery.

On the

second

exposed himself, and she knew what his desire was, and he
went towards her, and she did not flee fi-om him, and evidently gave him
occasion

license,

if he

perhaps

it

The jury then returned a

would be

virtual consent, (emphasis in the original)

verdict for the defendant and Alexander appealed.

Judge Hoyt H. Wheeler began
of persons to be

fi-ee

fi-om fear

his opinion

with a ringing endorsement of the right

of an assauh. "The

plaintiff had

a right to absolute

security against any attempt to violate her person," he wrote, and "any invasion of that

right

was

unlawfiil,

actionable."

and

Though

if proceeded

the

trial

with so far as to interfere with her person was

judge had correctly stated the law for assaults generally,

case
according to Wheeler, he had failed to take into account the sexual nature of the
instruction that so long as the
before him. Wheeler focused on that part of Judge Ross's

defendant thought

Mary

desired his attentions his exposing himself, coming towards her,
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and putting

hands on her could not be an assault and

his

that for a 'Virtuous

woman or

what the defendant attempted
Blodgett thought, but what

all, it

proceeded

was

in that

rejected this, noting

could be no more grievous personal injury than

Mary Alexander perceived.
his

person and went toward the

unlawful. If he did so

manner

till

when he was

plaintiff in her

near enough or

he got near enough to her to indicate a

purpose to violate her person, and to

do

He

do to her and what mattered was not what Royal

to

exposed

If the defendant
sight at

girl" there

battery.

justly put her in fear that he

he was guilty of an assault upon her. What he supposed about her

so,

wishes or desires would make

gave him the right

directly

to

it

none the

suppose

so.

an assault unless she
He had no right to make any

less

attempt in that direction without her express

and direct

consent,

had and obtained. If he proceeded at all without
consent, it was at his own risk, (emphasis added).

that, too, first

and full

No

feelings

would

from him

if she

did so

fear

suchfi-ee

and the influence

it

would have upon her movements and

constitute an actionable injury to her." Further, she had no obligation to

in

order to sustain her claim since she might stay without consenting "and

should not be taken against her." The Court reversed the defense verdict

it

and returned the case to the

trial

court/'

Rounding out the Court's jurisprudence on the
assault cases

was an 1890

decision. State

v.

testifying that

question.

As

Alexander

v.

odd given the
this case, but

he had been so drunk

of male

intent in sexual

He

claimed intoxication as a defense,

time that he had no

memory of the

events in

a result, he argued that he could not have formed the requisite mental

Blodgett^ 44 Vt. 476 (1872).

fact that the
it

at the

issue

Hanlon. James Hanlon had been charged

with the attempted rape of Anna Thompson.

"

and

touching was required to prove the sexual assault according to the Court because the

mere "imposition of the

flee

would

is

may explain why

The Courts' emphasis on

defendant never raised a consent defense.

the issue of consent in Blodgett

is

We do not have the transcript of

nan est factum. This
possible that Blodgett argued consent as an alternative defense to
the issue

vk^as

raised at

all.
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intent necessary to

was a

commit a

criminal act. Courts were split as to whether intoxication

valid defense to a criminal act.

Vermont, a dry

state since

1

852, had

little

tolerance for this defense, and the Court ruled in 1878 that voluntary intoxication

not a defense to a crime."^ The

was a defense and

in fact told

difference. Instead, the jury

assault to determine

what

trial

them

was

judge

his intent

refiised to instruct the jury that intoxication

aflOrmatively that if Hanlon

to focus

on what Hanlon

was drunk,

made no

had been, rather than what might have been

that both the victim and the others present at the time

of the

trial

in his

court noting

assault all agreed as to

what

place.''^

Thus,

rules

it

did and said at the time of the

mind. The jury convicted. The Supreme Court, on appeal, upheld the

had taken

was

at the

same time the courts were carving out

of evidence permitting

this

gendered exception to the

specific sexual character evidence to reftite a claim

consent, they were also creating another line of cases making

it

clear that in

of

Vermont,

the question of civil and criminal culpability for sexual assaults depended on the female's

perspective.

The courts

rejected attempts by defense lawyers (and

some

create a subjective male-centered standard for determining consent.

permitted to escape punishment because they "thought" the

trial

judges) to

Men were

not

woman consented.

Instead,

they were on notice that they had to be sensitive to the woman's desires, as she

perceived them, at

matter

if they

all

times-not just before the act-but during

were mentally impaired by alcohol

either.

It

was

it

as well.

And

it

did not

their actions that

483 (1878). Tatro was a prosecution for the axe murder of a woman, Alice
is the
Butler, by her husband's hired hand. An example of the Vermont courts' attitude toward alcohol
1890 sentence of John O'Neil of Whitehall, New York to fifty- four years imprisonment for mailing
federalism grounds.
liquor into the state c.o.d. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the sentence, mostly on
State

State

V.

State

V.

Tatro, 50 Vt.

O'Neil, 58 Vt. 140 (1885); aff'd 144 U.S. 323 (1892).

V.

Hanlon, 62 Vt. 334 (1890).
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mattered and the

eflfect

of those actions on women, not what they thought the

woman

wanted.

Corroboration

While some legal rulings might appear to work a hardship on rape complainants

sometimes the opposite was

at first glance,

true.

Take

for

example another exception to

the general rules of evidence which at least one judge believed applied to rape

cases-corroboration. In State

first

time that a

man

v.

Bedard (1892) a Supreme Court judge

stated for the

could not be convicted for rape solely on the testimony of the

woman. Judge Loveland Munson,

taking a page fi-om

Mathew Hale, noted

that rape

complaints were "easily simulated" and that proof of the complaint was received "in
disregard of the general rules of evidence, because of the peculiar nature of the charge,

and of the suspicion with which the law regards the testimony of the prosecutrix."
Judge Munson' s statement was not supported by any authority and
precedent for

it

in

any Vermont materials which preceded the decision. In

judges imposed the corroboration requirement only

relied solely

in

in criminal

I

can find no

fact,

Vermont

cases where the state

on the testimony of an accomplice or particeps criminis such

as the partner

an adultery case and even that was not law, but simply a rule of practice-and one not

closely adhered to at that.'"

reflected

At

first

glance such special requirements (and the attitude

by them) might lead one to believe

that this

new

line

of reasoning would work a

Munson' s rule seemed to
hardship on alleged rape victims and prosecutors-after aU,
crime rather than as an alleged
conceive of the female complainant as an accompUce to a

^

State

V.

Potter,

42 Vt. 495 (1869).
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But instead of using the law to shield rape defendants,

victim.

hands of the

state.

For

in

making the statements as he

did.

it

was

a sword in the

Judge Munson was

justifying

the introduction of stale's evidence harmful to the defendant, and not normally

permitted. In

home

Bcdard the

trial

court had allowed the state to

aller the alleged assault, the

woman cried

's

case.

I

'urthermore, evidence of a

that while returning

continuously. Judge

special need for corroboration, upheld the admission

the state

show

Munson,

of such evidence

woman's

in

citing the

order to bolster

physical or mental distress

following the alleged assault could be used to explain "what might otherwise be deemed
a suspicious delay in making complaint."

conviction and sentenced him to ten years

The Supreme Court upheld

Bedcird's

in prison."*^

Just as the Court's belief that consent

was hard

to

prove had allowed exceptions

to the general rules governing the admission of chtiracter evidence, the corroboration

handicap meant that courts allowed prosecution evidence which was generally
inadmissible in other criminal cases. For example, the courts allowed testimony by

witnesses that the

assailant.

This

had complained to them of being assaulted and had mmied the

woman

was a

clear exception to the hearsay rule-one

which aided prosecutors

and harmed defendants. Challenged repeatedly, the Court upheld the admission of such
evidence each time,

Slate

V.

finally

declaring in 1918 that the matter

was

settled for good."''

278 (1892); "Biennial Report of the Superintendent of the
Vermont State Officers' Reports for IH93-IS94 (Rutland, 1894), 28.

Ik'darJ, 65 Vt.

1893-1894"

in

And

State I*rison for

asserted. Davis v.
an out of court statement intended to prove the truth of the matter
Juslice and Public Officer (Rutland, 1906),
Fuller, 12 Vt. 178 (1840); Henry A. Harmon, The Vermont
woman or girl had reported an assault to them
350. Vermont law permitted witnesses to testily that the
but the
witness to name the man
that she had named an assailant. It did not permit the

*^

"Hearsay"

and

is

to allirm

alleged victim could

do

that.

Slale

v.

Carroll, 67 Vt.

477 (1895); Slate
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v.

Niles,

47

Vt.

82 (1874).

lastly,

despite MunsoiVs belief that corroboration

was

required, defendants were

convicted solely on the uncorroborated testimony of women and

Conviction Rates

girls/^

County Courts

in the

Assessing the impact of character evidence, corroboration requirements, and

woman-centered perceptions of sexual

We caji never know how many
prosecuted.

Thus

we

cannot

on

assault

ctTorts to enlorce rape laws

rapes actually took place as compared to those

know how many women

refused to bring such charges

because they feared being cross-examined about past actions. Nor can

a

woman's

past history

may have

attempted rape cases did not go to a verdict, but

we

data beyond knowing

can only do so

how many

commit rape

which went to

trial

And even

then,

I

identified

1

1

1

prosecutions Ibr rape and assault with

(hereinaller "attempted rape")

of women above the age of consent

or plea. In addition, another thirty-three cases went to verdict for

was probably

County beginning

rape and

records do not allow us to qu;uitify

cases were ultimately not pursued.

assaults ol'a sexual nature (including lewdness).

verdict

tiie

Many

Ibr certain periods in the various counties.

Between 1794 and 1920
intent to

we know whether

inlluenced grand juries or prosecutors not to go

forward with a prosecution because of the prosecutrix's past history.

this

is dillicult.

in

1

he number of cases actually going to

slightly higher than this since the figure rellects data

1827 and from Rutland (\)unly beginning

in

from Addison

1838.

Stimpsofu "IJricflbr Slate," 3 and ^XYTlificalioii of Appeal," 2; Vermont
there was no corrolx)rating testimony.
Reports liriefs, 78(1), no. 19 ( l<)().S) where the defense argued that
upholding the conviction. State v.
he Supreme t\nirt never addressed tliis point in its opinion

Sec

for

example. State

v

I

Stimpson^ 78 Vt. 124 (1905).
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When a

prosecutor did decide to go forward with charges, defendants faced the

likelihood of conviction either by jury verdict or plea."* In the fifty-two rape cases which

went to

trial

or verdict, thirty-four (65 percent) resulted

in

a guilty verdict by jury

(twenty-five) or by plea (nine). Out of these thirty-four convictions, six were convictions

two

for lesser offenses (four for attempted rape and

for simple assault).

In fourteen

cases (27 percent) the jury acquitted the defendant. In three cases the jury was hung and

in

one case the prosecution dismissed the case while

cases going to

trial

at trial.

In addition to the fifty-two

or verdict, another four prosecutions ended in defaults with

defendants forfeiting their bonds (see Table

5).

A prison sentence was imposed in twenty-five rape cases.
for those convicted

of rape was 8.6

years."^

Those convicted of the

attempt received an average sentence of 7.6 years. Fines

rare

The average sentence

in lieu

lesser offense

of

of prison were extremely

where the defendant had been convicted of rape. Only one instance of this was

recorded.^*'

One way

to put these figures in context

non-sexual crime

like

homicide went to

trial

(fifty-two for

is

to

compare them

homicide. During the same period, eighty-four prosecutions for
or plea. Fifty-six cases (67 percent) resulted in guilty verdicts

murder or manslaughter and four

for assauh).

Twenty-seven cases (32

percent) resuhed in acquittals (including five by reason of insanity).

1

assume

for

to another serious,

purposes of this study that a plea bargain was an alternative to

One

case resuhed in

trial.

where judges imposed a sentence falling between a range of years, 1 used the lower figure.
ten years, used the eight-year
a case in which the judge imposed a sentence of from eight to

In cases

I

Thus,

in

figure.

Bowker pled guilty to the rape of Susan Smith. Payment of a $225 fine within
in the state prison. State v. Bowker,
twenty-four hours was imposed as an alternative to a sentence
In

1

882, George

Windsor County Court, May

1

882 Term, State Cases,

vol. 3, p. 181.
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Table 5

Outcomes of Cases Going
Cause

Total

Guilty

52^

Rape

to 1 rial or Verdict'

Guilty (Jury) Guilty (Plea)

Not Guilty

34 (65%)'

25 (48%)

Homicide

56 (67%)'

42 (50%)

14

(17%)

27 (32%)

Alt.

Rape

51 (86%)*

34 (58%)

16(28%)

7(12%)

Att.

Murder

123 (89%)'^ 60 (43%)

63 (46%)

Sex. Assault

138"

33"

(94%)

31

8

(24%)

9(17%)

14

23 (70%)

Avr. Sent

(27%)

Avr. Fine

8.6 years"

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

4.6 years''

$37/88

14(10%)

5.4 years''

$73/81

%)

2.0 years""

$75

2

(

6

Data covers Orange County (1794-1920); Windsor County (1790-1920); Addison County (1827-1920);
Rutland County (1839-1920).
'

hung juries and

^

This figure includes 3 cases ending

^

Includes 4 verdicts for attempted rape and

^

N=25. Average sentence

^

One

*

Includes convictions for

^

One

*

Includes 15 verdicts for assault.

^

N=30. Average sentence

for a

in

I

lor

1

case nolle pressed during

trial.

simple assault.

rape conviction (8.6 years) and for attempt (7.6 years).

case ended in a hung jury.

case

The

was

first

first

and second degree murder, manslaughter, and

nolle prossed during

figure

is

tor

trial.

an attempted rape conviction (4.6 years) and

average tine

in

assault.

attempted rape verdicts (n=9);

tlie

for assault (3.25).

second

is

for assault verdicts

(n=9).

One case

resulted in a

hung jury.

Includes 59 verdicts for attempted murder and 64 for assault.

" N=83. The average sentence for an attempted murder conviction (5.4 years) and

for assault (1 .6

years).

The

first

figure

is

average fine

for

attempted murder verdict (n=15); the second

Includes 29 cases for lewdness and four for assault.

>*N=18.
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is

for assault (n-27).

a hung jury and three more defendants were not prosecuted

because they were

at all

found to be insane. The data shows that conviction rates for rape and homicide were
within

two percentage

points of one another (67 v. 65 percent).

The

homicide was 5 percent higher however, perhaps because, unlike
defendants feced a possible death penalty (see Table
Fifty-nine cases for attempted rape

went to

percent) resulted in convictions. Thirty-four

and sixteen more pled
convictions, sixteen

guilty (28 percent).

were

acquittals (12 percent). In addition, there

forfeited

trial.

bonds and defaulted and one

in

in rape cases,

homicide

5, above).

trial

men were

Out of the

for the lesser ofifense

acquittal rate for

or plea. Fifty-one cases (86

convicted by juries (58 percent)

fifty-one cases resulting in

of assault. Seven cases resulted

were another nine cases

in

in

which defendants

which the prosecutor dismissed the case during

Thirty defendants convicted of attempted rape and assault received confinement as

punishment. The average sentence for those convicted of attempt was 4.6 years and
3.25 years for those convicted of assault.

One of the

hospital and four received probation. Fines in lieu

convicts

was sentenced

to the state

of prison were more common for

those convicted of attempted rape than for rape convictions. The average fine

cases

when

this

occurred was $37. Interestingly, the average

in the nine

fine in nine cases in

attempted rape defendants were found guilty of the lesser offense of assault was

higher-$88 (see Table
Again,

we

5,

which

far

above).

can try to get some perspective on these figures by comparing them

with another violent, but non-sexual crime, attempted murder. One hundred thirty-eight
cases for attempted murder went to verdict.

resulted in convictions (sixty-three

One hundred and twenty-three

by plea bargain,
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sbrty

by jury

verdict).

(89 percent)

Sixty-four

verdicts were for the lesser offense of assault. Fourteen cases (10 percent) resulted in

of which were by reason of insanity). The jury was hung

acquittals (four

one defendant was not prosecuted because he was found
murder,

we

to be insane.

see very close similarities in conviction patterns

in

one case and

As with rape and

when we compare attempted

rape and attempted murder prosecutions. Attempted murder conviction rates were
slightly higher than those for

and acquittal rates

attempted rape (89 percent versus 86 percent respectively)

for attempted

percent respectively) (see Table

One

last

of the charge.

murder were

5, p.

and a $300

lower (10 percent versus 12

253).

category of sexual assaults were those

I

in

uncovered thirty-three cases of assaults

lewdness prosecutions which went to

jail

slightly

trial

which rape was not an element

that

were

explicitly sexual

during this period. Punishable by two years in

fine (increased to five years in jail in 1888),

lewdness ran the gamut Irom

public exposure to sexually assaultive behavior including fondling and

Of the

thirty-three cases

which went to

convictions. Eight convictions

were by plea (70
five cases

percent).

resuUed

clothing."

were by juries (24 percent) and twenty-three convictions

In eighteen

conviction the defendants were confined.

Two

lifting

verdict, thirty-one (94 percent) resulted in

Only two cases (6 percent) resulted

in defaults.

and

in acquittals.

of the thirty-one cases

Another

resulting in a

The average prison sentence was two years.

other convicts were confined to the industrial school. Eight other convicts paid

fines averaging seventy-five dollars (see Table 5, p. 253).

" Lewdness, prohibited
statute

99

§ 8;

law

in

1839.

in 1779,

dropped out of the legal code

Soule, 12: 39-41; Revised Statutes

1888 Vt. Acts 138.
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in 1797, but

of Vermont.

then reappeared in the

(Burlington, 1840), Chapter

Another way to place the figures

for rape and attempted rape in context

compare the results when defendants were found
of simple

is

to

guilty (or pled guilty) to the lesser offense

Courts treated convictions for assault arising out of a charge of rape or

assault.

attempted rape much differently than they treated an assault which was not related to sexual

For one

assault.

thing, in

no case was a man tried

for rape found guilty

of the

of assault. In only two cases was a man accused of rape permitted to plea
Defendants convicted of the lesser offense of assault

in

lesser offense

to assault.

a rape or attempted rape

proceeding either by plea or verdict received disproportionately harsher sentences than
defendants foimd guilty of assault where the charge was not a lesser offense

assault case.

The

vast majority

of the 570

assault cases

which went to a

in

a sexual

guilty verdict

(73 percent) were resolved by payment of a small fine averaging twenty-six dollars.

Only

1

16 (20 percent) of assault cases resulted

sentence

was a

were just as

little

likely to

women were more

in

a jail term of any kind. The average

under ten months. Interestingly, while

be found guilty as men

likely to

who

men who

assaulted

assaulted other men,

be jailed for the assault" (see Table

women

men who

attacked

6).

In contrast to assault cases, assault convictions arising out of rape or attempted

rape prosecutions had more serious consequences. Five out of these eighteen
convictions resulted in jail or prison sentence (28 percent as opposed to 20 percent for

simple assault cases) and those sentences averaged far longer (3.45 years versus 9.75

months). The average fine in assault convictions arising out of rape and attempted rape

prosecutions

was

also far higher than the average for assault prosecutions (ninety-six

dollars versus twenty-six for assault). Thus,

judges punished

men

implicated in sexual

« Out of the 149 men convicted of assaulting female victims, 27 percent were confined. Out of the 431
men convicted of assaulting other men, 8 percent were confined.
1
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Table 6
Penalties for Assault Convictions

Compared

to Assault Convictions Arising out of Rape

and Attempted Rape Cases
Cause

Total

Confinement

570

Assault

Rape/Att.

assaults

116(20%)

18

more

harshly even

Avr. Sent,

5

if the

years

$26

3.4 years

$96

.8

(28%)

Avr. Fine

evidence could only sustain a conviction for the lesser

offense of assault.

Not

all

cases in which a rape or attempted rape

was

alleged ended

up

in court.

Prosecutors had the discretion to decide whether or not to prosecute a given criminal
case by having the court enter a "nolle prosequr in the docket book. Gathering this
information allows us to determine the percentage of sexual assault cases that were

brought but never prosecuted. Clerks

in the different counties

began keeping track of

nolle prosequis by specific criminal cause of action at different times.

differentiated

between statutory rape and ordinary rape

They

in these entries so

rarely

non-

prosecution rates combine these two criminal causes of action. The rates ranged

between 14 and 25 percent depending on the county. The
the four counties combined

was 22

total

non-prosecution rate for

percent^^ (see Table 7).

" Windsor (1851-1920) (27 percent for rape, attempted rape, statutory rape, and attempted statutory
percent);
rape combined); Orange County (1880-1920) (16 percent); Addison County (1883-1920) (18
Rutland County (1893-1920) (25 percent).
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Table 7

Comparative Non-Prosecution Rates

Cause

To Verdict

209

146 (70%)

69

58 (84%)

8

(12%)

3

111

91 (82%)

11

(10%)

9 (8%)

470

341 (73%)

103 (22%)

26 (6%)

Homicide

Murder

Simple Assault

Although the conviction and
favorably, the non-prosecution rates

to prosecute

murder

Four Counties'

Total

Sexual Assault^

Att.

in the

more often

Nolle Prossed

Other^

47 (22%)

acquittal rates for rape

show important

16(8%)

and homicide compared very

differences. Prosecutors chose not

in sexual assault cases than they did in

murder and attempted

cases. Prosecutors failed to pursue cases in only 12 percent

of homicide cases

and 9 percent of attempted murder cases. The combined non-prosecution

two crimes was

On the

(4%)

rate for these

10.5 percent, or half the rate for the sexual assault cases (22 percent).

other hand, the non-prosecution rate in simple assault cases was almost

identical to that

of sexual

low of 12.5 percent

in

assaults.

The non-prosecution

Addison County

rate for aU four counties

to a high

was 22 percent or equal

rate for assaults ranged

of 26 percent

in Rutland.

The

from a

overall

to the overall non-prosecution rate for

sexual assaults (see Table 7, above).

'

Windsor County (1851-1920); Orange County (1880-1920); Addison County (1883-1920); Rutland

County (1893-1920).
^

Includes cases not carried forward by the court and defaults.

^

rape.
Includes rape, attempted rape, statutory rape, and attempted statutory
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Comparison with Other
Another way to place the Vermont data
findings of other scholars

working

Jurisdictions

in context is

in other jurisdictions.

by comparing

it

with the

The most analogous study

is

a

1993 doctoral dissertation by Kathleen Parker. Parker examined the outcome of every
rape, attempted rape, statutory rape, and indecent liberties case (the analog to attempted

statutory rape in this study) brought in

1

Ingham County, Michigan between 1 850 and

950. The county represents a demographically more diverse and dynamic jurisdiction

than that of Vermont. The population of the county grew rapidly during
fi-om 25,000 in

1870 to over 50,000 by 1910 and 130,000 by 1940. Encompassing the

state capital at Lansing,

economic engines: the
imiversity.

By

this period,

it

represented a diverse

state

economy centered around

three

government, automobile manufacturing, and a large

the 1920s, the expansion of the automobile industry began attracting poor

whites and blacks fi-om the South.

Parker found

far

fewer forcible rape cases in Ingham County. She documents

only forty cases during a hundred-year period (Vermont shows a

minimum of one

himdred rape prosecutions and the number was presumably higher given the incomplete
data in

some

coimties).

Between 1850 and 1897, she documents only fourteen rape

cases of which only one resulted in a conviction. Almost

all

of these were intra-family

required victims to prove utmost resistence.

rapes.

From 1 872 onward, Michigan law

Of the

twenty-six cases brought between 1897 and 1950, nine were brought in the

1940s.

and

its

It is

obvious that there were significant dififerences between Vermont rape law

application and the experience of Ingham County, Michigan.

^ Kathleen Ruth

Parker, "Law, Culture, and Sexual Censure: Sex

County Circuit Court, 1850-1950" (Ph.D.

diss..

Crime Prosecutions

University of Michigan, 1993),
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in a

7, 26, 58.

Midwest

Comparing Parker's data with mine

methodology and

"unknown" and

analysis.

Parker

lists

the

is diflScult

because of differences in

outcome of large percentages of cases as

calculates conviction rates as a percentage of the total

number of

prosecutions initiated rather than as a percentage of cases which went to

have gone to

trial

had they not resulted

in a plea bargain.

When she

trial

or would

calculates this

way,

her conviction rates for rape are quite low (37.5 percent convicted, 12.5 percent
acquitted, 32.5 percent nolle prossed, 17.5 percent unknown).

the outcome in 17.5 percent of her cases

actual conviction rates based

on

this

it

is

Since

we do

not

know

hard to have a good understanding of the

method. Based on the lower overall numbers for

rape and what she understands as low conviction rates she argues that "there was a

remarkable disinclination to prosecute cases of forcible rape."

low numbers

true given the

overall.

greater reluctance of juries to find a

to find a

who

man

actually

guilty

of raping a

went to verdict

However, she

show

may

very well be

also claims that the figures "reveal a

guilty" than

we

calculate conviction rates for

men

Ingham County, we

find that seventy-five percent

were

But when

convicted and twenty-five percent were acquitted.

acquittal rates

this

man accused of raping an adult woman

child.

in

And

instead that prosecutors

were

The high conviction rates and low
carefiil to

bring cases they

knew

they

could win. Even so, the overall low numbers and the utmost resistence requirement

surely

meant

that

women were

less likely to report

rapes and prosecutors less likely to

pursue them than in Vermont.^^
Parker's data for attempted rape

four cases for attempted rape (versus a

"

Parker, 77-1 12, 472, Table

is

also subject to the

same

minimum of eighty-five

5.
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caveats.

Of seventy-

in the four counties), she

shows 64.8 percent convicted,

show conviction rates

Recalculated to

to

4.1 percent acquitted, and 13.5 percent

for cases going to verdict the percentages

94 percent convicted and 6 percent acquitted. Once

show prosecutors very

When Parker's

figures are adjusted to

verdict, her conviction rates are higher than

fairly severe.

points lower, those

County. As

Though

trial

acquittal figures

to

trial.

rates for cases going to

Both

states

showed high

rates

of

or verdict and in both states sentences for convicts

the conviction rate for Vermonters going to

who were

change

Vermont's (8 percent higher than Vermont

trial

was ten

convicted faced longer sentences than those in Ingham

noted above, twenty-seven of the thirty-four

I

low

win when going

show conviction

for rape and 10 percent higher for attempted rape).

were

again, her

carefully choosing cases they could

conviction for cases going to

unknown.

men

convicted in rape

prosecutions received prison sentences and only one convict received a fine in lieu of
prison (the remaining defendants were convicted of lesser offenses and fined or

convicted of rape and then

fi-eed after appeals).

The average imprisonment

for those

charged with rape and convicted of rape or a lesser offense was about eight years.

the thirteen

men

convicted of rape in Parker's

the average

was

five years.

twenty-eight

Two

men who were

other

work who received determinate

men were

sentenced to

life

in prison.

sentenced to determinant sentences for attempted rape,

Vermont. These lower average sentences occurred despite the

5*

As

maximum

sentences (up to

life

in prison) for

with the calculations for average sentences in Vermont,

a range of years

sentences,

Of the

Parker shows an average prison sentence of 3.2 years as opposed to 4.6 years

provided longer

Of

was imposed.
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1

fact that

both

in

Michigan law

oflfenses.^^

used the lower figure where a sentence

Parker found overall rates of non-prosecution for rape, attempted rape,
statutory
rape, and indecent liberties with a child (the analog to attempted statutory rape
in

my

study) of 1 8 percent. This compares to an overall non-prosecution rate of 22 percent
for

these causes combined in the Vermont courts. In both Michigan and Vermont, the

numbers and conviction

rates for sex cases involving underage girls

were higher than

those cases involving adult women. In contrasting what Parker considers to be low
figures for prosecutions involving adult

Ingham County Court was

that the

far

women with those

more

solicitous

involving

girls,

she argues

towards young victims than

it

was

toward adult women.
Three other works include systematic surveys of trial court records of sexual
assault in

Canada during

the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

One from the

Canadian West and two from Ontario. In a survey of 125 rape and rape-related cases
the Canadian

man was

West between 1 890 and 1 920,

historian Terry

Chapman found

that not

one

sentenced to prison for his crimes."

Two

in-depth studies from Ontario provide a less startling record of non-

prosecution, but

still

represent significant differences between this jurisdiction and

Vermont. The law of rape
penalty

was

years to

life

available as punishment in Ontario until

was

permitted.

For one

itself was quite different.

The

possibility

1

thing, only the death

873 when imprisonment for seven

of a death sentence may well have

contributed to prosecutors' hesitation to charge, and jurors' hesitation to convict. In

addition, the Ontario Legislature

was

far

more involved

Vermont's General Assembly. Whereas the law

" Terry

L.

in

Chapman, "Sex Crimes

in the

in

in crafting rape

Vermont underwent

law than

little

change

West, 1890-1920," Alberta History 35 (Fall 1987): 6-18.
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during the nineteenth century, Canadians tinkered with their law radically and
often. In
response, the judiciary repeatedly limited efforts to expand the reach of sexual
assauU

law

in Ontario.

It

required the

Crown

to prove utmost resistance (including out-cry)

the part of the alleged victim in order to sustain

its

on

case and refused to permit a rape

prosecution where the intercourse had been accomplished on an unconscious or mentally

impaired victim.

Canadian historian Constance Backhouse reviewed prosecutions
courts from

1

forty-nine (21

840
.5

to

1

892. She shows that out of

1

in the

Ontario

87 rape cases which went to verdict,

percent) resuUed in a rape conviction, and thirty-three

more (14.5

percent) resuUed in a conviction for a lesser offense for a total conviction rate of 36

percent.

She

lists

105 cases as resulting

one cases (18 percent) she could not

in

a fmding of not guilty (46 percent). In forty-

find a record

of the

final disposition

Unlbrtimately, Backhouse does not explain her methodology so

how

she deah with cases brought but not prosecuted. She

her "not guilty" figures or they

lists

as

may have comprised

outcome unknown. Backhouse

"abysmally low," and writes that

it

of the case.

is difficult

may have

background and

the eighteen percent of cases she

characterizes the conviction rates for rape as

'Vomen who were

raped could expect

actions, striving to ensure that only the

"^'^
She found
were granted protection.

years for

men

know

included them in

little

from criminal courts. Skeptical lawyers, judges, and jurors pored over every
their

to

sympathy

detail

most 'deserving'

typical prison sentences

of

women

of from seven to ten

convicted of rape after 1873 and sentences for lesser offenses of from

Backhouse, Petticoats and Prejudice, 111,331.
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several months to several years between

1

840 and

1

890 but does not

further specify this

information.

Backhouse argues (based on reported appeUate cases only)
not extend protection to

women of doubtful reputation or

cites several egregious cases in

of the

which assaults on

victims' dubious station in

attackers.

She

life,

also reports that in the

that the courts

would

independent women. She

women resulted

in acquittals

because

despite obvious evidence of the guilt of their

few cases

in

which independent

complaint, their assailants were acquitted. All of this

rape cases and low conviction rates she documents

may

woman made

explain the low

when compared

to the

number of

Vermont

experience.^^

Canadian historian Karen Dubinsky surveyed the records of over twenty counties
in Ontario

between 1880 and 1929. She found some 348 prosecutions

for rape,

attempted rape, statutory rape and indecent assauh. The overaU conviction rate for these
crimes combined was 49 percent. The dispositions of 9 percent of the cases was

unknown. As with Backhouse's work, Dubinsky does not explain how she generated
her figures and does not differentiate between statutory and non-statutory cases.

we know whether

she considered nolle pressed cases or even

in her "not guilty" figures, so

it

is

if

Nor do

she simply included them

hard to compare her figures with mine. Nonetheless,

Constance B. Backhouse, "Nineteenth-Century Canadian Rape Law, 1800-1892," in Essays in the
History of Canadian Law, vol. 2, ed. David H. Flaherty (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983),

Backhouse writes that between 1840 and 1892
approximately 330 cases for rape, statutory rape, assault with intent to commit rape, and indecent
assault "went to trial." Backhouse, "Rape Law," 212. In 1891 the population of Ontario was 2.1
201-247. To put her figures

in perspective.

During the same period, almost 100 such cases went to
which had a combined population in 1890 of 121,481 people.
million.
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trial

or verdict in the four counties

it

is

worth noting

that in the four counties

between

1

880 and 1920, 247 cases for rape,

statutory rape, and lewdness were brought in four small counties
of Vermont.^

Again,

it

would seem

that

Vermonters brought

did people in Canada and Michigan.

much

Two

far

more cases of this type than

conclusions are possible.

First,

Vermont had

higher rates of sexual assault than these other places. This seems very
unlikely

given the state's historically low rates of violent crime. The second possible explanation
is

that prosecutors, victims, or both

who

sexually assaulted

sexual violence against

were much more

likely to bring

charges against

women. This could

reflect

women

or violence of any kind in general. The

in particular

development of Vermont's rape law indicates

men

a legal culture unwilling to tolerate

that this

was

in fact true.

This review of rape law provides us insight into the legal elements of proof as
they developed and changed

at the

hands of Vermont's appellate judges. The figures

fi-om the trial courts allow us to get a sense

of the overall conviction rates

prosecutions compared to other major offenses

jurisdictions as well.

principles

But what did a rape

of the law play out

at the local

once a human face was put on the actors

Rape

trial

in

for rape

the state and in comparison to other

actually look like?

How did abstract

courthouse? What do these cases look

in these

Trials in

like

dramas?

Action

Transcript evidence fi-om both adult and statutory rape cases indicates that

despite the appellate decisions' focus

focused on the

—seeming

men

on

women

(for better or worse), juries

and judges

to ignore the character, circumstances, and veracity

^ Karen

Dubinsky, Improper Advances: Rape and Heterosexual Conflict
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), Appendix, Table 3.
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in Ontario, 1 880- 1 929

of the

aUeged victims—as weU as the plausible defenses of the accused.
Take the case of Slate
V.

Danforth, an 1894 prosecution for rape and attempted rape
brought

County. Mary Josephs was a forty year-old Syrian immigrant

in

who spoke

Windsor
almost no

English. Married with three children, she lived with her family
in Burlington. She had

taken the train

down

to

South Royalton where she had been peddling door-to-door,

carrying her goods with her in a vaUse as she walked the back roads of
the rural town.

judge would

later

eight year-old

note her "forelom and friendless condition." Danforth was a thirty-

shoemaker who

slow he did odd jobs

from a

A

for local

visit to his elderly

lived in the village

of Royalton Center. When work was

women. On Saturday

mother

at his brother's

afternoon, Danforth

house

walking along the road, he offered to drive her the

rest

in

was

Tunbridge. Seeing

returning

Mary

of the way to the depot

at

South

Royalton.

Mary

told the jury that Danforth then turned off the

main road. After traveling

about a quarter of a mile, Danforth stopped the wagon and asked her to marry him.

Alarmed by
vehicle.

this

and the

he had turned off the main road, she jumped from the

fact that

Danforth pinned her to the ground, put his hands around her neck and

tried to

rape her. She struggled against him and he took out a knife telling her he would

if she

continued to

wagons came

by.

woman, begging

Mary

resist, actually

it.

At

that

her

moment, two more

Danforth got up and Mary ran to the second one driven by a local

for a ride.

The woman, Susan

then walked the rest of the

had happened to

pricking her chest with

kill

her.

way

to

Litchfield, refiased,

and drove away.

South Royalton where she told two men what

Danforth was arrested that evening.
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Mary

s (csJmioiiy

On (wo

impcrlcct Iwiglish.

the events

it

and

in

was given

open

court.

Ihroiij-h

an Arab translator

When

asked

have these kinds ofcases

in Syria.

Danlorth's lawyer was carclul to draw out the

A

the United Slates and

doctor

local

and the

ol"

blood

together or heard

in

led

back

down

in

to

1

le

South Royalton.

On

at

in

own

her umlcrwcar and blouse

Ix'hall, told a ilillerenl story.

lie stojiped the

at that

moment

saw

the twt>

wagon

the

1

le

claimed that he

that the

detour roail

Mary,

to light his pipe.

it,

aiul Tell to the

two witnesses came

by.

ground.

lie

rajic her.

cross examination, the pioseculor asked detaileil i|uestions aK>ut where

get huu to ailmit that he had Ivcn incarcerateil

The court allowed

admitted

a Syrian ininugrant,

the time ol the assault, ex|)laiiung the

Danlorth had lived prior to coming io Royalton lour years

years.

she

she had bruises and cuts on

liom the wagon, caught her clothing on

rushed over to help her up and

denied trying to

teslilied that

order to get some hay for his horse, explaining

("righlened, then leapt

il

lx:g Lilchlield lor a ride.

Danforth, lestilying on his

took the detour

asked

On cross-examination,

her underwear. Other witnesses teslilied that they

Mary

was ashamed of

Slie then

Mary was

noted the hcsh tears

Mary had Ixth menstruating

fact that

presence

lie also

U)

Vermont.

who had examined Mary

her face, throat, and breast,

that

liict

spoke

at teslilying

alioul the actual rape slie said she

could explain what happeneil "in secret" but the court relused.

in

hiniscll"

occasions, she expressed her eniharrassnK-nt

that they did not otlcn

newly-arrived

who

that

he had Ixen

at

His purpose was to

Ix-lbrc

the state prist>n

at

Windsor

lor lour

the prosecutor to ask whether he had Ivcn conlined.

I

hc |)io.scculor then ipuckly added "wcie yv)U
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iu)l in

Danloilh

Windsor

for four years for an assault with intent to

state

commit rape?" The defense objected and the

withdrew the question, but the damage had been done.

The
assistance.

last

key witness was Susan

She explained

Litchfield,

that she did not

who had

know what was

refused to give

Mary

happening, could not

understand Mary, and was fiightened. Her testimony was crucial however, because she

was

the only one

who

claimed to be able to see that Danforth's trousers were

unbuttoned indicating to her that he was up to "some foul purpose." This was new
testimony, for as the defense pointed out, at the preliminary hearing, Litchfield had

simply testified that she saw Danforth bending over Mary, attempting to help her up.

The judge's charge

to the jury included the usual rambling recapitulation

evidence that greatly annoyed

no proof of penetration had

lawyers.^'

trial

actually

He mentioned

been introduced and

of the

that the defense argued that

that

he did not remember any

evidence of it either. But he explained that he had not heard everything the translator

had

said

and that

in the

had been proven or

not.

end

it

He

was up

to the jury to decide whether the elements of rape

told the jury that they should consider whether

Mary

Josephs had any interest in fabricating the story and should weigh that against the idea
that she

He

would make up such a

also urged

them to consider

story, given the

"minuteness of detail" of her testimony.

the other evidence concerning the condition of her

clothing and the injuries observed by the doctor.

1897 meeting the members of the Vermont Bar Association passed the following resolution:
"Resolved, That the members of the Vermont Bar Association recommend to the legislature the passage
of a law requiring courts in their charges to the jury, not to argue the fects to the jury, and so far as

At

their

possible refrain from giving an opinion that

of the Vermont Bar Association

4, no. 3

(

1

may

influence the jury in deciding the facts." Proceedings

897), 391.
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He

noted that Danforth had admitted being confined for an

crime and that

earlier

the\ should take the conviction into account in weighing the credibility
of his testimony.

But he warned them not

to use the information for any other purpose.

In other words,

Danforth' s past bad acts went to his credibility rather than his desenedness for

con\iction—just
consent

five

as a prosecutrix's past bad acts

went

her desen edness to be raped. The

ratlier tiian to

minutes before returning a guilty

v erdict for

of her

to the credibility

jur>-

was out

iailure to

for only tliirty-

attempted rape.

Prior to sentencing. Danforth* s lawyer spoke for liim. Danforth had done

for several people in the village, including the lawyer's owti

mother and

problem with alcohol and an aged mother and the lawyer wanted
length) sentence

liis

lawyer, tliere

to

would have on him and on those who depended on

was

still

a chance for Danforth to

become a

father.

know what
liim.

work

He had
eftect a

According

was

that he

married. Wlien he

a bigamist for

was

released he married another

state's attomev- explained that he

"that the court

past

at

life,

and

the time

ma> understand

that there

of the

was no

saw

tlie

State

V.

has

liis

first

conviction he had

woman, whom he soon

duty to rnake

tliis

ra|:>e

let^.

The

infonnation knowii

The Judge, noting Danforth's

indication that he had been under the influence of alcohol

assault, sentenced liim to eight years.^"

Court. This rape took place

^

it

Prior to his

character of tliis man.**

.\nother case of stranger rape

lamiliouse
tamilv
w

good measure.

to

respectable citizen and he

sought leniency. The state reiterated Danforth* s previous conviction tor attempted

and added

a

when

in

Charles

was

tried at the

same term of the Windsor County

Chester. Cora Weightman. aged sLxneen.

Como.

thirty-one.

rode up

in his sulky.

w^s alone

Cora's father

Danforth. Windsor Count> Coiin. December 1894 Term. Transcript of Trial,
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in the

p.

103-107.

and brother were out mowing and her
mother and
asked

if

she had any grain to

the house.

Como, who was

there might be a

war and

Como then grabbed

floor and raped her.

in a

few days and

if

berries.

Como

Vermont town of Franklin,

told her that

he was surveying the area to gather the names
of men

might be drafted. He asked her her
notebook.

were picking

After finding none in the bam, he followed
her into

sell.

fi-om the northern

that

sister

her,

Afterward,

father's

name and then had

her sign her

dragged her into the parlor,

Como

told

Cora

that a

laid her

name

down on

who

in his

the

gang of men would be around

she told anybody about what happened, they would rape
her too

and she would be sent

to prison for four years.

As soon

mother and told her what had happened. Cora's mother
clothes were stained with blood and semen. She

and then washed them. Cora was

as

Como

left,

Cora ran

to her

testified that her daughter's

showed them

to a neighbor

woman

in great physical distress after the rape, but absolutely

refused to be vaginally examined by local doctors on two separate occasions.

Como

admitted stopping by the house and asking about grain, but denied raping the

girl.

However, he had thrown the book away

that

Cora had signed, and

it

had been recovered

with her signature inside.

Como

is

important for several reasons.

examination concerning Cora's sex
about a victim's sex

life

life

First, the

defense attorney's cross-

shows both the casual way

in

which questions

were inquired about and, despite the Supreme Court's

rules

about the use of such evidence, the way in which defense attorneys could inquire about

such matters so long as neither judge or prosecutor intervened.

Q:

You

say he forced you?

A:

Yes,

sir.
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Q:

What do you mean by

A:

He had

Q:

What do you mean by

A:

I

that?

intercourse with me.

can't explain

it

"intercourse?" (Witness hesitates).

any different way than

in

Did you ever have intercourse with any man before

A:

No,

Q:

And I suppose you

A:

No,

sir."

fishing and since this

was not a consent

case, his questions about

drawn an objection

jfrom the

any case. So no harm

credibility in

important, the cross-examination shows

and out-cry, so

significant at all) to

to the

vital in other jurisdictions,

how the

were

questions of utmost

far less significant (or not

Vermont's rape jurisprudence.

Q:

What

A:

I

Q:

Made no

A:

No, sir I did not say anything, he told me if I said anything he would
choke me, and I didn't have much chance to help myself: he was right
down on me.

Q:

Did you make any outcry when he had intercourse with you,

A:

No,

V.

^ Como

that?

was done.

More
resistance

know.

never have smce?

But Cora's answers bolstered her

state's case

I

sir.

past sexual activity were not relevant and should have

State

have as

Q:

Como's lawyer was

state.

I

did you do by

way of resisting

his attempt?

did not do anything.

effort to prevent

him

at all?

sir.^

Como, Windsor County

Court,

December 1894 Term, Transcript of Trial,

Transcript, p. 16-17.
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p. 17.

at all?

On
that

this issue

of resistance, Judge Jonathan Ross explained

some people confronted with an emergency

fierce resistance while others will

no power hardly

to

make

it

made

to

sense or not.

in,

and

it

will collect themselves

Ross

told the jurors that

would have

transferred to the State

State

V.

to be

to

Asylum

at

Como was

them

found

for the attempted rape

on

his farm.

trial.*'^

Bowen

Buckman, aged

to

her second floor

together,

Buckman

window from

Buckman

attacked

Gill.

work

for Gill. His wife

at Gill's

Bowen

tlic

mother of

tliis

issue

was

and children lived

and sometimes he

testified that in the

slept at his

weeks leading up

to

hiding under her bed, in her closet, and peering through

a tree.

Bowen

One morning when

in her

they were alone in the house

bedroom. She vigorously

dragged through three rooms before a friend of hers,
unexpectedly showed up outside with a team.

" Como,

be insane and

lived with her eighty-three year-old fatlier Jolm R. Gill

half a mile away. Sometimes he stayed over

the assault she found

to twelve

case brought in 1901 against

of Kate G. Bowen. She was

forty-three, did

house which was also owned by

the

to decide

three teenaged boys. She had divorced her husband Charles in 1896, but

not brought up at

was

Waterbury."

Buckman was another Windsor County

George N. Buckman

up

tliat

The jury convicted and Ross sentenced Como

years in prison. After a few months of confinement,

was

and put up

be in a perfectly dazed condition, and have

resistance." Judge

condition Cora testified she was

whether

"seem

in his instructions to the jury

65-66, 70; Records of the State Prison, vol.

Maud

Buckman

resisted

and was

Walsh, aged seventeen,

told her

it

was just

his

"God

2, p. 94.

The divorce was granted on grounds of intolerable severity. Because Bowen's marital status was never
brought up at trial, unless it was mentioned in the closing arguments, jurors had no way of knowing
whether she was single, divorced, or widowed. Bowen v. Bowen, Windsor County Court, December
**

1896 Term, Docket No. 829.
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damned luck and wished

that bitch

would

stay at

home." He released

her.

She then

spent ten or fifteen minutes brushing her hair and
completing her outfit before leaving the

house. She did not go to the authorities. The family sat

Buckman the

next day.

money owed

to him, hit the old

allegation against him.

He

man, and

including nervous prostration.

that

Bowen had

in

with Gill over wages owed to him.

Buckman' s wife and Buckman was

lav^ryer

put on

over

Bowen then made

Gill

had

Maud Walsh or Bowen' s

had been shown by the

a long history of medical problems

He

room, peered

admitted that he had gotten into a

refiised to

fiirious "the idea that

asked the court to charge the jury

pay him on orders of

man 43

years old wasn't

earnings." So, he slapped Gill and

that,

among

left.

other things, the state had not

other son to testify and that those facts should be taken

Buckman' s lawyer argued
state.

The court

that

no evidence of an

intent

refiised to so charge. Despite the

weak

evidence of assault with intent to rape, a delay

in reporting the assault until after Gill

Buckman had

put on corroborating evidence, and

gotten into a

her

explained.

that he never hid in her

any way.

own money ,-all his hard

against the state. Furthermore,

to rape

the house for good.

Buckman testified

through her window, or assaulted her

His

left

Gill

she had been "confined" for four months after the assault.

The defense introduced testimony

capable of handling his

breakfast with

then got into a fight with eighty-three year-old

The absence of her husband was never

Bowen claimed that

fight

down to

fight, the failure to

Bowen' s odd and unexplained behavior

in the

273

and

aftermath of the assault, the jury convicted

Buckman of attempted

rape.

The Vermont Supreme Court overturned

technical grounds, and, at a later

State

girl.

V.

trial,

Buckman was

One

on

acquitted.^'

Gauthier was a 1904 prosecution for the rape
of a nineteen year-old deaf

Mabel Fairbanks had been working

Hotel.

the verdict

as a

chambermaid

at the

Windsor Tavern

night the hotel owner's father, Nelson Gauthier,
entered her locked

room

with a pass key, threatened her with a gun, and then
raped her. She became pregnant

and delivered a child nine months
forth

no

between her and the

later.

attorneys.

She

Fairbanks testified by notes passed back and
testified that

she had strongly resisted but to

Gauthier, aged fifty-one, told a different story.

He

exposed herself to him and invited him to have sex with

her.

avail.

gave her three silver quarters.

It

was

word

solely his

testified that

Mabel had

When they were

done he

against hers. In his cross-

examination of Fairbanks, Gauthier' s lawyer attempted to impeach her reputation for
chastity:

Q.

How often did you go to Mr.

A.

I

Q.

Was there a man by the name

don't

Spicer's

room about

this

time?

know what that means.

Tavern

at this

of Spicer boarding

at the

Windsor

time?

A.

Yes

Q.

What were you

A.

I

sir.

in his

room

for?

did not go to his room.

Buckman, Windsor County Court, June 1901 Term, Transcript of Trial; State v. Buckman, 74
Vt. 309 (1902); State v. Buckman, Windsor County Court, State Cases, vol. 5, June 1901 Term, 315-316
The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant that the woman's testimony about Buckman being in the
tree was based on statements made to her by her son, who had not yet testified, was thus hearsay and
State

V.

improperly admitted.
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Q.

Were you

A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever go to Fred Gauthier's room?

A.

No.

Q.

Do you know Lucien Trombley?

A.

No.

Q.

Do you mean to

A.

No.

Q.

Were you out evenings with him?

A.

No.

Q.

Do you mean to

A.

No.

Q.

Do you know him?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you know Wentworth when he boarded

A.

No.'«

in

Charley Sanders room?

testify that

testify that

you do not know Lucien Trombley?

you don't know "Skinny" Eaton?

at the

Windsor Tavern?

This fishing expedition was typical. Defense attorneys would throw questions

—

the witness

usually without objection fi-om courts and prosecutors.

attorney cross-examined Mabel's father,

who was

the rape, he casually asked him if there had been a

like this to

When Gauthier's

also living in the hotel at the time

woman in his room when the

defendant had allegedly apologized to him for the assault. The witness denied

it.

defense also pointed out the fact that Mabel's parents were separated, but

was a

this

68

State

V.

Gauthier, Windsor County Court, June 1904 Term, Transcript of Trial,
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of

p.

22-23.

The

double-edged sword because Nelson's son was separated from
prosecutor took pains to make clear to the jury.
conviction for selling liquor. This

last inquiry

He

too—a point

his wife

the

also asked the son about his

drew an objection and

the court held that

evidence of a conviction had to be proved by the record. The state did not bother
to
follow up. The defense called several male witnesses
reputation for chastity

state

was not good, but

produced a witness who

said

who

testified that

offered no specifics. Then,

Mabel's

on

rebuttal, the

Mabel's reputation was good. After a short time, the

jury returned with a guilty verdict.

At sentencing, Gauthier's lawyer argued
to cross-examine her and that there

two were

fact that the

in

that Mabel's deafiiess

were indications of consent

made

it

difficult

in the facts, including the

bed together for several hours, engaged

in

a second act of

intercourse, that she delayed reporting the assault to her mother for aknost twenty-four

hours, that Gauthier had stayed in the area after the assault, and that the court should

consider his age in passing sentence. Gauthier himself simply said that he was at the

mercy of the

court.

The judge was unmoved and imposed a ten

to twelve year sentence

onhim.^'^

One

last

case. State

Bedard {IS90),

v.

reveals

how complex a rape trial and

appeal could be. The case arose out of an alleged gang rape in Burlington

1890.

Mary

and her

Pratt, seventeen,

fiance, Albert

in

October

Gonyeau, were walking home from

Burlington to neighboring Winooski. Pratt and Gonyeau were both French Canadians,

and Mary spoke no English. Deciding to take a shortcut home, they cut through the
park on the edge of the

city.

According to

their testimony,

^Gauthier, 90-9].
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Mary had

sat

down

ball

to rest.

As Gonyeau began to

sit

down, three men,

Wilkins jumped the couple
bitch."

telling

Blow, and Frank

Gonyeau "get out of here you Winooski son of a

Gonyeau fought back but was

Seeing that he could not

Philip Bedard, Charles

hit in

fight all three,

the back of the head with a long board.

he ran away to get help.

He

ran more than a half

a mile to the home of another Frenchman and returned with a party of men and boys who

were unable

to find the defendants or Mary.

While he was gone, Mary was thrown down, and the three
her. After they

were done, they

fled.

Mary picked up

house

battery

on Gonyeau. Mary did not report

she did the

days

men were

turns raping

her underwear and walked to her

Bedard and Blow were arrested the next day

sister's

in Burlington.

men took

for assault

and

the sexual assault for several days, but once

charged with rape as well. She and Gonyeau were married a few

later.

Bedard was

tried separately fi-om

convicted of rape. All three

Blow and

men claimed an

alibi in

Wilkins and aU three

defense.

men were

At Bedard's

trial,

his

lawyers drew out various pieces of evidence, but did not attempt to knit them together

until closing

arguments. There was

The couple had
park.

Gonyeau

left

much about

the lights and easy traveling

testified that

Pratt

and Gonyeau' s story

on Winooski Avenue

way

led

down

a steep

wooded

slope.

chosen the bare ground and darkened park as an appropriate place to
If Gonyeau fought face to face with the men,

past

Why had Gonyeau

two horse

carts

left

Pratt to the

was odd.

for the darkened

they intended to take a shortcut, but there was no

the other end of the park and the

head?

that

trail at

Why had Pratt

sit

down and

rest?

why was his wound on the back of his

mercy of the three men and why had he run

and several houses on

his
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way to

get help ahnost three quarters of a

mile

away?

Why had

not Pratt reported the rape immediately instead of two days later?

Medical testimony revealed that Pratt had

in fact

experienced intercourse within the past

few days and

time.

But other than a torn hymen and a

bruise

on her

that

it

was probably her

chest, she exhibited

first

no other signs of physical

injury,

which was odd given

her description of the violent assault and rape.

Bedard's lawyer had intended to put

argument and propose an
arguing that

Mary

Pratt

alternative explanation

He

of events. He began

his

summation by

and Albert Gonyeau had gone to the park for "an unlawful and

wicked purpose." He got no
stopped him.

evidence together in his closing

this

farther.

Judge Laforrest H. Thompson immediately

explained that there had been no evidence presented to indicate that

they went to the park for an unlawful purpose. Bedard's lawyer objected, but to no
avail.

Bedard was convicted.
In their brief on appeal, Bedard's lawyers laid out the argument they had intended

to

make

to the jury. In breathless prose, punctuated

scene of Mary Pratt's debauchment

into the

park

in order to

someone and Gonyeau

her.

at

It

fiance.

Gonyeau had

They had been discovered

set the

led Pratt

"/« coZ/m" by

(alternatively referred to as "her lover") "in the position naturally

assumed for such indulgence" was struck

shame

hands of her

at the

have sex with

by exclamation marks, they

in the

back of the head.^° In order to cover her

being so discovered, Pratt concocted the story of the rape.

was a

piece of masterly, though indelicate fencing in her part, to accuse

Blow, Bedard and Wilkins of rape,

who were

at the

if she

Park and discovered her

supposed they were the persons

own

immorality.

™

Bedard's lawyers were careful not to incriminate him along with Blow and Wilkins as the attackers,
for
but it would seem that they were in fact the ones. An assault conviction was certainly better than one
rape and perhaps the lawyers thought that a jury would be sympathetic to
couples out of Burlington's parks.
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men

ttying to keep fornicating

Her

fears

of publicity which had closed her mouth

for

two days were now

about to be realized. The parties who witnessed her degradation had
been arrested and were about to be put on trial. She had been called as
a
witness against them and must either tell a falsehood or add to her
humiliation by a public confession of lechery in the witness box.
She saw her opportunity -seized it-and the modest charge of a breach of
the peace by an assault upon her lover was lost in the graver and more

heinous charge of rape upon herself

Bedard's lawyers argued that evidence introduced

at trial

supported such a story and that

a rape defendant was always entitled to introduce evidence that the victim had had sex
with another

man

as a defense.

The prosecutor, opposing

the appeal, asserted that the

evidence did not support the defense's theory "and the attempt to influence the Jury by
groundless insinuations was properly restrained."

Bedard's conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court.

On the question of the

admission of the "unlawful and wicked purpose" evidence, the court found that since

Bedard's lawyers had been able to argue that medical testimony revealed the
that Pratt

and Gonyeau had engaged

in

possibility

sex prior to the assault, the jury was well able to

evaluate the possibility of this alternative explanation. Bedard got ten years.

Wilkins and

judge.

Blow were

The evidence

offered

tried separately at the next

was

nearly identical.

term of court by a

They too were convicted and

appealed at the same term of the Supreme Court that heard Bedard's appeal.

many questions
jury.

raised,

two were

The defense asked

rape immediately

successful.

different

Among the

Both involved requested charges to the

the judge to instruct the jury that Mary's failure to report the

was evidence

that

no rape had been committed. The judge had

refused. Instead, he instructed the jury that in considering the delay in reporting the
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rape, they should determine the elTeet sueh evidence had

reversing the

trial

Supreme Court agreed

court, the

on the question of eonsent.

that the defense's

proposed

instruction mis-stated the law, but that since the court had undertaken
to instruct

matter of delay,

it

In

on the

had an obligation to do so correctly. Since the defense was based on

an

alibi rather

on

the question of consent. Instead, the judge should have told the jury that they should

than on consent,

could not explain the delay,

bruises

on Mary

Pratt

was erroneous

it

would have

crisis.

human

In a

So too

1

fire,

in

reason, thinking

it

some might do

the

assume an explanation

most judicious things while

entirely useless."

of Bedard and

girl,

being grasped and

Mary struggled

The Court reversed. Since the

for five or ten

minutes with the

her might, the judge's instruction permitted the jury to

that did not

comport with the evidence presented

judges dissented from the decision, including .hidge Laforrest,

trial

Diiferenl persons

have done much, being frightened, overpowered, or for

was

all

Pratt.

a rape, ""the jury must weigh the testimony with

prosecution's case had indicated that

men, and resisted them with

have

he judge refused. Instead he told the jury that

actions and experience and say whether this

held, as she says she was, could

some other

it.

marks or

that the rape could not

meaning of the lack of marks on

to determine the

others might act foolishly.

reference to

If she

also asked the judge to instruct the jury that the lack of

had a tendency to impeach her and

reacted dilTercntly to a

Pratt's story.

would weigh against her testimony.

happened the way she had described

it

to instruct the jury about delay's elTect

m determining the credibility of Mary

take the delay into account

The defense had

it

Ixien upheld at the

same term.
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It

who had

must have made

at trial.

1

wo

presided over the

little

sense to

uphold one conviction and

same

events.

strike

down the

On retrial. Blow and

other two given that they arose out of the

Wilkins were again convicted. Each received five

years.^'

Several aspects of the Pratt rape are worth noting.

One must sympathize with

the juror of integrity attempting to do his job in a case like

was not allowed

to argue

its

Although the defense

this.

theory to the jury in the Bedard case,

pointing to another explanation had been laid out for

them

and Gonyeau beyond a

reasonable doubt rather than Bedard, Wilkins, and Blow. In both

skew

trials,

judges resisted

the evidentiary narrative too far to their advantage or to

adopt rigidly punishing rules of evidence by which a woman's
report a rape disqualified her fi-om bringing the charge at

instructed the jury that each case

woman's

the evidence

Despite the various

irregularities in their story, three separate juries believed Pratt

defendants' attempts to

all

was

different,

all.

failure to

immediately

Instead, the judges

and they had to take

specific circumstances in determining the evidentiary

into account

meaning of her actions

during and after the rape. The extent to which she could be expected to

on her circumstances and

personality.

prohibiting her fi-om bringing charges,

Her delay

fact to

be explained and might

when

the judge's instructions

misstated the law, or misled the jury as to the facts in evidence.

State

And even

then,

two

of the Pratt rape were gleaned from several sources: State v. Bedard, 65 Vt. 278 (1892);
Briefs, 65 (1), no. 42
Wilkins and Blow, 66 Vt. 1 (1892); State v. Bedard, Vermont Reports

facts

V.

depended

In general, the Supreme Court

affirmed this individualized approach, only reversing

The

resist

in reporting the rape, far fi-om

was simply a

merely reflect the shame of an afiSanced woman.

each

230-231.
(1892); Records of the Windsor State Prison, vol. 4, p.
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judges, including one intimately familiar with the facts of the case, dissented, arguing
that
the

judge had done nothing wrong

trial

at all.

Conclusion

During the 1850s and 1860s, the Vermont Supreme Court fashioned an
exception to the general rules of evidence permitting defense attorneys to question an
alleged rape victim about her past sexual activities with other men.

quite limited. First, the evidence

was only

The exception was

admissible in cases where the

woman testified.

Second, the evidence only went to the issue of consent and thus, could only be
introduced where the defendant offered a consent defense. Vermont's Supreme Court

extend the use of sexual character evidence beyond

explicitly refused to

exception-whether to prostitutes or brothel keepers testifying

underage

girls in statutory

rape

trials.

in

Finally, the introduction

murder

this

narrow

cases, or

of such evidence was

hardly a guarantee of an acquittal.

So we see
character

defendant

came up

in

in

who was

our review of the
Gauthier and

convicted.^^ In

five rapes described

in that

case

Como the

its

above that the

issue

of sexual

use provided no benefit to the

questions were perfunctory. Danforth,

another rape case, never raised the issue of consent and thus there was no inquiry into

Mary Josephs's
testimony that

^ The same was

sexual morality. In Bedard, the defendant attempted to introduce

Mary

Pratt had been sexually intimate with her fiance, but that

Hollenbeck discussed above. In that case the Court reversed
about her past
Hollenbeck's conviction because he had not been allowed to cross-examine the victim
issues, he was again convicted.
sexual history. Retried, and presumably allowed to examine her on these
of the State Prison for 1895-1896,"
State V. Hollenbeck, 67 Vt. 34 (1894); "Report of the Superintendent
3 1 ; Records of the State Prison at
1
in Vermont State Officers Reports for 1895-1896 (Rutland, 896),
true in State

v.

'

Windsor,

vol. 4, p.

292.
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information was not introduced as character evidence. Rather
explanation to

tell its

seamy

showing the

reftite

it

was an

alternative

the medical testimony and the judge did not allow the
defense to

story of premarital debauchment. Instead, he limited the
defense to

possibility that

convicted-in three separate

Mary had had
trials.

sex with her fiance. Her assailants were

Buckman was an attempted

was not an element of proving an attempted rape

rape case. Since consent

the defendant did not seek to introduce

character evidence and almost certainly would not have been permitted to introduce
such

evidence even

clear that

if he

had wanted.

women could

A series of decisions by the Supreme Court had made

not consent to an assault in any case.

Technically, a defendant's past reputation for sexual morality

But

this did

was

inadmissible.

not prevent prosecutors fi-om going after a defendant's reputation for

honesty, morality in general, and sexual morality in particular. They sought to introduce

whatever damaging evidence they could get away with. Thus

in the

Danforth case, the

prosecutor, having been instructed by the judge that he could introduce evidence of

Danforth's former imprisonment, but not the reason for

immediately blurted out that

it,

Danforth had been convicted for attempted rape anyway. At sentencing, the prosecutor
raised Danforth's

bigamy

for

good measure

"that the court

may

understand the character

of this man."

Coupled with the

issue

of the use of character evidence was the question of

whose perspective the court would
This

last

assault

aspect

law

is

rely

on

in

determining

if a

rape had occurred or not.

one of the more fascinating aspects of Vermont's judge-made sexual

in the nineteenth

century-the extent to which the Supreme Court seems to

have viewed rape fi-om the woman's perspective rather than the man's. Vermont

283

woman

allowed a

lo consent

and

llien objecl

or object and then consent.

solicitude toward her perceptions ofthe encounter that judges pointed lo

admission ol specilic sexual character evidence. Since a
the

power

the absence

credibility

in

man and have him imprisoned

to convict a

of other evidence,

on

Iclt

the consent issue.

it

only

lair lo

lor

woman
up

to

It

was

llus

in juslilyiiig

the

held within her hands

twenty years, the court,

in

permit a delendant to challenge her

That that inquiry should extend to past sexual Ix^havior

contravention ofthe normal rules of evidence seemed so obvious to male judges and

lawyers

that

who had
who

none of them ever questioned

consented to

illicit

sex

in

the past

it.

In the understanding

was more

ofthe time, a

woman

do so again than those

likely to

had observed the rules of conventional morality. Vermont was unusual

in

allowing

specific evidence rather than general reputation evidence lor imnu)rality, but that rule

laced constant challenge throughout the second half of the nineteenth century not only

because

it

contravened established authority, but because to some,

Critics

ofthe use of sexual reputation evidence argue

such inquiries would
morality and extend

lill

it

the protection

only to those

who had

sex particularly middle-class married

that

the

Vermont courts vindicated
mold of Victorian

of rape law from

the rights

respectability.

husbiuid

was never explained

at trial

unfair.

of

women of unconventional

girls.

of a wide variety o

I

illicit

consensual

Anecdotally

women who

Mary Josephs had numerous

foreigner, stranger, non-I uiglish speaker, and peddler.

seemed

that the practical elVect

not lx;en tainted by

women and young

it

we know
fell

outside

strikes against her as a

The absence of Kate l^owen's

(she had divorced him for intolerable severity in

18^)6),

she sullered from nervous prostration, did not immediately report the assault, and

stayed

in

the house for

Hneen minutes following the attack while her
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friend

waited

outside. She never explained this oddity.

working

class,

Mabel Fairbanks was young,

and evidence was admitted that she had a reputation

immorality. Her parents were separated and lived in local hotels.

English-speaking French-Canadian,

Mary

Pratt

was

at the

deaf,

and

for sexual

As a young, non-

bottom of Vermont's

social

pecking order. She and her fiance told a story of sexual assault containing many
troubling inconsistencies.

that juries

The point

is

not whether these assaults happened or not, but

would have been well within their

proof required

in

rights to decide that the high

burden of

a criminal case had not been met. But they chose instead to convict.

Constance Backhouse, Karen Dubinsky and Kathleen Parker have argued that
rape law was less protective of women with poor sexual reputations or

socio-economic standing (or that
presented here

tells

it

protected these

a more complicated story.

It

women not

seems to

at all).

women of low
The evidence

me that judges

and juries

repeatedly elevated the right to be Iree fi-om physical assault above any impulses they

may have had
and gender

make

to

stratification-at least

If the victims

least

rape.

the law an instrument upholding a standing order of ethnic, class,

of the men

with regard to

its

victims.

of rape included a variety of women, the same cannot be

in the four counties

who found

themselves on

trial for

said at

rape or attempted

A review of some fifty-one men who went to trial or pled guilty between

1876 and

1919 shows them to be overwhelmingly from what were considered the lowest ranks of

Vermont
few

mill

society.

Sixty-five percent

were unskilled workers, mostly farm laborers and a

workers. Only 14 percent identified themselves as farmers and some of them

may have been merely farm laborers. Twenty percent were
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skilled workers: mechanics.

bulchcrs, bakers, and house painters.

Fhere were no professionals

one counts a ^\|uaek doctor' convicted
'

in

1

eight ofthese had

New

neighlx)ring states oI

one or more parents

lx)rn outside

Hampshire, Massachusetts, and

percent were themselves lx)rn outside the state.
ol Irish or lYench (^anadian descent.

Many

Wnu

Vermonters,

Vermont or

New York

ol tliese

men

fined, placed

or their parents were

Native lx)rn defendants represented only 47

on probation, or found not

divorced, or widowed. Hieir average age

percent of all

guilty. Mlly-six percent

was

tiiirty-one

and a

liaif

Middle and upper class men are absent Irom

men

did not

come up

commit

explicitly in

rape, or if they did, they

one appellate case,

Blow's lawyer had asked witnesses
whether

it

was good or

that

were not

it.

alx)ut his general reputation

in

bad. 1 he state, in rebuttal,

likely to bring tlicir

good character

opportunity presented

their class

was an

1

showed

itself."

lulher these

he issue of class did

that following the

community was

bad.

show

order to help rebut the allegations against him.

'"you will consider with reference to the

an important area

and character and

the jury, the judge explained that a defendant always had a right to

good character

is

this data,

tried for

single,

of Wilkins and Hlow discussed above.

conuiiission of the crime, lilow's reputation in the

for

were

(see I'able 8).

Certainly the issue of class lx)th of victims and perpetrators

Ibr lurtiicr study.

the three

and another 37

percent of men confined for rape or attempted rape, hut represented

men

unless

S77 (Appendix A).

Sixty-three percent of men tried or convicted were native

However,

among them,

young men of this

I

Ic

In instructing

his reputation

then told them

class whether they

would be

to bear, in reference to this very crime, if an

The defendants argued on appeal

"invidious distinction" based
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on

their

that the reference to

^Yank or station." The Supreme

Table 8

Demographic Comparison: Men from the Four Counties Tried or Convicted on a Charge
of Rape/Attempt Versus Those Tried or Convicted on a Charge of Statutory
Rape/Attempt, 1875-1919

Cause

Age

Rape/Att.

31.5'

Confined

Non Native

Married

Single

32 (63%)

19(37%)

22 (44%)

28 (56%)'

32 (65%)

10(20%) 6(14%)

32.9'

16(47%)
8 (89%)

Acquitted

32.3'

8

0%)

15(45%)
7 (78%)
5 (63%)

22 (67%)

27.6"

18(53%)
1 (11%)

19 (55%)

Fine/Prob.

(63%)
(63%)

7(21%) 4(12%)
1(13%) 2(25%)
2(25%) 1(13%)
7(13%) 15(28%)

Vt.

Born

(100%)

0

(

Unskilled

2 (22%)

5

(38%)

5

3

33.5*

41 (70%)

17(29%)

27 (47%)

30 (53%)''

28 (52%)

Confined

33.8«

22.7'

17(36%)
0( 0%)

24 (52%)
1 (14%)

22 (48%)
6 (86%)

22 (50%)

Fine/Prob.

Acquitted

42.6'°

30 (64%)
7 (100%)
4 (67%)

Court agreed

that

St.

Rape/Att.

But

it

had

this

2 (33%)

been the case

3

it

(50%)

commit crimes."

would have been

It is

hard to understand

men

5(11%) 14(32%)
6(100%) 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%)
1 (20%)
2(40%) 1(20%)

error

on the part of the judge.

as the respondents were

how this

'

N=55.

^

Includes 24 single men, 2 divorced, and 2 widowed.

'

N=34.

"N=9.
N=8.

*N=56.
'

(50%)

Farmer

held that "the court only meant to have the jury consider just what safe-guard

previous good character would be to such

'

3

Skilled

Includes 25 single men, 3 widowed, and 2 divorced.

«N=48.

'N=7.
'«N=6.
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is different

when tempted

from the invidious

to

distinction the Court said

was not always

would

rise to reversible error, but, as

clear or consistent in

its

rulings. In terms

in prison. All

were of Canadian

All three described themselves as

To

common

really understand the diversity

to

extraction,

many of the men
two

at least

they

were Catholic.

laborers."

of Anglo-American law

early twentieth century one need only look across the border to

state's rape

seen, the Court

of socio-economic

background, Bedard, Wilkins, and Blow were very similar

would be joining

we have

in the nineteenth

New York

and

The

State.

law was heavily weighted against the alleged victim. Whereas Vermont

had rapidly discarded the ancient requirements of out-cry and immediate reporting as
prerequisites for bringing a rape charge,

New York also required

period.

New York required them throughout the study

female victims to make the utmost resistence to their

attackers or they were deemed, as a matter of law, to have consented to the intercourse.

Victims

who had

delay. In cases

not reported the rape immediately were not permitted to explain the

where there was no corroboration the jury had

a matter of law. This requirement

was by

stattite.

And

to acquit the defendant as

evidence that a

woman

another of the assault was not considered corroborative for purposes of the

New York also wrote a marital
These harsh rules found

well.

Ravishment actions were

different standards

rape exclusion into

their

way

into

civil rather

its

V.

Wilkins

- People V.

New York's law of civil ravishment as

than criminal causes of action, relying on

of proof and resting on very different legal theories. Despite

and Blow, 66

(1900); People

v.

Vt.

1

making

it

this,

that

vol. 4, 199, 230-231.
(1892); Records of the State Prison,

f

854); Reynolds v.
^1
"^^^^^Jf Peop/e
v. Clark, 3 RY. Cr. R 280 (1885),
People
Dohring, 59 N.Y. 374 (1874);
851 (1900); People v. Flaherty, 162 N-Y^ 532 (1900^
''^J'^.'^^T
N.Y.S.
365 (1922).
223 N.Y. 519(1918); People v. Meh, 193

Morrison,

(,871V People v.
yJler 66 RY.S.

statute.

statute law.'"

utmost resistence rules applied,
the out-cry, immediate reporting, and
Slate

had told

1

Parker Cr. R. (N.Y.) 625

(1

Carey,
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.

more

dilFicult lor

New York women to

them. Unlike Vermont law,

New

obtain even

York law

civil

specifically

redress for sexual assaults

encouraged defendants

ravishment cases to show that the woman's conduct led them to believe
that

advances would be welcomed by
conduct designed or adopted to

him

Every

her.

incite

to believe that such advances

on

him

bit

on

in civil

their sexual

of evidence of plaintifTs "lascivious

to take liberties with her person, or induce

his part

would not be unacceptable, are

admissible."^' Clearly these choices reflected a different sense of values about sexual
assault and the role the law should play in redressing this violation.

New

York faced a

Champlain

in

far different legal reality than a

in

raped just across Lake

Vermont.

Similarly, the experience

seems to have dictated
far

woman

A woman raped

more prosecutions

diflerent

under Canadian law and under the law of Michigan

outcomes.

for sexual assaults

towards complaimuits than

that

On a per

of all

kinds.

capita basis, Vermonters brought

Vermont's law was

of Canada and Michigan since

it

Canada and could look forward

likely to

harsh

did not require out-cry

or place other rigid limitations on the victim. While comparing data

accused of sexual assault were more

less

is dilficult,

men

be convicted than their counterparts

to longer pri.son

terms than

their peers in

in

Michigan and

the Canadian West.

As

in

other areas of law examined

in this

work, Vermonters

have ameliorated the harsher aspects of the male-dominated
suflering sexual

wrongs

at the

hands of men. Judges,

legal

legislators,

in general

seem

regime on

women

and

seem to have

juries

placed the right to personal safety and the rule of law above any desire to restrict

" Crossman

v.

Bradley, 53 liarb. (N.Y.)

12.5

(1868).
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to

women's
civil

access to the courts to seek legal redress for sexual violations. And, as in other

and criminal actions we have

sexual behavior, than to

non-elite

assume

make

men who ended up

that their

studied, they used these cases less to talk about female

clear their expectations for

in court)

men. Men, (or

were not to approach

women for

at least the

sex,

advances were welcome, were not to blame alcohol for

were not to

their

transgressions.

There

is

no doubt

that this

law was the product of an exclusively male legal

system which viewed the world through a highly-gendered

women who made

allegations

attempt to balance the needs of men and

feir,

that rape

what was not

would be

theirs to take, or that

status or morality

the law in a

women, apply

men to

were immune

It

women were

men who

attacked

made an

way which was

prison for violating the integrity

in the rape charge.

tolerated, that

their alleged

the system seems to have

reflected the gendered assumptions

acknowledged the tensions inherent
message

all that,

and ended up sending many

of female bodies. The system

A significant number of

of rape and attempted rape did not see

attacker convicted or even tried. Yet for

reasonable and

lens.

of the time, but

did so without sending a

fair

game

for

men who wanted

women of unconventional

local dynamic.

Rape law

various local (that
developed within the interstices created by the tug and puU of
legislature, trial courts,
state) institutions: the appellate court, the

is

unique to each

jurisdictions

state.

social

fi"om prosecution.

The evolution of rape law occurred within a complex

process

also

is,

and juries. This

This fact and the differences between various

of studying the
demonstrate as well as anything the necessity and benefits

290

law of sexual regulation

in the nineteenth

and early twentieth century as a

than as a national phenomenon.
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state rather

CHAPTER 5

STATUTORY RAPE

Introduction

American common and

statute

certain age to be rape regardless

legally capable

law had long considered sex with

of their consent. The age

of consenting was

at

which

girls

girls

under a

were deemed

very low in America until the end of the nineteenth

set

century. Statutory ages of ten or twelve were typical. Beginning in
1886, activists

waged

a highly effective national campaign to raise the age of consent for

campaign was part of the

social purity

movement, which sought

solely to married couples, eradicate a double standard

extra-marital sex without

much

sanction,

young

girls,

own ruin." Many argued that

infected

them with venereal

to limit sexual activity

which permitted men to engage

movement such

Temperance Union were shocked by the low age

consent to her

The

in

and to protect women, especially the young,

against the predations of men. Participants in the

Christian

girls.

"at

as the

which a

Woman's

girl

can legally

the situation encouraged the seduction of

disease, diminished their prospects for marriage,

or led them into prostitution. Furthermore, the low age meant that there were no legal

means

to prevent girls

from working

The campaign

to raise the age

in brothels.'

of consent,

like other aspects

movement, grew out of the concerns of an urban, Protestant

'

Mary

E.

Odem, Delinquent Daughters:

1885-1920 (Chapel

Hill: University

Protecting

elite.

and Policing Female

of the social purity

The

implications

of

Sexuality in the United States,

of North Carolina Press, 1995), 8-16; David

J.

Pivar, Purity

Crusade: Sexual Morality and Social Control, 1869-1900 (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1973), 139144; John D'Emilio and Estelle Freedman, Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in America (New
York: Harper and Row, 1988), 153
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urbanization, immigration, and changes wrought
by the industrialization and

commodification of society led these
efifort

to intervene

of the campaign
in the

in

directly in

urban settings

age of consent allowed

between teenage
class

more

girls

men and women to employ

human

sexual

in California

state officials

affairs.

state institutions in

Scholars examining the effects

and Michigan have found

who

initiated

fact that consent

cases, the courts often judged the teenage girls

was

who came

applied the law in a

urban areas targeted by other

way

before them as complainants

considerably different than that of the

Rape before

1

fixed by

law

in the state until

6,

71

;

with a

to be treated as a rape, regardless

accomplished "with her

Odera,

which Vermont law

girl

under eleven by a

man over the age

of whether the intercourse was

will or against her will." This

Kathleen Ruth Parker,

was

1818. In that year, the General Assembly

explicitly declared that sexual intercourse

^

at

capable of consenting to sexual intercourse was eleven. This age

common

of fifteen was

more

886

Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the age
girl

age of

raise the

studies.

Statutory

deemed a

lives

legally irrelevant to these

and witnesses.^ Vermont, too, responded to the national campaign to
it

by working

used the system to regain control over the sexual

of their teenage daughters. Despite the

consent. But

that the increase

and parents to police sexual relationships

and young men. Criminal cases were often

and immigrant parents

an

yoimg age was common

"Law Culture and Sexual Censure: Sex Crime

Midwest County Circuit Court, 1850-1950" (Ph.D.

diss.,
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Prosecutions in a

University of Michigan, 1993), 152-317.

throughout the country as a result of the

common law which fixed the

age

at ten

states' early

and twelve respectively.^

Very few statutory rape cases appeared
the earlier period of this study.

did not appear until 1814.^

The

adoption of English statute and

in the

first identifiable

records of the four counties during

case of statutory rape going to

trial

Between that date and 1886 when the age of consent was

raised to fourteen, only eleven cases for rape and attempted rape of girls under
eleven

appear

in the records.

guilty verdict. In

victim

was

However,

two other

in the nine cases

which went to

cases, the defendants defaulted.

The average prison sentence

nine years old.

trial, all

resulted in a

The average age of the

for those convicted

of statutory

rape during this time was eight years.
In addition, there were a few cases brought against

eleven- or twelve-year-old

rapes.

1

The

791 The
.

earliest

trial

girls,

such case

men for having

sex with

but these were brought as forcible rather than statutory

in the entire state

may have been brought

was observed by Samuel Hitchcock,

in

Bennington

in

a prosecutor and later Attorney

Vermont had adopted both the common law of England and the English statutes under its two earlier
constitutions and had also adopted the common law of Connecticut for a brief time as well. In 1797
under its third and most recent constitution, it adopted the English common law, but not English
statutes. While it is obvious that the age of consent came into Vermont by this process, it is not clear
why the age was established at eleven rather than ten or twelve as English statute or common law
provided. The eleven-year standard was rare. Laws of Vermont (Rutland, 1798), 71; Allen Soule, ed..
Laws of Vermont, 1777-1780, vol. 12 ofState Papers of Vermont (Montpelier: Secretary of State, 1964),
27, 35; John A. Williams, ed.. Laws of Vermont, 1781-1784, vol. 13 oi State Papers of Vermont
(Montpelier, Secretary of State, 1965), 101-102; John A. Williams, ed.. Laws of Vermont, 1785-1791,
^

oiState Papers of Vermont (Montpelier, Secretary of State, 1966), 238-239; 1818 Vt. Acts 1.
the age of consent in England and other states see William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws

vol. 14

On

of England,
"

vol.

4 (Oxford, 1769), 212; Pivar, 104-105, 141-143; Odem, 1-37.

In several early cases involving eleven-year-old girls, prosecutors brought charges for both rape and

statutory rape probably because the sexual activity

had overlapped the

girl's eleventh birthday.

Thus,

prosecution including a count for statutory rape also included counts for rape and attempt on
difiFerent specific days. The defendant was found guilty of attempt and was sentenced to seven years at
the

first

hard labor
3, p.

in the state prison.

State

v.

Blood, Windsor County Supreme Court, August 1814 Term,

481-482.
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vol.

A man named Turner had been charged 'Tor an infamous

General and federal judge.

abuse offered to a

little

Girl

of Eleven years of age." Hitchcock described the

trial

as

"lengthy and affecting." Turner was found guilty, fined twenty pounds
and jailed for six

months. In Hitchcock's opinion, he was lucky to have avoided death. Turner
should
thank the "lenity of our Laws, that has saved him from the gibbet-he deserved

it,

if

death

can be considered as a proper punishment for an actual attempt and even violence on the

body of a female of a

was

the

first

brought

in

little

more than eleven

years." Hitchcock remarked that the

for such an offense within the state. There

were

also five cases

trial

of incest

the four counties during this time against fathers for having sex with their

daughters.'

Thus, while judges, juries and commentators condemned sexual activity between

men and young
1

886 the

activity

state

girls

and took

demonstrated

it

seriously

it

was brought

to their attention, prior to

interest in proactively regulating "consensual" sexual

little

between men and young

when

girls.^

The

small

number of cases

especially

is

noteworthy when compared with the number of forcible rape and attempted rape
cases-seventy- five-going to

nineteenth century then

trial

Vermont

or verdict during the same period. Prior to the

officials did

policing non-forcible sexual activity between

statutory age law already in place, or by

not demonstrate

men and young

moving

much

late

interest in criminally

girls-whether by use of the

to raise that age to

encompass more

consensual sexual activity.

'

Samuel Hitchcock

to

Lucy Allen Hitchcock, 28 August 1791

Kin: Correspondence, 1772-1819, vol.

My thanks to John

Duffy

for calling

1

in

John Duffy,

ed.,

Ethan Allen and His

(Hanover: University Press of New England, 1998), 378-379.

my attention

to this source.

Given the enormous disparities in age and power that existed between young girls and the men who
had sex with them, the notion of consent is problematic. 1 use the term here solely in its legal sense.
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The Campaign

to Raise the

This situation changed dramaticaUy

in

1

Age of Consent

886 when

the General

Assembly raised

the age of consent from eleven to fourteen (and then to sixteen
twelve years

General Assembly took

this action in

response to the national campaign to raise the low

age of consent which prevailed across most of the country. Vermont's
in

The

later).

legislature acted

response to a petition from a group of Lyndon citizens seeking an
amendment to the

statutory age law-a change the petitioners described as being "for the
better protection

of women." Led by Charles M. Chase, a conservative Democrat, banker, and

editor of

the weekly Vermont Union newspaper^ forty-one citizens asked the General Assembly
to raise the age

of consent from eleven

we can assume that

it

was

like

to eighteen. Chase's petition has

been

one of the thousands of petitions circulated by

but

lost,

social

purity activists to local chapters across the nation."

The

bill

started out in the

apparent controversy.

It

House, which raised the age to fourteen with

then passed to the Senate, where

Judiciary Committee. In raising the age of consent,

They needed

sexuality should

come

to determine the age at

was assigned

to the

Vermont lawmakers were faced with

the task of making illegal activity which had never before

surveillance.

it

little

come under

the criminal law's

which unmarried teenage female

within the purview of the law and articulate the reasons for

The only evidence we have of the

on this

Legislature's deliberations

issue

is

it.

contained in

a report issued by the Senate Judiciary Committee. The report reveals the familiar

tensions that existed

whenever Vermont law sought to regulate sexual

^

Venila Lovina Shores, Lyndon:

*

Pivar, 145-146;

Odem,

Gem

in the

Green (Lyndon,

20; D'Emilio and Freedman, 153.
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Vt.:

Town

activity.

As we

of Lyndon, 1986), 314-315.

have seen

in other contexts,

Vermonters struggled to balance goals which were often

in

tension with one another: holding people accountable for their
actions, preserving
morality, using the law to shore up a highly-gendered conception
of society (including

the need for

fi-ee

men to

contain their sexual impulses), and protecting a person's right to
be

jfrom physical violence.

In

recommending

that the

age of consent be raised to fourteen for

girls rather

than eighteen as the petition had requested, the Senate Judiciary Committee reasoned
that "after people have attained the age

do not regard

it

as the proper province of legislation to treat acts and intercourses

between any two of them
assault

of mature powers and judgment, your committee

that has the

mutual concurrence of their

wills, as

a forceable

of the one upon the other." Despite the rhetoric of consent and equality

contained in this statement, the report next explained that a higher age of consent would

fail

to protect older adolescent boys.

The Committee noted

As

physically and mentally.

mature boy" as a
often

result

more wicked

matured more quickly than did boys, both

that girls

a resuh,

it

would be

unfair to punish the "older but less

of the "temptations thrown

girl."

in his

path by the more mature and

Instead, the less mature, but chronologically older

have "as adequate protection as

his female

susceptible to the proper teachings

companion, whose

of morality and

finer

moral nature

overcome

young women

this natural inclination

as sexual temptresses.

due to

is

But young

their greater susceptibility to
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is

more

virtue." In other words, girls

matured more quickly than boys and were thus more dangerous. This
earlier sexual ideology:

boy should

an echo of an

women could

moral instruction.

l

iic

Coinniiitcc next lurncd to a

more

practical problem,

Vermont marriages where women were under age
rai.sed to

eighteen.

riiere

If the

were

ni:iny

age of consent was

eighteen the law would turn husbands into statutory rapists
and wives into

incompetent children, viewed by the state as incapable of consenting
to sexual relations
with their husbands. The C'ommittee rejected such a notion."

I

the C

'inally,

ommittee returned

to issues

Women

of sexual ideology.

were

neither sexual fiends, incapable of controlling themselves, nor were they
gullible dupes.

"We

think the end will be better attained through proper religious and
moral training,

than by a law that shall adverti.se mature

and convictions to protect

t)f

the other sex."

women
it

was

womanhood

itself against its

Hie Committee

own

as too feeble

in its

moral powers

indiscretions or the wiles and seductions

refused to institutionalize by law the notion that

could not control their sexuality. "Alter she arrives

at years

of moral discretion"

her responsibility to police her sexuality, to protect her reputation and character

"by the uprightness of her demeanor, the purity of her heart and the strength of her
character.""'

While the Senate
oiler an

.settled for

amendment which

an increa.se to fourteen rather than eighteen,

.sex

with a

girl

under I'ourleen

he committed to the l^eform School. But

"

in Vcrtnoii(, tninors

readied

lier

tnajorily

were

ix)th

if a

if a

guilty ol a

boy under sixteen had

misdemeanor and could

hoy under sixteen

iiad Ibrcible .sex

could not marry without (he permission of llicir parent or guardian.

M

did

distinguished between consensual sex between young

teenagers, sex with older men, and forcible sex of any kind,

consensual

it

age eighteen, a man

at

age twenty-one. Revised Statutes.

with a

A woman

IfiJV (lUiriington,

1840), Chapter 62.

"Report ol the Senate .hidiciary Committee," Journal of the Senate (Montpeiier, 1887), 71-72.
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girl

under fourteen, he was to be treated as an

and the

bill

became law.

as well and by

1

New Hampshire,

889 aU three

states

The House agreed

adult.

Massachusetts, and

had raised

their

to the

changes

New York moved quickly

age of consent to

thirteen, fourteen,

and sixteen respectively."
Social purity campaigners wanted a uniform national age of
consent of eighteen.

After the

first

wave of legislation

failed to

accomplish

this,

they renewed their

eflforts in

the 1890s. Reflecting this renewed pressure, in 1898 Vermont's legislature received

more

petitions praying for an increase in the age

of consent to eighteen. One was

submitted to the House by Reverend L. H. Bigelow and almost five hundred others fi-om
Montpelier. The other

was submitted

auxiliary, the King's Daughters.

sixteen-a rapid,

The

if not

The General Assembly

sixteen-year-old standard remains the law in

The

rise in the

sexual activity

by the

WCTU's young woman's

raised the age

of consent to

completely satisfying response to the prayers of the petitioners.

applies to both boys and

that

to the Senate

Vermont

to this day-though

it

now

girls.

age of consent created an enormous expansion

now under the

surveillance

and regulation of the

state.

in the

amount of

Sexual encounters

had not even been within the purview of the criminal justice system were now

" Journal of the

House of Representatives (Montpelier, 1887), 46,

69, 71, 363, 373, 383; Journal of the

Senate (Montpelier, 1887), 53, 67, 74, 240, 253, 264; 1886 Vt. Acts 63; Pivar, 141-143. The effort to
raise the age of consent was not only national in scope, but took in all of the English-speaking world,
since

all

of the former colonies had inherited the low age of consent from England as

indication of the international character of this

movement was

the effort in

New

well. Just

one

South Wales to raise the

"age of seduction" from fourteen to eighteen. Legislators there expressed sentiments ahnost identical to
those of Vermont's senators. The effort failed. Michael Sturma, "Seduction and Punishment in Late
Nineteenth Century

New

South Wales," Australian Journal of Law

& Society 2

(1985), 77-78.

Journal of the House of Representatives (St. Albans, 1899), 83, 130, 177, 289, 305, 377; Journal of
the Senate (St. Albans, 1899), 131, 134, 147, 163, 175, 191, 232, 294; 1898 Vt. Acts 188; Vt .Stat. Ann.
tit.

13 § 3252(C)(3) (1977).
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treated as rapes and brought with

the

trial

them the

risk

of a twenty-year prison sentence. Both

courts and the Supreme Court suddenly found themselves confronting
the legal

issues raised by non-coercive sexual encounters

The Supreme Court witnessed both a
rape cases

heard.

it

The Court did not

decided the Johnson case discussed

issue

in the

between teenage

girls

and older men.

quantitative and qualitative change in the

its first

decision

previous chapter.

on rape
It

until

1

856 when

it

then issued nineteen more

decisions between 1856 and 1922. Out of the sixteen cases decided after 1889, ten arose

out of statutory rape convictions.

period, nine

involving

were statutory rape

women above the

statutory rape

trials,

Of the

last

ten appeals heard by the Court during this

The Court reversed

cases.

six

of ten convictions

age of consent, but reversed only three of ten arising out of

and two of the reversals came

in the first

two

statutory rape cases

brought.'^

Men facing a charge of statutory rape had few defenses.
was deny the
Even

the

two

These

rate

reversals handed

but were based

the defendant

The high

act.

on general

was

last figures

of afiBrmances by the Supreme Court reflected

down by

principles

tried again

and

the Court had

little

of criminal law and

to

do

vrith

in at least

The burden of proof in

at best.

lower and the issues that kept the Court most busy in rape appeals
in trials for statutory rape.

girl

this fact.

rape law at

all,

one of those cases,

—evidence

a statutory rape

was

trial

was

issues going to character

Nevertheless, the high affirmance rate in these

cases further demonstrates the message emanating fi-om the courts in cases of statutory rape.

accused of having sex with a young

do

convicted.'''

provide crude information

and consent—were absent

All they could really

A man

in serious trouble.

477 (1895) the Court reversed the conviction because the four-and-a-halfState v.
year-old victim's mother had said too much about what the child had reported to her. hi
Manning, 74 Vt. 449 (1902) the trial judge had instructed the jury that if they did not believe the
an incorrect
defendant's alibi then they should find him guilty. The Court, holding that this was
Manning, 75 Vt. 185
statement of law, reversed. Manning was tried again and convicted. State v.
In State

v.

Carroll, 67 Vt.

(1903).
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Consent
Despite the odds against them, defendants did appeal their convictions.
Several

themes

in these appeals are discernible.

First,

some defendants attempted

consent as a defense even though the statute seemed to rule
challenges

came

in

it

out. All three

prosecutions for assault with intent to commit rape on

age of consent. In each, the defendants argued that the

girl

to resurrect

of these

girls

had consented to

under the

their

attempts to have sex with them and that the statute's vitiation of consent did not apply to
the attempt, but only to the actual intercourse.

any intercourse between a

girl less

commit

amended

rape. In

girl

this

men over

consented or not. But the statute had not

the attempted rape law,

making

statutory rape law treated as a rape

than fourteen (later less than sixteen) and

age sixteen regardless of whether the
explicitly

The

which made

illegal

an assault with intent to

argument, defendants sought to exploit

that the consent element remained in the case

this fact

and argue

of attempt, regardless of the age of the

alleged victim.

The
eight,

first

challenge

had attempted

to

came

in State

v.

Wheat (1890). Henry Wheat, aged twenty-

have sex with Alice Taylor

who was

under fourteen. The

indictment did not state the age of either Alice or Henry, but simply noted that he had

attempted to rape her "against her will." The

was immaterial whether

age, if Wheat had attempted intercourse he

was under

On

appeal, his lawyer argued that consent

because

it

judge had instructed the jury

that

it

Alice had consented to the attempted intercourse or not. Since

she

intercourse.

trial

The Court side-stepped

found that the

failure

still

the issue

of the

was

applied to attempts

of consent

in

state to allege Alice's

301

guilty.

He was

if not

convicted.

actual

attempted statutory cases

age was prejudicial to the

He had no way of knowing whether the

defendant.

rape case or a statutory one.

He

could not

tell

state

was trying

the case as a forcible

whether consent might be a valid defense

or not. Though the Court noted that there was evidence that the attempt
was by force

and against the

will

of the alleged victim, the judge's charge

that consent

was

irrelevant

prevented the jury from considering that aspect of the case. The Supreme Court
reversed.'^

The Court addressed

the consent question in attempt cases

another appeal heard six years after Wheat. In State

James

Sullivan,

had been

drove for the cash store
the girls

ofiFer.

down

Once

with him.

at

young

in St. Albans.

into the cellar.

girls to ride

Upon

arriving

in

Sullivan (1896), an elderly man,

with him on the delivery

back

wagon he

at the store, Sullivan invited

Only nine-year-old Bessie Pomeroy took him up on

in the cellar, Sullivan

When

a nearby

soliciting

v.

more squarely

had fondled her

genitals and asked her to

his

have sex

she refused, Sullivan offered to meet her that night or the next morning

bam for the same purpose.

Bessie, looking pale,

left

and immediately told her mother. Sullivan was arrested soon

the cellar, ran

after,

home,

charged with

attempt, and convicted.

He

raised several issues

on appeal including the argument

that the indictment

had

alleged that he had assaulted Bessie against her will and that that needed to be proved.

But the Court held

that as long as the indictment alleged that Bessie

was under

age,

phrases such as "against her will" or "with force," were mere "surplusage" and irrelevant

to the charge. Sullivan also argued that the state

was under

'5

State

V.

age, but that the defendant

was

needed not only

sixteen or older.

Wheat, 63 Vt. 673 (1890).
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to prove that the girl

The Court

rejected this

aiguincMU,

defense lo

lu>ldiii^ thai (he dcloiuliuU's

rest

which had to Iv proven by

il,

noted dryly

that if tliere

tlie

by the appearanee of tlie delendant himself,

show an

sex with her

intent to

1

an olciuonl oi

orituc, but rather

{\\c

the defendant^ age,

whom

it

had Iven

the C ourt deserilvd as

ourt dismissed Sullivan's claim that

have sex with the

sonic later tiuKV

at

(

iu>l

he

(

a

defendant himself In any ease, the (\>nrt

was any qnestion aU>nl

grayheaded old man." Lastly, the
not

age was

the time of

girl at

tl)e

tlie

^

jnit

io

a

evidence did

assault, but rather to

have

ourt held that the evtdence slu>wed that Sullivan

would have had sex w ith Bessie 'Mhen and

there"

if

she had not ^Yelused and repulsed his

solicitations."*^'

The
case.

1

I

issue

of consent

'dward (Mark aged

inma Uillideaux

in

filly-lhrce

in the railroad

watched as (Mark olVered the

on top of her.

I

attempt cases

was

finally laid lo rest in

and a painter, was caught with eleven-year-old

engine house

girl liquor,

in

Montpelier.

attempt,

llis

local police olVicer

(hen put her hand on his genitals, and laid

syphilis,

l-mma's teslinu>ny confirmed

olUcer and ailded (hat Clark had Ihreatenetl her with a

I lark

A

down

Ipon Iving taken into custody, Clark told the otlicer that he "couldn't do

anything" Ixvause he had

attempt,

a sv>rdid I^H)4

appealed, arguing,

lawyer argued

in his

among

knife.

other things, that

brief that b

inma "was as

I

that

of the police

Aller IxMug Ci>nvictcd

'mma consented

i^l

to the

willing to play and tondle

with (he responden( as was the respondent with her, and that she put forth no lorce or

elTort to assist

any attempt made by the respondent, and

In support, (Mark's lawyer cited cases

'\SV(j/c

V.

SulliViW.

(>X

V(.

>•»()

this is not

denied by the state

from a lew other slates which had drawn

(18%).
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"

distinctions

between attempt and actual intercourse

in

terms of the use that could be

made of consent.'^
Unusual for a

state brief, the prosecutor

question, showing that ahnost

was

all

reviewed the law of all states on the

courts that had ruled on the issue had held that consent

as irrelevant in an attempt case as

it

was

an actual rape case. Referring to the

in

only case which stood for the defendant's position, the prosecutor wrote
that
"maintains the illogical position that while the complete act of rape

upon a

child

commit

lesser crime

that rape cannot be committed, if the child,

conclusively presumed by law to be unable to consent, consents."
the matter in one sentence, holding that since

irrelevant.

may be consummated

under the age of consent, with or without her consent, yet the

for an assault with intent to

it

Emma was

This foreclosed any further appeals along this

The Court

dealt with

under sixteen consent was

line.'*

Changing Stories
Another issue
statutory rape

testimony.

was

that

came up more than once

a petition for a

new

trial

cases, defendants

Manning

State

V.

( 1

had

little

from convictions

in adultery cases.

girl

had changed her

Defendants sought to

story.

luck in convincing the Court to grant a

902) the defendant,

Clark, Respondent's Brief,

who had

p. 4,

for

based on the victim's recanting of her

We have already seen this strategy

introduce post-conviction evidence that the

in appeals

ah-eady

trial.

adultery

In State

v.

won one new trial based on a bad

Vermont Reports

Montpeiier, Vermont; Records of the State Prison, vol.

new

As with

5, p.

Brieft, 77(1), no. 3 (1904), State Library,

437, Special Collections, University of

Vermont, Burlington, Vermont.
'«

Stale

V.

Clark, Brief for State, p. 27,

Vermont Reports

Vt. 10(1904).
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Briefs, 77(1), no. 3 (1904); State

v.

Clark, 77

charge to the jury, sought yet another
year-old

trial after his

second conviction for raping thirteen-

Emma Fosby.

Fosby had no mother. Her father worked a
boarded out to many homes

in

Manning

and three children

lived with his wife

town

variety

of jobs and

including Peter Manning.

at the

Aged

home of his

Emma had been

thirty-three,

father-in-law.

too did a variety of jobs including seasonal lumbering. At the time of the rape,

was

living

with her grandmother Ursula,

who when asked

Manning showed up

Ursula told him he did not

Manning,

Manning

After

off the road. She

told

him

saw Manning

that

Emma was not

on top of Emma and have

was

afi-aid

of Manning: "there are

happens about such times with people

home

like that; there

go

into the

woods

stop the assault, Ursula

of accidents, you know,

was no one around, and no one

at

but myself."

Emma's

story largely

comported with Ursula's. She

walked back to the house wdth Manning and
her grandmother that

and

Emma to

lots

Emma just

intercourse with her.

Emma refiised. When asked why she did not try to

explained that she

staying with her.

the neighbor, Ursula took her

Afterwords, Ursula testified that she heard Manning ask

with him, but

mistrustful of

went looking. She came upon Manning and
get

When

her door looking for her son.

Emma did not return fi-om a trip to

adult retarded son with her and

they claim." Ursula

Manning asked about Emma. Ursula,

live there.

whom she knew in passing,
left.

at

Emma

to describe her relationship to

Emma stated "They call me her grand-mother; my son is her father,
testified that in late July

Manning

his family.

Emma's

father

that she

had offered to

Manning denied the whole

thing.
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also admitted that she

had kissed him. Manning had

let

Emma come back to

He had

live

never been to Fosby's

had

told

with him

at all,

never had sex with

Emma, and

the day before and

was

At

in

his

second

stranger

who

identify the

father,

looked

bed recovering from the surgery the next morning.

in

trial.

which she recanted her
like

olVcred as an alibi the fact that he had had a tooth pulled

Manning presented two

wood whip me

if

I

that she

Manning. Her grandmother told her
her, so

Emma named

him she was wrong and

told

purportedly written by

She explained

earlier testimony.

man, she would whip

Emma

letters

sed any difarnt."

it

had been raped by a

that if she refused to

Manning. After Ursula told her

was not Manning, but her

Emma denied

Emma

father "sed he

writing the letters and denied that her

grandmother and father had threatened her with whippings

for failing to implicate

Manning. Both her father and grandmother denied threatening

her.

Manning was

convicted again.^^

On
witnesses

appeal. Manning's lawyers sought a

who

said they had heard

man who claimed

to have mailed

trial

Emma deny Manning

Emma's

Fosby did not have a good reputation
uncharacteristically nasty tone for

new

letters to

had raped

her, testimony

Manning, and evidence

for truthfulness.

Vermont

based on new evidence:

The

from a

that Ursula

appellate briefs revealed an

litigation as the state's attorney

and defense

counsel traded allegations of impropriety and ran dovsoi one another's witnesses.

In

its brief,

the state

condemned

the defendant's tactic of challenging

Emma's

testimony. Manning's lawyers had been "lied to and cheated as to the facts, or the

Respondent and

his witnesses deliberately perjured themselves."

inappropriately pressured to acknowledge the letters as hers.

Emma had

The

frivolous appeal

" State

V.

Manning, Windsor County Court, December 1901 Term, Transcript of Trial.

State

V.

Manning, "Certification of Appeal," Vermont Reports
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been

Briefs, 75(2), no.

29 (1902).

was

fueled by an appointed lawyer, drawing

on the

state treasury for his

"an ignorant community, with the usual attendant low
supples [where] evidence can be found by those
possible condition of facts."

The

swift witness,"

man

of morals, for a base of

cater to such work, to meet any

state's attorney then ran

by the defense including "poor Joe Carter a

name," "McGibbon ... a

who

state

down

the witnesses relied

so ignorant he cannot write his

Manning's lawyer pulled no punches

As

either.

that she

make such

threats

own

might be discredited.^'

to the threats

father and grandmother, the lawyer pointed out that 'Hhose people

to

on

and Ursula Manning 'Hhe broken old

grandmother" forced to go to the scene of the assault so

enough

pay and relying on

would be corrupt enough

to

made by Emma's

who would

be corrupt

deny them." The Fosbys,

according to Manning's lawyer, were "'way down' tramps,

living in shanties or

an old

school-house, and moving from town to town."^^

This kind of rhetoric was unusual

attorney,

trial for

who was soon

to retire,

was

Peter Manning. Similarly,

must have been equally

The Court

felt

if

in

Vermont

appellate practice.

clearly frustrated at the prospect

Manning was

in fact

The

state's

of yet another

innocent, he and his lawyer

frustrated.

that

none of the new evidence warranted a

third trial.

The

testimony of the mail deliverer was ambiguous, Ursula Tosby's reputation had been

argued both pro and con, and Fosby "evidently a poor and obscure person" did not,
according to the Court, really have a reputation one

^'

way

or the other.

Stale

V.

Manning, Vermont Reports

Driefs, "Brief Ibr State," p. 2, 6.

State

V.

Manning, Vermont Reports

Briefs, "Brief lor

New

Trial," p. 7.
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Respondent,"

p. 3

As

for the

and "Brief on Petition

for

testimony that others had heard

Emma recant, the Court found

contradictory and

it

unpersuasive. Manning went to prison for six years.^^
Just a year later another case

of retracted testimony came before the Supreme

Court. Charles Willett, aged thirty-three, was convicted of the statutory
rape of his
twelve-year-old stepdaughter Nina Papineau. Nina lived with her
grandmother in
Burlington. Her mother lived with Willett, an

illiterate

teamster, and six other children in

nearby Shelbume. Nina had gone to Shelbume for a

visit in

had been raped by Willett on several occasions. She

told her

complained to the

state.

Willett denied the charges, but

August and claimed
grandmother

who

that she

then

was convicted and sentenced

to

four to five years.

Nina paid a

visit

to her

mother who had relocated to Burlington with the children

after Willett's imprisonment.

As Nina

her children to the poor farm

in Williston.

at trial

and

entered, her mother

was packing up

Nina explained to her mother

that "she thought that as long as he [Willett]

was

to

go with

that she

there [in prison] and

had

lied

was

not guilty of anything he better be at home." Nina and her mother then went to Willett's
lawyer's oflSce where Nina gave a sworn statement. She explained that her four-year-old

stepbrother had told her grandmother that WUlett had done something

According to Nina, her grandmother

fi-equently

whipped her and

wrong

to her.

told her that if she did

not accuse Willett she would whip her again. Nina said that her grandmother did not

Willett

for

"

its

and wanted to see him

in prison

and

that

part pointed out the medical testimony

no one had

from the

trial that

Manning, 75 Vt. 185 (1903); Records of the State Prison,
appeal can be found at 74 Vt. 449 (1902).
State

V.
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told her to recant.

The

like

state

Nina's hymen had been

vol. 5, p. 401.

Manning's

first

ruptured and was raw and tender. The grandmother also swore
that Nina's story was
false

and

that since she left her

house several months before, "she never darkened

doors" again. Confronted with

this testimony, the

Supreme Court simply

my

stated that a

majority of the justices believed that Willctt had been justly convicted.'"

Character

The

major issue confronted by the Court as a

last

prosecutions

was

What

the question of character.

result

role, if any,

of statutory rape

could the alleged victim's

sexual character play in the prosecution? Technically, the answer

forcible rape

we

constrained.

It

vsdll

recall that the

was none.

In cases of

use of sexual character evidence was quite

could only be used to impeach the credibility of the alleged victim on the

matter of consent and then only

when

she testified. Wliere consent

was not an

issue,

such evidence was not permitted. The Court's rulings on the use of sexual character
evidence

niling

in

other contexts

made

clear

how

limited the rape/consent exception was.

on the matter with regard to statutory rape

is

further evidence

of its

Its

intent that

sexual character evidence not be a tool used by defendants to smear the state's

wdtnesses.

The question came before the Court
thirty-five, a farmer,

girl.

Stimpson denied ever having sex wdth

girl in

order to

been pregnant before and

2"

State

V.

Willett,

a 1905 case. State

v.

Stimpson. Stimpson,

and married, was accused of having sex with a fifteen-year-old

aged

examine the

in

show

that she

that since

Vermont Reports

her.

was

At

trial, his

six to eight

lawyer sought to cross-

months pregnant, had never

age twelve she had had sex with "many different

Briefs, 78(2), no.

23 (1904); State

309

v.

Willett,

78 Vt. 157 (1904).

persons." Stimpson's lawyer argued that her lack of chastity
affected her credibUity and
that her promiscuity and ensuing

pregnancy provided a motive for her to accuse

Stimpson "perhaps to protect her paramours." The
pregnancy, but not the

fact that the girl

want the pregnancy admitted unless

it

was

state

willing to admit the

had been with other men. The defense did not

could show promiscuity. The

trial

judge sustained

the state's objection and did not allow in the evidence of pregnancy or promiscuity.

Stimpson was convicted and sentenced to four to
In

its

appeUate

the state explored the use of sexual character evidence in

brief,

rape cases, pointing out that

the

woman's

its

on

was

only appropriate use

assertion of non-consent.

position based

five years in the state prison."

citation to the

same

The defendant's

in ascertaining the credibility

brief sought to support his

cases. Recognizing that those cases involved

forcible rape, his lawyers argued for an expansion in the application

fi-om its special use

defense, this only

sense. "Should a

bad as to licentiousness and lewdness be
involving her

own

shame, as another

The Supreme Court
had

in fact

had sex with the

out that consent

was

woman whose

entitled to the

woman whose

girl

and that

it

V.

irrelevant in a statutory case.

Stimpson, 78 Vt. 124 (1905); State

Records of the State Prison,

same

v.

credit, in

character

It

test

To

the

proverbially

a prosecution

without stain?'

is

It

is

believed that Stimpson

had been had with her consent, but

Morse, Spears, and Fournier cases discussed

State

credibility.

general character

rejected Stimpson's arguments.

expand the use of sexual character evidence as a

"

of such evidence

on the question of consent, to a gauge of general

made

of

it

pointed

rejected Stimpson's attempts to

of general

credibility.

in earlier chapters,

it

Citing the

reiterated again that

Stimpson, Vermont Reports Briefe, 78(1), no. 19 (1905);

vol. 6, p. 48.
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such evidence was not admissible as a

test

forcible rape cases

at issue.

whether a

of his

trial

where consent was

of general

The Court

judge could allow testimony of sexual

discretion.

credibility

and was limited only to

did leave

activity

open the question of

with other

men

as a matter

But since the issue had not been raised the Court did not address
the

question.

Certain general trends are apparent in the appellate cases heard by the
Court

between 1890 and 1922.

men

for having sex with

First,

young

Vermonters used
girls.

As

their statutory rape

law to punish older

the cases discussed above anecdotally

demonstrate, Vermont did not generally enforce the statutory rape law against teenage

boys and young men. The average age of a female victim

The average age of the defendants was

half.

girls

and men

living hardscrabble lives

thirty-nine.

in these

cases

was eleven and a

Second, many cases involved

on the margins of Vermont

society.

Third,

statutory rape cases often took place in the context of extended families riven by intra-

family tensions and conflict.^^ Fourth, statutory rape cases placed tremendous

the hands of very young girls-especially since corroboration

limited.

at the

was

power

in

often absent or very

While judges and juries were very willing to accept a young girPs story of rape

hands of grown men, they were unwilling to believe her when she recanted. As

male

State's attorneys faced with sexual activity between older

relatives

and young

girls

could

prosecute the case under Vermont's incest law or as a statutory rape. Those convicted of incest were
subject to a

maximum

prison term of five years, the

rape faced up to ten and

(after

1

basically the same, a prosecutor

848) twenty years

same

as for adultery. Those convicted of statutory

in prison.

Since the elements of the crime were

was making an important decision

in

choosing which statute to charge

under. While incest brought a lesser penalty, the stigma of a conviction was probably for worse than
that of a conviction for statutory rape. Those tried for incest faced very good odds of conviction and
prison.
in

Between 1813 and 1919, twenty-two cases went to

trial

or verdict.

Sixty-eight percent resulted

convictions (27 percent by plea, 41 percent by jury), 23 percent resulted in acquittals by jury; one jury

was hung, and one case was dismissed by prosecutors during trial. Out of fifteen convictions, fourteen
defendants were confined. Twelve served prison sentences averaging three and a half years. Two were
confined to the Industrial School till age twenty-one. One was given probation.
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with several adultery cases

we have

tremendous pressure on these

change

girls to

and fathers had been sent to prison as a
Papineau have

felt

alone, at the table in the

trip to the

recognized the

men and women, mothers

their stories after

result

of their testimony. What could Nina

as she walked into her mother's

packing up the family for a

may have

seen, the courts

poor farm?

home

to find her in the midst

How did

limma Fosby

Manning household while Manning's wife and

get her to acknowledge that the letter recanting her story

was

feel as

sister

of
she sat,

sought to

actually in her

handwriting?^' Lastly, matters of character and class permeated these cases. Even

though a

girl's

consent, sexual reputation, and family background were technically

irrelevant to these cases,

all

three issues

made

their

way

into these trials, but to

little

effect.

Results in the County Courts

Records from the four counties
and

fifteen cases for

attempt went to

tell

trial

the story. Sixty-six cases for statutory rape

or a plea during the period under study.

Ninety percent of these cases were brought after 1886 when the age of consent was

raised

from eleven

to fourteen.

Of the

sixty-six cases that

went

to trial or a plea for

statutory rape, fifty-eight (88 percent) resulted in a guilty verdict by jury (38 percent) or

by plea (50 percent). Only seven

men were found

not guilty

eight guilty verdicts in rape prosecutions, forty-four

were

(1

State

V.

Willctt, "Petition for a

Manninf^, "Brief for State,"

p. 2,

New

percent).

for rape, eleven

attempt, and three were for simple assault. Fifty-one resulted

"

1

in

Of the
were

fifty-

for

confinements (forty-nine

I'rial," p. 3,

Vermont Reports

Briefs, 78(2), no. 23 (1904); State

Vermont Reports

Briefs, 75(2), no.

29 (1902).

312

v.

prison sentences and two confinements to the Industrial School). Four

men received

probation and three were fined. The average prison sentence for those convicted
of rape

was

six years.

Men convicted

There were very few

were found
1

lesser charge

of attempt averaged sentences of 4.7

Men convicted of assault got an average of six months^* (see Table 9).

years.

after

of the

guilty.

886. Six

trials for

Fifteen cases

men were found

attempted statutory rape, but

went to
guilty

trial

all

of the defendants

or plea during the study period,

by juries and nine were found

by

guilty

all

but

two

Of

plea.

the fifteen convictions, nine were for the lesser offense of simple assault. In eleven of the
convictions, a prison sentence

was imposed. Those convicted of attempt received an

average sentence of 3.3 years while those convicted of simple assault averaged 1.2 years
in prison.

Two men received probation and two
men

Overall, the penalties for

were
and

were

fined or received probation.

convicted of statutory rape and lesser included offenses

less severe than those convicted

of rapes on adult women. (Compare Tables

5,

6

9.)

The demographic
under the statutory law

is

difiference

more

between men convicted of rape and those convicted

When we compare the kinds

significant.

of men

sentenced to the state prison on rape charges with those sentenced for offenses under the

statutory rape law certain factors stand out.

years older than

men charged

On average,

statutory rapists

were two

with raping adult women-yet another sign that statutory

rape was enforced against older men. While statutory rapists did not

come

fi:om the

«

upper echelons of Vermont society, they were more established than men who had been
imprisoned for raping adult women. Overall, they were older, more

^ Where

a range of sentence

was imposed,

I

likely to

be married,

used the lower figure in calculating the average.
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Table 9

Outcomes of Statutory Rape Cases Going

Cause

Total

Guilty

Cuilty(Jury) Guilty (Pita)

St.

Rape 66^

58 (88%)'

25 (38%)

St.

Rape 15

15(100%)^

6(40%)

33 (50%)

9 (60%)

to Trial or Verdict'

Not Guilty

Avr. Sent.

7(11%)

6.0 years^

n.a.

0 (0%)

3.3 years*

n.a.

Avr. Fine

(Attempt)

more

likely to

be Vermont natives, and held a slightly higher rung on Vermont's

economic ladder than men convicted on
educated professionals found

in

men

likely to

have been

The only

college-

these data were a priest and a teacher convicted of

more

statutory rape. Forcible rapists were

and more

forcible rape charges.

bom

transient,

more

likely to

be

common

laborers,

outside the state and country. If we consider only the

confined for these crimes, the difFerences are even more pronounced. Sixty-seven

percent of forcible rapists

who were

confined were unskilled laborers, while

Data covers Orange County ( 794- 920); Windsor County
Rutland County ( 839- 920).
'

1

^

This figure includes

^

Includes

4

N=51. Average sentence

1

(

1

790- 1 920); Addison County

(

1

percent

827- 920);

I

trial

which ended

in

a

hung jury.

verdicts for attempted statutory rape

and

3 for simple assault.

for statutory rape conviction (6 years), for attempt (4.7 years), for assault (.5

years).

^

6

Includes 9 convictions for simple assault.

]sj=l 1,

1

1

1

1

1

fifty

Average sentence

for attempted statutory rape (3.3 years), for
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simple assault (1.2 years).

a

of statutory

rapists

8 and Appendix

who were

confined for their crimes were unskilled. (Compare Table

A and B.)

Statutory

Rape

The very high conviction rates and

the

guilty to a crime as serious as statutory rape

consent removed fi-om the case,

Trials in Action

number of defendants willing to plead

makes

clear that with the question

men accused of statutory rape had very few options.

Their only defense lay in arguing that they had not committed the

show that

the child

was

of

lying and/or that

someone

else

act.

had committed

Thus, they had to

Typically their

it.

only means of doing so was to attack the credibility of the child and, often, her family.

Character

—sexual and otherwise—

^was intimately

both direct and

indirect, defense

counsel tried to

bound up

show that

By means

in this strategy.

the child had knowledge or

opportunity, or both, to engage in sex with another or painted her family as deviant

—

kind of backhanded attack on the child's morality by association. Defense attorneys tried
anything the court would

let

them

get

away

with.

But two could play this game, and

prosecutors often sought to introduce evidence that showed the defendant to be deviant

himself Often these efforts focused on the failure of witnesses to

—

roles

^roles

centered

Almost
in the trial

all

on

femilial

fiilfill

their

and gender norms.

of the issues discussed

in the

review of appellate cases came together

of Joseph Hamel for the rape of his eight-year-old niece Delia
and

his wife

expected

were

living

in

March 1897.

with her parents, the Westovers on

their

Hamel,

thirty-three,

farm

Williamstown. The Westovers' daughter Linnie also lived on the farm with her

in

Jewett.
husband Frank Thrasher and four children including Delia and a half brother Roy
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In addition, the

town boarded out an

elderly

Canadian from Ontario, had shown up with

man on

the farm. Hamel, a French-

his wife in

work. The Hamels went back to Ontario for a month
February.

Hamel

did

worked on

Delia testified that

November 1 896 looking
in January,

for

then returned in

the farm and intermittently at a job in Williamstown.

Hamel had

first

molested her

in the

kitchen in late March.

Later that morning, Hamel followed her out to the hen house where Delia said he stood
her up

on a feed trough and raped

her.

A medical examination several days later

revealed that Delia had been partially penetrated and that her genitals were swollen and
sore.

In constructing their narrative to the jury, both the state and the defense sought

to portray the other side's witnesses as sexually deviant, unfaithfiil to expected gender

roles, or derelict in the duties

expected of adults and parents. For example, the

prosecution highlighted the fact that Hamel

Hamel had

first

molested Delia

in the

was

often in places where he did not belong.

kitchen while the

two were doing

dishes.

The

prosecution pointed out that dishwashing was women's work. Hamel not only denied

touching Delia

took place

in the

in the

space. This

is

kitchen but also denied even washing the dishes. The rape

hen house, a location

why

that, like the kitchen,

Hamel

in a place

Westover remembered the
there.

as a female

the testimony of Delia's grandmother, Mrs. Westover, that she

Hamel come out of the hen house was doubly
but also placed

was marked

itself

incriminating.

It

where he was not supposed to

incident because she thought

it

saw

confirmed Delia's story,

be.

Indeed, Mrs.

strange that he should be in

Delia's father had difficulty answering questions about the layout of the hen house
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under examination. Despite the
law's farm, as a grown

hen house was

in the

man

was simply not a

it

same configuration as

1 hrasher answered: "1 don't

anything to do with the hens

Similarly,

was

a

.

.

when I lamel

common

it

know, because

1

place he went into.

said that he

thing, wasn't

it,

immediately backed off answering

went

don't get the eggs, and

remembered

drew out

and awash

in

"I

don't

Hamel's lawyers

the fact that he

know

and grandparents

that Delia's grandfather

Roy
seen

in

State

V.

first

it

was

that

serving the children.

the prosecutor.

Delia engaging

Hamel

was."^"

it

was

Delia's ten-year-old half-

an effort to show a household

in disarray

who

initially

got a divorce fi-om

husband came through. They even

was a bigamist and had been

in

in

prison

in

tried to

Canada.

testified that

he had

sexual play around the farm. His lawyers drew out that

when

the rape allegedly occurred because

Hamel, Orange County Court, June 1897 Term, Transcript of Trial,

Hamel, 203, 294
"

don't have

had a good appetite

Jewett was painted as a chronic masturbator and Hamel

Roy and

the

introduced evidence that Delia's mother married her father

Delia's parents had been absent fi-om the farm

^'

as

son of your mother by the husband

later

if

the act. In order to bolster this defense, they

several years before her divorce from her

show

I

sexual deviance. In their examination of Delia, Hamel's lawyers

identified Jewctt as "the

her."^'

that Delia

you waiting on them?" asked

Roy Jewctt who had committed

after Delia's parents

asked

had heen on the date of the alleged rape

Hamcl's lawyers defended him by arguing
brother

When

.

the night of the alleged rape, the state

"It

he lived and worked lull-time on his father-in-

iact that

Hamel, 23.
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p.

107,177.

lhe> had been attending a

aduherous

affair

murder

trial in

Montpclier where they

testified atxnit the

of the two defendants. After asking Delia aKnit

argued that Delia had heard her parents diseussing the case and

this.

Hamel's lawyers

had put ideas

it

in

her

head. They introduced or attempted to introduce other cNidence
indicating the

breakdown of parental

W eslover fann.

responsibilit} at the

because her mother had been away for four weeks attending

been done. Delia had bragged
school and

^eh

his jackknife

in front

of her parents

move." Several boys

at

Delia's underwear

trial

that she

was

filthy

and no washing had

had

sat

on a boy*s lap

at

school had been fooling around

with her. She did not regularly attend Sunday school and her grandparents, rather than
her parents, were responsible for her schooling.

portrait

of a household

in

w hich

In the end. the defense painted a

parents were failing to adliere to domestic nomis

concerning marriage, domestic responsibilities, and the supervision and correction of
their cliildren.

But

it

did not work.

These kinds of allegations were a double-edged sword. The

state

and

its

witnesses attacked the validity of Hamel's marriage by invariably referring to his wife as

"the so-called Mrs.

that

Hamel's wife

and

that she

married her

Hamel" or "Mrs. Hamel,

left

had been

her

first

living

husband

with her

first

marry him,

The

that she

state introduced e\idence

was not properly divorced,

husband on and off since Hamel

said he

in 1893.^^

Most of the evidence used
perpetrated the act

to support the defense theory that

came from Hamel

fiddling with his clothes in the

" HameL

to

so-called."

bam

himself.

stall.

It

It

Roy

was Hamel who saw Roy

was Hamel who heard Roy

66, 80, 90. 113, 310-312.
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Jewett had

.Tewett

threaten Delia

that

he was gom)>

supposally

aiK^ueil that

io

put

altcinplin^'.

I

eommon

a

to

Ucvr Ami

inlcivoniso

Why

diil

some wieked eause

I

lanicl whi>

On

saw K wcMI and Delia

oioss-cxanunalion the state

own

depraved

lainel think that the

I

when you

to them,

words put
^

see these

something

thai

two

things in these

little

seems

the

in

meant

to her"

it

o(

state

{\>uld not Jewelt have simply Iven urinating

anything sexual? ^'Why do you always,

ehildreiu assign

was

ol these seenes relleeted his

io he a voyeur.

praetiee?

i(

the outhouse.

in

hunePs inlerprelalions

mind or showed him
stall

it

little

own

\o ilwell in yt>ur

mind, with wiekedness ralher than with innoecnccT'*' And what, the proseeutor wanted
to

know, was llamel

iloing peering Ihroiigh a eraek in the

minutes watehing the two ehildren

ilidiri

at

sex play?

Why

outhouse

didifl he slop

it

to tliree

Why

immeilialely?

he report these episodes lo the ehildreirs |>arents? IWeause, the pu>seeutt>r

argued,

lamel s purpose

I

in

peering through the eiaeks was not lor eorreetive

survcillanee, hut instead di>ne ^lor the pur|n>se ol an>using |his|

lameTs

I

it

two

lor

liiilure

to rept>rl

raised doubts about whether

it

what he saw was

had even happened

the elleel

ofmaking lamel seem depraved and

about

manhood:

his

I

the slate

useil in three

grilleil

conlronted Ki>y Jewelt or reported

I

voyeuristie.

ehiklren

HamrL

,

.

were doing

theie'^"

"Why

didiTl

into a

third

why

me why

water eloset

tlie

il

319

l

il

irsl,

had

raised ijuestions

he had

iu>t

The proseeutor

you, a man,

lo see

what

you have sulHeienl manhood

:^^>.

slate

detaileil al>ove,

this behavii)r to Delia's parents.

up there and peeking Ihroiigh eraeks

.

And

lamel again anil again about

tell

animal desires."*'

ways by

Seeond, as

repeatedly (|uestioneil his manhood. " Then won't you

ereeping.

own

I

was

wo

lillle

lo speak lo

.

them about

"Why

it?"

might correct the

when he
.

little

didn't

you have

sufficient

children?" "Don't

sees another person's

little girl,

manhood

you think
or

little

it is

to teU the parents so they

the duty

men whose

unsuccessful and he

cases went to

was found

guilty.

noted that Hamel had received a

who had done

a man,

trial,

it

.

might be corrected?"^^

Hamel's defense strategy was

At the sentencing. Judge Laforrest Thompson

fair trial,

been defended by able counsel

at state

expense

everything in their power to protect his rights and establish his innocence.

But the judge told him
hard to see

if he is

boy, doing what they ought not to do

to notify, or inform their father or their mother of it, so that

Like most

of a man,

that the jury

how they could

had found him

guilty

on evidence "so conclusive

have found otherwise and done

their duty."

it is

Hamel got

eighteen years.^^

While not
appear

in transcripts

some of those
roles in State

had a

all

child.

of the social conditions and
of other statutory rape

characteristics.

v.

Harlow

Thus,

we

strategies

trials, all

on

of those

see a similar focus

living

Hamel

case

transcripts contain at least

on proper gender and

(1898). Twenty-two-year-old Herbert

The Harlows were

display in the

family

Harlow was married and

with their in-laws Rollin and Martha Davis. The

Davises had an eight-year-old foster child Myrtle,

whom they had raised from birth. One

day Harlow's wife went out berrying. His mother-in-law sent him out

to find her

because the baby was fussing and she did not have time to take care of it. Harlow,
pushing a baby carriage and accompanied by Myrtie-an image that must have been
jarring to the all-male jury-set out to find her. Instead, he

Hamel, 244, 245, 246, 262, 265.
''Hamel, 311-372.
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took Myrtie

into the

woods

and raped

her.

her to

her parents that she had fallen on a stump.

tell

After trying to clean up Myrtie

In this case

in

it

was the defense who

who was

bleeding proftisely, he instructed

called attention to

Harlow's domestic

an attempt to show animus between Myrtle's parents and Harlow and
thus a motive

for a false allegation.

It

probably backfired. Harlow's wife and child had

with the Davises while Harlow worked out of town.

come

On cross-examination,

counsel asked Mrs. Davis about whether she had wanted Harlow to come

Davis answered affirmatively. But she

testified that

the support of his family and "of course

child.""

When

that "he did not

in its

him

.

defense

live

with them.

Harlow had not paid anything

we wanted him to

for

take care of his wife and

pay anything

at

our house." The defense pursued

this line

of questioning

cross-examination of Mr. Davis. While he claimed not have any hard feelings

.

.

."

The defense

his not supporting his wife,

I

did not feel that that

his

wife

—was

right

of

anything about supporting

there?

A:

There were a good many [months].

Q:

And

she lived with you?

A.

Yes,

sir.

Q:

Did you

V.

was

inexplicably continued this line of questioning:

Some months before he came there in May, he did not do

Q:

State

to live

asked whether he contributed to household expenses, she told the jury

toward Harlow "of course

"

failings

try to get

him

to

come

live

with you?

Harlow, Windsor County Court, December 1898 Term, Transcript of Trial,
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p. 21.

A.

No,

sir

when he

did

come

him

would take hold and try and do
something, and get ready to go to keeping house what money he
earned he might
put into stuff to keep house with and we would get along with
the rest.^^
there

I

told

Later, the state introduced a letter sent by

begged them

to help

Harlow from jail

him out and get Myrtie

three times in the short

letter.

to recant.

He

he wrote that he and

First,

beginning to keep house before his

if he

arrest.

Next he

to his in-laws in

which he

mentioned keeping house

their

daughter were just

them that he just wanted

told

to get

out and "go to keeping house." Finally he told them again that he and his wife had

begun

to

keep house

right before his arrest.

introduction of this evidence.

guilty verdict.

Harlow got

The defendant

The jury was out

for

did not object to the

two and

half hours before returning a

fifteen years.^^

Other defendants focused on more general issues of character and morality, but
did not

seem

her family

to matter

was portrayed. In State

thirteen-year-old

girl

how sexually active was the

had been

girl,

or

how immoral and depraved

Olney, an 1895 statutory rape case involving a

the twenty-six-year-old defendant introduced testimony that the

another

vsdth

v.

girl

man after the

event and that this was the

first

time she had had

intercourse, a fact she admitted. Furthermore, the consensual intercourse

as happening in a parlor while her father

woman. Because
penetrated,

it

the girl's testimony

would have been easy

place, but they chose not

State

V.

Harlow, 54.

State

V.

Harlow, 68.

^ State

V.

it

was

was

in the

next

was depicted

room entertaining

another

inconsistent about whether she had been

for the jury to find that penetration

to.'*°

Olney, Windsor County Court, December 1895 Term, Transcript of Trial,
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p. 5.

had not taken

We have already seen how in State v.
as

"way down tramps" and

the

girl

Manning, the victim's family was described

herself had been boarded out

a bad reputation for honesty, was not a

virgin,

foUowing the date of the alleged rape.

On cross-examination.

all

over the county, had

and had had sex with another

to disparage the thirteen-year-old's character by focusing

man

Manning's lawyer sought

on the removal of her

underwear.

Q:

Did you kick up your heels so

A:

Why he took them off.

Q:

Did you kick up your heels so

A:

Yes,

Q:

He asked you

A:

Yes,

Q:

And you was

A:

I

Q:

You

that he could take

that

you could do

them

off?

it?

sir.

to

let

him do

it?

sir.

was not

willing that he should?

wdlling, but

I

could not get away from him.

kicked up your heels so that he could take your drawers

off, didn't

you?

Court: She has said she did.

Since consent was not in issue in the case, one must conclude that Manning's lawyer was

going after

Emma Fosby's sexual character.

judge's intervention

may

was found guUty not once, but

V.

Emma was willing.

The

well indicate his displeasure at such a tactic, or at least his

impatience given the testimony's irrelevance.

State

In other words,

None of this

mattered any way. Manning

twice.'''

Manning, Windsor County Court, December 1901 Term, Transcript of Trial,
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p.

24-25

In State

whose

family

v.

let

Emma Davis was a one-legged girl

Thorley (1913) twelve-year-old

her spend her nights at the movie theater in White River Junction.
They

admitted that they were having trouble keeping her
the theater,

would

movies every
testified that

let

her and her girlfriends in for

night. In response to a question

he had never seen such a young

The defense showed

parents.

Nevertheless, Thorley

As with the

was found

Some weeks

free.

at

she went to the

out walking at night without her

was

at the Industrial

School for

stealing.

guilty."*^

fact patterns presented

show most prosecutions

home. Thorley, who worked

from Thorley' s lawyer, the police chief

girl

that her brother

at

by the reported decisions, the

involved sex between older

men and

transcripts

very young

girls.

These

anecdotal findings comport with the survey of the four county data. The average age of

male defendants

in statutory rape cases

was

than twelve. These figures changed somewhat during the three phases

slightly less

was

thirty-three.

The average age of the

of Vermont's age of consent law. Before the change from eleven to fourteen
average age of defendants was

and

1

898

it

was

thirty

and victims

thirty-one and ten. After

Based on the average age of the alleged
been physically sexually mature

The average age

V.

Thorley,

898

it

victims,

was

thirty- four

most of the

time intercourse

was

were

fifteen

girls

and just under

1

1

886

thirteen.

would not even have

alleged to have taken

variations during the period. Prior to

place."*^

was twenty-two

886 the average

Windsor County Court, December 1913 Term, Transcript of Trial.

and early twentieth century, the average age of menarche for American girls was
and sixteen. Today it is twelve. Joan Jacobs Brumberg, The Body Project: An Intimate

In the nineteenth

between

1886 the

than nine. Between

difference between defendants and their alleged victims

years. Again, there

State

at the

1

slightly less

in

victims

History ofAmerican Girls

(New York: Random House,
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1997), 3-5.

difference between defendants and alleged victim

and 1898

it

was twenty-two

years; and after 1898

was twenty-one
it

between

years;

was twenty-three

1

886

years (see Table

10).

There are a few cases where
relationships

between young people

it is

clear that the

law was used to break up mutual

that parents or authorities believed

were undesirable,

but this was quite rare. The average age of the defendants-thirty-three-malces this clear,
as does the fact that very few cases appear where both parties are teenagers. Out of
sixty-sbc cases

where the ages of both defendants and alleged victims are known,

in

only

ten cases were the defendants and girls seven or less years apart in age, but only seven of

these possibly qualify as teenage romances

probation, one

to prison terms

was sentenced

(1

1

percent).""

Two

of the seven received

to the Industrial School, and three others

of one to two, two to

three,

and four to

were sentenced

five years respectively.

The

oldest defendant, Bert Shotter (age twenty), got the longest sentence.

Even

in the

few cases which grew out of romances between teenage

slightly older boys, fathers

appeared hesitant to turn to the

new

girls

and

statutory rape law to

break up romances of which they disapproved-even despite great provocation on the

part

of the young man. But once these cases did go to

trial,

as with the

more

typical

prosecutions of older men, lawyers in these cases constructed their narratives around the

themes of parental responsibility (or neglect), respect for the
children,

and adherence to expected gender

Two of these

rights

of parents over

their

roles.

cases were instances of brother/sister incest and one involved a fifteen year-old boy and

Clayton Bearor, Orange County Court, April 1912 Term, vol. 24,
255 (eighteen year-old brother's rape of twelve-year-old sister); State v. James Benjamin, Orange
County Court, December 1909 Term, vol. 24, p. 103 (fourteen year-old brother's attempted rape of
an eleven year-old

girl.

Slaie

eleven-year-old sister); State

v.

v.

F.

Willie Perkins,

Windsor County Court, December 1899 Term,

Cases, vol. 4, p. 597-598 (fifteen year-old having sex with eleven year-old).
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take her out riding and Pixley would disobey him. FinaUy he sat
Pixley

down

in the

parlor and had a talk with him.

I

called

him

into the house,

and took him

room, the sitting
was true that he wanted to marry
into the front

room, alone, and asked him if this
Lizzie; he says "Yes" and I says "Do you love her?" He said
"Yes" I
says "Irving, has there been any wrong between you have you
committed
any crime with this girl? "No" he says nothing at all; he said he respected
and loved

her,

Now says

her.

and you are a man, and

"it is

I

a pretty hard thing— she

is

a child,

seems impossible to keep you apart; 1 says since
I told you to keep away from her, you have been
continuously with her;
and I says "It is almost impossible for me to keep you apart; if you love
her,

you

you

will respect her;

it

are true to her, if your have committed no crime with her,

house and seeing the

now,

I

says,

I

says,

don't object to your coming to the

I

our presence with the family; do not take her
out to ride in these by roads, and going to walk with her in these woodroads away from people and houses, as you have done you have done it
girl in

—

too much;

if you

anything to

He

you.

love her, you will do as

make people

says "that

talk

is right,

I

ask you

to,

and you

will not

do

and cast reflections on her character, and on

that

is

right"; "I will

come

here" and says

I

"you can come to the house and you may sit with our family, and visit
with the girl with us and in time, if you prove yourself all right, and
continue to be loving towards her, and wish to
old enough,

she

is

will

be a

man

we

with the

will see later
girl"

That

on

I

is all

make

her your wife,

have nothing against you,

would not take her

to ride

if you

was and he left,
nothing would be

the talk that there

promising that nothing had been done harmfiil, and that
done, and he said that he would

when

come and

see her with us, and that he

on by-roads, or back roads, or do anything

to

hurt her character."^

Several familiar themes are discernible in this excerpt.

happy about the relationships between Pbdey and

Pbdey

to continue seeing her, but only

to court Lizzie under

on

V.

Pixley,

his daughter, he

his terms.

was

that Pixley

obligation to "be a

his actions threatened the reputation

Windsor County Court, September 1901 Term, Transcript of Trial,
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not

willing to permit

Those terms meant

Ames's roof Ames reminded Pixley of his

man." And he also reminded Pixley that

State

Though George Ames was

p.

of his

61-62.

had

daughter and he, Pixley, as well. As

we have

seen in seduction cases, Pbdey's behavior

threatened Ames's reputation and that of the rest of his family too.
Despite his promises, Pixley was unable to stop himself.
discussion,

together.

Ames awoke

What

sound of Pixley and

to the

transpired next

is,

which Ames, Uke Joseph Hamel,

to

my mind,

testified

A week after this

his daughter getting ready to ride off

a fascinating moment of decision

in

about having to choose between surveillance

and prevention/repression. In the end, he chose

the one, and then the other. Rather

first

than run out and stop the two, which he could have done, Lizzie's father decided instead
to follow them.

and no

hat.

He engaged

in a rather

mad cap

testified that

ambiguously) "What are you doing here?

this

Ames

haven't done right."

I

Ames

Pixley admitted that he

have caught you

road and found

He and Pbdey

at last."

asked, "Irving, are

was

was

not.

not.

Ames

answered, "No,

asked "are you using

Ames then told Pbdey that

who had

finally told

arrived

them what

on the scene

happened.''^

Pixley, 62-66.
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is

("I

my

if he left

arrived.

sought to avoid turning the episode into a criminal matter.
questioning of others

it

wrong,

1

you the man you pretended you were,

drop the matter. Pixley agreed, but by then others had

he

wood

feet

he leapt out and shouted (again,

me on Sunday? Pbdey

Pixley answered that he

said) but

and dale with bare

got on top of him and asked, "Are you doing as you said you would? Is

doing as you talked v^th

me?"

hill

After more than a mile, he crept up to the couple on a

Pbdey on top of his daughter. Ames

brawled.

chase over

He

girl right?"

the state, he

Despite

tried to

to

all

would

of this,

Ames

evade the

hated to dis-honor

my family" he

On cross-examination,

Pixley's attorney argued that

Ames

the situation but chose not to so that he could "catch them,"
that

Ames

he had not followed them for "for crimes sake," but because

parent." But

why had he

Ames

while, and then ran

trouble with other

"it

was my duty

at the

it.

Pixley's lawyer also asked

he had seen Pixley unbutton his daughter's clothing, had waited a

up to them. Pixley's lawyer wanted to show that Ames had had

men concerning

and why he had engaged

fi-om him.

women

other

in his family

allow

its

in voyeurism.

But even Pixley

leave the state and never claimed that

No

and he had used

testified that

it

his

as a

daughter

Ames had

Ames had attempted to

extort

money

evidence was presented to support this theory and the court refused to

introduction.

Both the prosecutor and the defense sought

the notion of fatherly responsibility in the case

disregarded Ames's parental authority

Pixley

Ames

grand jury hearing. At that hearing the lawyer asserted that

means of getting money out of them. That was why Ames had not stopped

demanded he

as a

said he did not have time, but admitted he could

have yelled to them and they would have heard

Ames had testified that

disagreed, testifying

not stopped them at the house "if you acted on your duty
as a

parent?" asked defense counsel.

about his testimony

could have prevented

was

convicted.

—

^the

—

^the state

defense on

At the sentencing the

accused of having sex wdth another young

girl,

to focus attention

with regard to

how Ames had

how Pixley had

abused

state revealed that Pixley

and that

if the

Ames

on

it.

had been

case had not

come

up, he would have been tried for the other rape instead. Pixley's lawyer denied the

state's allegations with regard to the other girl.

He

also argued that while consent

was

technically irrelevant in statutory cases, the court should, in sentencing, take into account

both the respective ages of the parties, and the fact that Pbdey had not forced himself on

329

The judge was apparently moved by these arguments and
sentenced Pixley to no

Lizzie.

more than seven years

in state prison-eleven years less than

Joseph Hamel had

received.''^

State

V.

Adshad (1904) was a

statutory rape prosecution of nineteen-year-old

Arthur Adshad for having sex with Meen-year-old Edna King.
Edna's father Seth was a
butcher

who

operated his

own slaughterhouse and did day work to

supplement his

income. Adshad, a day laborer, had been coming around the house to
see Edna. In early
winter he showed up drunk and Seth King told him to leave. The next time
he showed

up drunk. King

told

him some names,

hit

Adshad served time

him

if he did

not leave, he would have him arrested. Adshad called

him, and King had him arrested for assault. Unable to pay his
at the

House of Corrections

in Rutland. It

was around

this

fine,

same

time that the state's witness George Hutchinson claimed to have seen Adshad and Edna

having intercourse in the bushes.

The

state

had a

difiBcult

case to prove. Both Adshad and Edna King denied

having intercourse, and Edna's father was not enthusiastic about the prosecution.

had not

filed the

complaint, instead

it

had been

filed

by a

He

local attorney after another

man, A. H. Ketchum, had reported what Hutchinson had told him. Both Edna and her
father testified for the defense.

As a result,

the state had to impeach the credibility of

both Edna and her father-a tactically unenviable strategy for a prosecutor. The
prosecutor asked King whether he had complained to Ketchum about the intimacy

between Adshad and

do to break up the

his daughter

relationship.

and whether Ketchum had told him what he needed to

King denied

it.

''Pixley, 185-187.
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Ketchum testified that he saw Adshad

and Edna together every day. But King

said the

two were

rarely together

and he told the

jury that after the preliminary hearing against Adshad Ketchum had
bragged: "Didn't
tell

you

I

would get a hook on [Adshad] sometime."

The prosecution had not presented a strong
Hutchinson who had seen the couple

two people who were
and her

The

father.

at

case.

a distance.

The

The only witness was
state

had had to discredit the

often the most efifective witnesses in a statutory rape case, the

father

had not made the complaint and was not interested

in

Adshad prosecuted. Edna and Arthur were both teenagers and they obviously
other.

And

the defense had

jury deliberated

all

such questions were, but
point,

The judge implored them to

in

seeing

liked

each

The

fi-ame up.

telling

them

that twelve

try again, recognizing

men would have

and that he despaired of getting any other twelve

The jury came
compromise

done a good job of raising the specter of a

girl

afternoon and then again the next morning before telling the judge

that they could not agree.

some

I

an hour

verdict.

later

and found Adshad

Adshad was sentenced

to

guilty

two

how

hard

to decide the case at

men as competent

as they.

of attempted rape-clearly a

House of

to three years at the

Corrections.'*^

In spite of the existence of a few cases

where the law broke up apparently

consensual teenage romances, the data makes clear that throughout the entire period, the
criminal justice system used the age of consent law to punish

much

older

men

for having

Adshad, Orange County Court, June 1904 Term, Transcript of Trial. In the two other
transcripts of cases falling within the pattern of a young mutual romance, fathers appear either
State

V.

powerless to stop the relationship or actually aid and abet

December 1913 Term, Transcript of Trial,

(after doctor

it.

Slate

examined

v.

Thorley, Windsor County Court,

girl

and informed

venereal warts and had been having sex with the defendant, father did not

make

father she

had

complaint, complaint

Olney, Windsor County Court, December 1895 Term, Transcript
of Trial (father repeatedly brings daughter to Olney's house, entertains another woman alone in one
room, while defendant and daughter sleep together in adjoining room).

was made by

state's attorney); State

v.
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sex with very young

similar age.

In the

I'cw cases involved mutual romances Ivtween teenagers of

girls.

we do

few cases

have oi such prosecutions, fathers did not

initiate the

complaints and appeared uncnthusiastic alx>ut employing the criminal law
as a remedy.

Comparison with Other

We

will recall that the

age oi consent campaign was intended, among other

things, to protect teenage girls

venereal disease,

.Ki r isdictions

Irom the ciVects ofpre-nwital

dimmed marriage

sex.

prospects, and falling into a

t

life

hese included

of prostitution. But

the impetus for the social purity campaign urbanization, immigration, industriali/ation

and coiumodification, existed
Boston, or Los Angeles.

11

in

the

Vermont

in

a far

more muted way than

comments of the Senate

guide to the sentiments of the Legislature as a whole,

Judiciary

we

sexual activity between teenagers and did not wish sweep

raising the

age of consent too high.

in

New

Committee

York,

are any

see that they were aware of

it

within the rape law by

The committee's reasoning makes clear that

it

did

not wish the age of consent campaign to criminali/e the traditional rural pattern of

premarital sex.

In this older model, sex

between young people

led to

pregnancy and then

a bastardy proceeding or marriage (or lust the one, and then the other).*'

Vermont

Sec

for

the increased

example, Shoro

v.

age of ci>nsent was not used

I

hus, in

to police teenage sexuality, but to

Shoro. Rutland Supreme C\nirt, Jamiary 1888 IVrm,

vol. 120, p. 21(>-217.

on a bastardy charge when he agreed to marry the complainant,
Anna, lie claimed (hat (he marriage was obtained by force and fraud and lha( Anna had a bad
rcputa(ion, (he (wo never lived (ogedier, and never had sex. The Supreme (\nir( gran(ed (he annulment.
Miirsctt V. MarscU^ Addison C\nin(y C\nirt, December 18^)2 Term, vol. 33, p. 5^2-3^)3 (peli(ion lor
annulment: forced marriage of minor by cons(able aiier bas(ardy accusation); Ralph v. Ralph, Rudand
I

IcrlxMl

Coun(y

Shoro, a minor, was in

C\n!r(,

March

1^)15

jail

Term,

marries (o get out of jail); AnJrus
57-.S8 (petition for

annulment:

vol. 01, p.
v.

445 (pe(i(ion

for

annulmenC

false alle^a(ion

Andrus. Rudand C\)un(y C\nir(, September

false allegation

of bastardy, marries lo avoid
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P)l(>

jail).

of bas(ardy,

IVrm,

vol. (>2, p.

proscculc luucli dKIci

men

IJoslon,

(

I

slaliiloiy

Angeles,

,os

)akl;nul,

and

an autliority these people

.OS

men

Conversely,

in cities like

ansing, the higher age of consent and olhei

Angeles

at

delendants

a

modern, urban Anierican society had taken away
sought to separate teenage

girls I'roni liaisons

in

her study ol statutory rape prosecutions

in

Oakland and

the turn ol the century, reveals a signifieanlly dillerent pattern of

tlian thai

in

lell

teens or early twenties.

in their

prosecutions

demonstrated by the Verujonl data. For example, she

these cases

teenage

girls rather

had had

in

Ihe

I

that intervention

Thus, Mary Odenu

I

sex wilh youwy, puis

ol lhe stale in order to regain authority over the
lives ol tcenagc

Irom them. Typically
wilh

IkuI

lelorms allowed anihoiilies as well as working class and
immigrani parents to

employ the power
girls

wlu>

were overwhelmingly young men accused

ol having sex wilh

than the middle-aged, middle-chiss seducers Ihe purity campaigners

mind when they worked

men charged

linds (hat

with statiilory

to raise (he

ra|)e in

age ol consent. Seventy-three percent ol

Alameda County (Oakland) were between age

eighteen and twenty-nine the bulk of whom were between eighteen and twenty-four; 74
percent of such cases

ndeen and seventeen.
Calilornia al this time

dynnniic.

in T.os

It

is

Angeles County involved men even younger, between

important to rememlxM too that the age of consent

was eighteen

lor girls.

While conviction rales were

with hallThe

men

iiigh

Punishment rellected

of consent

receiving probation. In addition, according to

lashion.

I

he

to

first

this alternative

(sixty-seven percent), sentences were lenient

sanctioned the use of character evidence against the girls

issue

in

Odem, many

in a
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judges

these eases, permitted the

be brought out, and allowed the girls to be treated

person to gel probation

in

statutory rape case,

in a

was

punitive

not, like in

Vermont, a teenage boy, but a
year-old

girl.

fifty-seven-year-old

The sentencing judge took

pity

man who

had had sex with a

on him because

fifteen-

the girl looked older than

her years and was perceived as having bad morals. Recall
that

when

Irving Pixley, aged

twenty-one, asked for leniency on the ground that his relationship
with thirteen-year-old
Lizzie

Ames had been consensual,

he received a seven-year sentence. Clearly the

experience in Vermont and California was remarkably

Kathleen Parker's study of sexual assault

in

different.^"

Michigan also demonstrates

statutory rape law could be implemented in a variety of ways. In a

diverse

Ingham County, the

sexual assaults on adult

1850 and 1950

between

1

in

1

authorities simply did not enforce the rape laws in cases

women. While

1

950.

consent campaign, raising

in

As
its

in

Parker's

Vermont.
fi-om the

First,

1

work

an acquittal (10 percent had

in

of

887 and to sixteen

in

a conviction,

unknown outcomes).

both jurisdictions showed high numbers of prosecutions and convictions

880s onward. But unlike

in

Vermont, the courts paid much greater attention

shows

prosecutions arose out of such courtships, while

Odem,

1

to the age

reveals both similarities and differences with the experience in

to consensual romantic relationships. Parker

cases.

for statutory rape

Vermont, Michigan too reacted quickly

age of consent fi-om ten to fourteen

in

of

there were only forty such prosecutions between

897. Eighty-four percent of all cases going to a verdict resulted

while only 6 percent resulted

*°

more urban and

Ingham County, the courts heard some 326 cases

880 and

how

that at least a third

Vermont data

of all

reveals very

few such

Despite the fact that the cases involved statutory rape, Parker asserts that judges

of Their Own Lives: The Politics and History of
Boston 1880-1960 (1988), 187-193 (on working class and immigrant parents' use of

20, 39, 53, 76; see also Linda Gordon, Heroes

Family Violence,

stubborn child laws to gain control over teenage children).
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focused much more on the issue of character and consent
different

from

that exhibited

in these cases-again,

by the Vermont evidence.'' Again, we see

a pattern

that

generalizations about law and sex in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries break

down when
and

scrutinized in the context in

legislative

which they

chambers of each individual

actually existed-in the

courtrooms

state.

Conclusion

The "he

said, she said" nature

of proof in a statutory rape

trial

and absence of a

consent defense meant that both the state and the defense had very few options except
to
discredit the character

failure to

of each other's witnesses. That they often drew attention to

observe traditional family roles for

us that they thought these
deviant family

life

men and women,

parents and children,

would resonate with judges and juries

failings

was of great concern to

their

—

^that is,

tells

that

these men. Parents were supposed to be

supervising their daughters, and taking care of their children's material, spiritual, and

educational needs.

When they did

not, defendants sought to exploit this. Conversely

defendants were supposed to protect children,

of their parents not to have

When defendants

up

to sexual norms, respect the rights

their children interfered with,

relatives, not betray the trust that

home.

live

and

in the case

of boarders and

had been bestowed on them by being allowed

took advantage of this

into the

trust, lived in suspect marital

relationships, violated parents' wishes, or failed to provide for the material needs

families, prosecutors highlighted these failures.

This was part of a larger pattern

of their
in

" Kathleen Ruth Parker, "Law Culture and Sexual Censure: Sex Crime Prosecutions in a Midwest
County Circuit Court, 1850-1950" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1993), 152-317, Table 21.

335

which both

sides, but especially the defense,

would

try anything

it

could get

away with to

sway the jury.
Nevertheless a more important value overcame

of these moral and social

all

shortcomings. The transcripts from statutory rape cases, the appellate records, and
the

high percentages of convictions in

all

statutory rape cases,

show

that

it

did not

seem to

—defendants

matter what the character of the prosecutrix or her family was for chastity

were found

guilty

of the charges. Furthermore

was very weak and

in

young

girls

of this

not. This suggests to

me

had wanted

activity

this fact

may

not sound surprising,

had only been made

to,

but in the great majority

a strong intolerance for sex between

which overcame any desire to punish deviant

Though

cases the state's evidence

defendants presented highly plausible defenses. In other words, the

juries could have found for the defendants if they

of cases they did

many of the

it is

illegal five, ten,

men and

girls.

important to remember that

or fifteen years before.

much

And, more

important, these trials represented an extraordinary inversion ofthe social hierarchy. Almost

invariably conviction rested

on the testimony of a young

girl against that

This dynamic inverted traditional roles, giving very young

girls

of an older man.

extraordinary

power over

men.

At the same time

young

girls

and

sex.

it

created a dramatic increase in explicit courtroom talk about

In his perceptive

work on pornography and

obscenity law in the

nineteenth and early twentieth century, Walter Kendrick describes the creation of a

discursive foil

by

legislators, judges, lawyers,

person"-the person

was

the invention

who needed

protection.

and commentators knovm as 'the young

Sometimes female, sometimes male, she

of those who sought to determine what was or was not
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suitable for her

gaze.

She

ever present in the writings of commentators and judges-the
person on

is

whose behalf the whole

exercise

was supposedly

perspective of those regulating on her behalf and

necessary; a person created from the

who

lives only in the

minds of those

people. Judges and regulators might view materials harmful to 'Hhe
young person" with
impunity.

In statutory rape cases, however, the courtroom

became a nexus

at

which

regulators and a "young person" actually met face to face. Constitutional protections.

Supreme Court precedent, and common law
explicitly sexual nature

would be common

increased repression of all sexual display

level,

tradition guaranteed that evidence

in statutory

rape

trials.

was being pursued

of an

At a time when

at the local

teenage female bodies and sexuality were to be put on display

and national

in the incredibly

public space of a county court jury trial."

Why did

Vermonters so eagerly

did they expand the

it

is

amount of sexual

impossible to ignore the

way

in

surge in prosecutions that followed

documented

in earlier

culture rested

on

invert the

talk in their criminal justice system?

which the change

it

coincided with

and

age of consent law and the

many of the

failed,

other developments

divorce rates skyrocketed,

and venereal disease seemed to have become

time, in the area

For one thing,

familial forms, but also felt that those institutions

were sagging. Villages and towns declined, farms

same

in the

And why

chapters of this study. Vermonters believed that their hallowed

specific social

adultery, abortion,

gender and age hierarchy?

common place. At

of seduction law, the Vermont Supreme Court

" Walter Kendrick, The Secret Museum: Pornography
123, 142-43, 156, 160, 177, 193,227.
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in

Modern

Culture

the

increasingly

(New York:

Viking, 1987),

justified punishing

the

impregnated a man's daughter out of wedlock not only for

economic harm they caused, but

relationship.

to

men who

go

It

was

after older

at this

men

time that prosecutors used the increased age of consent law

having sex with young

Such sexual behavior,

prison.

also for the disruption in the father/daughter

like adultery

girls,

convict them, and send them to

and seduction, was a knife pointed

at the

heart of the institutions and values Vermonters believed defined them-close extended
families, sexual propriety, and adherence to proper gender and age roles.

I

believe that the willingness of Vermonters to punish

sex with underage

girls reflected a fear that

family relationships and traditional

involved

roles.

men

accused of having

changing circumstances were disrupting

The suddenness with which

the state

became

of sexual relationships, and the

in the issue, the rapid increase in regulation

firmness with which juries and judges punished these violations reflects a dramatic

in mentality.

problem

Not only was sex between

that stale institutions could

girls

and older

and should

fix.

again, that intervention focused less on girls than

Committee's report made

clear, senators

men

But, as

a problem,

we have

it

shift

was a

seen again and

on men. As the Senate Judiciary

understood

tliat

raising the age of consent

signaled a decision to no longer hold teenage girls responsible for their actions. Instead,

it

shifted the

onus to men, articulating expectations for male, rather than female

behavior. Thus,

it

is

no surprise

actions, but did not allow

By

them

that the court

contrast, in other areas

much more on

girls'

to foil a prosecution.

of the country where the law was used

teenage sexuality, especially of older

focused

proceedings took notice of the

girls,

rather than protect younger

the behavior of the girl. This
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was

to regulate

girls, the

law

also true of jurisdictions that

crimiiiali/cd seduction,

liccausc these laws governed consensual sex by

women

iind girls

they applied only to lemales of "previously chaste character,"
implicating the

complainant's morality/' Vermont never adopted such a law,
and
action brought by lathers, not by daughters.

men who had

punish

sex with young

girls

As

civil

was an

seduction

a result, both fathers and the state could

while muting criticism or condemnation of the

herself (and her family) which might lead to a not guilty
verdict in other jurisdictions,

girl

furthermore, sending a defendant to prison for six years was a more
elfective way to
protect

all I'amilies

from interference than punishing a family

t)r girl

who

might be beyond

saving by acquitting the defendant.

We

can see confirmation of these concerns

in

the

themes

that prosecutors

judges wove into their texts narratives they used to persuade juries to

find

and

Ames

justify their

In his attempts to reason with Irving Pixley,

case.

insistence

would not
after

punishment, ('onsider again the story told by (leorge

them

on

respect for parental authority.

olx-y

him and neither would

in a state

Ames

fell

lell

in the J*ixley

on deaf ears.

his thirteen-year-old daughter.

Ames

(ieorge

Ames

man must have

Linda
Tulsa

J.

that

and

hill

lx.'en

a

stripped of the trappings of

Victorian respectability (his hat) and civilization (his slK)es) added fuel to the

an image

I'ixley

had to chase

father chasing his daughter over

dale to prevent her sexual exploitation at the hands of an older

powerful one. That Pixlcy's actions

guilty

referenced manly obligation and

Rut these entreaties

of undress. The image of a

men

and

lire.

It

was

had to have resonated.

Laccy, "Introtiiiciiin

Law Journal 25

I'cinini.sl Jiirispriidcncc:

(1990): 775, 793-794.
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An

Analysis ot Oklahoma's Seduction

Slaliilc,"

Listen to the

comments of judge

Joseph Hamel convicted for raping

Hamel

for his betrayal

Laforrest

Thompson

his eight-year-old niece.

of the Thrashers' hospitaUty and

in delivering sentence

on

Thompson condemned

for betraying his obUgations as a

man.

You were

a guest in her father's house.
every thought of manhood and decency

You were
made you

child in the absence

a

man of full age, and

the protector of that

of her parents, and yet
instead of fulfilling that
trust imposed upon you, by virtue of your manhood, and the fact that
you
had a mother, and may have had sisters, you saw fit to make this gross
assault

upon

.

.

.

and to ravish her without any regard to the
consequences, simply to gratify your own animal lust

These few

lines

this child,

encapsulated not only the main themes presented at

themes echoed over and over again
institutions: familial

adhered

to, that

in the texts

trial,

but also the

produced by Vermont's lawmaking

and parental obligation, the expectation that gender roles would be

male sexuality must be contained, the belief that

meant the difierence between a society

that

was

civilized,

and one

and a firm commitment to punish those who transgressed these

//awe/, 371-372.
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fidelity to these

that

rules.

models

was barbarous,

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION
On Monday,

June 2 P*,! 897,

in the

Orange County Courthouse,

Vermont, a crowd of men gathered around Roy Jewett
his penis.

The ten-year-old was a witness

half sister

DeUa

Hamel, argued

Thrasher.

that

it

examine the

in the statutory rape trial

size

of

of his eight-year-old

Delia's thirty-three year-old uncle, Joseph

was Roy who had penetrated

charge, the state had had

far

The accused,

in order to

in Chelsea,

Roy examined by

Delia, not he. In order to rebut the

a doctor

too small to have caused the injuries to the

who

little girl.

testified that

Concerned

Roy's penis was

that the doctor's

testimony alone was not enough to convince the jury, the state had asked the judge to
allow the jurors to see for themselves, suggesting that the examination be held

in a small

witness chamber off the main courtroom.

Judge Laforrest Thompson did not
the witness chamber and had

Roy

the state,

J.

The

of twelve male jurors, gathered

fi-ont

Thompson, lawyers H. K. Darling and

W. Gordon and William Lapoint

himself, Joseph Hamel.

state's

recorded

in

medical expert. Dr.

shorthand by Mrs.

Mary

J.

fi-om all

H. Watson for

for the defendant, and the defendant

J.

H. Winch was there and so

were any members of the public who might have been present
dutifolly

of

simply drop his trousers in the middle of the

courtroom. The boy exposed himself in
the towns in the county, Judge

feel that the inspection required the privacy

that day.

The events were

Chestnut, the court reporter.
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And

so a

little

boy's genitals became (according to the prosecutor) "an
exhibit"

public,

most

ofiBcial

space the county had to

This work has

shown how

most

in this the

ofifer.'

the legal system defined, investigated, and punished

sexual transgression. But in so doing, Vermont's legal system
also became the most

important

of public sexual discourse

site

informations, briefe, and

this discourse, the

in the state.

If the laws, indictments,

Supreme Court opinions we have examined were

county courtrooms were stages on which those

scripts

the scripts for

were

performed. Prior to the creation of state agencies charged with regulating these
behaviors and exercising control over them just before and after World

War I, Vermont's

courts were the place where the state took ofBcial notice of sexuality and sexual
deviance, classified

committed the

in criminal

evaluated and articulated

this

process unfolded within the

The jury, unique

and

civil trials.

to every part

press,

harms, and punished those

was

of public

civil

and criminal

legal

Anglo-American law, guaranteed a
that each

who had

trial,

village,

system

and

hill

it

was

role for the public

town supply jurors

over, the stories told in the court

of the county-to town,

constitutional traditions

fi-ee

to

The requirement

court meant that after the term

away

its

acts.

Because
highly public.

it,

to the county

would be

carried

farm.^ Historical and

public accusation, right to confi-ont witnesses, a

and the boredom and gossip characteristic of small-town

Hamel, Orange County Court, June 1897 Term, Transcript of Trial,

life fiirther

317-319.

'

State

2

In his remarks to the annual meeting of the bar association in 1901, lawyer Felix McGettrick explained

V.

p.

more educated than when they had left and upon arrival
there, they mingled with "their fellow-citizens, and impart[ed] to them the information they have
acquired and the experience they have received." Proceedings of the Vermont Bar Association 6, no.

how jurors

returned to their respective towns

(1901), 54.
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1

guaranteed the public nature of these events. The biannual
meeting of the county court

was a major happening
were recorded

in local

in

each shire town and the cases brought and

their dispositions

newspapers.' Lastly, the requirement of a record, necessary
to

preserve the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, and the
precedential value of that
court's decisions-again, unique to the Anglo-American system-meant
that the stories
told in the county courts

throughout the

would be taken down,

state.

Vermont had one of the highest
nineteenth century and

available to

its

printed, digested, and circulated

citizens.

fi-om the beginning.

many of the

literacy rates in the

texts created

world

by and for

at the

this legal

turn of the

system were widely

Legal materials had formed a significant part of family

A survey of private collections of books gathered

libraries

jfrom probate

records between 1780 and 1835 for example found that Blackstone was one of the most

popular works held

The laws and

in private libraries in

statutes

of Vermont was the

libraries, the first collection

Nathaniel Chipman in

Windsor County and not only those of lawyers.

1

fifth

most common book found

of opinions of the Supreme Court published by Judge

793 was

twenty-fifth.''

Much of this process of dissemination was
Beginning

in

See

for

sponsored by the

state itself.

1829, the General Assembly required that the decisions of the Supreme

Court be published annually and that

'

in family

example The Bradford Opinion,

Farnham Papers, Folder 21-16, Special
When the Orange County Court was in

1 1

five

hundred copies be deposited

January 1879,

for listing

v*nth the secretary

of cases. Copy

in the

Roswell

Collections, University of Vermont, Burlington, Vermont.

session in Chelsea for

witnesses, and parties descended on the the

little

its

biannual term, judges, lawyers, jurors,

town taking over the

entire

Orange County

Hotel.

Proceedings of the Vermont Bar Association 2 no. 4 (1889), 221-223.
Gilmour, Reading Becomes a Necessity of Life: Material and Cultural Life in Rural
England. 1780-1835 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1989), 43, 64-65.
"

William

J.
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New

of state

for sale to the pubUc.

Vermont Reports be

By

1843, the General Assembly was requiring that the

distributed to every

town

in the state as well as the libraries

of the

University of Vermont, Middlebury College, and Norwich University.
In 1856 the

General Assembly called for the publication of a digest of cases and authorized
the
production of "a cheap edition" specifically intended for private

Reports were being sent to every

state

citizens.

By 1874

judge and ex-judge, the U. S. District Court

judge, every court clerk and register of probate in addition to every town clerk.
years

later,

the Legislature increased

the

Two

order to 800 copies per year and ordered that

its

any excess be made available to the public. By 1906 the annual

print

run was 900

copies.^

As we have

seen, the

Vermont Reports provided a wealth of information about

sexual transgressions and the social context in which they took place. This point

lost

on Vermont's

lawyers. In an address to a mixed audience at the Association's 1885

annual meeting lawyer Elisha

May reviewed the

bench and bar were mirrored

in

rhetoric,

was not

them and

and pictures of our social

life.

.

Vermont Reports, commenting

that they "contain

.

.

that the

much of the history,

They cover most every phase of human

life;

they sing nearly every song." After describing several decisions involving adultery and

allegations

.

of sexual slander,

reports and that

it

May noted that

was sometimes the case

Vermont's

that "the fair

social

life

was depicted

fame of a family

is

tarnished

the revelations before the Court."^

'

*

1828 Vt. Acts

3;

1843 Vt. Acts 48; 1856 Vt. Acts 59; 1874 Vt. Acts 82; 1906 Vt. Acts 215.

Proceedings of the Vermont Bar Association, 1885-1886 (Montpelier, 1886), 37-47.
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in these

by

The

public nature of criminal and civil proceedings meant
that the courts were a

singular source of frank, pubUc talk about sex and
sexuality in

There was no other

place,

and certainly no other public and

conversations could take place.
nineteenth century

came

And

to an end.

took place, but rarely went into

trial

proceedings and even
states about

of these

list

at this time.

official place,

where such

volume of such cases only increased as the

Vermont's newspapers might document
details.

They might

that a rape

also print the results

of divorce

the cause (including aduUery) or reprint stories from other

murderous love
But even

stories.

the

Vermont

triangles.

Such coverage never went

this indirect contribution

into the sexual details

of the courts to sexual

talk in society

was too much

for some.

past president

of the Vermont Bar Association, law professor, diplomat, and one-time

In an essay written in the late nineteenth century, E.

Phelps,

J.

candidate for Chief Justice of the United State Supreme Court, complained about the
effects

Phelps,

of the discourse churned out by the courts and reported

who had

Vermont

in the

1

served as professor of medical jurisprudence

in the

popular press.

at the University

of

880s, railed against the "serious mischief to the public" caused by:

the unclean and repulsive sensational narratives with which so

columns of papers of this

many

class are filled: the criminal, obscene, and

demoralizing incidents, which, bad enough

when merely

reported as part

of the news of the day, are spun out, elaborated, and repeated with an
intimate variety of disgusting and unwholesome detail; the lives and
conduct of the criminal, the vicious, and the profligate; the most unsavory
conflicts in courts

of justice, amplified and adomed-all

morbid and depraved

The

rather

tame (and mostly

that panders to the

taste.^

skeletal)

coverage provided

other sources of sexual talk were rare and in fact

in

Vermont's papers

aside,

illegal.

"The Age of Words," in J. G. McCullough, ed.. Orations and Essays of Edward John
Phelps: Diplomat and Statesman (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1901), vii-xv, 468.
'

E.

J.

Phelps,
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Prior to the passage of the federal customs law of

obscenity statute was the only one in the nation. In other

was prosecuted
that

common law rather than as

as a

1

842, Vermont's

states, as in

1

821

England, obscenity

a statutory ofifense. Scholars postulate

obscene or pornographic materials were a low

priority for the state prior to the

middle of the nineteenth century since only the wealthy and educated had
access to
them.*

It is

possible that Vermont, with

its

high literacy rates and vibrant print culture,

experienced the phenomenon of cheap, widely-circulated pornography earUer than
other
places.

As

early as

1

81 7, for example, almost

300 copies of Memoires of a Woman of

Pleasure were on hand just across the Connecticut River

New Hampshire.

Fanny Hill

Vermont's obscenity

also circulated in

statute punished

in a printer's

Windsor County

anyone

who

conviction.

By

1

in

Walpole,

at this time.^

did "print, publish, or vend,

any lewd or obscene book, picture, or print" and assessed a

upon

shop

fine

of up to 200 dollars

839, the category of censored materials extended to ballads, or

any "other thing containing obscene language, obscene

prints, pictures, figures or

descriptions manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth" and increased

the penalty to include

up to a year

in jail.

The

created and sold these materials, but anyone

anyone who "introduce[d]

The

statute

into

statute punished not only those

who purchased

or possessed them and

any family, school or place of education" such materials.

remained largely unchanged throughout the century, continuing to protect

youth fi"om corruption and to protect families and schools.

«

who

Walter Kendrick, The Secret Museum: Pornography in

77-78.

'Gilmour, 114-134, 177-178.
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An

1

892

statute barred the

Modern Culture (New York:

Viking, 1987),

iniblic

and

posting or exhibit ol -ol)scciic

prohihitccl the exhibit

months

Mouse

in the

shows were added

ol

(

to the

olObseene

good

comedies or shows,

plays,

list

requires."'*^

in

1017 and two years

in

providin}>

later the legislature

shows, movies, and tiances and
Ironically, the

jail

to three

gave towns and

in the

county

any other venue.

judges, lawyers, doctors, jurors, witnesses, and parties

public, too,

understood

up

sentence had they

Court ()roceediiigs were public, and anyone could attend.

of the

languajic^'

deny such licenses when

to

proceedings taking place

courts would have subjected the participants to a potential

occurred

Ucsu iplions or

orreelions for the violation. Immoral movies or vaudeville

eilies the authority to license

^^the public

pic tures, llgurcs, prints,

were

ordinarily in attendance.

who appeared

damage

in court,

members

Lawntakers and comnientators

that the sexually explicit nature ol the court

case had the potential to spread

In addition to the

proceedings meant

to the wider society.

I

that a court

hey thus sought to

balance the needs ol the justice system against the harm such displays could do to
individuals and society.

(ireenleafexplained

how

In discussing the

this

problems posed by such cases, Sinion

balance should be maintained.

mere indecency ofdisclosures does not, in general, suirice to exclude
them, where the evidence is necessary lor the purposes ol civil or criminal
justice; as, in an indictment lor rape; or in a cpiestion upon the sex ol One,
riie

claiming an estate entailed, as heir male or lemale; or, u|)on the legitimacy
ol One claiming as lawful heir; or in

an action by the husband

for criminal

conversation with the wile. In these and similar Ciises the evidence

is

necessary, either for the prool and punishment of the crime, or Ibr the
vindication of rights existing before, or independent of the fact sought to

be disck)sed.

\

VI.

Acts

I

§ 2

Vt. Acts 88; 1*>I7 VI.

\\

Ki'visi'd Statuh's oj

Virmonl,

Acts 240; 1^)19 VI. Acts

/A'.^^

1*>3.
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(Murlingtoii, IK-IO), Chapter

§ 10, 1892

On the

other hand,

in

cases where the parties have 'Voluntarily and impertinently

interested themselves in a question, tending to violate the peace
of society, by exhibiting

an innocent third person to the world
his

own peace

decision

may

in

a ridiculous or contemptible

light,

or to disturb

and comfort, or to offend public decency by the disclosures which

require, the evidence will not be received." Greenleaf cited as
examples a

bet between parties about the sex of a third person or whether an unmarried

had a

its

child, or a declaration

woman had

by a husband or wife that they have not had sex and that

therefore their children were spurious. Such cases, according to Greenleaf are "on the

same general ground of decency,
Commentators as

far apart as

morality, and policy

.

.

.

uniformly excluded."

Canada and Australia worried

sexually explicit evidence, even

when

that the admission

required for resolution of a case,

was

of

still

bad for

society."

Vermonters too were worried. In November 1886, the same month

that the

Legislature raised the age of consent to fourteen, ushering in a surge of sexually explicit

statutory rape prosecutions, the Legislature also gave judges authority to exclude

children and others from the court to protect

entitled

"An Act

them from sexually-charged

to Protect Minors," required justices

Simon Greenleaf, A

Treatise

on

(he

Law of Evidence

trials.

of the peace and judges

A bill,

to exclude

(Boston, 1860), 352-353. For example, some

contemporary commentators were sensitive to the increasing sexual explicitness of legal discourse on
seduction and worried that this talk itself could undermine morality. Concerning debate on an
Australian seduction

bill,

the Sydney

better for public morals." In

Canada

Morning Herald urged

that "the less such matters are discussed the

a judge in an 1863 seduction case expressed concern about the

moral values of the "so-called victims" of seduction and worried that public airing of seduction cases
would lead to more immoral behavior. Michael Sturma, "Seduction and Punishment in Late Nineteenth
Century New South Wales" Australian Journal of Law & Society 2 (1985), 80; Martha J. Bailey,
"Servant Girls and Masters: The Tort of Seduction and the Support of Bastards" Canadian Journal of

Family

Law

10 (1991), 159; Constance Backhouse,

Nineteenth-Century Canada" Dalhousie

"The Tort of Seduction:

Law Journal

10 (1986), 71.
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Fathers and Daughters in

imiiors

li 1)111

the court

unless their presence

whenever a "cause of scandalous or obscene nature

was necessary

and judges to exclude

"all

cases at their discretion.''

known. The

The

to the giving

from becoming

It

on

trial"

further authorized justices

persons" not necessarily present as parties or witnesses
extent to which judges

transcripts reveal that judges did

courtroom prior
stories

as a witness or party.

is

made use of this

statute

is

iiig

such

not

sometimes order witnesses to leave the

of their teslimony-a standard precaution to prevent

tainted by heai

in

the testimony of others.

But

their

have found no

I

evidence on the record of judges excluding members of the public under the 1886 law.

These attempts to

limit the

reach of the sexual talk taking place

in

Vermont's

courts could not keep pace with the sheer volume of cases with sexual implications heard
there.

From

the

1

860s onward, the volume of cases which

dealt with errant sex

increased dramatically. Skyrocketing divorce rates and an accompanying increase in the

raw number of adultery

allegations along with the increased

number of adultery

prosecutions and statutory rape charges ai\er 1880 meant that deviant sex had a
larger presence in the courts than ever before. That these narratives

within an officially sanctioned setting

But

in fact,

were contained

may have provided some comfort

they were not contained there because so

many

far

to observers.

ordimiry Vermonters were

active participants in the process.

Between 1860 and 1920

for

example almost two hundred criminal cases

statutory rape, adultery, and lewdness

were heard by juries

in the four counties (as

opposed to the many more decided by plea or by a bench

trial).

heard each of these cases, and eight witnesses testified

each

'2

1886 Vt. Acts 60.
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at

for rape,

Assuming twelve jurors

trial,

that

means

that

some

four thousand people either observed
a whole

Hundreds more people participated
can only guess

at the

or participated

trial

a portion of it.

in

as parties, lawyers, judges, and court officers.

numbers of public spectators

in

attendance including those

other business before the court. During the same
period as

many

as

We

who had

two thousand

divorces were heard which asserted adultery as a cause
in the petition. These hearings,

while not jury

trials,

also

would have had witnesses

in attendance

pubUc unless a judge decided to close them. The law
their petition in the local

newspaper

in

and were open

also required the parties to

to the

pubUsh

cases where the other spouse no longer resided in

the state.

Thus perhaps ten thousand people
discourse examined

in this

study and that

participated in or witnessed the creation

is

of the

only in the four counties studied. Because

the rate of statutory rape, aduhery, and divorce proceedings accelerated towards the
end

of the period of study, the number of explicit
witnesses, and spectators

decade. In the

trials.

first

would have

and thus the number of participants,

trials

also been

on the

increase with each successive

decade of the twentieth century for example there were

If we count only jurors and witnesses,

more than

1

fifty-six

100 people participated

such

in

these proceedings in nine years-approximately one percent of the entire population of
the counties.

And

this figure

does not take

cases as judges, lawyers, court officers, or

figures also

do not take

into

into

who

account others

account the many other proceedings

except the parties and the court officers

if he

in a divorce/adultery case, see

chose. For an

Fannie

Mae

amended

all

Elson

v.

in

which

William

amend

petition published in a

E. Elson,

Windsor County

divorce petition by adding adultery

petition to be published in the local newspaper.
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this sexual

persons from a divorce hearing

example of a

Court, June 1901 Term, Docket No. 1201 (motion seeking to
as a cause; court orders

participated in these

witnessed them as spectators. These

1870 Vt. Acts 27 and 28. The judge had discretion to exclude

newspaper

who

The

Spirit

of the Age).

talk

might also have played a

role, including bastardy cases, civil suits for

marriage promise, alienation of affections, seduction,

have seen

that

many of these

civil assault,

an altemative center of power began to grow
century. Vermont's regular physicians

authority in the state. These

drew

to a close.

two voices
With

in the public space that

was

in

their "scientific"

fi-ank

came together

approach and

norms disrupted

in the

middle of the

in the legal

of
system as

clinical descriptions,

and public discussions of sex and sexuality

the county courthouse.

It explicitly

deviancy that existed in some of Vermont's households.

families

and society.

It

forced judges and juries to

in so doing, to articulate the sexual

come

It

demonstrated the sexual

showed how

violations

engaged the court and participants

re-imagining of these sexual narratives and played out

it

through the courts

increasingly powerfiil source

increasingly

This process had several different effects.

Finally,

all

for constructing this discourse, but

Vermont beginning

became an

they helped lawyers create astonishingly

sexual

filtering

We

period.''*

Lawyers and the law were mainly responsible

the century

and obscenity.

case also created an explicit sexual narrative. Taken

together these suits add several hundred more cases to those

during this

breach of

new ones before

of
in the

their very eyes.

to terms vsath the meaning of these acts, and,

and gender expectations they held for the parties

appearing before them.

For qualitative examples, see Proceedings of the Vermont Bar Association vol. 1, no. 2 (1899)
(Supreme Court judge tells a mixed audience at bar meeting of prosecution of two women for running a
that
brothel in Barre); Proceedings of the Vermont Bar Association 6, no. 1 (1901), 54 (lawyer explains
18-19
return to towns and relate what they have seen at court); Hamel, Transcript of Trial, p.

juries

(testimony of witnesses at a murder/adultery

trial

discussed in front of family members).
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To
Vermont

citizens steeped in the twin rhetorics

morality, the ugly reality revealed

courts must have been deeply disquieting.
graphically described sexual misbehavior:

of Victorian propriety and homespun

by the

I

civil

and criminal business of the

have already highlighted many cases which

young

girls

fondled and raped by old men;

daughters impregnated by their fathers and step-fathers; wives stumbling

Many of these

husbands and paramours.
In 1898, Almira

Cushman of Hartland sought an uncontested

on behalf of his mother. He

at the family

women.

home

in

how he,

his brother

divorce from her

their

son William

Guy, and

Hartland one afternoon during sugaring season in

Belle Strong and

May

Sturtevant,

took Belle Strong upstairs while
while, William and Strong

room

told

shortly thereafter.

his father

after that

pants, took out his private parts and

myself, and said to us,

showed up and the
took

May

came back dovmstairs,

"Soon

upon

cases created images that were truly horrifying.

husband E. W. Cushman on grounds of adultery. At the hearing,
testified

in

1

897.

Two

five played cards.

William

my father went

and Sturtevant re-entered the

to the sink, unbuttoned his

in the presence

of my brother Guy and

'You see what you get when you have been doing what

His private parts were covered with blood and he washed them

Cushman' s divorce was

were

Sturtevant into a bedroom. After a

his father

showed them

their father

at the sink."

I

have,'

AJmira

granted.'^

Cushman v. Cushman, Windsor County Court, May 1898 Term, Docket No. 1073. E. W. Cushman
was charged with adultery as a resuh of the allegations. But William Cushman was accused of making
up the testimony and charged with perjury. A jury found him not guilty, but it found E. W. not guilty
'5

They could not both have been telling the truth, but the juries apparently thought so. State v.
William E. Cushman, Windsor County Court, State Cases, vol. 4, p. 549; State v. Edward E. Cushman,
Windsor County Court, State Cases, vol. 4, p. 519-520. Sturtevant and Strong had aduUery charges
defaulted and the
brought against them in 1901 (Sturtevant for having sex with Cushman) but both
Court, June 1901
prosecutor entered a nolle prosse in their cases. State v. Sturtevant, Windsor County
too.

Term, Docket No. 1046; State

v.

Strong, Windsor County Court, June 1901 Term, Docket No. 1058.
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These cases not only contained descriptions of sexual immorality,
but also
demonstrated

how that

activity corrupted family

marriage promise cases the defendant's actions

and home. In seduction and breach of

left

the relationship between father and

daughter "broken and dishonored" or harmed the woman's chances for
destiny as a wife and mother. In

Cushman, the

nakedness

in his sons' presence, then

partner.'^

The attempted murder

in

an

earlier chapter

with

father

had aduUerous

her

own

uncovered

sex,

his

contaminated the kitchen sink with the blood of his

trial

of EfiBe Spaulding and Solomon James discussed

of the defendants' adultery also

its tale

folfilling

filled

the courtroom

with images of contamination and corruption. Forced out of his v^e's bed and even his

home by Solomon James, Wilbur

Spaulding then consumes a meal prepared by his

wife-coffee and potatoes laced v^th poison.'^

Proving or disproving these stories engaged participants in a process of imagining
the acts or provided opportunities for the performance of new ones. This led to

powerful and sometimes bizarre displays, akin to the burlesque shows prohibited by

Vermont

law.

The Hamel case with

its

public inspection

of Roy Jewett's penis was one

such example. Pity the poor boy. The defendant's lawyer, faced with evidence that the
boy's penis

was too

small to have committed the act, sought to

show by

the doctor that

the boy's chronic masturbation had since caused his organ to shrink so that

smaller than

it

might have been. Thus, he might

in fact

have been able to

it

was now

injure

DeUa

as

the defense claimed.

All three actions

were also affronts

to

Mosaic law. Lev. 20:10

nakedness before his sons); Lev. 15:33 (lying with a

" State

V.

woman

Spaulding and James, Windsor County Court,
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(adultery); Gen. 9:21-27 (Noah's

during her period).

May 894 Term,
1

Transcript of Trial, p. 134.

Q:

Isn't

it

true that the male organ

is

apt in course of time to diminish in size

if there

has been masturbation,-tend to wither?

A:

No

Q:

You think

A:

No

Q:

It

A:

No

Q:

You had

A:

Yes, somewhat.

Q:

Of children of this

A:

Of this

sir.

it

would not?

sir.

wouldn't injure

it

so that

it

would tend

to diminish in size?

sir.

experience in that class of cases?

age?

age, but not of this size, perhaps.

Court: If that has no effect upon the male organ in respect to

The excitement caused by masturbation would tend

A:

size,

what

is its

tendency?

to abnormally increase the

size.

In this examination. Dr.

Winch was bucking

masturbation caused the penis to wither.

his

common Victorian wisdom that

the

Roy

Jewett simply had a small penis for a boy

age and Dr. Winch knew, because over the years, he explained:

many." Exhibited yet again to the jury, again
boy's penis, stating "There

is

the organ

I

in

open

"I

have seen a good

court, the doctor pointed to the

examined,-abnormally small."'*

Jewett aside, lawyers and doctors mostly helped

tell

stories in court involving

intimate discussions about female bodies. In rape cases, the female

body was the main

expect to hear
piece of physical evidence. Observers of rape trials could almost always

'«

State

V.

Hamel, June 1897 Term, Transcript of Trial,
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p.

319-320.

^

graphic accounts from the

her male assaUant.

woman herself about how her body had been acted upon by

Had he

he penetrated her? If so,

lifted

her skirts?

Had

he put his hands on her genitals?

how much? They could

also expect a clinical description

Had
of the

female genitals from doctors as prosecutors
sought to corroborate the female's story.

These descriptions were extremely graphic,
whether the hymen was

and what

it

meant

if

was

it

not.

Hamel case,

position of the vulva

Had the

girl

on an eight-year-old compared

to that

respective ages and size?

the act in their mind.

sitting?

The question forced every person

The discussion grew so complicated

detailed medical illustration taken

in the

While standing, was

them

in public.

in the

command of the

state.

it

was

illegal to

But these exhibitions and

visualize

had a

in

most Vermont

stories

possess such illustrations or

were legitimized by

virtue

of

courtroom and were produced, preserved, and disseminated by the

example, the testimony of Dr. O. W. Peck in State

Vermont Reports

courtroom to

wonders whether many of the male jurors had ever seen human female

being contained

for

their

from Gray's Anatomy circulated among the jury.

genitals in such detail. Technically at least,

" See

woman

that the state's expert

Given Victorian notions of female modesty and the lack of lighting

to display

or

of an aduh woman. Was the

opened or closed? Could Hamel have penetrated her from behind given

dwellings, one

bruising,

lawyers and doctors grappled with each other about the

appearance of the organ different while standing than while
it

of fluids,

How long before? How many times?'

had sex before?
In the

intact

detailing the presence

v.

Briefe, 65(1), no. 42, p. 35-37 for a lengthy

examination of the victim.
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Bedard, "Respondent's Exceptions,"

and graphic account of his gynecological

Some women and
stories with their bodies.

refused to

aUow

girls resisted

attempts by the medico-legal process to write

Cora Weightman, a sixteen-year-old rape

a vaginal examination by two different doctors.

her mother said that no doctor ever could get her
to

corroborated by her mother and a neighbor

blood and semen,
statutory rape

or, in her

trial

who

aUow

testified

it.

victim, repeatedly

When asked

it,

Cora's story was

about underwear containing

mother's words "what there would be jfrom

of Amos Ohey, the

about

victim, thirteen-year-old

him."^''

In the

Edna Severance,

battled

the defense lawyer over several pages of transcript as he questioned
her on the legally
vital

question of penetration. Severance refiised to elaborate on the sexual
encounter.

The judge

finally

had to threaten

measures to make you, and

I

her.

"If you

do not answer, the court

advise you to answer

it,

will

have take

without the court having to resort

to any methods." Despite the threat, Severance continued to resist the efforts

the defense attorney and the judge to force her to elaborate

of both

on exactly what she and

Olney had done.

Go on

Q:

and

tell

what he

did.

Do you remember that there was any penetration of

your person that night with his?

A:

Yes,

sir; I

Q:

You

are positive about

A:

Yes,

sir.

Q:

And

willing to

A:

Yes,

sir.

Q:

Tell just

State

V.

think there was.

swear to

it,

are

you

not,

on

that occasion?

it?

what happened-just

how much-just how

far

it

was? (Not answered)

Como, Windsor County Court, December 1894 Term, Transcript of Trial,
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p. 27, 39.

Court: Well, can you

A:

Well,

Other

I

tell?

don't remember.^'

women resisted,

Mary Josephs

before finally telling the courtroom everything

repeatedly asked the judge

secret," but the judge said no.^^

if

it

needed to hear.

she could describe the attempted rape "in

There could be no sexual secrets

in

a criminal

trial in

Vermont.
I

undertook

this project

and sex would provide useful
that this

with the hope that a comprehensive local study of law

insights into

an important new sub-discipline.

work has demonstrated both the methodological and

I

believe

substantive advantages of

such an approach. Rather than having to resort to generalities about a particular cause

of action, we can have a good idea of how often
juries

responded to

it.

treatment of various

This method allows us to

civil

it

was brought and how judges and

make

useful comparisons of the courts'

and criminal causes of action over time, compare them with

other causes of action where issues of sex or gender were not implicated, and contrast

them with data from other jurisdictions.
trial

and appellate judges

in the isolated

provide.

And

manner
lastly,

specific statutes

in the context

also allows us to understand the decisions

It

of a broader

that national surveys

we

of

state- wide jurisprudence rather than

of specific criminal or

civil

see by examining the actual operation of the

causes of action

trial

courts

and precedents become subjected to the forces of broader

how

legal

imperatives, the particular facts of a case, the needs of the parties, and the personalities

2'

^

State

V.

Olney, Windsor County Court, December 1895 Term, Transcript of Trial,

State

V.

Danforth, Windsor County Court, December 1894 Term, Transcript of Trial.
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p.

9-12.

ol

judge and jury. Law, even

interplay

in

a small rural slate like Vermont,

was

a

eomplex

of texts and emotions.

The methodology provides important
diversity that existed in the

Anglo-American

substantive results.

legal

It

demonstrates the

system during the nineteenth and early

twentieth century. The difTcrences bet ween jurisdictions

in

application are too obvious to be ignored.

that generalities

particular causes

It

seems clear

of action such as rape, statutory

longer tenable. Relatedly, studies of law and sex

people continued to

live their lives

during

terms ol law and

its

about

rape, seduction, or adultery are

in rural

this period,

no

America, where so many

can provide valuable

insight into

the process of the legal regulation of sex. Local studies offer us a better understanding

of how decisions

in

Thus, examining a

Vermont

one area of law

raft

at least, the

fit

into a broader state

scheme of sexual

of civil and criminal causes of action has allowed us

it

threatened traditional family and gender

expectations. Finally, this study, by focusing on the courtroom process

how

site) for

very important the county courts themselves were as a

the discussion

century.

It

articulated

was here
its

to see that in

theme running through the Supreme Court's jurisprudence was the

containment of male sexuality-particularly as

revealed

regulation.

of sexuality

in

that thousands

Vermont

in the late

itself,

site

has

(perhaps the

nineteenth and early twentieth

of Vermonters came together, talked about

sex,

dangers, and punished transgressors. Thus, the steepled courthouses

dotting the rural landscape of Vermont were a source of power far beyond anything

may have

imagined.
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APPENDIX A

SOCIO-ECONOMIC DATA ON MEN GOING TO TRIAL
OR PLEA FROM THE FOUR COUNTIES FOR RAPE OR

ATTEMPTED RAPE,

I876-19I9'

data from convicts at the State Prison, Records of the House of Correction and manuscript
House of Correction than for
census. Data is more complete for those sentenced to the State Prison or the
(after 1 875) and House of
those fined, placed on probation or acquitted. Every man at the State Prison
'

Combined

House
898) had data compiled on him, while those not sentenced to the State Prison or
Socio-economic data was available for
of Correction had to be located by census. Between 1876 and 1920,
percent of acquittals.
84 percent of convictions in rape and attempted rape cases and 85
Correction (after

1
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1

Year

..

Charge Age

Nativity

1

ather/Mother Married

Literate Schooling

Occupation

Religion
^

Confined^

1876

94

OO
Mass.

Vt./N. Y,

O /W

JZ

Vi.

Vt.

1X77

'^7

Mich.

XT A

Y

XT A

1

1
1

X7X
o
/ o

1

OOV/

1

OO

1

1

No
No

Yes

Common

Laborer

N.A.

No

N.A.

Farmer

N.A.

Yes

Yes

N.A.

Quack Doctor

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

Vl./N.H.

Farmer

None

Vl.

XI LI /\/*

IN.H./ Vt.

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

N.A.

VI.

Limited

Fanner

Meth.

N.A.

Laborer

N.A.

Limited

Laborer

Cath.

Common

IN.

Att
/All.

1

1

*

Vt.

Div.

Att
/All.

^l.

Ireland

VI.

Vt./N. Y.

No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

Laborer

Cath.

X

No

X

No

None

Laborer

Cath.

No
No

Yes
Yes

Common
Common

Laborer

Meth.

Painter

None

OO J

I\a|JC

9S
ZJ

1

ooo

Att
/All.

ire.

Ire.

IXQO

Att
/All,

90
zy
99
zz

Vt
VI.

Vl

Att
/All.

JO

iviass.

Mass.

1

oyj
RO^

Att
/All.

H

1

c.an.

Can.

X

No

X

No

Limited

Laborer

Cath.

1
1

XQ4
O
7^

J

1

Vt
v I.

Can,

Yes

Yes

Laborer

Cath.

VI.

Vl.

Uiv.

Yes

Shoemaker

Meth.

ire.

ire.

Yes

Blacksmith

VI.

Can.

No

Yes
Yes
Yes

Common
Common
Common
Common
Common

Laborer

None
None

Laborer

Bapt.

^R
JO
97
Z/

1

1

1

X04
o

Att

OVJ

Att
/\ll.

99
ZZ
99
Zz

OVO
XOO

AH
AU.

47

Vl.

n r\ A
ivape

'^9
JZ

ire.

oni

Atf
All.

Att
1

1

1

1
1

1^

1

HJ
1 7
1 /

1

vuz

1

QCiA

AH
AU.
AH
All.

1

OHA
VU4

rvdpe

3

1905

Att.

1906

Att.

22
34

1907

Att.

1907
1908

Rape
Rape

1909

1912

1

9^
c

1

1

V

•

XI
IN. Y

iN.n.

IN.

Y

I

1

Yes

iN.A.

No

No

X

None

Farmer

ire.

Yes

Yes

Common

Laborer

None
None

No

XI

N.A.

Laborer

Cong.

XT A

XT

N.A.

N.A.^

Common
Common

Marble Rubber

Cath.

Laborer

Cath.

Amer.
lOwr^^ /X

Yes
A

Not

T

A

A

No

Vl.

VI.

Yes

Yes
Yes

Can.

Can.

Wid.

Yes

Vt.

Vt.

No

N.A.

Laborer

N.A.

N.Y.

N.Y./Ire.

Wid.

Yes
Yes

Common

Mill

None

No
No

Little

Hand
Lumberman

None

Laborer

Cath.

Common

Farmhand

Meth.

N.A.

Fireman

Meth.

Common

Butcher/Labor.

Cath.

Me.

N.Y.

Can./N.A.

54

Vt.

Vt.

Att.

24

N.Y.

Vt./N.Y.

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Rape

57

Germ.

Germ.

No

guilty

I

Lng./JN.A.

vt.

I

Me.

men

1

X _

34
39

Includes

I

XT A

Yes
Yes
Yes

N.A.

Meth.

confined to the State Prison, the House of Corrections, the State Hospital, and the Industrial

School.

by reason of insanity, confined to

state hospital.

360
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¥

Vl.

1X04
O

^

Limited

^9
3Z
9X
zo

Att

RR'^
OOJ

49
HZ
99
zz

IN .A.

1

1

^

IV #1 4^

Year Charge

Age

Nativity

Father/Mother Married

Literate Schooling

Occupation

ReHgion

Confined, cont'd.

1912

Att.

35

vt.

Amer.

Yes

1913

Att.

17

Vt,

vt.

1916

Att.

33

Eng.

24

1884

Rape
Rape

1885

N.A.

Fanning

None

No

No
No

N.A.

Laborer

N.A.

Eng.

Yes

Yes

Common

Baker/Clerk

Prot.

Vt.

M.A./Ire.

No

Mill Worker

N.A.

Vt.

Vt.

Yes

Yes
Yes

N.A.

32

NA

32

Can.

Can.

Laborer

N.A.

1901

Att.

17

Vt.

M.A./Vt.

Laborer

N.A.

Att.

27

Vl.

VI.

N.A.

Rape

21

VI.

Vl./lN.rl.

N.A.
N.A.

Laborer

1914

N.A.

N.A.

1917

Att.

29

VI.

L.an./iN. Y.

>i.A.

Laborer

N.A.

1917

Att.

44

VI.

for*
L^an./A/f
Vl,

Yes

N.A.

Farmer

N.A.

1919

Att.

23

\/t
VI.

XT
IN. I ./A/f
Vl.

No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

N.A.

1907

No
No
No
No
No

N.A.
N.A.

Fanner
A %4A

Att.

N.A.

Trainsmith

N.A.

21

Vt.

Ire.

No

N.A.

Laborer

Cath

33

Vt.

Vt.

Yes

N.A.

vt.

N.H.m.

No

N.A.
N.A.

Laborer

31

Laborer

N.A.

27

vt.

Vt.

Yes

N.A.

Asst. Cashier

N.A.

24

Vt.

Can.m.

Yes

N.A.

Vt.

Vt.

No

Laborer

N.A.

Yes
Yes

Yes.

N.A.
N.A.
N.A.

Painter

23

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Marble Worker

N.A.

Yes

N.A.

Farmer

N.A.

Fine or Probation

1882

V

No

Not Guilty

1898

Rape
Rape
Rape
Rape
Rape
Rape

1910

Att.

49

vt.

vt.

1911

Att.

50

vt.

Vt.

1879
1884
1885

1888

1897
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APPENDIX B

SOCIO-ECONOMIC DATA ON MEN GOING TO TRIAL
OR PLEA FROM THE FOUR COUNTIES FOR STATUTORY
RAPE OR ATTEMPT, 1875-1919^

House of Correction and manuscript census. Data is
State Prison or the House of Correction than for those fined, placed
on probatiOT or acquitted. Every man at the State Prison and House of Correction had data compiled on
him, wiiile those not sentenced to the State Prison or House of Correction had to be located in the census.

Combined data from convicts at the
more complete for those sentenced to
*

State Prison,

Socio-ecOTomic data was available for 84 percent of all defendants convicted by jury or plea for statutory
rape or attempted statutory rape. Six of seven defendants acquitted of statutory rape had socio-economic
data available (86 percent). No defendants charged with attempt were acquitted.
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1

Year

Charge Age

Nativity

Father/Mother Married

Literate Schooling

Occupation

Religion

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Limited

Laborer

Epis.

Common

Painter

N.A.

Yes.

No

None

Laborer

None

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

Limited

Fanning
N.A.

Meth.

Laborer

Cong.

Farmer

None

Laborer

Univ.

N.A.

Laborer

N.A.

Common

T

Laborer

Chris.

CommcMi
None

Farmmg

Univ.

Farmer

Bapt.

Common

Stone Cutter

Cath.

Laborer

Bapt.

Confined^

io/j

lo/O
loo /
1 001
1

QO<

1

oVD

loV7
loVo
ono
1898
1

1

Ann

1901

1903

1904

1904
1906

Rape
Rape
Rape
Alt.

Rape
Rape
Rape
Rape
Kape

Rape
Kape
Rape
Rape
Rape
—

-

1909

Rape
Rape
Rape
Rape
Rape

ono

t\ape

1907
1907

1907
1909
1

1909
1910
1911
1911

1912

1912
1912

2

Rape
Rape
Rape
Rape
Rape
Rape
Rape

Includes

men

vt.
XT IJ

N.H.

zi

Vt.

oc
Zj

Vt.

^(\
j\j

Vt.

ZD

vt.

XT TT

/VT X7
N.R/N.Y.

XT A

N.A.

A 7*

Vt.

V, T

A

N.A.

Vt.

VT

\7*

No
No

Vt.

XT A

N.A.

55

Can..

Can.

OU
oo

XT

U
N.H.

XT IJ

Vt.

Vt.

Yes
Yes
Yes

\7*

VT _

1

Q
O

Vt.

Z

/

vt.

N.H.

No

Vt.

Vt./Can.

Yes

A

7a

21

vt.

Vt.

No

AA

\ 7*

A 7*

AA

Ita.

Ita.

Yes

44
1

c\

19

vt.

Can.

J

Wid.

Vt.

Can. (Eng.)
A

7*

7a

No
XT
No

VT

No
Yes
X7
Yes
VT

VT

Common
Common
Common
VT A

VT

"V T

A

N.A.

No

Vt.

No
VT _
No
VT_
No

Yes
Yes
xr
Yes
Yes
Yes

VI.

Vt
Vi.

Vac
I es

31

Wales

Wales

33

Vt.

N.H.

33

Vt.

VtTlre.

30

Vt.

18

Vt.
VT T T

A

N.A.

1

46

Att.
-

Z9

1

Alt.

T%

L

'

*A

J

1

TT

Limited

N.A.

A

1

Hotels

Cath.

Common
Common

Harness/Carp.

Adv.

Farming

Meth.

M

_A.t_

VT A

N.A.

Labors

VM

aI-

Seminary

TA_I

Priest

Cath.

Common

Millwright

Viae
I es

V-'OmmuD

roiuivr

Cath.
T^m
c
lipiS.

No

No

None

Slatemaker

"Welch^

Hired

Common
Common

Farmer

Meth.

Teamster

Meth.

Vt.

Can.m.

No

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

36

Vt.

Vt.

Common

Farmhand

N.A.

43

Vt.

Vt.

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

N.A.

Vt.

Yes
Yes
Yes

No

Poor

Farmer

None

Vt.

63

Vt.

40

A 7*

o
18
1

33
1

o

18

Vt.

N.Y.
XT A

N.A.
Vt.

/A 7a

Vt.

Yes
Yes

VT A7

XT

N.H.A^t.
A

7a

N.Y.

XT A

N.A.
A 7*

Man

J

A

Meth.

N.A.

the
confined to the State Prison, the House of Corrections, the State Hospital, and

Industrial School.

State
Fined one thousand dollars in lieu of prison because of tuberculosis.
Court, June 1909 Term, Transcript of Trial, 95-96.
'
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Hickey, Windsor County

V

Year

.

.

Charge Age Nativity

Father/Mother

Literate Schooling

Occupation

Religion

Confined, cont'd.

1912

1

Rane
Ranp
Ranp
Ranp
Rane
VOL/
Ranp
Ranp
Rane
Rane
Rane

1912
1912
1913
1913

1913
1914
1914

1914
1914
1915

1915

1917

Rape
Rape
Rape
Rape
Rape

1917

o

Vt
vx.
1

Vt.

on

Can.

lid.

M
IN. V
I

itai.
.

n (1
eng.
Vt
V I.

Y.

IN.

No
XT
No

Yes
Yes

Common
Common

Laborer

Cath.

Laborer

Cath.

Yes
Yes

No
No

N.A.

Merchant

Cath.

None

Farmer

Meth.

Common
Common
Common
Common
Common
Common

Eng.

XT _

bng./ Vt.

Yes

lie.

ire.

No

Vt
V I.

^^an./ VI.

Yes

64

Vt
V I.

IN.rl.

Wid.

2S

Vt
V I.

VI.

R
IV.

Vt
VI.//KI
IN. V
I

No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

I-"

20
2^

1
1

No

Bell

Hop

None

Laborer

Meth.

Farmer
Farmer

Cath.

Farmer

Meth.

Laborer

Prot.

Poor

Farmer

Prot.

Cath.

Salv/

46

Russia

Russia

Yes

No

None

Laborer

26
48

Vt.

Can.

Div.

Yes

Common

I

Vt.

Vt.

No

Poor

Farmer

Meth.

19

N.Y.

N.Y.

No
No

Nr

Common

Laborer

Meth.

40

College

Preach/Teach.

Quak.

Att.

23

Vt
V I.

NI
IN.

IN. A.

Yes
Yes
Yes

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

1918

Att.

46

Pan

vjer./i_an.

Yes

No

None

Farmer

Ch.Sc

1918

Rape

40

Vt
V I.

Vt
VI.

Yes

Yes

Highschool

Plumber

Meth.

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

N.A.

Hostlpr

N
A
IN ./\.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

Farmhand
Mill Worker

N.A.

Laborer

N.A.

N.A.

Lumper

Cath..

N.A.

Laborer

N.A.

Yes

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

Yes
Yes
Yes

N.A.

Laborer

N.A.

N.A.

Farmer

N.A.

N.A.

Student

N.A.

Yes
Yes
Yes

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

Auto Repair

N.A.

N.A.

Candy Maker

N.A.

1917
1917
1917

Yes

V

A/t
VI.

I ./

alllllll^

1

Cain. i^am.

Probation or Fine

1897

Att.

31

Vt.

N.H./N.A.

Yes

1899

Rape

23

Vt.

Vt./Me.

1899

Att.

15

Vt.

1901

Att.

25

Vt

Can.
Vt
V I.

No
No

1910

Rape
Rape
Rape

28

Vt

Ire
11 w.

18

Vt

Vt

19

Vt.

Vt

Nn
INU.
No
No

28

N.Y.

N.Y.

Yes

48

Vt.

Vt.

Wid.

17

vt.

CanA^t.

No

35

vt.

Vt.

Div.

61

Vt.

N.H./Vt.

67

N.H.

N.A.

Yes
Yes

1916
1919

INO

Cath.

Not Guilty
1896
1903
1903
1905

1907
1915

'

Rape
Rape
Rape
Rape
Rape
Rape

"Salv."

= Salvation Army
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TABLE OF PUBLISHED CASES
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Alexander

Blodgett, 44 Vt.

476 (1872)
Chesley, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 284 (1852)
Barbour V. Stephenson, 32 F. 66 (Cir.Ct.KY, 1887)
Beals V. Furbish, 39 Me. 469 (1855)
Bray v. Wheeler, 29 Vt. 514 (1857)
Chase v. Elkins, 2 Vt. 290 (1829)
Clark V. Hodges, 65 Vt. 273 (1893)
Colby V. Reynolds, 6 Vt. 489 (1834)
Commonwealth v. Moore, 3 Pick. (Mass ) 194

Stacey

(1825)

Bailey

v.

v.

Commonwealth V. Harris, 131 Mass. 336 (1881)
Crossman v. Bradley, 53 Barb. (N.Y.) 125 (1868)
Davidson v. ^^?6o«, 52
Davis V. Carpenter, 72
Z)av/j

570 (1880)
Vt. 259 (1900)
Vt.

Fw/Zer, 12 Vt. 178 (1840)

V.

Drake v. Town of Sharon, 40 Vt. 35 (1867)
Dyer v. La/or, 94 Vt. 103 (1920)

State

V.

State

V.

Audette, 81 Vt. 400 (1908)

State

V.

State

V.

Bedard, 65 Vt. 278 (1892)
Bigelow, 88 Vt. 464 (1915)

State

V.

Bisbee, 75 Vt. 293 (1903)

State

V.

State

V.

Bridgman, 49 Vt. 202 (1876)
Brink andCibbs, 68 Vt. 659 (1896)

State

V.

Buckman, 74

State

V.

Burpee, 65 Vt.

State

V.

Carroll, 67 Vt. 477 (1895)

State

V.

Chillis, Brayt. 131

State

V.

Clark, 77 Vt. 10 (1904)

State

V.

State

V.

Coatney, 8 Yerg. (Tenn.) 210 (1835)
Colby, 51 Vt. 291 (1878)

State

V.

State

V.

Tupper, 45 Vt. 275 (1873)
Rollins V.Chalmers, 49 Vt. 515 (1877)

State

V.

State

V.

Fitzgerald V. Connors, 88 Vt. 365 (1914)

State

V.

French

State

V.

State

V.

Earl

V.

PFare, 65 Vt.

v.

Goldsmith's Admr.

v.

338 (1892)
Joy, 61 Vt. 488 (1889)

Dolan, 88 Vt. 369 (1914)
Annice, 1 N. Chip. 9 (1789)

v.

Vt.
1

309 (1902)
(1892)

(1818)

Comstock, 86 Vt. 42 (1912)
Cooper, 16 Vt. 551 (1844)
Croteau, 23 Vt. 14 (1849)
Damon, 2 Tyl. 387 (1803)
Fairbanks, 101 Vt. 30 (1928)
Forshner, 43 N.H. 89 (1861)
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